Montanez v. York City, Pennsylvania et al

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT this action is DISMISSEDwith prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on April 12, 2013. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALFREDO MONTANEZ,
Plaintiff
v.
YORK CITY, PENNSYLVANIA,
et al.,
Defendants

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 1:12-CV-1530
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
On December 17, 2012, we entered an order dismissing the above-captioned
action, but did so without prejudice to the plaintiff moving for leave within 20 days
for leave to file an amended complaint that corrected the deficiencies that we had
identified. The plaintiff failed to seek leave to amend within this period, and has in
fact failed to file any further documents or take another steps to litigate his claims.
We will now dismiss the complaint with prejudice and have the case marked
closed.
I.

BACKGROUND
Alfredo Montanez commenced the above-captioned action on August 7, 2012,

against York City, Pennsylvania, the York City Police Department, and one or more
unknown police officers. (Doc.1.) In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had
been subjected to unlawful arrest, excessive force, and assault by members of the

York City Police Department, and charged with a number of crimes including firearms
and drug offenses, and receiving stolen property. (Id.) On October 19, 2012, the
parties consented to proceed before the undersigned as a United States Magistrate
Judge assigned to this case. (Doc. 7.)
On November 2, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim, raising a number of dispositive arguments, including: (1) that
the claims alleged were time-barred; (2) that the York City Police Department is not
a legal entity capable of being sued; (3) that the plaintiff failed to make sufficient
allegations to support a claim for municipal liability; and (4) that the plaintiff’s claims
for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution fail as a matter of law. (Docs. 10,
11.) The plaintiff filed a brief opposing the motion, arguing generally that his claim
was timely and sufficiently pleaded, and requesting alternatively that he be given an
opportunity to amend the complaint if the Court concluded that it failed to state a
claim.
Upon consideration of the complaint and the parties’ briefs, we found that the
complaint as pleaded clearly failed as a matter of law.

(Doc. 18.)

In our

memorandum and order, we found that the plaintiff’s claim against the York City
Police Department failed as a matter of law because the department is not a separate
entity subject to the lawsuit. (Id. at 7.) We also found that the plaintiff’s claims for
2

damages for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution failed as a matter of
law. (Id. at 8-10.) We further concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege
sufficient facts to support a claim for municipal liability against the City of York. (Id.
at 10-16.) Finally, we declined to embrace the defendants’ arguments that the
plaintiff’s claims were necessarily time-barred for having been filed one day after the
two-year limitations period applicable to the claims in this case appears to have run,
finding that this argument was an affirmative defense, potentially factually dependent,
and not properly the basis for dismissal of the case as pleaded. (Id. at 16-19.) We
further observed that the plaintiff’s complaint also failed for other fundamental
reasons that we discussed at length, and thus although we found it “substantially
doubtful” that the continuing violations doctrine, the discovery rule, or principles of
equitable tolling could have any application or power to save the complaint from
being untimely, we based our decision to dismiss the complaint on the merits of the
claims as pled. (Doc. 18.)
Accordingly, on December 17, 2012, we entered an order dismissing the
complaint, but did so expressly without prejudice to the plaintiff seeking leave within
20 days of the order seeking leave to submit a motion to a motion for leave to amend
the complaint, together with a copy of the proposed amended complaint that addressed
the pleading deficiencies identified in the memorandum. (Id.)
3

The 20 day-period within which the plaintiff was required to seek leave to file
an amended complaint expired on Monday, January 6, 2013. The plaintiff did not
seek leave to amend the complaint before this date. It is now April 12, 2013, and the
plaintiff has not filed any additional pleadings, motions or other documents in this
case, and we find that he has now abandoned this action and that it should be
dismissed with prejudice, and the case marked closed.
II.

DISCUSSION
Although the plaintiff’s complaint was manifestly defective and failed to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted, we nevertheless endeavored to provide the
plaintiff with an opportunity to correct the deficiencies that we had identified for him.
Indeed, the plaintiff requested that the Court provide him with an opportunity to
amend if the complaint was found to subject to dismissal. We granted that request.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff has now failed to take any further steps to prosecute
this action, and dismissal with prejudice is now appropriate. “A district court has the
authority to dismiss a suit sua sponte for failure to prosecute by virtue of its inherent
powers and under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” Azubuko v. Bell Nat.
Organization, 243 F. App’x 728, 729 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). Dismissal of an action in this way is deemed to be an
adjudication on the merits, and bars further action between the parties. Id. (citing
4

Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1992). As the Third Circuit observed in
Azubuko, dismissal is warranted in a case such as this, where the district court
dismissed a complaint for failure to state a claim, provided the plaintiff with leave to
amend the complaint, but where the plaintiff failed to file a timely amended complaint
or otherwise failed to comply with court orders. Indeed, the Third Circuit further
observed that although in most cases a district court is required to consider and
balance six factors enumerated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d
863 (3d Cir. 1984), when considering, sua sponte, to order dismissal as a sanction, in
cases where “a litigant’s conduct makes adjudication of the case impossible . . . such
balancing under Poulis is unnecessary.” Azubuko, 243 F. App’x at 729 (citing Spain
v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994) and Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424,
1429-30 (3d Cir. 1990)).
In this case, we previously dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint because it
manifestly failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We provided the
plaintiff with an opportunity to seek leave to file an amended complaint if he believed
he could address and correct the deficiencies that we had noted with respect to that
pleading as originally filed. In this situation, where a deficient complaint is dismissed
without prejudice but the plaintiff refuses to timely amend the complaint, it is well
within the court’s discretion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice given the
5

plaintiff’s refusal to comply with court directives. Indeed, the precise course was
endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pruden v. SCI
Camp Hill, 252 F. App'x 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007). In Pruden, the appellate court
addressed how district judges should exercise discretion when a plaintiff ignores
instructions to amend a complaint. In terms that are equally applicable here the court
observed that:
The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and
allowed [the plaintiff] twenty days in which to file an amended
complaint. [The plaintiff] failed to do so. Because [the pro se plaintiff]
decided not to amend his complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it dismissed [the pro se plaintiff’s] complaint with
prejudice. See In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 704
(3d Cir.1996). The District Court expressly warned [the plaintiff] that the
failure to amend his complaint would result in dismissal of the action
with prejudice. “[I]t is difficult to conceive of what other course the
court could have followed.” Id. (quoting Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439,
455 (3d Cir.1994)).
Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F. App'x 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007).
The plaintiff here has declined this opportunity to amend, and we therefore conclude
that there is no reason why this case should not now be marked closed.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT this action is DISMISSED
with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States District Court

6