Hatten v. Bledsoe

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - AND NOW, this 27th day of August, 2012, it is ORDERED that petnr.'s mtn. 11 for reconsideration of the order of 7/24/12 10 is DENIED. (See order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 8/27/12. (am, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TIMOTHY HATTEN,
Petitioner
v.
BRYAN A. BLEDSOE,
Respondent

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: CIVIL NO. 1:12-CV-772
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MEMORANDUM

Petitioner, Timothy Hatten, an inmate at USP-Lewisburg, Pennsylvania,
filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his 1992 conviction in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on drug-trafficking
offenses. The petition argues that the searches of his vehicle and residence violated
Florida state law interpreting the Fourth Amendment as set forth in State v. Marrow, 459
So.2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), and State v. Beney, 523 So.2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation, recommending
that the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner had not shown
that relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective. Upon review of
Petitioner’s objections to the report, on July 24, 2012, we adopted the report and
recommendation and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Petitioner has filed a motion for
reconsideration of the July 24 order. He argues that section 2255 is inadequate or
ineffective because at the time he filed his 2255 motion in 2000, the Bureau of Prisons
did not provide access to Florida State law so that he could have presented at that time
his current claim based on the two cases cited.
We reject Petitioner’s argument. Section 2255 is not inadequate or
ineffective because a defendant convicted under federal law has no access to state law.
The two cases cited by Petitioner, Story v. Morgan, 786 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. Pa. 1992),
and Sills v. Bureau of Prisons, 761 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1985), in support of that position
are distinguishable. First, both cases were civil-rights actions seeking access to legal
materials unavailable at their prisons, not habeas corpus petitions. Second, the legal
material the plaintiffs were seeking access to was relevant to proceedings they were
pursuing to challenge their convictions. In Story, the plaintiff had been convicted under
Pennsylvania law and needed access to Pennsylvania legal materials. In Sills, the
plaintiff had been convicted under military law and was seeking access to military legal
materials.

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Since section 2255 was not inadequate or ineffective, we lack jurisdiction
over the 2241 petition. See Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971);
Abed v. Bledsoe, 473 F. App’x 106,

(3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential).1

Even if we could adjudicate the 2241 petition claim, the claim lacks merit.
Petitioner contends that the searches of his vehicle and residence violated Florida State
law interpreting the Fourth Amendment. State-law claims are not cognizable in federal
habeas corpus. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 874-75, 79
L.Ed.2d 29 (1984) (section 2241); Swarthout v. Cooke,

U.S.

,

, 131 S.Ct. 859,

861, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) (section 2254). Petitioner must present a violation of the
federal Constitution or federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (noting that a section
2241 petition may be brought when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States”).
If the claim is intended as a straightforward Fourth Amendment claim, we
would still not grant relief upon it. The claim was adjudicated against Petitioner in his
direct appeal, United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1254-57 (11th Cir. 1998), using
the same Supreme Court case, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57
L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), that guided the Fourth Amendment ruling in Marrow, with Beney

1

As further support for our authority to entertain the petition, Petitioner also claims
to be “actually legally innocent” of his offenses. (Doc. 11, motion for reconsideration at p. 3).
See United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 107 (3d Cir. 1999) (procedural default can be
excused if a defendant shows actual innocence). However, Petitioner alleges no facts to
support that contention.

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later citing Franks and Marrow. Collateral proceedings cannot be used to relitigate
matters decided on direct appeal. United States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100, 105 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1993) (section 2255 motion).
We will issue an appropriate order.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

Date: August 27, 2012

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TIMOTHY HATTEN,
Petitioner
v.
BRYAN A. BLEDSOE,
Respondent

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:
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: CIVIL NO. 1:12-CV-772
:
:
:

ORDER

AND NOW, this 27th day of August, 2012, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s
motion (Doc. 11) for reconsideration of the order of July 24, 2012 (Doc. 10) is DENIED.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge