FLETCHER v. AVILES et al
Filing
167
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motions to reconsider various rulings on motions in limine (Docs. 145 , 158 .) are DENIED and: 1. The defendants will be able to present evidence of any flight b y the plaintiff on December 3, 2009. 2. Absent the approval of the court, Fletcher may not present evidence of other unrelated incidents in the trial of this case. However, if Fletcher intends to attempt to use police policies at trial to show that p olice violated their own internal policies in the course of his arrest, he should notify the Court and opposing counsel prior to attempting to present this proffered evidence so that this matter may be considered and resolved outside the presence of the jury. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on June 18, 2014. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL FLETCHER,
Plaintiff
v.
URIAH AVILES, et al.,
Defendants
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Civil No. 1:12-CV-86
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a pro se civil rights action brought by Michael Fletcher, a state prisoner.
Mr. Fletcher’s complaint presents a specific and discrete legal claim, with the plaintiff
alleging that the defendant police officer employed excessive force against him in the
course of a December 3, 2009, arrest. Specifically, Fletcher alleges that, in the course
of this arrest, police unnecessarily and excessively tasered him three time in the chest
and testicles, causing pain and other injuries to him.
This matter is scheduled for trial, and the parties have consented to proceed
before this Court. In connection with the upcoming trial we considered, and ruled
upon, four motions in limine, including a motion filed by Fletcher that sought to
exclude evidence of Fletcher’s attempted flight from the scene of this December 2009
police encounter. Reasoning that flight was one factor the courts instruct juries to
consider in assessing excessive force claims we denied this motion in limine.
We also ruled upon a motion in limine filed by the defendants which sought to
exclude from the trial of this case any evidence of police practices, policies, customs
and procedures. We granted this motion noting that some courts have excluded such
evidence reasoning that such policy “directives had the potential to lead the jury to
equate local policy violations with constitutional violations, and that this risk of
confusing the issues substantially outweighed the directives' probative value.”
McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009) However, these
courts have instead permitted plaintiffs to “offer[] evidence of police practice
standards in other ways; for example, plaintiffs [could] cross-examine police
witnesses about proper police conduct.” Id.
Fletcher has now filed two motions to reconsider, which ask us to reexamine
and reconsider these two in limine rulings. (Docs. 146 and 158.) For the reasons set
forth below, we will deny these motions to reconsider.
II.
Discussion
A.
Motions to Re-Consider–The Legal Standard
The legal standards that govern motions to reconsider are both clear, and
clearly compelling. “The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct
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manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Harsco Corp.
v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985). Typically such a motion should only
be granted in three, narrowly defined circumstances, where there is either: "(1) [an]
intervening change in controlling law, (2) availability of new evidence not previously
available, or (3) need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice".
Dodge v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F.Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1992 ). As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly observed:
“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration ... is to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Max's
Seafood Café, 176 F.3d at 677 (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779
F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985)). “Accordingly, a judgment may be altered
or amended if the party seeking reconsideration shows at least one of the
following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2)
the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court
granted the motion for summary judgment; or (3) the need to correct a
clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Howard Hess Dental Laboratories Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251
(3d Cir. 2010).
Thus, it is well-settled that a mere disagreement with the court does not
translate into the type of clear error of law which justifies reconsideration of a ruling.
Dodge, 796 F.Supp. at 830. Furthermore, "[b]ecause federal courts have a strong
interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be granted
sparingly." Continental Casualty Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F.Supp. 937,
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943 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Moreover, it is evident that a motion for reconsideration is not
a tool to re-litigate and reargue issues which have already been considered and
disposed of by the court. Dodge, 796 F.Supp. at 830. Rather, such a motion is
appropriate only where the court has misunderstood a party or where there has been
a significant change in law or facts since the court originally ruled on that issue. See
Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va.
1983).
Applying these benchmarks, we will decline Mr. Fletcher’s invitation to
reconsider our ruling permitting evidence of flight by the plaintiff to be presented in
the trial of the excessive force claim that lies at the heart of this case. As we have
previously noted, the legal standards that govern excessive force claims in the context
of police arrests are well-settled. “In an excessive force case, whether there is a
constitutional violation is ‘properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's
“objective reasonableness” standard[.]’ Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109
S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The relevant inquiry is ‘the reasonableness of
the officer's belief as to the appropriate level of force[,]’ which ‘should be judged
from [the officer's] on-scene perspective,’ and not in the ‘20/20 vision of hindsight.’
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (internal citations and quotation marks
removed). That reasonableness inquiry requires ‘careful attention to the facts and
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circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,
and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206-07 (3d
Cir. 2007)(emphasis added). Since the United States Supreme Court has expressly
held that evidence that an offender may be attempting to flee is relevant to a
determination regarding whether police used reasonable force in making an arrest,
that evidence cannot be excluded from the trial of an excessive force claim.
Therefore, Fletcher’s motion will be denied to the extent that it seeks to exclude such
evidence.
We will also decline Mr. Fletcher’s request that we reconsider our ruling
excluding evidence of any alleged police customs or practices, or other uses of tasers
in making arrests of other offenders, from the trial of this case. Arguing that there
is no municipal liability claim in this case, defendants asserted that evidence of other
unrelated uses of tasers when subduing different offenders would be both irrelevant
and prejudicial. (Docs. 115 and 116.) While we agree with the defendants that
evidence of unrelated incidents would typically be irrelevant and generally would not
permit testimony concerning other unrelated police incidents without some further
offer of proof, we also note that Fletcher’s pre-trial memorandum and motion to
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reconsider suggested that he may attempt to present evidence that police violated their
own internal policies and procedures in effecting his arrest. As we have noted, in the
past, some courts have excluded such evidence reasoning that such policy “directives
had the potential to lead the jury to equate local policy violations with constitutional
violations, and that this risk of confusing the issues substantially outweighed the
directives' probative value.” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d
Cir. 2009) However, these courts have instead permitted plaintiffs to “offer[]
evidence of police practice standards in other ways; for example, plaintiffs [could]
cross-examine police witnesses about proper police conduct.” Id. In other instances,
courts have permitted testimony regarding police use of force directives in excessive
force cases, but have permitted that testimony subject to a limiting cautionary
instruction. See Grabski v. Logan, CIV.A. 12-4978, 2014 WL 1340583 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 4, 2014).
Therefore, we continue to conclude that Fletcher may not present evidence of
other unrelated incidents in the trial of this case without some further offer of proof.
However, if Fletcher intends to attempt to make some narrower use of police policies
at trial to show that police violated their own internal policies in the course of his
arrest, he should notify the Court and opposing counsel at trial prior to attempting to
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present this proffered evidence so that this matter may be considered and resolved
outside the presence of the jury.
III.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider
various rulings on motions in limine (Docs. 145, 158.) are DENIED and:
1.
The defendants will be able to present evidence of any flight by the
plaintiff on December 3, 2009.
2.
Absent the approval of the court, Fletcher may not present evidence of
other unrelated incidents in the trial of this case. However, if Fletcher
intends to attempt to use police policies at trial to show that police
violated their own internal policies in the course of his arrest, he should
notify the Court and opposing counsel prior to attempting to present this
proffered evidence so that this matter may be considered and resolved
outside the presence of the jury.
So ordered this 18th day of June, 2014.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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