Hatten v. Bledsoe
Filing
14
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - AND NOW, this 3rd day of October, 2012, it is ORDERED that petnr.'s mtn. 13 for reconsideration of the order of 8/27/12 12 is DENIED. (See memo for complete details.) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 10/3/12. (am, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TIMOTHY HATTEN,
Petitioner
v.
BRYAN A. BLEDSOE,
Respondent
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:
:
: CIVIL NO. 1:12-CV-772
:
:
:
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Timothy Hatten, an inmate at USP-Lewisburg, Pennsylvania,
filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his 1992 conviction in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on drug-trafficking
offenses. The magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation, recommending that
the petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We agreed with the recommendation
and dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which we
denied. We are considering Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration.
By way of some background, the petition argued that the searches of
Petitioner’s vehicle and residence violated Florida state law interpreting the Fourth
Amendment as set forth in State v. Marrow, 459 So.2d 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984),
and State v. Beney, 523 So.2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). The magistrate judge
recommended dismissal because Petitioner had not shown that relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 was inadequate or ineffective. Upon review of Petitioner’s objections to the
report, on July 24, 2012, we adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the July 24 order. He argued that section 2255 is inadequate or
ineffective because when he filed his 2255 motion in 2000, the Bureau of Prisons did not
provide access to Florida State law so that he could have presented at that time his
current claim based on the two cases cited.
By memorandum and order of August 27, 2012, we denied the motion.
Hatten v. Bledsoe, 2012 WL 3757482 (M.D. Pa.). We concluded as follows. First,
section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective when a defendant convicted under federal
law has no access to state law. Second, the claim lacked merit in any event for two
reasons: (1) state-law claims are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus; and
(2) treating the claim as a straightforward Fourth Amendment claim did not assist
Petitioner since the Fourth Amendment claim had already been adjudicated against
Petitioner in his direct appeal.
A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is used “‘to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.’” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591
F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). “A proper Rule 59(e) motion therefore
must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to
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prevent manifest injustice.” Id. It cannot be used simply to reargue issues that the court
has already considered and disposed of. Blanchard v. Gallick, No. 09-1875, 2011 WL
1878226, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2011) (Caldwell, J.) (citing Ogden v. Keystone
Residence, 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2002)). Nor can the motion be used to
raise new arguments or supporting facts that could have been raised previously, but
were not. Id.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration argues the following. First, contrary
to the court’s reference to the Fourth Amendment, the legality of the issuance of the
search warrant and the seizure of the evidence taken from Petitioner’s residence and
vehicle was governed by Florida law. Hence Petitioner did need access to state law.
Second, we erred in deciding that Petitioner had access to Florida law when he had no
access, as far back as his trial, continuing with his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, and even
now. Petitioner maintains that Marrow and Beney would have exonerated him if he had
had access to these cases previously. Third, we erred in deciding that his claim lacked
merit. Fourth, we erred in deciding that Petitioner’s claim had been adjudicated against
him on direct appeal. In support, Petitioner asserts that prosecutorial misconduct,
consisting of withholding the Marrow and Beney cases from the Eleventh Circuit, misled
the court of appeals into believing that the issuance of the search warrant was valid
under Florida law. In Petitioner’s view, case law can be Brady material.1 On this
argument, Petitioner adds that the federal prosecutor allowed law-enforcement officers to
1
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
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lie under oath before the grand jury, at pretrial suppression hearings, and at trial. The
testimony at the suppression hearings involved obtaining the search warrants while not
revealing the true source of the information supporting the warrants so that the wiretaps
could be kept secret.
We will deny the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner’s first argument is
partly correct. The legality under Florida statutory law of the wiretaps that led to the
searches of his residence and vehicle was an issue in his case, and decided adversely to
him on direct appeal. United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1252-54 (11th Cir. 1998).
But Petitioner did not present the state statutory claim in his 2241 petition. Instead, he
presented a Fourth Amendment claim, which was also decided against him on direct
appeal. Id. at 1255-57. A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to present a new
claim. Even if he had presented the statutory claim, since that claim has already been
decided adversely to him on direct appeal, collateral proceedings cannot be used to
relitigate it. Hatten, 2012 WL 3757482, at *2.2
Petitioner’s second argument is irrelevant. We did not find that he had
access to Marrow and Beney. Instead, we decided that it was immaterial whether he
had access or not. Id. at *1. Petitioner’s third argument is mistaken. We correctly
decided that his 2241 claim lacked merit. Petitioner’s fourth argument also fails.
Petitioner had a Fourth Amendment claim, not a Marrow or Beney claim, and that Fourth
2
We will assume for the purpose of Petitioner’s motion that the state-law wiretapping
claim presents an issue of federal law since the Eleventh Circuit decided that it would examine
the legality of the wiretaps under state law even though the prosecution was federal. Glinton,
154 F.3d at 1252-53.
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Amendment claim was adjudicated on direct appeal, Glinton, 154 F.3d at 1255-57, even
if the Eleventh Circuit did not cite Marrow or Beney. Additionally, there was no
prosecutorial misconduct when the government did not cite Marrow or Beney on
Petitioner’s direct appeal. Case law is not Brady material. Finally, Petitioner’s claim that
the federal prosecutor allowed law-enforcement officers to lie under oath before the
grand jury, at pretrial suppression hearings, and at trial is a new claim. We do not
address new claims on a motion for reconsideration.
We will issue an appropriate order.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
Date: October 3, 2012
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TIMOTHY HATTEN,
Petitioner
v.
BRYAN A. BLEDSOE,
Respondent
:
:
:
: CIVIL NO. 1:12-CV-772
:
:
:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of October, 2012, it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s
motion (Doc. 13) for reconsideration of the order of August 27, 2012 (Doc. 12) is
DENIED.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
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