UHS of Delaware, Inc. v. United Health Services, Inc.
Filing
269
ORDER DENYING UHS Delaware's MIL 190 to exclude evidence & argument that UHS Delaware does not own the UHS trademarks in dispute for failure to itself provide health care svcs thereunder. (See order for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 3/8/17. (ki)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UHS OF DELAWARE, INC.,
Plaintiff
v.
UNITED HEALTH SERVICES,
INC., et al.,
Defendants
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-485
(Chief Judge Conner)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of March, 2017, upon consideration of the motion
(Doc. 190) in limine by plaintiff UHS of Delaware, Inc. (“UHS Delaware”), seeking
to exclude evidence and argument that UHS Delaware does not own the “UHS”
trademarks in dispute for failure to itself provide health care services thereunder,
wherein UHS Delaware asserts that such evidence and argument is irrelevant and
likely to mislead the trier of fact, and the motion having been fully briefed by UHS
Delaware and defendants United Health Services, Inc., United Health Services
Hospitals, Inc., Professional Home Care, Inc., Twin Tier Home Health, Inc., Ideal
Senior Living Center, Inc., Ideal Senior Living Center Housing Corporation, Inc.,
Delaware Valley Hospital, Inc., and United Medical Associates (collectively “United
Health Services”), (see Docs. 191, 213, 225), and the parties having been given the
opportunity to file supplemental briefs (Docs. 252-1, 256, 263-2)1 following issuance
of the court‟s summary judgment ruling, (Doc. 235), and the court observing that
relevant evidence is that which has a tendency to make a fact of consequence “more
or less probable than it would be without the evidence,” FED. R. EVID. 401, but that
the court may exercise its discretion to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, [or] . . . misleading the jury,” FED. R. EVID. 403, and it appearing that UHS
Delaware‟s argument is twofold, to wit: (1) that licensed use of the trademarks by
UHS Delaware‟s subsidiaries inures to the benefit of UHS Delaware for purposes
of establishing continued use (and thus ownership and legally protectable status)
of the trademarks, and that the court‟s Rule 56 opinion confirmed UHS Delaware‟s
position as established fact, and (2) that introduction of such evidence or argument
would risk misleading the factfinder, (see Doc. 252-1 at 5-8), but the court observing
that UHS Delaware misapprehends our summary judgment ruling in that the court
did not definitively resolve the issue of continued use, but merely “reject[ed] United
Health Services‟ assertion that UHS Delaware cannot establish „use‟ of the marks,”
(Doc. 235 at 10 (emphasis added)), leaving the question of whether UHS Delaware
can establish use of the marks for the ultimate trier of fact, and the court concluding
that any evidence tending to establish or to dispute UHS Delaware‟s continued use
1
The court‟s order (Doc. 243) authorizing the parties to file supplemental
briefs granted UHS Delaware leave to file a supplemental brief in support of its
motion and United Health Services leave to file a supplemental brief in response
thereto. The order (Doc. 243) does not authorize the filing of a further reply brief
by UHS Delaware. In the interest of judicial economy, the court will nonetheless
consider the reply filed without leave by UHS Delaware. (See Doc. 263-2).
2
of the marks, whether independently or through its licensed subsidiaries and
affiliates, is directly relevant to a central element of this trademark infringement
case, but the court reiterating, to the extent the point remains in dispute between
the parties, that if UHS Delaware proves that its subsidiaries and affiliates are
licensed users of its marks and that UHS Delaware maintains sufficient control
over that licensed use, then subsidiary and affiliate use of the marks shall “inure
to the benefit of” UHS Delaware, (Doc. 235 at 9-10 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1055)), and
turning next to UHS Delaware‟s concern regarding the potential of this evidence to
mislead or confuse, the court noting that this matter will be tried as a bench trial
rather than by jury, and that, in the bench trial context, Rule 403 is generally
inapplicable, because the judge is unlikely to be misled or confused by legal or
factual nuance and is able to objectively assess probative value and reject any
improper inferences, see Suter v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 424 F. Supp. 2d 781,
790-91 (D.N.J. 2006) (citations omitted), and the court thus determining that there is
no risk of confusion or danger of being misled by admission of evidence concerning
UHS Delaware‟s failure to itself use the UHS trademarks, it is hereby ORDERED
that UHS Delaware‟s motion (Doc. 190) in limine is DENIED.
/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania
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