Ball v. Craver et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - for the foregoing reasons, the following discovery motions filed by the plaintiff, Dawn Ball in violation of this Courts prior stay orders; namely Balls Motions to Take Inmate Declarations; Motions for Examination by Ou tside Specialists; Motions to Test Mold Samples; and Motions to Order SCI Muncy to Release Records are DENIED, without prejudice to the parties pursuing appropriate discovery once the pending, and potentially dispositive, motions to revoke in forma p auperis status are resolved. It is further ORDERED that The plaintiffs motions for Stays of Briefing of the Motions to Revoke Balls In Forma Pauperis status are DENIED with prejudice. Finally Ball is advised that further failures to comply with the Court orders may result in dismissal of these actions pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on January 6, 2012. (kjn )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN BALL v. LT. SIPE, et al.,

:
:
:
DAWN BALL v. CAPT. CRAVER,
:
et al.,
:
:
DAWN BALL v. CAPT. POWLEY, et al., :
:
DAWN BALL v. SGT. COOPER,
:
et al.,
:
:
DAWN BALL v. DR. FAMIGLIO, et al., :
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-1830

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-1831

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-1832
CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-1833

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-1834

(CHIEF JUDGE KANE)
(MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CARLSON)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:
The plaintiff, Dawn Ball, is an inmate housed in the Restricted Housing Unit at
the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Muncy, who by her own account suffers from
a cascading array of severe mental illnesses, and who, in other litigation before this
Court, candidly acknowledges that she is profoundly disturbed, informing the Court
that:
My mental health is declining. I suffer from OCD so bad I scrub my
hands till they bleed, confusion, PTSD, disassociative disorder, I smell,
see and hear things not there, severely stressed, phobias, agoraphobia,
severe anxiety, lack of interest in things, lack of arousal in things, racing
thoughts, suicidal, cognitive problems and disorders, lack of interest in

life, disoriented, dizzyness, paranoid–schizophrenic, constant worry,
frightened scared, can’t properly care for myself, tics, bipolar, manic
depressive, mood swings that are so severe, can’t think clearly....
Ball v. Beard, No. 1:09-CV-845 (Doc. 42, pp.6-7).
Furthermore. Ball is also an inmate who is alleged to engage in destructive, selfdefeating and senseless behavior, conduct which was aptly described by prison
officials in one of Ball’s companion cases in the following terms:
[Y]our destruction of multiple cells . . . by spreading feces and urine
combined with paper products from your property and cell related
property made it impossible to identify your missing property item by
item as you submit.
(Ball v. Sisley, No. 1:11-CV-877 (M.D.Pa., Doc. 27, p.13.)
While she suffers from paranoia, schizophrenia, and experiences these visual
and auditory hallucinations, Ball is also a prodigious federal court litigant, bringing
numerous lawsuits based upon her perception of the events that take place around her
in prison. Indeed, at present Ball has a total of twenty two lawsuits pending before
this court.1 Ball has also been a prodigiously unsuccessful litigant, who has had at
See, e.g., Ball v. SCI Muncy, No.1:08-CV-700 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. SCIMuncy, No. 1:08-CV-701 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Hill, No.1:09-CV-773 (M.D.Pa.);
Ball v. Beard, No. 1:09-CV-845 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Lamas, No. 1:09-CV-846,
(M.D. Pa.); Ball v. Oden , No 1:09-CV-847 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Bower, No. 1:10CV-2561 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Sisley, No. 1:11-CV-877 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Struther,
No. 1:11-CV-1265 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Hummel, No. 1:11-CV-1422 (M.D.Pa.); Ball
v. Beckley, No. 1:11-CV-1829 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Sipe, No. 1:11-CV-1830
(M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Craver, No. 1:11-CV-1831 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Powley, No. 1:11CV-1832 (M..D.Pa.); Ball v. Cooper, No. 1:11-CV-1833 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v.
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least three prior lawsuits dismissed either for failure to exhaust her administrative
remedies, or as frivolous on the grounds that the lawsuit failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. See, e.g., Ball v. SCI Muncy, No. 1:08-CV-391 (M.D.
Pa.); Ball v. Hartman, No. 1:09-CV-844 (M.D. Pa.); Ball v. Butts, No. 1:11-CV-1068,
(M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Butts, No. 11-2862, 2011 WL 4375782, 1 (3d Cir. Sept 21, 2011).
In December 2011, the defendants in five of these actions–Ball v. Sipe, No.
1:11-CV-1830 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Craver, No. 1:11-CV-1831 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v.
Powley, No. 1:11-CV-1832 (M..D.Pa.); Ball v. Cooper, No. 1:11-CV-1833 (M.D.Pa.);
Ball v. Famiglio, No. 1:11-CV-1834 (M.D.Pa.)–moved to revoke Ball’s in forma
pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), and moved to stay proceedings
pending the litigation of these motions to revoke in forma pauperis status.
On December 8, 2011, we concluded that addressing the threshold issue of
Ball’s in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), was appropriate here,
and that a stay was proper for this purpose. Accordingly, we set a briefing schedule
for the briefing of these motions to revoke Ball’s in forma pauperis status, and further
ordered, in clear and precise terms, as follows: “Further proceedings are STAYED in
the above-captioned cases pending resolution of the joint motions to revoke Ball’s in

Famiglio, No. 1:11-CV-1834 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Eckroth, No. 1:11-CV-2238
(M.D.Pa.); Ball v. Campbell, No. 1:11-CV-2239 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v Barr, No. 1:11CV-2240 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v Curham, No. 1:12-CV-10 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v Giroux,
No. 1:12-CV-11 (M.D.Pa.); Ball v Giroux, No. 1:12-CV-12 (M.D.Pa.)..
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forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g).” Ball subsequently sought, and
obtained, an extension of time in which to respond to these motions, which raised
important threshold questions regarding whether Ball should be permitted to continue
to maintain these actions in forma pauperis, and we granted these requests.
Ball has now discounted and ignored the obligations placed upon her by these
prior court orders. Specifically, Ball has failed to abide by these stay orders by filing
a series of discovery motions; namely–
– Motions to Take Inmate Declarations;
– Motions for Examination by Outside Specialists;
– Motions to Test Mold Samples; and
– Motions to Order SCI Muncy to Release Records.
All of these motions have been filed by Ball in violation of the prior stay orders
entered by this Court. To the extent that Ball seeks to ignore these stay orders, and
pursue this discovery without first addressing the threshold question of her entitlement
to maintain these actions we will deny these motions.
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery are matters consigned to the
court’s discretion and judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding
Rule 37 motions are “committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”
DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly,
issues relating to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound
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discretion of the court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir.
1987). Thus, a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to
compel disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an
abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir.
1983). This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate
Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through

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discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict the
court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which is defined
in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”
Further, we note that nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes federal courts to
finance or pay for a party’s discovery expenses incurred while prosecuting a lawsuit,
even if that party has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a). Review of the case law reveals that numerous courts have recognized the
limitations of federal courts to relieve indigent litigants from the costs of pre-trial
discovery. See, e.g., Brooks v. Quinn, 257 F.R.D. 515, 417 (D. Del. 2009) (“Although
plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court has no authority to finance or pay
for a party’s discovery expenses. . . . It is plaintiff’s responsibility to pay for the costs
associated with the taking of a deposition.”); Augustin v. New Century TRS Holding,
Inc., No. 08-326, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96236, at *7-9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2008)
(denying plaintiff’s IFP application to cover costs for discovery requests); Badman v.
Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 605 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not require the
government to advance funds for deposition expenses); Toliver v. Community Action
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Comm’n to Help the Econ., 613 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (no clear
statutory authority for the repayment of discovery costs for IFP plaintiff); Sturdevant
v. Deer, 69 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “does
not extend to the cost of taking and transcribing a deposition.”); Ebenhart v. Power,
309 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Grave doubts exist as to whether [28 U.S.C.
§ 1915] authorizes this court to order the appropriation of Government funds in civil
suits to aid private litigants in conducting pre-trial discovery.”); see also Tabron v.
Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (“There is no provision in [28 U.S.C. § 1915]
for the payment by the government of the costs of deposition transcripts, or any other
litigation expenses, and no other statute authorizes courts to commit federal monies
for payment of the necessary expenses in a civil suit brought by an indigent litigant.”).
Thus, as a general rule, the court lacks the lawful authority to help finance, or relieve
plaintiff from, the costs associated with taking pre-trial discovery.
Finally, we note that this broad discretion over discovery matters extends to
decisions under Rule 26(c) relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and
regulating the timing of discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and
nature of [a protective order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court and
may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’ Galella v. Onassis,
487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir.1973) (citation omitted).” Dove v. Atlantic Capital Corp.,
963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992). One of these cardinal principles, governing the
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exercise of discretion in this field, is that the district court may properly defer or delay
discovery while it considers a potentially dispositive pretrial motion, provided the
district court concludes that the pretrial motion does not, on its face, appear
groundless. See, e.g., James v. York County Police Dep’t, 160 F. App’x 126, 136 (3d
Cir. 2005); Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson
v. New York Univ. Sch. of Ed., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly
deferring discovery in such a case, while the court determines the threshold issue of
whether a complaint has sufficient merit to go forward, recognizes a simple,
fundamental truth: Parties who file motions which may present potentially meritorious
and complete legal defenses to civil actions should not be put to the time, expense and
burden of factual discovery until after these claimed legal defenses are addressed by
the court. In such instances, it is clearly established that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation,
2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting Chrysler
Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March
7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

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Here, we note that the defendants have filed potentially dispositive motions in
this case, motions to revoke Ball’s in forma pauperis status. The merits of these
claims are currently being addressed by the Court, ensuring a very prompt resolution
of the motions. In this setting, we conclude, consistent with settled case law, that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation,
2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting Chrysler
Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March
7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Therefore, we will continue to stay further discovery pending resolution of these
outstanding dispositive motions.
In addition to ignoring the stay orders entered by this Court, Ball has also
sought to stay briefing of the outstanding motions revoke Ball’s in forma pauperis
status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), until we resolved all of her discovery motions.
We have now resolved all of Ball’s discovery motions by denying them, without
prejudice, since those motions violated the prior stay order entered by the Court.
Having resolved all of these discovery motions in this fashion, we now will deny

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Ball’s Motions for Stays of Briefing of the Motions to Revoke Ball’s In Forma
Pauperis status.
An appropriate order follows:
ORDER
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the following discovery motions filed
by the plaintiff, Dawn Ball in violation of this Court’s prior stay orders; namely
Ball’s–
– Motions to Take Inmate Declarations;
– Motions for Examination by Outside Specialists;
– Motions to Test Mold Samples; and
– Motions to Order SCI Muncy to Release Records.
are DENIED, without prejudice to the parties pursuing appropriate discovery once
the pending, and potentially dispositive, motions to revoke in forma pauperis status
are resolved.
It is further ORDERED that
– The plaintiff’s motions for Stays of Briefing of the Motions to Revoke Ball’s
In Forma Pauperis status are DENIED with prejudice.
Finally Ball is advised that further failures to comply with the Court orders may
result in dismissal of these actions pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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So ordered this 6th day of January 2012.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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