Shoop v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - AND NOW, this 24th day of Feb., 2012, upon con. of deft.'s mtn. to dismiss 1 5 , & plf.'s response thereto, & pur. to the accompanying Memorandum, it is ordered that said mtn. is DENIED. (See memo for complete details.) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 2/24/12. (am, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WENDY SHOOP,
Plaintiff
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE,
Defendant

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: CIVIL NO. 1:11-CV-2014
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MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
We are considering a motion to dismiss filed by defendant, Pennsylvania

Department of Revenue (“DOR”). The case involves the termination of plaintiff’s
employment. Shoop brought claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201, et seq., the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 P.S. §§ 951 et seq.
II.

Background
The following facts are set forth in plaintiff’s complaint and are taken as

true, as they must be when considering a motion to dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Plaintiff worked as a tax examiner for the
DOR for sixteen years. She was diagnosed with sleep apnea in July 2008 and
narcolepsy in October 2009, and informed defendant of her conditions. Plaintiff asserts
that both conditions affect the major life activity of sleeping, making them disabilities
under the ADA and PHRA. Due to these conditions, plaintiff would fall asleep during

work approximately three times a year. The period of somnolence would last for up to
several minutes.
Plaintiff was terminated for six alleged instances of somnolence from May
2008 through April 2010. She sought an accommodation of “indulgence,” and the
possibility of working over breaks and after hours for any lost time or productivity. This
request was denied. Plaintiff filed the instant suit on October 28, 2011, alleging
defendant did not reasonably accommodate her disabilities as required by the ADA and
the PHRA. She also brought a retaliation claim under the FMLA. Defendant moves to
dismiss, asserting that plaintiff’s requested accommodation is not reasonable.
III.

Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a

complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule
12(b)(6), we must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are
not required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964,
167 L.Ed.2d. 929 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief

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that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 at 1974. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, - - - U.S. - - -, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.)
“[L]abels and conclusions” are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 196465, and a court “‘is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.’” Id., 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (quoted case omitted).
In resolving the motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part analysis.”
Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual elements from the legal
elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, we “determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoted case omitted).
B. Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case
Plaintiff brings a claim for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA.1 The ADA prohibits disability discrimination in the hiring and discharge
process of otherwise qualified individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA defines a
“qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

Plaintiff also brings a claim under PHRA. Our "analysis of [her] ADA claim
applies equally to [her] PHRA claim." Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d
296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
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To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that she is “1) disabled; 2) qualified to perform the essential tasks of the job;
and 3) that [she] has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of
the discrimination.” Griffin v. Municipality of Kingston, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23847, *6
(3d Cir. 2011).
Defendant seems to argue that plaintiff’s sleep apnea and narcolepsy are
not viable disabilities under the ADA. Although defendant discusses plaintiff’s failure to
differentiate between her two medical conditions, it does not discuss how such a failure
means that plaintiff does not have a viable disability. Instead, defendant provides a
conclusory statement that treating the two medical conditions the same “demonstrate[s]
the futility of Plaintiff’s case.” (doc. 6, at 5). Defendant admits, however, that “if the only
alleged disability that Plaintiff had was sleep apnea then a motion to dismiss at this
juncture would not be appropriate.” (doc. 6, at 5). Without more, defendant does not
make a discernable legal argument for us to consider.
C. Reasonable Accommodation under the ADA
Under the ADA, an employer must provide reasonable accommodations
unless such accommodations would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004);
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Reasonable accommodations may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and

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(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals
with disabilities.
41 U.S.C. 12111(9).
Plaintiff asserts that defendant did not provide a reasonable
accommodation for her disability. She sought “indulgence, and the possibility of working
over breaks or after hours for any lost time or productivity.” (doc. 1, ¶ 11). Defendant
filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that allowing plaintiff to sleep on the job is not a
reasonable accommodation.
In response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues only that
defendant’s brief does not conform to local rules and “There is not a single discernable
legal issue in defendants’ [sic] entire brief. If there is one, it is not identifiable or
described.” (doc. 7, at 5). Plaintiff did not respond to the substance of defendant’s
motion. We disagree that defendant’s motion does not contain a discernable legal issue.
Defendant’s brief states “the problem with the complaint and Plaintiff’s case is that she
does not allege any ‘reasonable’ accommodation which DOR should have provided her
to ameliorate the problem.” (doc. 6, at 7). Defendant’s motion, however, must be
denied. Plaintiff’s complaint clearly indicates that she sought the accommodation of
working over breaks or after hours to make up for lost time or productivity. In the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, such a request amounts to a modified work schedule,
which is recognized by the ADA as a reasonable accommodation. See 41 U.S.C.
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12111(9)(B).

Defendant does not argue that complying with this request would be an

undue hardship.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, defendant’s motion to dismiss will be

denied. We will issue an appropriate order.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WENDY SHOOP,
Plaintiff
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE,
Defendant

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: CIVIL NO. 1:11-CV-2014
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:
:
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ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of February, 2012, upon consideration of
defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 5), and plaintiff’s response thereto, and pursuant to
the accompanying Memorandum, it is ordered that said motion is DENIED.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

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