Watkins v. Sauers et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2012, it is ordered that: 1. W/in 21 days of the date of this order, petnr. may file a brief opposing the court's determination that the 2254 petn. is time-barred. The brief shall also addr ess any prejudice he has suffered from the court's raising of the timeliness issue. 2. Respondents shall have 14 days from receipt of petnr.'s brief to file a reply brief. 1 (See memo for complete details.) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 4/26/12. (am, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MATTHEW D WATKINS,
Petitioner
v.
DEBRA SAUERS, et al.,
Respondents

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CIVIL NO. 1:11-CV-1825
(Judge Caldwell)

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
The pro se petitioner, Matthew D. Watkins, III, an inmate at SCI-Forest, in

Marienville, Pennsylvania, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Watkins is challenging his 2007 convictions in the Lycoming County Court of
Common Pleas for robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, theft by unlawful taking
or disposition, receiving stolen property, possessing instruments of crime, and simple
assault. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of twelve to thirty-two years of
imprisonment, to be followed by eight years of probation.
Watkins asserts his petition is timely, but it appears to the court that he is
mistaken. Respondents did not contest this issue in their answer, but since they only
forfeited it rather than waived it, we may raise the timeliness issue sua sponte. Day v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 1679-80, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006); United
States v. Bendolph, 409 F.3d 155, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc).
However, before dismissing the petition on the basis of the statute of
limitations, we must give Petitioner an opportunity to explain why his petition is timely. Day,

547 U.S. at 210, 126 S.Ct. at 1684. Additionally, since we raise the issue after the answer
was filed, prejudice to Petitioner must also be considered. Id., 126 S.Ct. at 1684.

II.

Discussion

A.

Statutory Framework
A petitioner confined under a state-court judgment has one year to file a 2254

petition challenging the judgment. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1). As relevant here, the
limitations period runs from the “date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. This
language applies to the right to seek discretionary review in state appellate courts and
means that the judgment does not become final until the time period for seeking such
review expires, even if review is not sought. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 421 (3d
Cir. 2000).
The one-year federal limitations period is subject to both statutory and
equitable tolling. Statutory tolling for a federal habeas claim occurs during the time “a
properly filed application for State post conviction or other collateral review with respect to
the pertinent judgment or claim is pending . . . .” Id., § 2244(d)(2). A properly filed state
petition “is one submitted according to the state’s procedural requirements, such as the
rules governing the time and place of filing.” Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir.
1998); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 1814, 161
L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)(where the state court rejects petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely,
the petition “was not ‘properly filed’ and [petitioner is] not entitled to statutory tolling under

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§ 2244(d)(2)”). The filing of a federal habeas corpus petition does not toll the limitations
period. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172-73, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2124-25, 150 L.Ed.2d
251 (2001); Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]n application for
federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. ¶ 2244(d)(2)”).
The limitations period may be subject to equitable tolling when the petitioner
shows that he “has been pursuing his rights diligently,” and yet “some extraordinary
circumstances stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida,
,

U.S.

, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010); see also Sistrunk v. Rozum,

674 F.3d 181,

(3d Cir. 2012) (also considering the possibility of equitable tolling by

way of actual innocence).
More specifically, the Third Circuit has identified four circumstances in which
equitable tolling is justified: (1) when the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff; (2)
when the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights;
(3) when the plaintiff has timely asserted his rights, but has mistakenly done so in the
wrong forum; or (4) when the claimant received inadequate notice of his right to file suit, a
motion for appointment of counsel is pending, or where the court has misled the plaintiff
into believing that he had done everything required of him. Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153,
159 (3d Cir. 1999). See also Urcinoli v. Cathel, 546 F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 2008).

B.

Calculation of Petitioner’s Limitations Period
Watkins’ one-year statute of limitations for filing his 2254 petition began on

December 17, 2007, the date on which his judgment became final because it was the date
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he filed a praecipe with the Pennsylvania Superior Court to withdraw his direct appeal.
Commonwealth v. Watkins, No. 567 MDA 2007 (Pa. Super. Ct.).1 Therefore, absent any
tolling, he had until December 17, 2008, to timely file his § 2254 petition.
The limitations period ran for twenty-four days until January 10, 2008, when
Watkins timely filed a state-court postconviction petition under the Pennsylvania Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541-9546 (West 2007 & Supp.
2012). Commonwealth v. Watkins, CP-42-0001965-2005 (Pa. Common Pleas Ct. Lycoming Cnty.). The state courts denied relief, culminating in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s denial of allowance of appeal on July 26, 2010. Commonwealth v. Watkins, No.
122 MAL 2010. Thus, the limitations period was statutorily tolled from January 10, 2008,
through July 26, 2010. Thereafter, the limitations period began running again, and Watkins
had 341 days from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for allowance
of appeal, or until July 5, 2011, to file his federal habeas petition.2 However, Watkins did
not file his 2254 petition until September 28, 2011, eighty-five days after the deadline,
thereby making the petition untimely.3
In reaching this conclusion, we have taken into account Petitioner’s reasons
why his 2254 petition is timely, asserted in his 2254 petition. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18). There are two

1

The state-court dockets are available through Pennsylvania’s Unified Judicial Docket
System docket research site at: http://ujsportal.pacourts.us/.
2

The deadline actually expired on July 2, 2011, but that was a Saturday of a July 4th
weekend, so the deadline expired on Tuesday, July 5, 2011. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
3

The petition was docketed October 4, 2011, but Petitioner affirms he placed it in the
prison mail system on September 28, 2011, so under the prison mailbox rule, we consider
September 28 the filing date. See Longenette v. Krusing, 322 F.3d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 2003).

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of them. First, the limitations period was tolled for the ninety days Petitioner had to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court from the state supreme
court’s order denying review in his PCRA proceedings. Thus, according to Petitioner, the
limitations period did not begin running again until October 26, 2010, the expiration of that
ninety-day period. Second, the limitations period was tolled again when he filed his first
2254 petition, on February 1, 2011, and did not start again until April 29, 2011, when we
dismissed that petition at his request so that he could file an all-inclusive one. See Watkins
v. Commonwealth, 1:11-0229 (M.D. Pa.) (Caldwell, J.). According to Petitioner, these
additional periods of tolling extended his deadline to December 31, 2011, thereby making
his petition timely when it was filed on September 28, 2011.
Neither reason has merit. The limitations period is not tolled for the ninety
days that a petitioner has to seek certiorari review in the Supreme Court of a state-court
decision denying postconviction relief. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 332, 127 S.Ct.
1079, 1083, 166 L.Ed.2d 924 (2007). And the limitations period is not tolled while a federal
habeas corpus petition is pending. Duncan, supra, 533 U.S. at 172, 121 S.Ct. at 2124.
Even though Petitioner has already apparently stated all his reasons why the
petition is timely, under Day and Bendolph we must nonetheless give him an opportunity to
oppose our sua sponte invocation of the statute of limitations. His brief should also
address any prejudice he has suffered because we have raised the issue after the answer
was filed.4

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Bendolph indicates the prejudice analysis is threefold. First, we must consider “how late
in the case the limitations issue was raised.” 409 F.3d at 168. Second, we must determine if
Petitioner “had sufficient opportunity to respond to the issue, once raised.” 409 F.3d at 169.

(continued...)
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We will issue an appropriate order.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

Date: April 26, 2012

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(...continued)

Finally, we must determine if the government acted in bad faith in regard to how the limitations
defense was raised. Id.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MATTHEW D WATKINS,
Petitioner
v.
DEBRA SAUERS, et al.,
Respondents

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CIVIL NO. 1:11-CV-1825
(Judge Caldwell)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2012, it is ordered that:
1. Within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order,
Petitioner may file a brief opposing the court’s determination
that the 2254 petition is time-barred. The brief shall also
address any prejudice he has suffered from the court’s raising
of the timeliness issue.
2. Respondents shall have fourteen (14) days from receipt of
Petitioner’s brief to file a reply brief.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge