Yates v. Bledsoe

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - AND NOW, this 24th day of June, 2011, it is ordered that: 1. The petn. for writ of H/C pur. to 28 USC 2241 1 is dism'd for lack of jurisdiction. 2. The Clerk of Crt. is dir. to close this case. (See memo for complete details.) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 6/24/11. (am, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES A. YATES,
Petitioner
vs.
B. A. BLEDSOE,
Respondents

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-0592
(Judge Caldwell)

MEMORANDUM

James A. Yates, an inmate at USP-Lewisburg, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, has
filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging
the validity of his 1997 conviction and subsequent sentence in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Yates seeks release from custody based on the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. O’Brien,

U.S.

, 130

S.Ct. 2169, 176 L.Ed.2d 979 (2010), which he alleges changed the legal landscape
regarding the distinction between elements of a crime and sentencing factors. Specifically,
he contends that under O’Brien his mandatory minimum life sentence under 21 U.S.C. §
848(b) for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) is unconstitutional as it was
never proven to a jury that he was a principal, organizer or leader of a criminal enterprise
that involved 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base.1
Since Yates has failed to show that a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is

1

In O’Brien, the Supreme Court held that the machine-gun provision in 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(B)(ii) was an element of the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense at issue rather than a sentencing
factor, so that whether the firearm in that case was a machine gun had to be proven to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt rather than determined by the judge at sentencing. O’Brien,
U.S.
at
, 130 S.Ct. at 2180.

inadequate or ineffective to present his claim, his 2241 petition will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
“A motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the means to
collaterally challenge a federal conviction or sentence,” Massey v. United States, 581 F.3d
172, 174 (3d Cir. 2009), and the motion must be presented to the sentencing court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)(providing that a defendant “may move the court which imposed the
sentence”). The defendant may only invoke section 2241 when he shows under section
2255's “safety valve” provision in section 2255(e), that the remedy under section 2255
would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. §
2255(e). “A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner
demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255
proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention
claim.” Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002). “Section
2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant
relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the
stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255.” Id. at 539.2 Rather, the
“safety valve” under section 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply only in
unusual situations, such as those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to
challenge his conviction for conduct later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening
change in law. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002)(citing In re

2

Section 2255's “gatekeeping” provision, section 2255(h), prohibits a second or successive
2255 motion unless certain requirements are met. Yates has already filed a section 2255 motion, in
2001. The district court denied the motion, and the Seventh Circuit denied a certificate of
appealability. (Doc. 1, Pet., pp. 2-3).

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Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997)). If a defendant improperly challenges his
federal conviction or sentence under section 2241, the petition must be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971); Hill v.
Williamson, 223 F. App’x 179, 180 (3d Cir. 2007)(per curiam)(nonprecedential).
Yates argues that he can rely on section 2241 because under Dorsainvil,
supra, section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to present his claim. He contends that just
as the Supreme Court held in O’Brien that the type of firearm is an element of the offense
under § 924(c) that must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, so also should
his role as a “principal” in the CCE offense under 21 U.S.C. § 848 be found by the jury.
Without such a finding, he claims he is “actually innocent” of being a principal in the CCE
which led to his mandatory minimum life sentence. His asserts that his claim of “actual
innocence” based on this change in law makes section 2255 inadequate and ineffective to
present the claim he now raises in his section 2241 petition.
We reject this argument. First, O’Brien is not an intervening change in the
law. See Cabrera v. Scism, 2011 WL 1460179 at *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 2011)(per
curiam)(nonprecedential). Second, O’Brien did not have the effect of rendering
Petitioner’s conduct non-criminal. It only dealt with the proper roles of the judge and jury,
and only in the context of a section 924(c) offense. In regard to the latter consideration,
O’Brien does not even apply directly to Yates, who was convicted under 21 U.S.C. §
848(b). Cabrera, 2011 WL 1460179, at * 2 (in affirming the district court’s dismissal of a
section 2241 petition, noting that O’Brien did not directly apply to the petitioner, who had

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been convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 846).3
We will issue an appropriate order.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

Date: June 24, 2011

3

We note that the Seventh Circuit denied Yates’s application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(3) to file a second or successive motion raising his O’Brien claim. Yates v. United States,
No. 11-1010 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2011). However, as noted above, a defendant’s inability to satisfy
the gatekeeping requirements of section 2255 is not enough to allow him to pursue a 2241 petition.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES A YATES,
Petitioner
vs.
B. A. BLEDSOE,
Respondents

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-0592
(Judge Caldwell)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of June, 2011, it is ordered that:
1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (doc. 1) is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

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