Diaz-Cabrera v. Sabol et al

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM (eo, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEXANDER JOSE
DIAZ-CABRERA,

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Petitioner
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v.
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WARDEN MARY E. SABOL, et al., :
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Respondents
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CIVIL NO. 1:11-CV-1065
Hon. John E. Jones III

MEMORANDUM
October 27, 2011
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS MEMORANDUM IS AS FOLLOWS:
On June 2, 2011, Petitioner Alexander Jose Diaz-Cabrera (“Petitioner” or
“Diaz-Cabrera”), a former detainee of the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) Office, who was being held at the York County Correctional
Facility in York, Pennsylvania, initiated the above action through counsel by filing a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Doc. 1.) He challenged ICE’s arrest and detention of him under the
provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) where ICE did not take him into custody
immediately upon his release from criminal custody, but instead arrested him and took
him into custody approximately six (6) years after his release from state confinement.

Diaz-Cabrera requested his immediate release or his release on reasonable bail from
ICE custody following a bail hearing before a neutral judge.
In preparing to dispose of the instant Petition, this Court checked the status of
Diaz-Cabrera’s detention through the ICE Online Detainee Locator System.1 The
System indicates that Diaz-Cabrera no longer is in ICE custody.
DISCUSSION
The case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of the United States
Constitution subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings. Parties must
continue to have a “personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Lewis v.
Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S.
395, 401 (1975). In other words, throughout the course of the action, the aggrieved
party must suffer or be threatened with actual injury caused by the defendant. Lewis,
494 U.S. at 477.
The adjudicatory power of a federal court depends upon “the continuing
existence of a live and acute controversy.” Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)
(emphasis in original). “The rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must be
extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Id. at n.10
(citations omitted). “Past exposure to illegal conduct is insufficient to sustain a present

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See ICE Online Detainee Locator System, available at http://locator.ice.gov/
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case or controversy . . . if unaccompanied by continuing, present adverse effects.”
Rosenberg v. Meese, 622 F.Supp. 1451, 1462 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)); see also Gaeta v. Gerlinski, Civil No.3:CV-02-465, slip
op. at p. 2 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2002) (Vanaskie, C.J.).
“[A] petition for habeas corpus relief generally becomes moot when a prisoner is
released from custody before the court has addressed the merits of the petition.” Lane v.
Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982). In the context of federal habeas petitions brought
by immigration detainees, it is well-settled that administrative action by immigration
officials addressing the concerns raised by an alien’s petition renders that petition moot.
Burke v. Gonzales, 143 Fed. Appx. 474 (3d Cir. 2005); Gopaul v. McElroy, 115 Fed.
Appx. 530 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, for example, the dismissal of a habeas petition as moot
is appropriate where a petitioner challenging his continued detention is released from ICE
custody on an order of supervision. See Phat v. Gonzales, Civil No. 4:07-CV-0630, 2007
WL 2407287 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2007) (McClure, J.).
In the instant case, because Diaz-Cabrera no longer is in ICE custody, his request
that this Court either order his release or order that he be released from ICE custody on
reasonable bail after a bail hearing before a neutral judge is entirely moot, and the
dismissal of his Petition as moot is therefore appropriate. An Order consistent with this
Memorandum will enter on today’s date.

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