Ball v. Sipe
Filing
54
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Accordingly, this 18th day of June, 2014, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs motion to compel, (Doc. 44.), is DENIED, in part, and, GRANTED in part, as follows: First, Balls request for an extension of time is GRANTED an d the following pre-trial schedule will apply in this case:Close of Discovery: September 29, 2014. Dispositive Motions and Supporting Briefs Due: September 29, 2014. Deadline toConsent to Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate: September 29, 2014. In all other respects the Motion to Compel is DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on June 18, 2014. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAWN BALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
LT. SIPE, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL NO. 1:12-CV-537
(Judge Kane)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
In this action, the plaintiff, Dawn Ball, a state inmate, housed at the State
Correctional Institution, Muncy, has sued a correctional lieutenant, alleging that in
July and August 2010, the defendant ordered her placed in a strip cell “with malicious
intent to punish me for non-suicidal reasons.” (Doc. 1.)
This case now comes before the Court for resolution of a discovery dispute.
Specifically, Ball has filed a motion to compel production of discovery. (Doc. 47.)
Ball’s motion makes claims that seem to shift and change over time. Initially, Ball
alleged that she had been completely denied access to discovery materials. (Doc. 47.)
When the defendant replied by providing copies of the discovery responses which had
been provided to Ball, (Docs. 51 and 52.), Ball’s claims transmogrified from an
assertion that she had been wholly denied discovery to an insistence that the
defendant’s objections to the release of certain policy manuals was improper, coupled
with a request for an extension of time in which to complete discovery and a demand
that the Department of Corrections provide Ball with copies of documents free of
charge.1
This motion to compel has been fully briefed by the parties and is now ripe for
resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied, in part, and
granted, in part, as follows:
II.
Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. . . .
With the type of lack of attention to detail which has sadly marked much of
Ball’s approach to litigation, this reply was filed in another, closed case, Ball v.
Sipe, 1:11-CV-1830 (Doc. 87.), rather than in this case, Ball’s current active, open
pending lawsuit against Lieutenant Sipe. We commend defense counsel for
alerting us to the existence of this curious, and curiously concealed, pleading.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the Court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
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a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
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defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict
the Court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of
discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which
is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573
(D.Kan. 2009).
Moreover, in a prison setting, inmate requests for far-reaching information can
raise security concerns, and implicate a legitimate governmental privilege, a
governmental privilege which acknowledges a governmental needs to confidentiality
of certain data but recognizes that courts must balance the confidentiality of
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governmental files against the rights of a civil rights litigant by considering:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by
discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2) the
impact upon persons who have given information of having their
identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which governmental selfevaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or
evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an
actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending
or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the
investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available
through other discovery or from other sources; and (10) the importance
of the information sought to the plaintiffs case.
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Ball’s various
discovery requests.
B.
Resolution of Ball’s Discovery Motion
1.
Ball’s Requests for Prison Policies is Overbroad and Will Be
Denied.
At the outset, to the extent that Ball seeks access various prison policies, we
note that her claim is not narrowly tailored and seems unmoored to any specific
assertion of the relevance of this information to the issues in this litigation. Instead,
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Ball seems to simply have a general interest in all prison policies, and views herself
as having a broad right to know all such prison security policies.
We disagree. Quite the contrary, recognizing the legitimate penal interest in
maintaining security courts have frequently rebuffed efforts by inmates to gain broad
access to prison security policies in the absence of some specific, narrowly tailored
showing of relevance. See e.g., Spencer v. Collins, 3:12-CV-00616, 2013 WL
5176747 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2013); Huertas v. Beard, 1:10-CV-10-SJM-SPB, 2012
WL 3096430 (W.D. Pa. July 30, 2012); Dockery v. Legget, CIV.A. 09-732, 2012 WL
45404 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2012); Victor v. Lawler, 3:08-CV-1374, 2011 WL 1884616
(M.D. Pa. May 18, 2011) on reconsideration, 3:08-CV-1374, 2011 WL 4753527
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2011). Since Ball’s motion makes no such showing, her request to
compel production of these manuals will be denied.
2.
We Will Not Order The Defendants to Bear the Costs of
Discovery
Further, to the extent that Ball seeks to have us order the defendants to make
copies of various records at their expense, for Ball’s use, we note that nothing in 28
U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes federal courts to finance or pay for a party’s discovery
expenses incurred while prosecuting a lawsuit, even if that party has been granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Review of the case
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law reveals that numerous courts within and without the Third Circuit have
recognized the limitations of federal courts to relieve indigent litigants from the costs
of pre-trial discovery. See, e.g., Brooks v. Quinn, 257 F.R.D. 515, 417 (D. Del. 2009)
(“Although plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court has no authority to
finance or pay for a party’s discovery expenses. . . . It is plaintiff’s responsibility to
pay for the costs associated with the taking of a deposition.”); Augustin v. New
Century TRS Holding, Inc., No. 08-326, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96236, at *7-9 (W.D.
Pa. Nov. 25, 2008) (denying plaintiff’s IFP application to cover costs for discovery
requests); Badman v. Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 605 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (28 U.S.C. § 1915
does not require the government to advance funds for deposition expenses); Toliver
v. Community Action Comm’n to Help the Econ., 613 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (no clear statutory authority for the repayment of discovery costs for IFP
plaintiff); Sturdevant v. Deer, 69 F.R.D. 17, 19 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (concluding that 28
U.S.C. § 1915 “does not extend to the cost of taking and transcribing a deposition.”);
Ebenhart v. Power, 309 F. Supp. 660, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Grave doubts exist as
to whether [28 U.S.C. § 1915] authorizes this court to order the appropriation of
Government funds in civil suits to aid private litigants in conducting pre-trial
discovery.”); see also Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1993) (“There is no
provision in [28 U.S.C. § 1915] for the payment by the government of the costs of
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deposition transcripts, or any other litigation expenses, and no other statute authorizes
courts to commit federal monies for payment of the necessary expenses in a civil suit
brought by an indigent litigant.”). Thus, as a general rule, the Court lacks the lawful
authority to help finance, or relieve plaintiff from, the costs associated with taking
pre-trial discovery. Therefore, as we have done in the past, we will deny this
particular request by Ball to have her defendants finance the costs of her discovery.
See e.g., Ball v. Struthers, 1:11-CV-1265, 2011 WL 4891026 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13,
2011); Ball v. Famiglio, CIV. 1:08-700, 2011 WL 4753526 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2011)
report and recommendation adopted, 1:08-CV-700, 2011 WL 6130610 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 8, 2011).
3.
Ball’s Request for Extension of Time Will be Granted
Finally, Ball seeks a 90 day extension of time in which to complete discovery.
This request is unopposed by the defendant, (Doc. 53.), and will be granted.
III.
Conclusion
Accordingly, this 18th day of June, 2014, it is ORDERED that the plaintiff’s
motion to compel, (Doc. 44.), is DENIED, in part, and, GRANTED in part, as
follows:
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First, Ball’s request for an extension of time is GRANTED and the following
pre-trial schedule will apply in this case:
Close of Discovery:
September 29, 2014
Dispositive Motions and Supporting Briefs Due:
September 29, 2014
Consent to Proceed Before U.S. Magistrate
September 29, 2014
In all other respects the Motion to Compel is DENIED.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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