Stemrich et al v. Zabiyaka et al

Filing 109

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 58 MOTION to Bifurcate w/ certificates filed by James Stemrich, Danielle Stemrich, 61 MOTION in Limine To Bifurcate Liability and Damages filed by T.L. Transport, LLC., Oleh Zabiyaka. Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 3/10/14. (pw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES STEMRICH, and
DANIELLE STEMRICH, his wife,
Plaintiffs
v.
OLEH ZABIYAKA and
T.L. TRANSPORT, LLC
Defendants

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Civil No. 1:12-CV-1409

Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court are the parties’ cross motions to bifurcate
trial. (Docs. 58 & 61.) Plaintiffs argue that the trial should be bifurcated into two
segments: first, the jury should consider whether Defendants are liable for the
injuries alleged, whether Defendants’ conduct was recklessly indifferent, and the
amount of compensatory damages to be awarded; and second, the jury should
consider the amount of punitive damages to award, if any. (See Doc. 58, ¶ 9.)
Defendants argue that the trial should be trifurcated into three segments: first, the
jury should consider whether Defendants are liable; second, the jury should consider
the extent of Plaintiffs’ injuries and the amount of compensatory damages
appropriate; and finally, the jury should consider whether punitive damages are
warranted. For the following reasons, the court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion to
bifurcate and deny Defendants’ motion to bifurcate.

I.

Background
This case arises out of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on

September 28, 2011, in the right lane of Interstate 83 in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Defendant Oleh Zabiyaka, an employee of Defendant T.L. Transport,
rear-ended an automobile being operated by Plaintiff James Stemrich (“Plaintiff”)1
and caused Plaintiff to suffer serious injuries.2 Plaintiffs assert that Defendant
Zabiyaka was negligent in operating his vehicle and that Defendant T.L. Transport
negligently hired/retained/supervised and negligently entrusted Defendant Zabiyaka.
Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages.
After discovery closed, Defendants field a motion for partial summary
judgment, in which they sought judgment in their favor on Plaintiffs’ claim for
punitive damages. (Doc. 51.) On February 21, 2014, the court denied the motion.
(Doc. 77.) On February 10, 2014, both Plaintiffs and Defendants filed the instant
motions to bifurcate. (See Docs. 58 & 61.) The motions have been fully briefed and
are ripe for disposition.3

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Plaintiff Danielle Stemrich was not involved in the motor vehicle collision and is not
claiming physical injuries related thereto, and is a party to this action only for her loss of consortium
claim. To that extent, unless otherwise noted, the court’s reference to “Plaintiff” refers only to Plaintiff
James Stemrich.
2

This court has jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
because: (1) Plaintiffs are Pennsylvania citizens, Defendant Zabiyaka is a citizen of Michigan, and
Defendant T.L. Transport, a limited liability corporation, maintains a registered office in Michigan; and
(2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
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The court finds no need for additional briefing and will accordingly deny Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to file a sur-reply. (Doc. 86.)
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II.

Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, a trial court may, in its

discretion, bifurcate a trial. The rule provides as follows:
For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and
economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or
more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or
third-party claims. When ordering a separate trial, the
court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The decision to bifurcate, and the manner in which bifurcation
should be ordered, is left to the trial court’s informed discretion and must be decided
on a case by case basis. See Idzojtic v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 456 F.2d 1228, 1230
(3d Cir. 1972) (“The district court is given broad discretion in reaching its decision
whether to separate the issues of liability and damages.”). In exercising its
discretion, the court “must weigh the various considerations of convenience,
prejudice to the parties, expedition, and economy of resources.” Emerick v. U.S.
Suzuki Motor Corp., 750 F.2d 19, 22 (3d Cir. 1984). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing that bifurcation is appropriate. See Innovative Office Prods.,
Inc. v. Spaceco, Inc., Civ. No. 05-cv-4037, 2006 WL 1340865, *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15,
2006).
The Third Circuit has noted that “this court has heretofore cast its lot
with the views expressed by the Advisory Committee that bifurcation ‘be encouraged
where experience has demonstrated its worth,’ but that ‘separation of issues for trial
is not to be routinely ordered.’” Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819, 824 (3d
Cir. 1978). The Third Circuit has also noted that “bifurcation is appropriate where
litigation of one issue . . . may eliminate the need to litigate a second issue.” In re
Bayside Prison Litig., 157 F. App’x 545, 547-48 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis in
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original). However, bifurcation is certainly not required in circumstances where the
“issues are so closely interwoven that the plaintiff would have to present the same
evidence twice in separate trials.” Id. at 548.

III.

Discussion
Defendants request the court hold separate proceedings on liability and

damages, which, at first glance, is a similar procedure to that proposed by Plaintiffs.
However, a closer examination of Defendants’ brief reveals that they actual request
the court compartmentalize liability, compensatory damages, and punitive damages
into three separate phases. (See Doc. 62.) Plaintiffs, on the other hand, request the
court bifurcate trial into two phases, wherein the jury will first receive and consider
evidence on the issues of liability, recklessness, and compensatory damages and then
receive evidence on the amount of punitive damages, if any. The court concludes
that bifurcation of the trial in the manner proposed by Defendants is inappropriate.
A.

Bifurcation of Punitive Damages from Remainder of Trial

Both Plaintiffs and Defendants recognize that the scope of the injuries
Plaintiff suffered and the possibility of punitive damages could create prejudice
against a wealthy company, as evidence of Defendants’ net worth is relevant when
presenting evidence on a claim for punitive damages but would not be relevant when
presenting evidence on Plaintiffs’ tort claims. The court agrees that the issue of
punitive damages is not so interwoven that Plaintiffs would have to present the same
evidence twice at separate trials. Moreover, a verdict in favor of Defendants on the
liability issue would completely eliminate the need to litigate the punitive damages
issue. However, evidence regarding Defendants’ mental state, i.e., whether
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Defendants acted negligently or with a reckless indifference to the safety of others, is
an interwoven issue with Plaintiffs’ tort claims. Indeed, the jury will have to
consider the same set of facts in determining whether Defendants acted with ordinary
negligence or reckless indifference. Thus, whether Defendants acted with reckless
indifference to Plaintiff’s safety is so interwoven with liability that it would most
expeditiously be presented during the phase of trial when Plaintiffs’ negligence
claims will be presented. Accordingly, the jury will consider whether Defendants
acted with a reckless disregard to the rights of Plaintiff before receiving evidence on
the extent of punitive damages.
B.

Bifurcation of Liability from Compensatory Damages

Defendants go a step further, however, and argue that presenting
evidence on the issue of consequential damages arising from Plaintiff’s injuries
during the liability phase may prejudice the jury, insofar as it may return a verdict in
favor of Plaintiffs for an improper reason, i.e., sympathy. The court, Defendants
argue, should therefore hold three separate proceedings to assess the consequences of
the collision in which the parties were involved: having the jury first return a verdict
on the issue of liability before receiving evidence on the nature and extent of
Plaintiffs’ injuries arising therefrom, all of which would be considered before
considering punitive damages. The court finds that this procedure would create a
needless waste of the court’s time and resources. Every civil trial contains questions
of liability and damages; indeed, an element of a negligence claim is that the plaintiff
suffered actual damages. See Schemberg v. Smicherko, ___ A.3d ____, ____, 2014
PA Super 23, *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 2014) (citing Mahan v. Am-Guard, Inc.,
841 A.2d 1052, 1058-59 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)) (“Generally, to prevail in a
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negligence case, a plaintiff must demonstrate . . . actual loss suffered by the
plaintiff.”). At issue in this case is the assigning of fault in a collision between an
automobile and a tractor trailer. That task is not so complicated that a jury needs to
consider the issue of liability in a separate proceeding before addressing
compensatory damages. The court cannot conclude that the jury will be confused by
the task of assigning fault for the accident and then, if appropriate, determining the
extent of Plaintiff’s injuries. Furthermore, the court finds that the issues of
negligence and consequential damages are inextricably linked, such that a bifurcation
would quite possibly create needless repetition of presentation of evidence and
testimony, costing additional time and resources. Thus, bifurcating liability from
consequential damages is not an economic use of judicial resources.
The court also finds that Defendants would not be subject to undue
prejudice because of the extensive damages Plaintiff claims he suffered due to
Defendants’ actions. Without predicting a result, the court notes that Plaintiff was
involved in an automobile accident that allegedly injured him severely. Plaintiffs
have evidence that Defendants’ actions caused that accident. If a jury accepts
Plaintiffs’ arguments on liability, they could receive substantial damages. Such are
the facts of the case. To accept Defendants’ position that the extensive liability to
which they are exposed creates prejudice and entitles them to a separate trial on
liability and damages would allow every defendant facing large liability for severe
injuries sustained as a result of his or her conduct to bifurcate trial into a liability and
compensatory damages phase. The court does not accept Defendants’ blanket
position that severe injuries (or a potentially large verdict) creates unfair prejudice
and the impossibility of a fair trial. Here, the court is confident that a proper
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explanation of the law and adequate jury instructions will cause the jurors to decide
Defendants’ liability based on the facts of the case, not based on sympathy for
Plaintiff’s condition. Accordingly, the court will deny Defendants’ motion to the
extent it seeks to compartmentalize the presentation of evidence regarding liability
from the presentation of evidence regarding the nature and extent of Plaintiffs’
injuries.

IV.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes bifurcation of the amount

of punitive damages from the balance of the trial is appropriate, but that the
compartmentalization of evidence regarding liability and evidence regarding the
nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries are inappropriate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
motion to bifurcate will be granted and Defendants’ motion to bifurcate will be
denied, and the trial will be conducted in a manner consistent with the accompanying
order that will issue and be docketed separately.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge
Dated: March 10, 2014.

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