Dietrich v. Susquehanna Valley Surgery Center
Filing
59
MEMORANDUM re 46 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Susquehanna Valley Surgery Center. Signed by Honorable John E. Jones, III on 2/5/13. (pw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT DIETRICH,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
v.
SUSQUEHANNA VALLEY
SURGERY CENTER
Defendant.
1:11-cv-925
Hon. John E. Jones III
MEMORANDUM
February 5, 2013
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
Presently before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of
Defendant Susquehanna Valley Surgery Center (Doc. 46). For the reasons set
forth below, the motion shall be granted.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 13, 2011, Plaintiff Robert Dietrich (“Dietrich”), filed a complaint
against Defendant Susquehanna Valley Surgery Center (“SVSC”). (Doc. 1).
Specifically, Plaintiff asserted claims against Defendant for violations of the
following: (1) Count I: Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §
12101, et seq.; (2) Count II: Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 44
1
P.S. § 951, et seq.; and (3) Count III: Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”),
29 U.S.C. § 2611, et seq. All three counts are at predominantly based on SVSC’s
termination of Plaintiff’s employment. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 34-64).
On November 1, 2012, Defendant filed the Motion for Summary Judgment
that is currently at issue (Doc. 46) along with a brief in support thereof (Doc. 47).
Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on December 4, 2012, (Doc. 57), and
Defendant filed a reply brief on December 14, 2012. (Doc. 58). Thus, the pending
motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff Dietrich was employed by Defendant SVSC from January 22, 2003
until his termination on June 15, 2009. (Doc. 50 ¶ 2). At the time of his
termination, he was employed by SVSC as an operating room technician. (Doc.
55 ¶ 2). Dietrich is a hemophiliac and SVSC was aware of his condition at all
relevant times. (Doc. 50 ¶¶ 4, 5). Dietrich’s hemophilia requires him to use
medication to control and/or treat his bleeding and to occasionally take time off
from physical activity to control major bleeds. (Doc. 1 ¶ 16). Each time Dietrich
had to miss work for hemophilia-related reasons, he informed SVSC that the
1
Facts are principally derived from Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact (Doc. 50) and
Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 56).
2
absence was for hemophilia-related reasons. (Doc. 50 ¶ 29). Dietrich claims that
he was permitted to take time off for hemophilia-related reasons, but that he
nevertheless received discipline for taking that time. (Doc. 56 ¶ 30). SVSC
agrees that it never denied Dietrich any time off when he felt unable to work for
hemophilia-related reasons, but contends that the majority of Dietrich’s absences
were unrelated to hemophilia and fell on work days immediately prior to and
following weekends. (Doc. 50 ¶¶ 30-32).
Dietrich received a number of written warnings throughout 2003 and 2004
as a result of absenteeism and received a one-day suspension on January 18, 2005.
(Doc. 50 ¶¶ 19-25). At this time, Dietrich spoke with Deb Leib (“Leib”), SVSC’s
Administrator, and claimed that he was being discriminated against because of his
hemophilia. (Doc. 50 ¶¶ 26, 27). On or about February 3, 2006, he received
another written warning which was followed by another one-day suspension on
November 2, 2006. (Doc. 50 ¶¶ 33, 34). The November 2006 disciplinary action,
signed by Dietrich and his supervisor, Rebekah Troutman, states that “an
employee who accumulates eight occurrences of absence within a twelve month
period are [sic] eligible for termination.” (Doc. 51-3 at 57). The document lists
more than eight days on which Dietrich was absent and goes on to say that “Bob
has had additional absences that were related to his chronic health condition that
3
have not been counted in the above occurrences.” (Doc. 51-3 at 57). Dietrich’s
attendance improved over time and his January 2009 annual performance review
rated his attendance as improved and satisfactory. (Doc. 50 ¶ 39).
Since approximately 1999, Dietrich has owned and operated a side
landscaping business. (Doc. 50 ¶ 40). On Sunday, June 7, 2009, as part of his
landscaping business, Dietrich began work on installing a patio for Dr. Ernst, an
eye surgeon affiliated with SVSC. (Doc. 50 ¶ 45). The installation was a “rush
job” and to complete this project, Dietrich employed a part-time employee,
Damien Silks, who had no background in landscaping prior to 2009 and had not
previously installed a patio. (Doc. 50 ¶¶ 41, 46, 48, 49, 56). While working at Dr.
Ernst’s house on June 7, 2009, Dietrich began passing blood in his urine. (Doc. 50
¶ 50). Upon discovering this, he cut short the work day, drove home with Silks,
and began taking hemophilia medication to treat his internal bleeding. (Doc. 50 ¶
51). Later on June 7, 2009, Dietrich called Greg Beishline, his immediate
supervisor at SVSC, to inform him that he had an internal bleed and that he would
be absent from work the following day, Monday, June 8, 2009. (Doc. 50 ¶ 53).
On June 8, 2009, Dietrich stayed home and administered his hemophilia
medication, which causes drowsiness. (Doc. 50 ¶ 60). Also on June 8, in Rebekah
Troutman’s presence, Dr. Ernst talked about the patio project Dietrich was
4
completing at his home and mentioned that it needed to be completed in time for
his daughter’s graduation party scheduled for that weekend. (Doc. 50 ¶ 61).
Dietrich called Beishline on the afternoon of Monday, June 8, to report that he
would be absent again on Tuesday because he needed to stay home and wait for
delivery of additional medication. (Doc. 50 ¶ 62). Dietrich claims that he called
Beishline again on Tuesday to report that he would be absent on Wednesday.
(Doc. 50 ¶ 65). Beishline denies that he ever spoke with Dietrich or received a
voicemail message from him regarding that day. (Doc. 50 ¶ 73). Dietrich did not
report to work on Wednesday, June 10, 2009. (Doc. 50 ¶ 78). Instead, Dietrich
and Silks drove together to Dr. Ernst’s house. (Doc. 50 ¶ 79). Dietrich and Silks
arrived at Dr. Ernst’s house shortly after 10 a.m. and left between 1:30 p.m. and 2
p.m. when a thunderstorm approached. (Doc. 50 ¶ 81). Dietrich claims that he did
not perform physical labor at Dr. Ernst’s on June 10, but merely provided
instruction and supervision to Silks. (Doc. 50 ¶ 82). Meanwhile, Rebekah
Troutman noticed that Dietrich was not at work and contacted Beishline to ask
whether Dietrich had called off work for that day. (Doc. 50 ¶¶ 88, 89). Beishline
responded that he had not heard from Dietrich. (Doc. 50 ¶ 90). When Deb Lieb
arrived at work, Rebekah Troutman informed her that Dietrich had not arrived.
(Doc. 50 ¶ 95). SVSC claims that Leib drove by Dr. Ernst’s house during her
5
lunch break and personally observed Dietrich’s landscaping truck parked near the
house as well as Dietrich himself outside the house with his shirt off. (Doc. 50 ¶¶
98, 99). Dietrich denies that Lieb witnessed him, based on the fact that he was
within sight of the road and never saw Lieb drive past the home that day. (Doc. 56
¶¶ 98, 99). Early on the morning of Thursday, June 11, 2009, Dietrich called
Beishline to report that he would not be at work that day, but expected to return on
Friday, June 12, 2009. (Doc. 50 ¶ 102). Later in the day on June 11, 2009,
Rebekah Troutman called Dietrich to inform him that, due to issues related to his
absence on June 10, he had been suspended indefinitely pending further
investigation. (Doc. 50 ¶ 104). Deb Lieb and Rebekah Troutman made the
decision to terminate Dietrich’s employment and on June 15, 2009, Troutman
called Dietrich to inform him that his employment had been terminated. (Doc. 50
¶ 111, 113).
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Initially, the moving party bears the
burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant meets this burden by
6
pointing to an absence of evidence supporting an essential element as to which the
non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325. Once the
moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to
show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). An issue is
“genuine” only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find
for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is “material” only if it might affect
the outcome of the action under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
In opposing summary judgment, the non-moving party “may not rely merely
on allegations of denials in its own pleadings; rather, its response must ... set out
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). The
non-moving party “cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond
pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine
issue for trial.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000).
Arguments made in briefs “are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a
factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985).
However, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the non- moving party. P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of
7
Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 2006).
Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a disagreement
about the facts or the proper inferences that a factfinder could draw from them.
Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). Still,
“the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; there must
be a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 247-48.
IV.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff presents claims under the ADA, PHRA, and FMLA. The legal
standard for “[t]he PHRA is basically the same as the ADA in relevant respects
and ‘Pennsylvania courts ... generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal
counterparts.’” Rinehimer v. Cemcoloft, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)). Therefore,
our analysis of Plaintiff’s ADA claim applies equally to his PHRA claim.
Plaintiff presents discrimination and retaliation claims under both the ADA
and FMLA. It is undisputed that all of these claims are subject to the burdenshifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). (Doc. 57 at 3, Doc. 58 at 2). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
8
the plaintiff first bears an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff can do so, a presumption of
discrimination or retaliation arises and the burden shifts to the defendant to
produce “evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there
was a nondiscriminatory [or nonretaliatory] reason for the unfavorable
employment decision.” Dawley v. Erie Indem. Co., 100 Fed. Appx. 877, 880 (3d
Cir. 2004) (citations and quotations omitted). A defendant satisfies its burden
under this prong so long as it articulates any nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72
F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A]n employer may have any reason or no reason
for discharging an employee so long as it is not a discriminatory reason.”).
“If the defendant carries this burden, the presumption drops out and the
plaintiff must submit evidence from which a fact finder could reasonably either (i)
disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (ii) believe that an
invidious discriminatory [or retaliatory] reason was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Dawley, 100 Fed.
Appx. at 880 (citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he plaintiff cannot simply
show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual
dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer . . . .
9
Rather, the nonmoving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable fact finder
could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d
759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Castellani v. Bucks County, 351 Fed. Appx. 774,
777 (3d Cir. 2009).
A.
Plaintiff’s ADA and PHRA Claims
To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must
prove that he (1) has a disability, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) has
experienced an adverse employment action because of his disability. See Turner v.
Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, the first two
criteria are not in dispute and we cannot say that a reasonable jury could not
initially believe the third. However, SVSC has articulated a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Dietrich’s employment. SVSC denies
that Dietrich’s termination was because of his hemophilia; rather, SVSC claims
that he was fired because he failed to appear at work and was seen conducting his
landscaping business instead. Plaintiff is therefore subjected to the more exacting
standard described in Fuentes. He must demonstrate that a reasonable fact finder
could rationally find SVSC’s proffered reason for terminating him to be unworthy
10
of credence. In the situation presented by this case, the burden on the Plaintiff to
prove a retaliation claim under the ADA is essentially identical to his burden to
prove a discrimination claim. To succeed with either claim, Dietrich must show
that SVSC’s stated reason is pretext. See Castellani, 351 Fed. Appx. at 777-778.
Even assuming that Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of
discrimination and/or retaliation, his claims would fail because he lacks evidence
that the legitimate non-discriminatory non-retaliatory reason offered by SVSC was
pretext for discriminatory or retaliatory animus. SVSC maintains that Dietrich
was fired because (1) he failed to call and notify anyone at SVSC that he would be
absent on June 10, 2009, and (2) he was discovered engaging in his side
landscaping business on that day. On the first point, there continues to be a
factual dispute, as Dietrich maintains that he did call and leave a voicemail
message on June 9, 2009. However, on the second and far more critical point
there is no real dispute. Dietrich claims that he was not “working” at Dr. Ernst’s
house but rather merely supervising his employee. He also denies that any agent
of SVSC saw him at Dr. Ernst’s house, based on the fact that he did not personally
witness any SVSC employees observing him. Ultimately though, Dietrich admits
that he was at Dr. Ernst’s home conducting his landscaping business for a number
of hours on June 10, 2009. Regardless of how SVSC learned of this fact, it
11
undeniably gained knowledge of Dietrich’s actions at some point prior to
terminating him. Any employee, regardless of his or her disability or lack thereof,
might reasonably expect their employer to take disciplinary action if he or she is
absent from work and found to be instead engaging in some other side business.
This is especially true if the employee failed to notify his or her employer of the
impending absence, but such behavior can reasonably be seen as dishonest and
worthy of discipline even if an excused absence was requested. Plaintiff has not
presented evidence which could lead a reasonable jury to infer that this rationale
for his termination is weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent, or contradictory.
Because Plaintiff has failed to throw enough doubt on SVSC’s explanation for a
rational fact finder to reject it, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall
be granted as to Plaintiff’s ADA and PHRA claims.
B.
Plaintiff’s FMLA Claims
In addition to his ADA and PHRA claims, Plaintiff also presents claims
under the FMLA. The FMLA provides that an eligible employee is entitled to
twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve-month period because of a serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his or
her position. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The statute makes it unlawful for
any employer to “interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
12
exercise any right provided” under the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that SVSC (1) did not issue to him a Notice of Rights
and Responsibilities under the FMLA, (2) did not issue to him a Notice of
Eligibility under the FMLA, (3) refused to offer or grant him leave time pursuant
to the FMLA, and (4) terminated him in order to avoid its responsibilities under
the FMLA. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 58-64). None of these arguments are sufficient to survive
summary judgment.
An employer’s failure to issue a Notice of Rights and Responsibilities does
not automatically amount to a statutory violation and does not support a cause of
action under the FMLA in the absence of any injury. See Alifano v. Marck & Co.,
Inc., 175 Fed. Supp.2d 792, 794 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Voorhees v. Time Warner Cable
Nat’l Div., 1999 WL 673062 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Fry v. First Fidelity Bancorp., 1996
WL 36910 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Here, even if Dietrich did not receive this notice, he
was never denied leave or otherwise injured by a violation of the FMLA. He was
clearly aware of his ability to stay home from work on days when his medical
condition required him to do so. He was never denied such a request and, as
discussed above, he has not shown that his termination was related to his
hemophilia.
Plaintiff’s second argument fails for the same reason, because an employer’s
13
failure to comply with the notice requirements of the FMLA only supports a cause
of action where the inadequate notice effectively interferes with a plaintiff’s
statutory rights. See, e.g., Fink v. Ohio Health Corp., 139 Fed. Appx. 667, 671 (6th
Cir. 2005); Womack v. Brown-Forman Corp., 2012 WL 4450892 (E.D. Tenn.
2012); Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Centers, Inc., 982 F.Supp. 213, 219
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). Dietrich exercised his right to FMLA leave without interference.
By raising the issue of these notices in the absence of any FMLA-related injury,
Plaintiff asks us to emphasize form over substance. We, in agreement with the
numerous other courts that have examined this issue, decline to do so.
As stated above, Plaintiff has not shown that he was injured by a
deprivation of his FMLA rights. Plaintiff’s third argument fails because Dietrich
admits that he never reported to work when he was medically unable due to his
hemophilia and that his requests for time off due to his condition were never
denied. (Doc. 50 ¶ 134, Doc. 56 ¶ 134). Plaintiff’s fourth argument fails because,
as discussed in our analysis of his ADA and PHRA claims, he has not
demonstrated weakness in SVSC’s purported rationale for his termination such
that a reasonable fact finder could infer it to be pretextual. Because Dietrich has
not shown that his rights under the FMLA were denied, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment shall be granted as to Plaintiff’s FMLA claims.
14
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we shall grant Defendant Susquehanna Valley
Surgery Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46). An appropriate order
shall issue.
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?