Harris v. Martinez
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING petition for writ of habeas corpus 1 & directing Clrk of Ct to CLOSE case. (See memo & order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 10/31/12. (ki)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
REHEIM M. HARRIS,
Petitioner
v.
RICARDO MARTINEZ,
Respondent
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-1024
(Judge Conner)
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which Reheim M. Harris (“petitioner” or Harris), an
inmate at the United States Penitentiary at Allenwood, White Deer, Pennsylvania,
alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) incorrectly computed his
federal sentence by not crediting him with thirty-eight months of time spent in state
custody on a criminal offense he argues is related to the federal offense. (Doc. 1, at
2.) For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be denied.
I.
Background
On May 11, 2007, petitioner was sentenced in the Court of Common Pleas of
Cambria County in Criminal Case No. 980-06, to a term of imprisonment of two to
five years for “Criminal Conspiracy – Delivery of Cocaine” stemming from an April
24, 2006 arrest. (Doc. 9-1, at 5, ¶ 8.) On the same day as the sentencing, the
sentence was modified to allow petitioner to serve the sentence on home
confinement. (Id. at ¶ 9.) He was released to home confinement on May 14, 2007.
(Id. at ¶ 10.)
On August 7, 2007, he was arrested by the Johnstown Police Department and
Cambria County Drug Task Force and charged with False Identification to a Law
Enforcement Officer in Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Case
No. 1647-07. (Doc. 9-1, at 5, ¶ 11.) The arrest stemmed from activity which occurred
between January, 2007, and August 7, 2007. (Id. at 6, ¶ 12.) On January 18, 2008, he
was sentenced to three to twelve months of incarceration, which sentence was to
run consecutive to the two to five-year sentence he was serving in Criminal Case
No. 980-06. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.)
On February 25, 2008, he was taken into custody by the United States
Marshal’s Service (“USMS”) via a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to
answer charges in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania in federal criminal case CR 07-36-01J. (Doc. 9-1, at 6, ¶15; Doc. 9-1, at
27.) On or about February 8, 2010, he entered a plea of guilty to Conspiracy to
Distribute and Possess With Intent to Distribute 100 Grams or More of Heroin and 5
Grams or More of Cocaine Base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and Possession With
Intent to Distribute Less Than 100 Grams of Heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). In sentencing petitioner, the Court stated as follows:
“The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of
Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of: 120 months; this sentence consists of
120 months at each of Counts One and Fourteen, which shall be served
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concurrently with each other and this sentence of the Court shall run concurrent
with any other sentence that Defendant is serving from February 8, 2010 forward.
This Court’s intent is that Defendant’s federal sentence shall begin February 8, 2010
and that the period of concurrence with the state sentence shall also begin
February 8, 2010.” (Doc. 9-1, at 31.)
Petitioner was returned to the custody of state authorities on February 8,
2010. (Doc. 9-1, at 7, ¶ 18; at 27.) On June 9, 2010, he was paroled from the state
charges in Cambria County Criminal Case No. 980-06. (Doc. 9-2, at 2.) At that time,
he began serving his consecutive three to twelve-month state sentence in Cambria
County Criminal Case No. 1647-07. (Doc. 9-1, at 7, ¶ 20.)
On July 20, 2010, the sentenced imposed in Criminal Case No. 1647-07, was
vacated. (Doc. 9-1, at 24.) However, on August 3, 2010, the order was amended to
reflect that the sentence was suspended. (Id.)
On August 3, 2010, the USMS was notified that all county and state charges
against petitioner were resolved and that he was in federal custody as of July 20,
2010. (Doc. 9-2, at 4.) The USMS assumed primary custody of petitioner and he
was designated to a federal facility to complete his federal 120-month term of
imprisonment. (Doc. 9-1, at 28.) His federal sentence was calculated to begin on
February 8, 2010, the date of imposition. (Doc. 9-1, at 27-28, 31.)
Prior to commencing this action, he pursued administrative remedies. The
Regional Director responded to the appeal as follows:
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A review of your appeal revealed, on August 7, 2007, you were arrested by
Pennsylvania Police officials for violation of controlled substance
offenses. On December 18, 2007, the state charges were dismissed. You
remained in Pennsylvania State custody on pending state revocation
charges. On January 18, 2008, you were sentenced by the Cambria
County Court, for violation of parole. On February 25, 2008, you were
“borrowed” from Pennsylvania State authorities via a federal writ of
habeas corpus for prosecution on federal charges. On February 8, 2010,
you were sentenced in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, to 120 months “concurrent with any other
sentence that Defendant is serving from February 8, 2010 forward.” The
state authorities had primary custodial jurisdiction over you until you
completed your state sentence. Your production for federal prosecution
via a federal writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum did not shift
primary jurisdiction from the state. Your federal sentence began on the
date imposed, February 8, 2010, the earliest date possible under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(a).
Credit for time in detention prior to the sentence commencing is
governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which prohibits prior custody credit
toward a federal sentence when credit is awarded toward another
sentence. The Designation and Computation Center (DSCC) correctly
found you were not entitled to additional credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b),
since that time was credited toward your state sentence. Accordingly,
your appeal is denied.
(Doc. 1, at 6.) The instant petition was filed on May 27, 2011. (Doc. 1.) He has a
projected release date of October 25, 2018, via Good Conduct Time release. (Doc. 92, at 13.)
II.
Discussion
A petition for writ for habeas corpus under § 2241 is the proper vehicle for
relief “where the petitioner challenges the effects of events ‘subsequent’ to his
sentence,” Gomori v. Arnold, 533 F.2d 871, 874 (3d Cir. 1976), and where he
challenges the execution of his sentence rather than its validity. See United States
v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185-88 (1979); Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d
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Cir. 2001). Thus, petitioner has properly invoked section 2241 to challenge the
determination of sentencing credit by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and
has done so in the proper district, where he is imprisoned. Barden v. Keohane, 921
F.2d 476, 478-79 (3d Cir. 1990).
The Attorney General is responsible for computing federal sentences for all
offenses committed after November 1, 1987, United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,
331 (1992), 18 U.S.C. § 3585, and the Attorney General has delegated this authority
to the Director of the BOP. 28 C.F.R. § 0.96 (1992). The following statutes are
relevant to sentence computation: 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), which governs a federal
court’s authority to order that a federal sentence be served concurrently with a
state sentence; 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a), which governs the date upon which a federal
sentence commences; and 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which governs the grant of credit
against a federal sentence for time spent in custody prior to trial. The BOP’s
policies regarding sentence computation are set forth in Program Statement
5880.28, Sentence Computation Manual (“PS 5880.28”). (Doc. 9-2, at 6- 9.)
A.
Date Upon Which a Federal Sentence Commences
Section 3585(a) governs the commencement of service of a federal sentence
and provides that a sentence commences “on the date the defendant is received in
custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of
sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” 18
U.S.C. § 3585(a). In determining the date of commencement of a sentence, it is
therefore clear that “[a] sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date
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the defendant is received in custody. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). “As a result, a federal
sentence cannot begin to run earlier than on the date on which it is imposed. See
United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1998).” Taylor v. Holt, 309 F.
App’x 591, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2009).
In determining the commencement date of a federal sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3585(a), the Court must first address whether the defendant was in primary
federal or primary non-federal custody at the time the federal sentence was
imposed. If he is in primary federal custody, the federal sentence will commence
upon imposition. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). However, if the defendant is in primary
non-federal custody at the time the federal sentence was imposed, the BOP must
determine whether the federal sentencing court expressly indicated its intent as to
whether the federal sentence should run concurrently to or consecutively with the
non-federal sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).1
The primary custody doctrine provides that the sovereign that first arrests an
individual has primary custody over him. The sovereign with primary custody is
entitled to have the individual serve a sentence it imposes before he serves a
sentence imposed by any other jurisdiction. See Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145,
1153-54 (3d Cir. 1982). Primary custody remains vested in the sovereign that first
arrests the individual until it “relinquishes its priority by, e.g., bail release, dismissal
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at
different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run
concurrently.
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of the state charges, parole release, or expiration of the sentence.” Chambers v.
Holland, 920 F. Supp. 618, 622 (M.D.Pa. 1996) (citing United States v. Warren, 610
F.2d 680, 684–85 (9th Cir. 1980); and Roche v. Sizer, 675 F.2d 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1982)
(finding federal government relinquished jurisdiction by releasing prisoner on
bail)). The relinquishment of jurisdiction is an executive function, not a judicial
function. Id. Significantly, a federal sentence does not begin to run when a
defendant is taken into federal custody from state custody pursuant to a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum. Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir.
2002); Chambers, 920 F. Supp. at 622. This is because the state, not the federal
government, remains the primary custodian in those circumstances.
In the matter sub judice, petitioner was in the primary non-federal custody of
Cambria County, Pennsylvania officials during his tenure at the federal facility
pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. As a result, he remained in
the primary custody of the state and his federal sentence cannot begin to run earlier
than the date on which it is imposed. Therefore, his federal sentence was properly
computed as having commenced on the date of imposition, February 8, 2010.
B.
Prior Custody Credit
Because the BOP computed his sentence as having commenced on the
earliest possible date, his request for additional sentencing credit must be treated
as a request for pre-commencement credit, known as prior custody credit, which is
governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). This section provides the following:
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A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the
date the sentence commences - (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested
after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
Id. The intent of the last clause is to prohibit double credit situations. United
States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992) (explaining that with the enactment of §
3585(b), “Congress made clear that a defendant could not receive double credit for
his detention time.”). Thus, the BOP may not grant prior custody credit under §
3585(b) for time that has been credited against another sentence. Rios v. Wiley, 201
F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Vega, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
Petitioner seeks credit for thirty-eight months spent in state custody prior to
the imposition of the federal sentence for a “criminal offense related to the federal
offense.” (Doc. 1, at 2.) Whether the state criminal conduct was related to the
federal offense is immaterial because state records indicate, and it is undisputed,
that all thirty-eight months were credited to his state sentence. Consequently, the
BOP is statutorily precluded from granting prior custody credit under § 3585(b).
Further, his argument that the sentencing court intended to “adjust his
federal sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for the time he was in state
custody before the imposition of the federal sentence” is not supported by the
record. (Doc. 1, at 2.) Federal law, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3584 and section 5G1.3 of
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the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), allows a sentencing court to
award a concurrent sentence to a defendant who is subject to an undischarged term
of imprisonment. Section 5G1.3 endeavors to coordinate the sentencing process
“with an eye toward having such punishments approximate the total penalty that
would have been imposed had the sentences for the different offenses been imposed
at the same time (i.e., had all of the offenses been prosecuted in a single
proceeding).” Wilson, 503 U.S. at 404-05.
The sentencing court’s authority under §5G1.3(c) to “adjust” a sentence is
distinct from the BOP’s authority under 18 U.S.C. §3585(b) to “credit” a sentence,
even though the benefit to the defendant may be the same.2 Ruggiano v. Reish, 307
F.3d 121, 131-33 (3d Cir. 2002). In Ruggiano, the court held that in imposing a
sentence, a district court may grant an “adjustment” for time served on a preexisting sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. §5G1.3(c). Id. To determine the credit
intended, “the appropriate starting point is to ascertain the meaning that we should
“A federal court’s authority to order that terms of imprisonment imposed at
different times shall run concurrently is limited to cases in which the federal term
of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an
undischarged term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Under U.S.S.G. §
5G1.3(c), the court may impose a sentence “to run concurrently, partially
concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to
achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c).
Further, under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), a concurrent sentence is mandatory and shall
be imposed to run concurrently to an undischarged sentence when “the
undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully
taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).” Escribano v. Schultz, Civ. No. 07-3204 (RBK), 2009 WL
3230833, at * 1 (D. N.J. Oct. 1, 2009)
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ascribe to the sentencing court’s directives.” Rios, 201 F.3d at 264. When there is
an ambiguity between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written
sentence, the court may recognize that the oral sentence “often consists of
spontaneous remarks” that are “addressed primarily to the case at hand and are
unlikely to be a perfect or complete statement of the surrounding law.” Ruggiano,
307 F.3d at 133 (quoting Rios, 201 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2000). It is therefore
essential to consider the context in which the statement is made. Id. at 134.
“Because the imposition of a concurrent sentence normally means that the
sentence imposed is to run concurrently with the undischarged portion of the
earlier-imposed sentence, it is unlikely that a sentencing court would deviate from
the norm and impose a retroactively concurrent sentence without any discussion.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3584; Ruggiano, 307 F.3d 121, 133 (3d Cir. 2002).” Markland v. Nash,
No. 05-4708, 2007 WL 776775, at * 8 (D. N.J. March 7, 2007). In cases where it has
been concluded that the sentencing judge intended to impose a retroactively
concurrent sentence, the sentencing court engaged in a dialog on the issue of credit
for time served and explicitly directed that the defendant receive credit retroactive
to the commencement date of defendant’s earlier imposed sentence. See Ruggiano,
307 F.3d at 131, 135.
There is no indication that the sentencing judge had any intent of making the
sentence retroactively concurrent or to further adjust petitioner’s sentence. The
judgment of conviction clearly and unequivocally states that “this sentence of the
Court shall run concurrent with any other sentence that Defendant is serving from
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February 8, 2010 forward,” and that the “Court’s intent is that Defendant’s federal
sentence shall begin February 8, 2010 and that the period of concurrence with the
state sentence shall also begin February 8, 2010.” (Doc. 9-1, at 35.)
III.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 will be denied. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum.
S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge
Dated:
October 31, 2012
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
REHEIM M. HARRIS,
Petitioner
v.
RICARDO MARTINEZ,
Respondent
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-1024
(Judge Conner)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 31st day of October, 2012, upon consideration of the petition
for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
2.
The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge
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