Williams et al v. City of Harrisburg et al

Filing 32

ORDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 23 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED and Counts Two and Five of the complaint are DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Dft City of Hbg from this action. Signed by Chief Judge Yvette Kane on July 18, 2013. (sc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERA WILLIAMS and
T’JUANNE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs
v.
CITY OF HARRISBURG, et al.,
Defendants

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No. 1:12-CV-1566
(Chief Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
Presently pending before the Court is Defendant City of Harrisburg’s motion for partial
dismissal of Plaintiffs Tera Williams and T’Juanne Williams’s amended complaint. (Doc. No.
24.) For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion and dismiss Counts Two and
Five of the amended complaint.
I.

BACKGROUND
The background of this case is set forth in detail in the Court’s prior order dismissing

without prejudice Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Defendant City of Harrisburg. (Doc.
No. 20.) However, the Court will briefly review the relevant procedural and factual
background.1
On August 10, 2012, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint against the City
of Harrisburg, Officer Matthew Haflett, and four unnamed police officers. (Doc. No. 1.) In their
original complaint, Plaintiffs brought four claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and two state-

In reviewing the motion to dismiss, the Court will accept Plaintiffs’ factual allegations
as true and will “consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Lum v. Bank
of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).
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law claims. These claims arise out of an August 3, 2011 altercation between Plaintiff Tera
Williams and five members of the Harrisburg Police Department. (Id. ¶ 8.) On January 17,
2013, the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against Defendant
City of Harrisburg, because Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to impute liability on
Harrisburg under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 31, 2013. (Doc. No. 22.) Plaintiffs’
amended complaint is nearly identical to their original complaint, but contains a few additional
factual details. According to the amended complaint, on August 3, 2011, Plaintiff Tera Williams
called the police to report an altercation near her home. (Id. ¶¶ 8-11.) As Ms. Williams was
consoling her distraught neighbor who had intervened in the fight, Officer Matthew Haflett
arrived on the scene and allegedly grabbed Ms. Williams by the arm, demanding to speak with
her. (Id. ¶¶ 13-17.) A verbal altercation ensued, and Plaintiffs allege that Officer Haflett
“slammed [Plaintiff Tera Williams] to the ground,” before handcuffing her. (Id. ¶¶ 18-22.)
Plaintiffs further allege that Ms. Williams was placed in a police cruiser, dropped off at a
convenience store a few blocks away, and allowed to “limp back” to her home in great pain
while “bleeding profusely.” (Id. ¶¶ 24-40.) Plaintiffs allege that the “assault on Plaintiff Tera
Williams took place within inches of the horrified Plaintiff T’Juanne Williams.,” Plaintiff Tera
Williams’s daughter. (Id. ¶ 26.)
On February 5, 2013, Defendant City of Harrisburg moved to dismiss all of the claims
against it, arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to impute liability on it.
(Doc. No. 23.) Plaintiffs timely filed a brief in opposition on February 19, 2013. (Doc. No. 26.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the
complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In reviewing a motion to
dismiss, a court may “consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the
complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Lum, 361
F.3d at 221 n.3. The motion will only be properly granted when, taking all factual allegations
and inferences drawn therefrom as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990). The burden is on the
moving party to show that no claim has been stated. Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir.
1980). Thus, the moving party must show that Plaintiff has failed to “set forth sufficient
information to outline the elements of his claim or to permit inferences to be drawn that those
elements exist.” Kost, 1 F.3d at 183 (citations omitted). A court, however, “need not credit a
complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906, 908 (3d Cir. 1997). While the 12(b)(6) standard
does not require “detailed factual allegations,” there must be a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket
assertion of entitlement to relief. . . . ‘[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Put otherwise, a civil complaint must “set out ‘sufficient
factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578
F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1955 (2009)).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleges six causes of action: (1) a Section 1983 claim,

alleging several constitutional violations, brought by Plaintiff Tera Williams against the
individual Defendants (Count One); (2) a Monell claim brought by Plaintiff Tera Williams
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against Defendant City of Harrisburg (Count Two); (3) supplemental state-law claims brought by
Defendant Tera Williams against the individual Defendants (Count Three); (4) a Section 1983
claim brought by Plaintiff T’Juanne Williams against the individual Defendants (Count Four);
(5) a Monell claim brought by Plaintiff T’Juanne Williams against Defendant City of Harrisburg
(Count Five); and (6) supplemental state-law claims brought by T’Juanne Williams against the
individual Defendants (Count Six). (Doc. No. 22.) As in its motion to dismiss the original
complaint, Defendant City of Harrisburg moved to dismiss Counts Two and Five of the amended
complaint, the only counts that are raised against it. (Doc. No. 23.)
First, Defendant City of Harrisburg argues that the Section 1983 claims raised against it
for failure to train its employees must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have failed to plead a valid
Monell claim. (Doc. No. 24 at 3-7.) As in their original complaint, Plaintiffs Tera and T’Juanne
Williams both assert Section 1983 claims against Defendant City of Harrisburg for failing to
adequately train its employees, resulting in constitutional violations. Specifically, Plaintiffs
allege that the City of Harrisburg failed to provide its officers with sensitivity training in race
relations, and that the City knew or should have known that the interaction between white
officers and residents of predominantly black communities “creates a risk of harm for all in
emotionally charged and volatile situations.” (Doc. No. 22 ¶¶ 57-58, 86-87.) Moreover,
Plaintiffs allege that the City of Harrisburg “was deliberately indifferent to foreseeable
constitutional use of force violations.” (Id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiffs further allege that the lack of proper
race relations training caused the constitutional violations lodged against the individual
Defendants, arising from the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 65, 89.)

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As the Court explained in its order dismissing Plaintiffs’ original complaint, the general
rule is that “a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a
tortfeasor.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). However, “there are
limited circumstances in which an allegation for a ‘failure to train’ can be the basis for
[municipal] liability under § 1983.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989). To
state a claim for failure to train, a plaintiff must establish that the supervising defendant’s
“failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact.” Id. at 388. The standard of deliberate indifference is, however, a “stringent
standard of fault,” which requires proof that the supervisor “disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action.” Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). “A pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate
deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350,
1359 (2011) (citing Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). Additionally, a “continued adherence to an
approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees”
may constitute deliberate indifference. Id. (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409). “A plaintiff
pressing a § 1983 [failure to train] claim must identify a failure to provide specific training that
has a causal nexus with their injuries and must demonstrate that the absence of that specific
training can reasonably be said to reflect a deliberate indifference to whether the alleged
constitutional deprivations occurred.” Reitz v. Cnty. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997)
(citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378; Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017 (3d Cir.
1991)).
The Court has previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ Monell claims as insufficiently pleaded.
In the Court’s order partially dismissing Plaintiffs’ original complaint, the Court noted that
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Plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts to support a finding that the failure to train the
police officers constituted deliberate indifference, that an increased risk of harm was an obvious
consequence of the lack of racial sensitivity training, or that there was a pattern of similar
constitutional violations by members of the Harrisburg Police Department. (Doc. No. 20 at 6-7
(citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388; Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409-10).) Plaintiffs have failed
to cure these defects; their amended complaint is nearly identical to their original complaint,
containing only a few additional factual allegations. For instance, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
alleges that their community is considered to be a trouble spot for gang disturbances. (Doc. No.
22 ¶¶ 55-56.) Moreover, in their amended complaint, Plaintiffs assert, without explanation or
detail, that the City of Harrisburg “was deliberately indifferent to foreseeable constitutional use
of force violations.” (Id. ¶ 22.) The Court need not credit such a conclusory statement, as the
assertion is not sufficient to raise their right to relief above the speculative level. See Morse, 132
F.3d at 906, 908; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, as with their original complaint,
Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead a causal nexus between their alleged failure to train
and their alleged injuries. See Reitz, 125 F.3d at 145. Plaintiffs’ assertions that the City of
Harrisburg failed to provide its officers with racial sensitivity training, and that it “knew or
should have known” that there was a risk of harm when white police officers interacted with
residents of predominantly black neighborhoods are not enough to state a Monell claim for
failure to train. Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the City of
Harrisburg.
Next, Defendant City of Harrisburg again argue s that all claim s against it by Plaintif f
T’Juanne Williams must be dismissed because she has failed to suffi ciently plead an underlying
constitutional violation. (Doc. No. 24 at 8-11.) Because the Court will dismiss all of the claims
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against the City of Harrisburg for
failure to state a claimunder Monell, the Court need not determ
ine
whether Plaintiff T’Juanne Williams has failed to identify an underlying constitutional violation.
In their brief in opposition to Defendant City of Harrisburg’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs
request leave to amend their complaint after some discovery, in the event that the Court finds that
they have failed to state a claim against the City of Harrisburg. (Doc. No. 26 at 5.) Rule 15 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure perm amendment of pleadings once as amatter of course within
its
21 days of s ervice, or, with leave of court or consent from the opposing party, where justice so
requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Plaintiffs have been granted leave to amend their complaint, and
have failed to cure the defects noted by the Court. Leave to amend, at this stage, would serve only
to delay the litigation of this action. At a later stage, should Plaintiffs believe that further leave to
amend their complaint is warranted, they may file a motion to that effect.
IV.

CONCLUSION
As with their original complaint, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to support

a claim against Defendant City of Harrisburg for fa
iling to train its police officers. Thus, the Court
will dismiss Counts Two and Five of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
An order consistent with this memorandum follows.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TERA WILLIAMS and
T’JUANNE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs
v.
CITY OF HARRISBURG, et al.,
Defendants

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No. 1:12-CV-1566
(Chief Judge Kane)

ORDER
AND NOW, on this 18th day of July 2013, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 23) is GRANTED, and Counts Two and Five of
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint are DISMISSED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Defendant City of Harrisburg from this action.
S/ Yvette Kane
Yvette Kane, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania

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