Ball v. Struthers et al
Filing
26
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motions for subpoenasand for oral depositions (Docs. 20 and 22 ), are DENIED, without prejudice to the parties pursuing appropriate discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on October 13, 2011. (kjn )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN BALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
C.O. STRUTHERS, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL NO. 1:11-CV-1265
(Chief Judge Kane)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This case is a civil rights action filed by Dawn Ball, a state prisoner, who
alleges that her constitutional rights were violated by eight prison officials while she
housed at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Muncy.
Presently before the Court are two discovery motions filed by the plaintiff
seeking the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum (Doc. 22), and leave of court to
conduct numerous oral depositions. (Doc. 20) On October 4, 2011, this matter was
referred to the undersigned for pre-trial management. (Doc. 23) Upon our review of
these motions, for the reasons set forth below, in the exercise of our discretion over
these discovery matters, we will deny the various discovery motions filed by Ball,
without prejudice to renewal of these motions, as needed, once a comprehensive case
management order has been entered in this matter.
II.
Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, the scope of discovery is defined by Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions relating to the scope of
discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the Court.
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a court’s
decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel disclosure of
certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching
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discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters.
In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict
the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of
discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which
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is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573
(D.Kan. 2009).
Another immutable rule defines the court’s discretion when ruling on motions
to compel discovery. It is clear that the court cannot compel the production of things
that do not exist. Nor can the court compel the creation of evidence by parties who
attest that they do not possess the materials sought by an adversary in litigation. See,
e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeilJanssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL 5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21,
2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251 (M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
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Further, we note that nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes federal courts to
finance or pay for a party’s discovery expenses incurred while prosecuting a lawsuit,
even if that party has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a). Review of the case law reveals that numerous courts have
recognized the limitations of federal courts to relieve indigent litigants from the costs
of pre-trial discovery. See, e.g., Brooks v. Quinn, 257 F.R.D. 515, 417 (D. Del. 2009)
(“Although plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court has no authority to
finance or pay for a party’s discovery expenses. . . . It is plaintiff’s responsibility to
pay for the costs associated with the taking of a deposition.”); Augustin v. New
Century TRS Holding, Inc., No. 08-326, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96236, at *7-9 (W.D.
Pa. Nov. 25, 2008) (denying plaintiff’s IFP application to cover costs for discovery
requests); Badman v. Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 605 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (28 U.S.C. § 1915
does not require the government to advance funds for deposition expenses); Toliver
v. Community Action Comm’n to Help the Econ., 613 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (no clear statutory authority for the repayment of discovery costs for IFP
plaintiff); Sturdevant v. Deer, 69 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (concluding that 28
U.S.C. § 1915 “does not extend to the cost of taking and transcribing a deposition.”);
Ebenhart v. Power, 309 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Grave doubts exist as
to whether [28 U.S.C. § 1915] authorizes this court to order the appropriation of
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Government funds in civil suits to aid private litigants in conducting pre-trial
discovery.”); see also Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (“There is no
provision in [28 U.S.C. § 1915] for the payment by the government of the costs of
deposition transcripts, or any other litigation expenses, and no other statute authorizes
courts to commit federal monies for payment of the necessary expenses in a civil suit
brought by an indigent litigant.”). Thus, as a general rule, the Court lacks the lawful
authority to help finance, or relieve plaintiff from, the costs associated with taking
pre-trial discovery.
Finally, we note that this broad discretion over discovery matters extends to
decisions under Rule 26(c) relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and
regulating the timing of discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and
nature of [a protective order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court
and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’ Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir.1973) (citation omitted).” Dove v. Atlantic
Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992). One of these cardinal principles,
governing the exercise of discretion in this field, is that the district court may properly
defer or delay discovery while it considers a potentially dispositive pretrial motion,
provided the district court concludes that the pretrial motion does not, on its face,
appear groundless. See, e.g., James v. York County Police Dep’t, 160 F. App’x 126,
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136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir.
1992); Johnson v. New York Univ. Sch. of Ed., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). Briefly deferring discovery in such a case, while the court determines the
threshold issue of whether a complaint has sufficient merit to go forward, recognizes
a simple, fundamental truth: Parties who file motions which may present potentially
meritorious and complete legal defenses to civil actions should not be put to the time,
expense and burden of factual discovery until after these claimed legal defenses are
addressed by the court. In such instances, it is clearly established that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Guided by these legal tenets we conclude that Ball’s various discovery motions
should be denied at this time.
We regard these motions as premature and
inappropriate at this juncture since no comprehensive case management schedule and
discovery schedule has been entered in this case.
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At the outset, to the extent that Ball seeks an order from this Court directing
the defendants to finance the costs of depositions, it is clear that she is not entitled to
this relief. Quite the contrary, numerous courts have held that federal courts may not
relieve indigent litigants from the costs of pre-trial discovery, or shift those costs
upon other parties. See, e.g., Brooks v. Quinn, 257 F.R.D. 515, 417 (D. Del. 2009);
Augustin v. New Century TRS Holding, Inc., No. 08-326, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96236, at *7-9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2008); Badman v. Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 605
(M.D. Pa. 1991); see also Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (“There
is no provision in [28 U.S.C. § 1915] for the payment by the government of the costs
of deposition transcripts, or any other litigation expenses, and no other statute
authorizes courts to commit federal monies for payment of the necessary expenses in
a civil suit brought by an indigent litigant.”). Therefore, this request will be denied.
Further, Ball’s motion for authorization to conduct oral depositions of the
defendants pursuant to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure fails for yet
another reason.
Under Rule 30, rulings on inmate requests to conduct oral
depositions rest in the sound discretion of the court. That discretion, though, is
bounded by a basic recognition of the security and logistical difficulties that such
depositions present. McKeithan v. Jones, 212 F.App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2007). In light
of these logistical and security concerns, it is often preferable for inmates to seek
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discovery through timely written depositions pursuant to Rule 31 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a course which Ball has not followed in this case. Given these
alternative means of obtaining discovery, and the obvious security and logistical
concerns presented by inmate oral depositions, we hold that the proper exercise of
discretion in this field would be to deny this inmate request for an order compelling
oral depositions, in favor of Rule 31 depositions through written questions.
McKeithan v. Jones, 212 F.App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2007).
In addition, to the extent that Ball seeks subpoenas at the outset of this
litigation, we note that decisions regarding whether to issue subpoenas to pro se
litigants rest in the sound discretion of the court. Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 772
(3d Cir. 1990). In this case, Ball seeks subpoenas to obtain access to information
which can be obtained through conventional discovery requests, once a comprehensive
case management order is entered in this case. Therefore, rather than issue these
subpoenas, which may well entail collateral litigation of motions to quash, we believe
that the parties should in the first instance pursue convention discovery disclosures
from one another.1 In this regard, we will, by separate order, set a comprehensive case
Finally, in the event that the defendants file potentially dispositive motions
in this case, it may be that:
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“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a
potentially dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have
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management schedule for this litigation.
An appropriate order follows:
III.
Order
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motions for subpoenas
and for oral depositions (Docs. 20 and 22), are DENIED, without prejudice to the
parties pursuing appropriate discovery.
So ordered this 13th day of October, 2011.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
substantial grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be
without foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 20910 (S.D.N.Y.1991)) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,
203 F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001);
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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