Boring v. Sanders et al
Filing
57
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 48 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Robert C Boring. It is ORDERED that the plaintiffs motion to compel, (Doc. 48.), is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part, as follows: First, with respect to the plaintiffs request for access to his own medical records, it is ordered that Borings request is granted, in part, provided that he completes the procedures prescribed by Department of Corrections policies.Second, with respect to Borings request for access to p ertinent prison policies, this request is denied as moot given the defendants response releasing what they represent to be the pertinent policies. Third, on or before October 9, 2013, we direct the defendants to provide to the Court for its in camera inspection to provide to the Court for its in camera inspectionany other responsive inmate grievances submitted between December 2010 andMarch 2012, in which the inmates grievance was upheld, citing the defendants for medical mistreatment in the field of eye care. Status Report due by 10/9/2013. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 11, 2013. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT C. BORING,
Plaintiff
v.
DR. SANDERS, et al.,
Defendants
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civil No.1:12-CV-419
(Judge Jones)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
This is a pro se civil rights action brought by Robert Boring, a state inmate who
was confined at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Rockview. (Doc. 1.) In his
complaint, filed on March 6, 2012, Boring named prison medical staff, Dr. Sanders
and Hospital Care Administrator Ted Williams, as defendants and advanced an
Eighth Amendment medical deliberate indifference claim, and a related state law
medical negligence claim, arising out of the eye care which Boring alleges he has
received while in custody. According to the well-pleaded facts set forth in Boring’s
complaint, the plaintiff suffers from cataracts in both of his eyes, a medical condition
which has led to a progressive loss of vision for Boring. In December of 2010, while
1
he was in custody, Boring received surgery to remove these cataracts from his right
eye. (Id.) Following this surgery Boring was seen by Dr. Sanders, and requested that
surgery be scheduled to remove the cataracts from his left eye. (Id.) Boring alleged
that Dr. Sanders refused to schedule this second cataract surgery, telling Boring that
his overall vision was now adequate, and further surgery was not required under
prison medical policies. (Id.) Voicing a concern that he was becoming blind in his
left eye, Boring appealed this medical judgment to Health Care Administrator
Williams, who denied his request for this additional cataract surgery on May 4, 2011,
stating that his overall vision was now adequate given the successful cataract surgery
Boring had received on his right eye in December 2010. (Id.)
This matter now comes before the Court on a motion to compel filed by Boring,
which seeks copies of the plaintiff’s medical records, pertinent Department of
Correction policies relating to health care and specifically medical treatment for
vision problems, and copies of all grievances filed against the defendants relating to
eye care. (Doc. 48.) The defendants have now responded to this motion, providing
Boring with access to his medical records and copies of pertinent prison policies, but
objecting to be compelled to conduct any search of inmate grievances regarding eye
care. (Doc. 49.)
2
For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be DENIED, in part, and
GRANTED, in part.
II.
Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, the scope of what type of discovery may be compelled is
defined by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as
follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the Court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
3
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
4
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict
the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of
discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which
is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”
A party moving under Rule 37 to compel discovery, or for sanctions, bears the
initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested information. Morrison v.
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial
burden is met, “the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack
of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within
the broad scope of relevance as defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such
marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh
the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust
Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D.Kan. 2009).
5
At the outset, Boring seeks to review pertinent prison policies governing eye
care. The defendants have responded by producing what they represent to be the
pertinent policy excerpts. Therefore, this request is moot.
Second, Boring seeks to review his own prison medical records.
The
defendants note that, with respect to this request, when an inmate initiates a request
for production of his own medical records, in accordance with the DC-ADM 003,
"Release of Information," the Department's procedure provides a method by which
he is given a reasonable amount of time to examine and inspect the requested
documents. As part of this procedure, the inmate must initiate this process by
submitting Department Form DC-135A "Inmate Request to Staff" to the
Superintendent's Assistant or his/her designee at his current institution. The inmate
may then review the documents and obtain copies of any documents at his expense;
however, charges for the photocopies are made in accordance with the Department's
policies and procedures. Thus, we understand that the defendants do not object to
Boring’s access to his own medical records. Rather, they simply urge the Court to
direct Boring to comply with these procedures when requesting medical records.
We believe that compliance with the prison regulations is a fitting and proper
procedure for Boring to follow in securing access to these medical records. Indeed,
in this regard we note that courts have frequently directed or encouraged inmates to
6
comply with reasonable institutional procedures when securing copies of their own
prison medical records for litigation purposes. See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 143
F.App’x 468 (3d. Cir. 2005); Daniels v. Kelchner, No. 05-1601, 2007 WL 2068631
(M.D. Pa. July 17, 2007). Therefore, with respect to this request, it is ordered that
Boring’s request be granted, in part, provided that he completes the procedures
prescribed by Department of Corrections policies.1
We note that those policies, in part, call for Boring to bear the cost of
making copies of these medical records. While Boring has not made a specific
request to have the defendants bear these costs, we note that nothing in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 authorizes federal courts to finance or pay for a party’s discovery expenses
incurred while prosecuting a lawsuit, even if that party has been granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Review of the case law
reveals that numerous courts within and without the Third Circuit have recognized
the limitations of federal courts to relieve indigent litigants from the costs of pretrial discovery. See, e.g., Brooks v. Quinn, 257 F.R.D. 515, 417 (D. Del. 2009)
(“Although plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court has no authority to
finance or pay for a party’s discovery expenses. . . . It is plaintiff’s responsibility
to pay for the costs associated with the taking of a deposition.”); Augustin v. New
Century TRS Holding, Inc., No. 08-326, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96236, at *7-9
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2008) (denying plaintiff’s IFP application to cover costs for
discovery requests); Badman v. Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 605 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (28
U.S.C. § 1915 does not require the government to advance funds for deposition
expenses); Toliver v. Community Action Comm’n to Help the Econ., 613 F. Supp.
1070, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (no clear statutory authority for the repayment of
discovery costs for IFP plaintiff); Sturdevant v. Deer, 69 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Wis.
1975) (concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “does not extend to the cost of taking and
transcribing a deposition.”); Ebenhart v. Power, 309 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (“Grave doubts exist as to whether [28 U.S.C. § 1915] authorizes this court
to order the appropriation of Government funds in civil suits to aid private
litigants in conducting pre-trial discovery.”); see also Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147,
159 (3d Cir. 1993) (“There is no provision in [28 U.S.C. § 1915] for the payment
1
7
Finally, Boring asks for copies of any grievances submitted by other inmates
citing the defendants for medical mistreatment with respect to eye care. Boring
argues that this material is relevant to his case because it may disclose a pattern or
common course of conduct on the part of the defendants, something which would be
probative of a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
The defendants have objected to this request citing several grounds. First, the
defendants contend that the disclosure of these third party complaints would violate
the privacy rights of those third parties. See Mincy v. Chmielewski, No. 05-292,
2006 WL 3042968 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 25, 2006)(denying access to third-party complaints
on privacy grounds). In addition, the defendants contend that this material is not
relevant or calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence since evidence
of other wrongs is not admissible in federal proceedings. Further, the defendants note
that the release of grievances which are mere allegations, particularly those which are
not substantiated, may be far more prejudicial to the defendants than probative for the
plaintiff. Finally, the defendants note that this request may require a manual
inspection of more than 670 grievances, which they contend is an undue burden.
by the government of the costs of deposition transcripts, or any other litigation
expenses, and no other statute authorizes courts to commit federal monies for
payment of the necessary expenses in a civil suit brought by an indigent litigant.”).
Thus, as a general rule, the Court lacks the lawful authority to help finance, or
relieve plaintiff from, the costs associated with taking pre-trial discovery.
8
This particular request legally complex and problematic on a number of
grounds. At the outset, we recognize that there are legitimate third-party privacy
interests that may need to be addressed and protected in connection with this request.
However, the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant
information” a concept which is defined broadly. Thus, “[r]elevant information need
not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence”.
As we understand it, Boring seeks information concerning other claimed
episodes of medical neglect by the defendants in order to establish a pattern of
behavior by the defendants, a pattern that would allow a fact-finder to infer a motive
and intent, and a pattern that would rebut any claim of mistake or innocent error. If
this is the basis for his request, then the request may, in fact, “lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.” Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the
admissibility of other acts evidence and provides as follows: “Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident....” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). With respect to
the admissibility of Rule 404(b) other act evidence:
9
While . . . Rule 404(b) is “construed as a rule of inclusion rather than
exclusion,” United States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir.1988)
(internal quotation marks omitted), [the courts] have also cautioned that
the . . . reasons for introducing prior bad acts evidence may be a
combination of showing a “consequential fact as well as ... impugn [ing
a party’s] character.” United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1272 (3d
Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d
Cir.1992)). Therefore, “when evidence of prior bad acts is offered, the
proponent must clearly articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of
logical inferences, no link of which can be the inference that the [party]
has the propensity to commit the [act] charged.” United States v.
Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Jemal, 26 F.3d at
1272).
United States v. Lindsay 339 F. App’x 268, 272 (3d. Cir. 2009)
In this case, given the fact that Rule 404(b) is defined as a “rule of inclusion”, there
may well be information in other inmate grievances which would be admissible under
the Rule as proof of “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident....” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). However, no
judgement on the relevance and admissibility of this evidence is possible in the
abstract, and any assessment of these issues involves a multi-faceted and fact-specific
analysis of both the proffered evidence and the party’s claims. Recognizing that these
prison records may contain arguably discoverable material, we note that in the past
courts have reconciled the interests of inmate-plaintiffs and corrections officials by
rejecting broadly framed requests for access to prison records, see Paluch v. Dawson,
No. 06-1751, 2007 WL 4375937, *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2007), while conducting
10
an in camera review of those records which may be relevant to more narrowly
tailored discovery demands. Paluch v. Dawson, No. 06-175, 2008 WL 2785638, *3
(M.D. Pa. July 17, 2008).
This is the course we will adopt here, subject to restrictions which we will
outline for the parties. We are mindful of the burden that this request may impose,
since the defendants represent that more than 670 health care grievances were filed
at SCI Rockview from 2010 through 2012. We also recognize that unfounded
accusations, standing alone, will have very little evidentiary relevance. Therefore,
we will direct the defendants to only provide to the Court for its in camera inspection
any other responsive inmate grievances submitted between December 2010 and
March 2012, in which the inmate’s grievance was upheld, citing the defendants for
medical mistreatment in the field of eye care.
By limiting this search to well-founded grievances, and restricting the time
period to the sixteen month period described in Boring’s complaint, we believe that
we reduce the burden upon the defendants, while ensuring that potentially pertinent
information may be screened by the Court for relevance. Armed with this information
the Court can then determine: (1) whether this information is relevant to the issues
raised in this case; (2) whether it is subject to any valid claim of privilege recognized
11
by the Federal Rules; and (3) to what extent, in what format, and under what
conditions it may be released to the plaintiff.
Accordingly, this 11th day of September 2013, it is ORDERED that the
plaintiff’s motion to compel, (Doc. 48.), is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part,
as follows:
First, with respect to the plaintiff’s request for access to his own medical
records, it is ordered that Boring’s request is granted, in part, provided that he
completes the procedures prescribed by Department of Corrections policies.
Second, with respect to Boring’s request for access to pertinent prison policies,
this request is denied as moot given the defendants’ response releasing what they
represent to be the pertinent policies.
Third, on or before October 9, 2013, we direct the defendants to provide to the
Court for its in camera inspection to provide to the Court for its in camera inspection
any other responsive inmate grievances submitted between December 2010 and
March 2012, in which the inmate’s grievance was upheld, citing the defendants for
medical mistreatment in the field of eye care. Armed with this information the Court
can determine: (1) whether this information is relevant to the issues raised in this
case; (2) whether it is subject to any valid claim of privilege recognized by the
12
Federal Rules; and (3) to what extent, in what format, and under what conditions it
may be released to the plaintiff.
So ordered this 11th day of September 2013.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?