Montanez v. York City, Pennsylvania et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the plaintiffs motion forreconsideration (Doc. 20.) is GRANTED. The courts order dismissing this actionwith prejudice as to all parties (Doc. 19.) is VACATED. IT IS FURTHERORDERED THAT the claims against t he City of York and the York City PoliceDepartment are DISMISSED with prejudice. The claims against the Unknown PoliceOfficer are not dismissed, but the plaintiff shall file a status report on or before July 15, 2013 describing efforts to identify this putative party defendant. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on June 11, 2013. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALFREDO MONTANEZ,

:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
YORK CITY, PENNSYLVANIA, :
et al.,
:
:
Defendants
:

Civil No. 1:12-CV-1530
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Now pending before the court is the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of

the court’s order dismissing this action with prejudice as to all parties. (Doc. 20.)
The plaintiff argues that the case should have been dismissed only with respect to the
two defendants who moved for dismissal, but not as to a third, unidentified police
officer, who has not answered or otherwise moved to dismiss this case. For the
following reasons, we agree, and our order dismissing this action as to all parties with
prejudice will be modified.
II.

BACKGROUND
Alfredo Montanez commenced the above-captioned action on August 7, 2012,

against York City, Pennsylvania, the York City Police Department, and one or more

unknown police officers. (Doc.1.) In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had
been subjected to unlawful arrest, excessive force, and assault by members of the
York City Police Department, and charged with a number of crimes including
firearms and drug offenses, and receiving stolen property. (Id.) On October 19,
2012, the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned as a United States
Magistrate Judge assigned to this case. (Doc. 7.)
On November 2, 2012, the City of York and the York City Police Department
moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, raising a number of
dispositive arguments, including: (1) that the claims alleged were time-barred; (2)
that the York City Police Department is not a legal entity capable of being sued; (3)
that the plaintiff failed to make sufficient allegations to support a claim for municipal
liability; and (4) that the plaintiff’s claims for damages under the Pennsylvania
Constitution fail as a matter of law. (Docs. 10, 11.) The plaintiff filed a brief
opposing the motion, arguing generally that his claim was timely and sufficiently
pleaded, and requesting alternatively that he be given an opportunity to amend the
complaint if the court concluded that it failed to state a claim.
Upon consideration of the complaint and the parties’ briefs, we found that the
complaint as pleaded clearly failed as a matter of law.

(Doc. 18.)

In our

memorandum and order, we found that the plaintiff’s claim against the York City
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Police Department failed as a matter of law because the department is not a separate
entity subject to the lawsuit. (Id. at 7.) We also found that the plaintiff’s claims for
damages for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution failed as a matter of
law. (Id. at 8-10.) We further concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege
sufficient facts to support a claim for municipal liability against the City of York. (Id.
at 10-16.) Finally, we declined to embrace the defendants’ arguments that the
plaintiff’s claims were necessarily time-barred for having been filed one day after the
two-year limitations period applicable to the claims in this case appears to have run,
finding that this argument was an affirmative defense, potentially factually dependent,
and not properly the basis for dismissal of the case as pleaded. (Id. at 16-19.) We
further observed that the plaintiff’s complaint against these parties also failed for
other fundamental reasons that we discussed at length, and thus although we found
it “substantially doubtful” that the continuing violations doctrine, the discovery rule,
or principles of equitable tolling could have any application or power to save the
complaint from being untimely, we based our decision to dismiss the complaint on
the merits of the claims as pled. (Doc. 18.)
Accordingly, on December 17, 2012, we entered an order granting the motion
and dismissing the complaint, but did so expressly without prejudice to the plaintiff
seeking leave within 20 days of the order seeking leave to submit a motion to a
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motion for leave to amend the complaint, together with a copy of the proposed
amended complaint that addressed the pleading deficiencies identified in the
memorandum. (Id.)
The 20 day-period within which the plaintiff was required to seek leave to file
an amended complaint expired on Monday, January 6, 2013. The plaintiff did not
seek leave to amend the complaint before this date. Accordingly, on April 12, 2013,
we entered a memorandum order in which we concluded that the plaintiff had
abandoned this action, and we dismissed the case with prejudice against all parties.
(Doc. 20.)
On April 25, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of this order.
(Doc. 20.) In his motion, the plaintiff noted that in his original complaint, he had
named as defendants the City of York, the York City Police Department, as well as
an unknown police officer. (Doc. 20.) The plaintiff recited that Donald B. Hoyt, Esq.
entered his appearance for all defendants on August 15, 2012, and that on September
2, 2012, John Gonzalez, Esq. entered his appearance as counsel only to the City of
York and the York City Police Department. (Id.) Thereafter, on November 2, 2012,
counsel for the city and its police department moved to dismiss the complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 10.) As the plaintiff recites, this court entered an
order granting the motion to dismiss on December 17, 2012, but without prejudice to
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the plaintiff filing an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies that we had
identified. (Doc. 18.)
In his motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff represents that after reviewing
the court’s December 17, 2012 order, he elected not to pursue his claims against the
City of York or the York City Police Department, but instead decided to proceed
solely against the as yet unknown police officer named in the complaint, represented
by Attorney Hoyt. (Doc. 20, at 2.) The plaintiff argues that counsel for the unknown
police officer did not move to dismiss the claims against that defendant, and thus the
claims against that party should not have been included in the court’s order
dismissing the case with prejudice against all parties. (Id.) Notably, counsel for the
unidentified defendant did not respond to the plaintiff’s reconsideration motion. In
contrast, counsel for the City of York and the York City Police Department filed a
brief opposing the requested relief (Doc. 23.), even though the plaintiff’s motion
expressly did not seek reconsideration of the order dismissing this case against those
two defendants.
Upon consideration, we find that the plaintiff’s motion should be granted.
III.

DISCUSSION
The legal standards that govern motions for reconsideration of prior court

rulings are both clear and clearly compelling. “The purpose of a motion for
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reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985).
Typically, such a motion should only be granted in three narrowly defined
circumstances, where a court finds: (1) that there has been an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available; or (3)
a need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Howard Hess
Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)).
In consideration of this narrow standard, it is well-settled that a mere
disagreement with the court does not translate into the type of clear error of law
which justifies reconsideration of a ruling. Dodge v. Susquehanna Univ., 796 F.
Supp. 829, 830 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Furthermore, “[b]ecause federal courts have a
strong interest in the finality of judgments, motions for reconsideration should be
granted sparingly.” Continental Cas. Co. v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 884 F. Supp.
937, 943 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Moreover, a motion for reconsideration is not a tool to relitigate and reargue issues which have already been considered and disposed of by the
court. Dodge, 796 F. Supp. at 830.
Mindful of these stringent standards, we agree with the plaintiff that the court’s
dismissal order should not have encompassed the claims brought against the unknown
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officer. Although it is not clear whether the plaintiff has, by this time, determined the
identity of this unnamed defendant, or whether the plaintiff’s claims against this
defendant were in fact timely filed, we do find that our order dismissing this case with
prejudice (Doc. 19.) should be modified so as to dismiss only those claims against the
two defendants who actually moved for dismissal – the City of York and the York
City Police Department.
The plaintiff has conceded that he abandoned his claims against those parties,
and for that reason elected not to file an amended complaint as to them following the
court’s disposition of their motion to dismiss. However, the plaintiff represents that
he did not abandon his claims against the unidentified officer, and that this defendant
– who has at all times been represented by separate counsel – never moved to dismiss
the claims brought against him. We agree. Accordingly, we will modify our prior
order to clarify that it applies only to the City of York and the York City Police
Department, and not to the unknown police officer.
In modifying our prior order, however, we observe that the plaintiff should take
steps promptly to move to amend the complaint in order to identify the unnamed
police officer. Additionally, we underscore that nothing in this order shall be
construed as a final determination regarding the timeliness or threshold merits of the

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plaintiff’s claims against the unknown police officer, who has not yet answered or
otherwise responded to the claims against him in this case.
IV.

ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration (Doc. 20.) is GRANTED. The court’s order dismissing this action
with prejudice as to all parties (Doc. 19.) is VACATED.

IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED THAT the claims against the City of York and the York City Police
Department are DISMISSED with prejudice. The claims against the Unknown Police
Officer are not dismissed, but the plaintiff shall file a status report on or before July
15, 2013 describing efforts to identify this putative party defendant.
So ordered this 11th day of June 2013.

/S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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