Lane v. PA Board of Probation and Parole
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying pltf's motion for relief from judgment 14 . (See memo & order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 04/11/12. (ki)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GERALD LANE ,
Plaintiff
v.
PA BOARD OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE,
Defendant
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-1907
(Judge Conner)
MEMORANDUM
Gerald Lane (“plaintiff ”), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional
Institution at Retreat (“SCI-Retreat”), Hunlock Creek, Pennsylvania, commenced
this civil rights action on October 17, 2011, naming the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole (“the Board”) as the sole defendant. Plaintiff moves to
proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2.) Obligatory preliminary screening reveals that
the complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I.
Allegations of the Complaint
Plaintiff alleges that the Board refused to grant him credit for time spent
while incarcerated in the State of New Jersey. (Doc. 1, at 2.) He seeks “an order
directing the Board to grant Plaintiff, the full amount of time credit for the time he
spent incarcerated in New Jersey, solely on the Board’s warrant prior to and
following being sentence[d].” (Doc. 1, at 3.) He also seeks to have his “original
unexpired sentence” reinstated, and to have the Board “honor the sentencing order
of the New Jersey Superior Court, by running the sentence concurrent with the
Parole violation time, thereby, requiring Plaintiff to be discharged from custody.”
(Id.)
II.
Standard of Review
Section 1915(e)(2) states, in pertinent part, “the court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that (B) the action . . . (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. . . .” 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a federal court must dismiss a case filed in forma pauperis if the
court determines that the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.” In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept
the truth of the plaintiff's factual allegations. Morrison v. Madison Dearborn
Capital Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 2006). The assumption of truth
is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). The controlling question is whether the
complaint “alleges enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (rejecting the “no set
of facts” language from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Although the court is generally limited in its review
to the facts contained in the complaint, it “may also consider matters of public
record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record
of the case.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n. 2
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(3d Cir. 1994); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426
(3d Cir. 1997).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. 544). The plaintiff must present facts that, if true, demonstrate a plausible
right to relief. See FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a) (stating that the complaint should include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (explaining that Rule 8 requires more
than “an unadorned, the-defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”); Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief
above the speculative level”). Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, civil
complaints must now allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is
facially plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50; see also Twombly,
505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
This then “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. at 1948.
The Third Circuit now requires that a district court must conduct the
two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when presented with a motion to dismiss:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1949–50]. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has
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a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In other words, a complaint must do
more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to
“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35.
As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’ “Iqbal, [129 S.Ct. at 1949–50]. This
“plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210–211.
III.
Discussion
In order to prevail on a civil rights claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1)
the alleged wrongful conduct was committed by a person acting under color of state
law, and (2) the conduct deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d
Cir. 2000); Schiazza v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 168 F. Supp. 2d 361, 372 (M.D. Pa. 2001).
However, “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his
physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled
to immediate or speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is
a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Inasmuch
as plaintiff is only seeking credit for time served and immediate release from prison,
he is precluded from seeking such relief through a civil rights complaint. Under
Preiser, a habeas corpus petition is his only available avenue for immediate release.
Because plaintiff does not have a plausible claim for relief, his complaint will be
dismissed.
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IV.
Leave to Amend
Courts are cautioned that because of the liberal pleading standard, a plaintiff
should generally be granted leave to amend before dismissing a claim that is merely
deficient. See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. The federal rules allow for liberal
amendments in light of the “principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a
proper decision on the merits.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (citations
and internal quotations omitted). The United States Supreme Court, however, has
stated that leave to amend under Rule 15 may be denied in cases of (1) undue delay;
(2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) undue prejudice; or (4) futility of amendment.
See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; see also Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204-05 (3d
Cir. 2006) (stating that “leave to amend must generally be granted unless equitable
considerations render it otherwise unjust”); see also Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390,
400 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating “absent undue or substantial prejudice, an amendment
should be allowed under Rule 15(a) unless denial can be grounded in bad faith or
dilatory motive, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failure to cure
deficiency by amendments previously allowed or futility of amendment”) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir.
2000) (summarizing factors to consider under Rule 15).
Given the facts alleged by plaintiff, allowing him to amend would be futile.
However, the dismissal of this action is without prejudice to plaintiff’s right to
pursue his claim in a properly filed petition for writ of habeas corpus.
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V.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without
prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum.
S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge
Dated:
April 11, 2012
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GERALD LANE ,
Plaintiff
v.
PA BOARD OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE,
Defendant
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-CV-1907
(Judge Conner)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of April, 2012, upon consideration of plaintiff’s
motion for relief from judgment (Doc. 14), and it appearing that plaintiff, who is
indigent, seeks a waiver of fees in the case because he improperly filed a civil rights
action, as opposed to a habeas corpus action, and it further appearing that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 provides that if a prisoner brings a civil action in forma pauperis, he shall be
required to pay the full amount of the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), and that
plaintiff opted to file his lawsuit as a civil rights action, and he is therefore required
by statute to pay the filing fee, 28 U.S.C. § 1914; 28 U.S.C. § 1915, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion for relief from judgment is DENIED.
S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge
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