Amfosakyi v. Frito Lay

Filing 37

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 23 MOTION for Sanctions filed by Samuel K. Amfosakyi. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on November 17, 2011. (kjn )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SAMUEL AMFOSAKYI,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRITO LAY.
Defendant.

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Civil No. 1:11-CV-651

(Chief Judge Kane)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case

This is an employment discrimination action brought by Samuel Amfosakyi
against Frito Lay. (Doc. 1) In his complaint, Amfosakyi, a black male and a United
States citizen of Ghanaian heritage, alleges that the defendant discriminated against
him on the basis of his race and national origin when Frito Lay discharged him in
2009, acts which Amfosakyi alleges were taken in violation of Title VII of the Civil
rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,
43 Pa.C.S. §951. (Id.)
According to Amfosakyi’s complaint, from February 2005 through July 2009,
Amfosakyi was employed as a packer and cooker operator by Frito Lay, when
Amfosakyi was discharged for alleged dishonesty. (Id.) Amfosakyi asserts that one
fellow worker who was a white male committed similar workplace infractions but was

not discharged by Frito Lay. On the basis of this assertion of disparate treatment
Amfosakyi brings this employment discrimination action.
The parties are currently engaged in pretrial discovery. As part of this
discovery process Amfosakyi has now filed a motion for sanctions, (Doc. 23), and
brief, (Doc. 24), which alleges that Frito Lay has wrongfully withheld discovery from
him. As detailed in Amfosakyi’s pleadings, the discovery he seeks relates to a former
co-worker, George Rye. Amfosakyi alleges that Rye is caucasian and Amfosakyi’s
pleadings suggest that in 2006 Rye falsely claimed that Amfosakyi ran over Rye’s
foot while operating a piece of equipment at the Frito Lay plant. Amfosakyi asserts
that Rye’s misconduct in making this allegedly false claim in 2006 did not lead to his
termination, and cites this episode as proof of his claim disparate treatment of workers
by the defendant based upon race and national origin.
In order to support this claim, Amfosakyi has sought Rye’s 2006 job attendance
records from Frito Lay. Amfosakyi apparently seeks these attendance records because
he believes that they will show that Rye was not at work on the day in 2006 when he
alleged that Amfosakyi injured his foot, thus bolstering Amfosakyi’s assertion that
Rye made false claims regarding this episode. Frito Lay has responded to this request
in a threefold fashion: First, Frito Lay has informed Amfosakyi and the Court that
these 2006 attendance records do not exist for Rye. Second, Frito Lay has explained

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that its 2009 discipline of Amfosakyi was completely unrelated to this 2006 incident
in which Amfosakyi was alleged to have run over Rye’s foot. Indeed, Frito lay
stipulates that the 2006 episode led to no discipline against any Frito Lay worker and
played no part in the company’s decision to discipline Amfosakyi three years later.
Finally, Frito Lay has noted that Rye was, in fact, later discharged by the company for
an unrelated violation of the company’s rules of conduct.
Dissatisfied with this threefold response, Amfosakyi has filed the instant motion
for sanctions. (Doc. 23) This motion has been fully briefed by the parties, and is now
ripe for resolution. Having reviewed these pleadings, for the reasons set forth below,
Amfosakyi’s motion for sanctions will be denied.
II.

Discussion

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions for sanctions, and provides that:
(c) Failure to Disclose, to Supplement an Earlier Response, or to

Admit.
(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide
information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the
party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence
on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this sanction, the
court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
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fees, caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 37(c).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37, and give
rise to sanctions, is defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the

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scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This
far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
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outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict the
court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which is defined
in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”
A party moving under Rule 37 to compel discovery, or for sanctions, bears the
initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested information. Morrison v.
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial
burden is met, “the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack
of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within
the broad scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of
such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would
outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane
Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D.Kan. 2009).
One other immutable rule defines the court’s discretion when ruling on motions
for this type. It is clear that the court cannot compel the production of things that do

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not exist. Nor can the court compel the creation of evidence by parties who attest that
they do not possess the materials sought by an adversary in litigation. Therefore,
absent proof of deliberate spoliation of evidence, the court cannot sanction the failure
to produce that which no longer exists. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health
and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010
WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL
975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Amfosakyi’s
sanctions motion.
B.

Resolution of Amfosakyi’s Sanctions Motion
1.

Amfosakyi May Not Sanction Frito Lay for failing to Produce
Materials That Do Not Exist

At the outset, Amfosakyi’s sanctions motion rests upon an untenable premise:
Amfosakyi invites the Court to sanction Frito Lay for failing to produce documents
even though Frito lay has represented that the documents sought by the plaintiff no
longer exist.
This we cannot do. As we have noted, this Court cannot compel the production
of things that do not exist. Nor can the Court compel the creation of evidence by
parties who attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an adversary in
litigation. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho7

McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec.
21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9,
2009). Therefore, the defendants’ assertion that they no longer possess any responsive
records that meet the description of the records sought by Amfosakyi compels us to
deny these specific requests to sanction Frito Lay for failing to produce these records.
While we deny this particular request, we note that the parties have an on-going
responsibility to supplement their discovery disclosures. Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure imposes this obligation on all parties and provides that:
(e) Supplementing Disclosures and Responses.
(1) In General. A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)--or
who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or request
for admission--must supplement or correct its disclosure or response:
(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect
the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional
or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the
other parties during the discovery process or in writing; or
(B) as ordered by the court
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e). Thus, while we deny this motion at this time in light of the
defendants’ response, all parties are directed to continue to comply with the provisions
of Rule 26(e) and make prompt disclosure of any additional relevant, responsive
materials which they may encounter in the course of this litigation.

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2.

In Any Event Amfosakyi Has Not Shown that He is Entitled
to Disclosure of Personnel File Information

In any event, Amfosakyi’s sanctions motion fails for yet another reason;
Amfosakyi has not shown that he would be entitled to this particular personnel file
information from the files of a co-worker relating to job attendance by that co-worker
in 2006. As detailed in Amfosakyi’s pleadings, the discovery he seeks relates to a
former co-worker, George Rye. Amfosakyi suggests that in 2006 Rye falsely claimed
that Amfosakyi ran over Rye’s foot while operating a piece of equipment at the Frito
Lay plant. Amfosakyi asserts that Rye’s misconduct in making this allegedly false
claim in 2006 did not lead to his termination; cites this episode as proof of disparate
treatment of workers by the defendant; and apparently seeks Rye’s attendance records
to show that Rye was not working on the day, five years ago, when he alleged that
Amfosakyi injured his foot.
The difficulty with this proffer of relevance by the plaintiff is that Frito Lay has
explained that its 2009 discipline of Amfosakyi was completely unrelated to this 2006
incident in which Amfosakyi was alleged to have run over Rye’s foot, and Frito Lay
has also stated that the 2006 episode led to no discipline against any Frito Lay worker
and played no part in the company’s decision to discipline Amfosakyi three years
later. Moreover, Frito Lay reports that Rye was, in fact, later discharged by the
company for an unrelated violation of the company’s rules of conduct, facts which
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actually make the company’s treatment of Rye similar to the treatment accorded to
Amfosakyi .
To the extent that Amfosakyi claims that he is entitled to discovery of these
personnel files based upon his assertions relating to this one remote episode in 2006,
we disagree. Corporate employees do not forfeit their personal privacy in personnel
records when their company is sued. Quite the contrary, courts have long recognized
that:
Although personnel files are discoverable, they contain confidential
information and discovery of them should be limited. See, e.g., ReaganTouhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir.2008) (“Personnel
files often contain sensitive personal information ... and it is not
unreasonable to be cautious about ordering their entire contents disclosed
willy-nilly.... This is not to say personnel files are categorically out-ofbounds.”); Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D.Pa.1994)
(“[P]ersonnel files are confidential and discovery should be limited.”).
The Court must weigh the right to relevant discovery against the privacy
interest of non-parties. The Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to the
entire personnel records of all the individuals without a more
particularized showing of relevance
Harris v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. Operations, Inc, No. 09-1449, 2010 WL
4683776, *5 (M.D.Pa Nov. 10, 2010). Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D.
Pa. 1994)(“personnel files are confidential and discovery should be limited.”).
Here, given the confidentiality which attaches to third party personnel records,
Amfosakyi’s proffer is simply insufficient to compel disclosure of Rye’s personnel

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attendance records from 2006, when the employment actions taken by Frito Lay with
respect to Amfosakyi and Rye are entirely unrelated to any workplace events in 2006.
Moreover, to the extent that no such records exist, the defendants have certified the
non-existence of these records, a reply which constitutes a complete response to this
particular inquiry. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund
v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088
(E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251
(M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
3.

The Court Will Treat Amfosakyi’s Motion As a Request for
Spoliation Sanctions and Will Deny That Request Without
Prejudice

Finally, while the precise tenor of this motion is not entirely clear, we will also
regard Amfosakyi’s motion as a request for spoliation sanctions, and will deny that
motion without prejudice since Amfosakyi’s pleadings do not carry his burden of
proof on the question of whether any culpable spoliation has occurred here.

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Evidentiary rulings, including rulings regarding whether a spoliation inference
is appropriate, rest in the sound discretion of the court. Ward v. Lamanna, 334
F.App’x 487, 492 (3d Cir. 2009). That discretion is guided, however, by settled legal
tenets, tenets which define both the fundamental nature of spoliation and the
appropriate sanctions for acts of spoliation.

“Spoliation is the destruction or

significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's use
as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. Mosaid Techs., Inc. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 348 F.Supp.2d 332, 335 (D.N.J.2004).” Fortune v. Bitner.
No. 01-111, 2006 WL 839346, *1 (M.D.Pa. March 29, 2006); see Ogin v. Ahmed, 563
F.Supp.2d. 539, 542 (M.D. Pa. 2008). In assessing a spoliation claim:
[R]elevant authority requires that four (4) factors be satisfied for the rule
permitting an adverse inference instruction to apply: 1) the evidence in
question must be within the party's control; 2) it must appear that there
has been actual suppression or withholding of the evidence; 3) the
evidence destroyed or withheld was relevant to claims or defenses; and
4) it was reasonably foreseeable that the evidence would later be
discoverable. Mosaid, 348 F.Supp.2d at 336 citing Brewer, 72 F.3d at
334; Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233, 248-50 (D.N.J.2000); Veloso
v. Western Bedding Supply Co., 281 F.Supp.2d 743, 746 (D.N.J.2003).
Additionally, the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey recognized: “While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain
every document in its possession, even in advance of litigation, it is
under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, will
likely be requested in reasonably foreseeable litigation.” Mosaid, 348
F.Supp.2d at 336 (quoting Scott, 196 F.R.D. at 249).
Ogin,563 F.Supp.2d at 543.
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Thus, “[a] party which reasonably anticipates litigation has an affirmative duty to
preserve relevant evidence. Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F.Supp. 1285, 1290
(M.D.Pa.1994).

Where evidence is destroyed, sanctions may be appropriate,

including the outright dismissal of claims, the exclusion of countervailing evidence,
or a jury instruction on the ‘spoliation inference.’ This inference permits the jury to
assume that ‘the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable to the position of
the offending party.’ Schmid v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 78 (3d
Cir.1994).” Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 505 (M.D.Pa. 1996)
If the court finds that there is a culpable destruction or spoliation of evidence,
the question then becomes determining the appropriate sanction for this act of
spoliation. In this respect:
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has applied
three (3) key considerations to determine whether a sanction for
spoliation of evidence is appropriate. Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79. The
considerations are: 1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or
destroyed the evidence; 2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the
opposing party; and 3) whether there is a lesser sanction that will avoid
substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the offending
party is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in
the future. Id. When appropriate, a court may impose any potential
sanction including: 1) dismissal of a claim or granting judgment in favor
of a prejudiced party; 2) suppression of evidence; 3) an adverse
inference, referred to as the spoliation inference; 4) fines; and 5)
attorneys' fees and costs. Mosaid, 348 F.Supp.2d at 335.
Ogin, 563 F.Supp.2d at 545.
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In this case, we find that Amfosakyi has not carried his threshold burden of
showing any culpable spoliation of evidence at this time. Instead, Frito Lay simply
asserts that the requested documents do not exist and were not retained. Since
Amfosakyi has not carried his threshold burden of demonstrating some culpable
spoliation of evidence, we will deny this motion at this time, but we deny this motion
without prejudice to Amfosakyi renewing a spoliation motion if he possesses further
competent proof of culpable, deliberate spoliation of evidence.
III.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Amfosakyi’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.
So ordered this 17th day of November, 2011.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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