Rivera v. Jenkins et al
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting defts' motion to dismiss 11 , dismissing pltf's complaint in its entirety, directing Clrk of Ct to close case, & deeming any appeal from this order frivolous & not in good faith. (See memo & order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 11/30/12. (ki)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DANIEL RIVERA,
Plaintiff
v.
MR. JENKINS, MR. MILLER,
Defendants
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-0875
(Judge Conner)
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Daniel Rivera (“Rivera ”), an inmate housed at the State
Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (“SCI-Camp Hill), Pennsylvania, commenced
this civil rights action on May 10, 2012, naming Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Miller as
defendants. (Doc. 1.) Before the court is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed on behalf of both defendants. (Doc. 11.) For
the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss will be deemed unopposed and
granted.
I.
Procedural Background
On August 22, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 11.) A
supporting brief was filed on September 5, 2012. (Doc. 12) In response to
defendants’ motion and brief, Rivera filed a motion for appointment of counsel.
The motion for appointment of counsel was denied, but he was granted until
September 28, 2012, to file an opposition brief. (Doc. 16.) At that time he was
notified that his failure to comply with the deadline would result in the motion
being deemed unopposed. (Id., citing L.R. 7.6 (“Any party opposing any motion
shall file a brief in opposition . . . [or] shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.”))
Rivera moved for an extension of time to file his brief. On October 15, 2012, his
motion was granted and he was afforded until October 26, 2012, to file his brief.
(Doc. 17.) More than a month has passed since that deadline expired and he has
failed to oppose defendants’ motion. Consequently, the motion is deemed
unopposed.
II.
Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Gelman v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d
170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Although the court is generally limited in its review to the facts contained in the
complaint, it “may also consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached
to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case.” Oshiver v. Levin,
Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994); see also In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
2
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the
defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint in the face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of
the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1947 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a
claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, while mere
legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id.; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the well-pleaded factual allegations have
been isolated, the court must determine whether they are sufficient to show a
“plausible claim for relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege
facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). A claim “has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. When the complaint fails to present
a prima facie case of liability, however, courts should generally grant leave to
amend before dismissing a complaint. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2000).
3
III.
Allegations of the Complaint
Rivera alleges that he is being denied medication which is necessary to
prevent suicidal risks. (Doc. 1, at 2.) He alleges that defendants Miller and Jenkins
were deliberately indifferent to his mental health needs by refusing him his
medication. (Id.) He also indicates that he has “tried his hardest to file all
grievances but was not able to fully” because he in unable to write in English. (Id.)
IV.
Discussion
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a
cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .
Id.; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder,
95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
4
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (the “PLRA”), a prisoner is
required to pursue all avenues of relief available within the prison’s grievance
system before bringing a federal civil rights action concerning prison conditions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 291(3d Cir. 2000). It has
been made clear that the exhaustion requirement is mandatory. See Williams v.
Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 (holding that
the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA applies to grievance procedures
“regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures”); Nyhuis v.
Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (same). This “exhaustion requirement applies to
all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or
particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’s (“DOC”) grievance procedure
provides that an inmate must file a grievance with the Facility Grievance
Coordinator within fifteen working days of the event upon which the claim is based.
((Doc. 12-1, at 9, 15, Policy Statement, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department
of Corrections, DC-ADM 804 (“DC-ADM 804"), Section 1.A.13 (Effective Date
December 8, 2010)). If the grievance is properly submitted according to the
grievance procedures manual, the Facility Grievance Coordinator will designate a
staff member to serve as a Grievance Officer. (Id. at 16, Section 1.B.5.) Once a
decision is issued, the inmate generally has fifteen working days to appeal to the
prison’s Facility Manager. (Id. at 27, Section 2.A.1.a.) Any inmate dissatisfied with
5
the disposition of an appeal to the Facility Manager may submit an Inmate Appeal
to Final Review within fifteen working days of the decision. (Id. at 29, Section
2.B.1.b.) Every appeal to final review must be addressed to the Secretary’s Office of
Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). (Id. at 30, Section 2.B.1.f.) Upon
completion of the review, SOIGA will respond directly to the inmate using the Final
Appeal Decision form. (Id. at 32, Section 2.B.2.e; at 41.)
Defendants argue that the complaint is subject to dismissal because Rivera
failed to exhaust all avenues of administrative relief prior to proceeding to federal
court. (Doc. 12, at 7.) Tracy Williams, a Grievance Review Officer in the Secretary’s
Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals, declares that on February 5, 2012, Rivera
submitted Grievance #399973 alleging that he was denied mental health treatment.
(Doc. 12-1, at 6, ¶ 12; at 51.) His grievance was denied on February 16, 2012, based
on the following: “You are currently monitored by the block psychologist and are
seen periodically by a psychiatrist. According to your grievance you have discussed
your problems and treatment suggestions with them on a number of occasions.
Also, according to records there were recent mental health contacts either by a staff
psychologist and/or psychiatrist on 2/2/12, 2/3/12, 1/19/12 and 1/22/12. You have been
seen in a timely manner when you requested contact and your mental health status
continues to be monitored monthly by the treatment provider on the block.” (Doc.
12-1, at 50.) On appeal, the Facility Manager concluded that “[t]he record reflects
that you are being seen regularly and when you request. Your appeal and any
requested relief is denied.” (Id. at 49.)
6
On March 21, 2012, Rivera submitted the grievance to the SOIGA for final
review. (Id. at 6, ¶ 12; at 48.) On April 10, 2012, he was notified that his appeal was
incomplete because he failed to provide a legible copy of his appeal to the Facility
Manager. (Id. at 6, ¶ 13; 47.) He was afforded fifteen working days, or, until May 1,
2012, to provide the proper documentation. (Id. at 47.) On April 21, 2012, a letter
was submitted to the SOIGA on Rivera’s behalf indicating that he had difficulty
with the English language and that he needed additional time to secure and filed
the requested documents. (Id. at 46.) After the passage of twelve days beyond the
deadline, Rivera was notified that his appeal was dismissed for failure to provide
the required documentation for proper review. (Id. at 45.)
In failing to submit the required documentation for proper review, Rivera
failed to exhaust the administrative review process. Therefore, dismissal of the
complaint is appropriate. Leave to amend is not warranted as no amendment to
the complaint could cure the failure to exhaust the administrative review process.
V.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, the court will deem defendants’ motion to
dismiss (Doc. 11) as unopposed and grant the motion. An appropriate order follows.
S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge
Dated:
November 30, 2012
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DANIEL RIVERA,
Plaintiff
v.
MR. JENKINS, et al.,
Defendants
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-0875
(Judge Conner)
ORDER
AND NOW, this 30th day of November, 2012, upon consideration of
defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 11), and for the reasons set forth in the
accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.
The motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) is DEEMED unopposed and
GRANTED.
2.
Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.
3.
The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
4.
Any appeal from this order is DEEMED frivolous and not in good faith.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?