Stemrich et al v. Zabiyaka et al

Filing 77

MEMORANDUM re dfts' MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment 51 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 02/21/14. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JAMES STEMRICH and
DANIELLE STEMRICH,
Plaintiffs
v.
OLEH ZABIYAKA and T.L.
TRANSPORT, LLC,
Defendants

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Civil No. 1:12-CV-1409

Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM
In this civil action invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiffs
have sued Defendants for injuries suffered as a result of a motor vehicle collision.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the driver, Defendant Zabiyaka, employed by
Defendant T.L. Transport, was negligent in operating a tractor trailer, owned by
Defendant T.L. Transport, causing a motor vehicle accident (Count I). Plaintiffs
further allege that Defendant T.L. Transport negligently hired/retained/supervised
Defendant Zabiyaka (Count II) and negligently entrusted him with its vehicles
(Count III). Plaintiffs also assert a cause of action against both Defendants for loss
of consortium (Count IV). Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant T.L. Transport
is vicariously liable for the negligence of Defendant Zabiyaka (Count I).
Before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc. 51), which seeks judgment in Defendants’ favor on Plaintiffs’ claim for
punitive damages. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion will be
denied.

I.

Background
A.

Parties

Plaintiffs, James Stemrich (“Plaintiff”) and Danielle Stemrich
(collectively “Plaintiffs”), husband and wife, are citizens of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 54, ¶ 1.) Defendant Oleh Zabiyaka (“Defendant Zabiyaka”), a
professional truck driver, is a citizen of Michigan and is employed by Defendant T.L.
Transport, LLC (“Defendant T.L. Transport”), a limited liability corporation with a
registered office in Michigan. (Doc. 52, ¶¶ 2, 3.)
B.

Facts1

On September 28, 2011, a tractor trailer operated by Defendant
Zabiyaka collided with an automobile driven by Plaintiff in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 52, ¶ 4.) The collision occurred on Interstate 83 North. (Doc.
54, ¶ 4(c).) Defendant Zabiyaka was driving behind Plaintiff in the right lane when
traffic came to a stop for an unknown reason. (Id.; Doc. 56, Ex. 1, at p. 2 of 6.)
Despite his being an experienced truck driver, knowing that the roads were “wet and
slick,” and having no visual obstructions, Defendant Zabiyaka failed to timely stop
his tractor trailer and consequently rear-ended Plaintiff’s automobile. (Doc. 56, Ex.
1, at p. 1 of 6.) The force of this collision caused Plaintiff’s automobile to rear-end
another automobile, which in turn rear-ended yet another automobile, injuring
Plaintiff in the process. (Id.)

In considering the instant motion, the court relied on uncontested facts or, if facts were disputed,
viewed the facts and deduced all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiffs as the nonmoving party. See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, 527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008)
(stating that on motion for summary judgment, evidentiary materials of record must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party).
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C.

Procedural History

During discovery, Plaintiffs produced an expert report, written by
Walter Guntharp (“Guntharp”). The report concluded that both Defendants had
violated numerous trucking regulations and opined that Defendant Zabiyaka had
operated his tractor trailer in a “reckless disregard for the safety of [Plaintiff] and
everyone else on the highway.” (Doc. 52, ¶ 6.) Based on Guntharp’s opinion, on
June 26, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting leave to amend their complaint to
include claims for punitive damages against both Defendants (Doc. 29), which the
court granted on July 2, 2013. (Doc. 34.) Defendants filed their answer on July 30,
2013. (Doc. 39.)
The deadline for discovery has now passed. (Doc. 28.) On December
16, 2013, Defendants filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment (Doc.
51), a statement of material facts (Doc. 52), and a supporting brief (Doc. 53). The
motion seeks judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive
damages. Plaintiffs filed an answer to the motion (Doc. 55), a brief in opposition
(Doc. 56), and an answer to the statement of material facts on January 6, 2014 (Doc.
54). Defendants filed a reply on January 20, 2014. (Doc. 57.) Thus, Defendants’
motion for partial summary judgment is ripe for disposition.
II.

Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is

appropriate only when no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and when the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
fact is “material” if “proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome
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of the lawsuit under the law applicable to the case.” Burke v. Transam Trucking,
Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (M.D. Pa. 2009). An issue of material fact is genuine
if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, all factual doubts and reasonable inferences are to be resolved in favor of the
nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue
of material fact exists. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (U.S. 1986).
Once this burden has been met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce
evidence proving the existence of every essential element to its case. Id. The
nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings by way of affidavits,
depositions . . . or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which give
rise to a genuine issue.” Id. at 324. In considering a motion for summary judgment,
the district court is not to engage in credibility determinations or the weighing the
evidence. Burke, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 650. Instead, when the credibility of witnesses
is at issue or when conflicting evidence must be weighed, a trial is needed. Id.
III.

Discussion
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment challenges only

Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages. (Doc. 51, ¶ 15.) Defendants argue that
summary judgment should be granted because “[t]here is no evidence of record in
this action [that] suggests . . . [Defendant] Zabiyaka or [Defendant T.L.] Transport
[were] reckless,” and therefore no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning
both Defendants’ recklessness. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion
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on the basis that “the record adequately supports a finding that Defendants’ acted
willfully, wantonly[,] and recklessly.” (Doc. 55 ¶ 13.)
A.

Punitive Damages Claim Against Defendant Zabiyaka

In the instant case, Pennsylvania substantive law will determine whether
a claim for punitive damages is supported by the record because the matter invokes
the court’s diversity jurisdiction and the underlying claims are based on
Pennsylvania law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); accord Burke,
605 F. Supp. 2d at 650-51.
In Pennsylvania, punitive damages may be awarded for “conduct that is
outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or . . . reckless indifference to the
rights of others.” Hutchinson v. Luddy, 870 A.2d. 766, 770 (Pa. 2005). Because
punitive damages are penal in nature, they are proper “only in cases where the
defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton[,] or reckless
conduct.” Id. This requires that the defendant’s state of mind must have been
intentional, reckless, or malicious while performing the actions at issue. See id.
Therefore, a punitive damages claim must be supported by evidence sufficient to
establish that: “(1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of harm to which the
plaintiff was exposed and[;]. . (2) he acted, or failed to act…in conscious disregard
of that risk.” Id. at 772.
Defendants argue that the record contains no evidence suggesting
Defendant Zabiyaka acted recklessly. (See Doc. 51, ¶ 13.) The court disagrees.
Plaintiffs’ expert produced a report providing details of the motor vehicle collision
that occurred between Plaintiff and Defendant Zabiyaka. (See Doc. 56, Ex. 1.) The
report incorporates Defendant Zabiyaka’s description of the interstate, namely that
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the roadway was “wet and slick” from rain. (Id. at p. 2 of 6.) Guntharp stated his
opinion that the primary causes of the collision were Defendant Zabiyaka’s speed,
the “inappropriate” distance at which Defendant Zabiyaka followed Plaintiff’s
vehicle, and Defendant Zabiyaka’s failure to maintain a proper look-out ahead of his
vehicle. (Id. at p. 5 of 6.) Additionally, Guntharp concluded that Defendant
Zabiyaka violated numerous Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs),
which are “designed to protect motorists from the negligence of truck drivers.”
(Doc. 53, ¶ 10.) Guntharp opined that, as a truck driver, Defendant Zabiyaka would
have been aware of the FMCSRs.2 (See Doc. 56, Ex. 1, at pp. 2-4 of 6.) For
Defendant Zabiyaka to operate his vehicle in the manner he did would necessarily
require his conscious disregard of his training.
A jury could reasonably find that a trained truck driver with six years of
experience consciously appreciated the risk of driving too close to another vehicle on
slick, wet roads.3 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not proved Defendant
Zabiyaka’s “subjective appreciation of the risk of harm [involved].” (Doc. 53, pp. 67 of 12 (emphasis added).) However, when a dispositive issue requires a
determination of a party’s state of mind, “a court should be reluctant to grant a
motion for summary judgment” because “much depends upon the credibility of
witnesses in testifying as to their own states of mind, and assessing credibility is a
delicate matter best left for the fact finder.” Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 521
Defendant Zabiyaka had copies of the FMCSRs in his truck and was aware of their presence. (Doc.
56, Ex. 3, p. 49 of 174.)
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Holding that punitive damages may be appropriate against a truck driver for driving in this manner is
not new. Courts in this district have previously held that an experienced driver of a tractor trailer could
be found to have consciously appreciated the risk he created by driving in the manner that caused
injuries to another. See, e.g., Burke, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 655; Randazzo v. Grandy, No. 3:CV-10-0154,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42006, *15-16 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2010).
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(3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Determining whether Defendant
Zabiyaka subjectively appreciated the risk of harm involved and whether he
consciously disregarded that risk requires an assessment of Defendant Zabiyaka’s
credibility, which this court will leave for the trier of fact. Therefore, because a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendant Zabiyaka consciously
disregarded a risk, the court will deny Defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment as it pertains to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against Defendant
Zabiyaka.
B.

Punitive Damages Claim Against Defendant T.L. Transport

Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against Defendant T.L. Transport on
the basis of two theories: (1) that Defendant T.L. Transport is vicariously liable for
Defendant Zabiyaka’s negligent driving; and (2) that Defendant T.L. Transport was
negligent in hiring/training/supervising Defendant Zabiyaka. (See Doc. 37.) The
court will address each of Defendants’ theories in turn.
i.

Vicarious Liability Claim

Regarding Plaintiffs’ first theory, because a jury could reasonably find
that Defendant Zabiyaka acted with reckless indifference to the rights of others
through the manner of his driving, Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages against
Defendant T.L. Transport must stand. It is well settled in Pennsylvania that punitive
damages may be awarded on the basis of vicarious liability. Seamans v.
Tramontana, No. 3:13-0698, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42006, *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22,
2013). An agent is not required to “commit a [tortious] act at the direction of his
principal, nor must the principal ratify the act, in order for punitive damages to be
imposed on him.” Id. Therefore, the court will deny Defendants’ motion for partial
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summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages on the basis of
vicarious liability.
ii.

Negligent Hiring/Training/Supervising Claim

Regarding Plaintiffs’ second theory, Defendants argue that the record
contains no evidence suggesting that Defendant T.L. Transport acted recklessly in
hiring/training/supervising Defendant Zabiyaka. (Doc. 51 ¶, 13.) The court
disagrees. Guntharp’s report detailed that, at the time of the accident, Defendant
T.L. Transport was operating in violation of numerous applicable FMCSRs. (See
Doc. 56, Ex. 1, at pp. 3-6 of 6.) Guntharp further reported that Defendant Zabiyaka
had failed to disclose on his employment application several accidents and violations
in which he had previously been involved and that Defendant T.L. Transport failed
to verify the information contained in Defendant Zabiyaka’s employment
application. (Id. at pp. 4-5 of 6.) Guntharp also reported that Defendant Zabiyaka
routinely falsified his driving logs, which Defendant T.L. Transport failed to audit,
and that “[h]ad [Defendant Zabiyaka] logged the distances and hours properly, he
would have been operating in excess of the regulations that are designed to prevent
the operation of a commercial vehicle by a fatigued driver.” (Id. at p. 3 of 6.)
Finally, Guntharp opined that Defendant T.L. Transport failed to follow the
“industry best practices.” (Id. at pp. 3-6 of 6.)
A jury could reasonably find that Defendant T.L. Transport consciously
appreciated the risk of hiring Defendant Zabiyaka without verifying the information
contained in his employment application and without auditing his driving logs,
despite being required to do so by the FMCSRs. A jury could also reasonably find
that Defendant T.L. Transport consciously disregarded that risk by allowing
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Defendant Zabiyaka to continue driving among the general public. It is not unusual
in Pennsylvania for a court to hold that punitive damages may be appropriate
regarding a trucking company’s negligent hiring and supervision of truck drivers.
See Burke, 605 F. Supp. at 655-58. For example, in Burke, the court allowed a
punitive damages claim to survive a motion for partial summary judgment when the
trucking company permitted one of its drivers to continue driving despite his history
of speeding, driving over hours, and log falsification. Id. The court reasoned that
the trucking company’s “subjective appreciation of the risk of harm may be
evidenced by knowledge attributable to the corporation of the risk attendant when
tractor trailer drivers operate in violation of the hours of service regulations, falsify
logs, and continually drive over the speed limit.” Id. at 656. The court finds the
Burke court’s reasoning applicable to and persuasive in the instant case. Therefore, a
genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Defendant T.L. Transport
subjectively appreciated the risk of harm in allowing Defendant Zabiyaka to drive
among the general public, which includes Plaintiff. Accordingly, the court will deny
Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as it pertains to Plaintiffs’ claim
for punitive damages against Defendant T.L. Transport on the theory of the negligent
hiring/training/supervising of Defendant Zabiyaka.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that a genuine issue of

material fact exists as to whether Defendants acted with reckless indifference to the
rights of others. The court will therefore deny Defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims.
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An appropriate order will be issued.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: February 21, 2014.

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