Katona v. Asure et al
Filing
136
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Katona has filed a motion seeking a 60 day extension of time in which to respond to this motion,(Doc. 132.), which we will GRANT. With respect to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff shall file a response in accordance with Local Rule 7.6 on or before July 19, 2013. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the movants may then file reply briefs on or before August 2, 2013. The plaintiffs motion to conduct depositions (Doc. 133.), is DENIED without prejudice to the parties pursuing appropriate discovery once the pending, and potentially dispositive, motions are resolved. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on May 24, 2013. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MATTHEW KATONA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DONNA ASURE, et al.,
Defendants,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL NO. 1:11-CV-1817
(Judge Rambo)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a pro se civil rights action filed by the plaintiff, a state inmate.
Presently there is a motion pending before this court to dismiss Katona’s complaint.
(Doc. 130.)
Katona has filed a motion seeking a 60 day extension of time in which to
respond to this motion,(Doc. 132.), which we will GRANT. With respect to the
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff shall file a response in accordance with Local Rule 7.6
on or before July 19, 2013. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the movants may then file
reply briefs on or before August 2, 2013.
requirements prescribed by Local Rule 7.8.
All briefs must conform to the
The plaintiff has also filed a motion seeking to depose the defendants. (Doc.
133.) In the exercise of our discretion, however, we will stay discovery until after the
court rules upon the potential dispositive motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth
below, discovery will be stayed without prejudice to renewal of discovery, if
necessary, once the potentially dispositive pre-trial motions are resolved.
II.
Discussion
Issues relating to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 rest in the
sound discretion of the court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90
(3d Cir. 1987). A court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery will be
disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v.
I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This broad discretion extends to decisions
under Rule 26(c) relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and regulating
discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and nature of [a protective
order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court and may be reversed only
on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’ Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d
Cir.1973) (citation omitted).” Dove v. Atlantic Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d
Cir. 1992).
Certain basic principles, however, guide the exercise of this discretion. One
of these cardinal principles, governing the exercise of discretion in this field, is that
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the district court may properly defer or delay discovery while it considers a
potentially dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court concludes that the
pretrial motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g., James v. York
County Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ. Sch. of Ed.,
205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring discovery in such a case,
while the court determines the threshold issue of whether a complaint has sufficient
merit to go forward, recognizes a simple, fundamental truth: Parties who file motions
which may present potentially meritorious and complete legal defenses to civil
actions should not be put to the time, expense and burden of factual discovery until
after these claimed legal defenses are addressed by the court.
In our view these principles control here, and dictate how we should exercise
our broad discretion in this field. The defendants have filed potentially dispositive
motions, which raise defenses that do not, on their face, appear groundless. See, e.g.,
James v. York County Police Dep’t, 160 F. App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005). The
merits of these claims are currently being addressed by the court, ensuring a very
prompt resolution of this motion. In this setting, we conclude, consistent with settled
case law, that:
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“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Indeed, we find that an order staying this collateral discovery is particularly
appropriate here. It is fitting that further, collateral discovery be deferred until those
potentially dispositive motions are resolved.
III.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for extension of
time (Doc. 132.) is GRANTED, and the plaintiff’s motion to conduct depositions
(Doc. 133.), is DENIED without prejudice to the parties pursuing appropriate
discovery once the pending, and potentially dispositive, motions are resolved.
So ordered this 24th day of May 2013.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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