Ridgway v. Astrue

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION (Order to follow as separate docket entry) - Wwe will order that this case be remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 30, 2014. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT RIDGWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.

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Civil No. 1:12-CV-1796

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Introduction

In this case we are asked to consider whether substantial evidence supports an
ALJ’s decision denying benefits to the plaintiff, when the ALJ’s decision included
a form of ad hoc lay medical analysis by the ALJ expressed in terms that have been
repeatedly rejected and criticized by the courts, a lay opinion which was also
inconsistent with the factual findings set forth in the ALJ’s decision. Finding that
these errors, in combination, lead us to conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence, we will order that this case be remanded for
further consideration by the Commissioner.

II.

Statement of Facts and of The Case

The plaintiff, Robert Ridgway, was approximately 40 years old at the time of
the alleged onset of his disability and had completed the 12th grade of high school
in a special education program. (Tr. 42-43.) On June 3, 2009, Ridgway applied for
Supplemental Security Income benefits, claiming that he had become disabled on
May 15, 2009, as a result of a constellation of physical and mental conditions,
including serious low back pain due to degenerative disc disease and a congenital
spine abnormality, fibromyalgia, depression, anxiety, GERD, and Irritable Bowel
Syndrome. (Tr. 112-115.)
On November 3, 2010, an ALJ conducted a hearing in Ridgway’s case. (Tr.
37-68.) At this hearing, Ridgway and a vocational expert appeared and testified.
(Id.) Following this hearing, on January 21, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision, denying
Ridgway’s application for benefits. (Tr. 9-25.) In reaching this decision, the ALJ
found that Ridgway suffered from a series of severe impairments including
fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, congenital spine abnormality, major
depressive disorder, and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 11.) The ALJ also recognized that
Ridgway’s claims of intractable pain due to these disorders was a crucial component
of this disability claim. The ALJ’s treatment of the question of Ridgway’s pain,
however, was speculative and inconsistent.
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At the outset, the ALJ’s decision thoroughly documented the treatment that
Ridgway sought over the years for his fibromyalgia and other pain-related syndromes.
(Tr. 14-22.) In the course of this discussion, the ALJ specifically noted the effect of
this disabling pain upon Ridgway’s gait and ability to walk, and ultimately concluded
that Ridgway “also requires the use of a cane for ambulation.” (Tr. 14.)
However, after carefully documenting Ridgway’s complaints of pain, and
concluding that Ridgway could not longer walk without a cane, the ALJ summarily
discounted Ridgway’s medically documented claims of pain as disabling in a fashion
which seemed to express a lay medical opinion, stating:
In this case, the claimant’s case in establishing disability concerning his
physical impairments is also directly dependent on the element of pain
which is of an intractable nature. Pain is subjective and difficult to
evaluate, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Nevertheless, most
organic diseases produce manifestations other than pain and it is
possible to evaluate the underlying processes and degree of resultant
impairment by considering all of the symptoms. Generally, when an
individual has suffered pain over an extended period, there will be
observable signs such as a significant loss of weight, an altered gait or
limitation of motion, local morbid changes, or poor coloring or station.
In the present case, the claimant has complained of pain over an
extended period of time. None of the above signs of chronic pain are
evident. While not conclusory by itself, this factor contributes to the
determination that the claimant is not disabled as a result of pain.
(Tr. 23.)(emphasis added.)

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Thus, the ALJ’s decision in this case rested, in large part, on the ALJ’s decision
to discount Ridgway’s medically supported complaints of intractable pain. That
decision, in turn, was based largely upon a lay, ad hoc medical opinion by the ALJ
regarding how Ridgway’s pain should have manifested itself. Moreover, this lay
opinion was further undermined by an internal inconsistency. The ALJ discounted
Ridgway’s claims of pain, in part, based upon a finding that this pain should be
confirmed by “an altered gait or limitation of motion,” stating that: “In the present
case, the claimant has complained of pain over an extended period of time. None of
the above signs of chronic pain are evident.” (Tr. 23.)(emphasis added.) Yet, the
ALJ’s decision contradicted this conclusion that Ridgway displayed no altered gait
due to pain since the ALJ expressly concluded that Ridgway “also requires the use
of a cane for ambulation.” (Tr. 14.)
After exhausting his administrative appeals of this adverse ALJ decision,
Ridgway filed this civil action seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s disability
determination. (Doc. 1.) The parties have fully briefed this matter, (Docs. 9 and 10.),
and this case is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, we find that
it is necessary for this matter to be remanded

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III.

Discussion
A.

Standards of Review–The Roles of the Administrative Law
Judge and This Court
1.

Initial Burdens of Proof , Persuasion and Articulation
for the ALJ

Resolution of the instant social security appeal involves an informed
consideration of the respective roles of two adjudicators–the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) and this Court. At the outset, it is the responsibility of the ALJ in the
first instance to determine whether a claimant has met the statutory prerequisites for
entitlement to benefits. To receive disability benefits, a claimant must present
evidence which demonstrates that the claimant has an “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
432(d)(1)(A). Furthermore,
[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [her]
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
[she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot,
considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area
in which [she] lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for [her],
or whether [she] would be hired if [she] applied for work. For purposes
of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), “work which
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exists in the national economy” means work which exists in significant
numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In making this determination the ALJ employs a five-step evaluation process
to determine if a person is eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
See also Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999). If the ALJ finds that
a plaintiff is disabled or not disabled at any point in the sequence, review does not
proceed any further. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. As part of this analysis the ALJ must
sequentially determine, first, whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity. If a claimant is not engaged in gainful activity, the ALJ must then determine
at step two whether the claimant has a severe impairment. If a claimant fails to show
that his impairments are “severe,” he is ineligible for disability benefits. See
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999). The Regulations provide that
a “severe” impairment is an “impairment or combination of impairments which
significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20
C.F.R. §404.1520.
With respect to this threshold showing of a severe impairment, the showing
required by law has been aptly described in the following terms: “In order to meet
the step two severity test, an impairment need only cause a slight abnormality that
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has no more than a minimal effect on the ability to do basic work activities. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1521,416.921; S.S.R. 96-3p, 85-28. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that the step two severity inquiry is a ‘de minimusscreening device
to dispose of groundless claims.’ McCrea v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360
(3d Cir.2004); Newell v. Comm. of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir.2003). ‘Any
doubt as to whether this showing has been made is to be resolved in favor of the
applicant.’ Id.” Velazquez v. Astrue, No. 07-5343, 2008 WL 4589831, *3 (E.D. Pa.,
Oct. 15, 2008). Thus, “[t]he claimant's burden at step two is ‘not an exacting one.’
McCrea v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir.2004).
Once this threshold, de minimus showing is made, “[i]n step three, the ALJ
must determine whether [a claimant’s] impairment matches, or is equivalent to, one
of the listed impairments. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. If the impairment is
equivalent to a listed impairment, then [the claimant] is per se disabled and no further
analysis is necessary. See id.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112,
119 (3d Cir. 2000). The claimant, “bears the burden of presenting medical findings
showing that her impairment meets or equals a listed impairment. Burnett v.
Commissioner, 220 F.3d 112, 120 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2000). ‘For a claimant to show that
his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria.
An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely,
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does not qualify.’ Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d
967 (1990).” Hernandez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 198 F. App'x 230, 234 (3d Cir.
2006). This Step 3 analysis must also be accompanied by a discussion of the
evidence which is sufficient to permit informed judicial review. Burnett v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 120 (3d Cir. 2000).
Finally at Steps 4 and 5, the ALJ must consider whether the claimant’s
impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and whether the
claimant’s impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520. This disability determination involves shifting burdens of proof.
The initial burden rests with the claimant to demonstrate that he is unable to engage
in past relevant work. If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner
must show that jobs exist in the national economy that a person with the claimant's
abilities, age, education, and work experience can perform. Mason v. Shalala, 994
F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). If the ALJ finds that a Plaintiff is disabled or not
disabled at any point in the sequence, review does not proceed any further. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520.
The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic procedural and
substantive requisites.

Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a

requirement that the ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this
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disability determination. Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the
substantial evidence standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by "a clear
and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must
indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons
for rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate
in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis
for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Com. of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).
2.

Judicial Review of ALJ Determinations–Standard of
Review

Once the ALJ has made a disability determination, it is then the responsibility
of this Court to independently review that finding. In undertaking this task, this
Court applies a specific, well-settled and carefully articulated standard of review. In
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security denying plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits, Congress has
specifically provided that the “findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]” 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).

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The “substantial evidence” standard of review prescribed by statute is a
deferential standard of review. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).
When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, we must simply determine whether
the denial is supported by substantial evidence. Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,
1213 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198,
200 (3d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable
amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d
Cir. 1999).” Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200. See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552
(1988). It is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla
of proof. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence
means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)(quoting
Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995).
A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores
countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason
v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). However, in an adequately developed
factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the
evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
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evidence does not prevent [the decision] from being supported by substantial
evidence." Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
Moreover, in conducting this review we are cautioned that “an ALJ's findings based
on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight and deference,
particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness's demeanor
and credibility.’ Walters v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th
Cir.1997); see also Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801
(10th Cir.1991) (‘We defer to the ALJ as trier of fact, the individual optimally
positioned to observe and assess witness credibility.’).” Frazier v. Apfel, No. 99-715,
2000 WL 288246, *9 (E.D. Pa. March 7, 2000). Furthermore, in determining if the
ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court may not parse the record
but rather must scrutinize the record as a whole. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968,
970 (3d Cir. 1981).
3.

Legal Benchmarks for Assessing a Claimant’s
Allegations of Pain

This case entails evaluation of an ALJ’s assessment of the plaintiff’s claims of
chronic pain. In assessing a claimant’s allegations of pain, we begin by recognizing
that “[t]estimony of subjective pain and inability to perform even light work is
entitled to great weight.” Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir.1979),

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Given the “great weight” which this evidence should receive, an ALJ may only “reject
a claim of disabling pain where he ‘consider[s] the subjective pain and specif[ies] his
reasons for rejecting these claims and support[s] his conclusion with medical
evidence in the record.’ Matullo v. Bowen, 926 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir.1990).”
Harkins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 399 F. App'x 731, 735 (3d Cir. 2010).
Where a disability determination turns on an assessment of the level of a
claimant’s pain, the Social Security Regulations provide a framework under which
a claimant’s subjective complaints are to be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Such
cases require the ALJ to “evaluate the intensity and persistence of the pain or
symptom, and the extent to which it affects the individual’s ability to work.”
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). Cases involving an assessment
of subjective reports of pain “obviously require[ ]” the ALJ “to determine the extent
to which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he
or she is disabled by it.” Id. In making this assessment, the ALJ is guided both by
statute and by regulations. This guidance eschews wholly subjective assessments of
a claimant’s disability. Instead. at the outset, by statute the ALJ is admonished that
an “individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive
evidence of disability as defined in this section; there must be medical signs and
findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic
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techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered
with all the evidence. . . , would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a
disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).
Applying this statutory guidance, the Social Security Regulations provide a
framework under which a claimant’s subjective complaints are to be considered. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529. Under these regulations, first, symptoms, such as pain, shortness
of breath, and fatigue, will only be considered to affect a claimant’s ability to perform
work activities if such symptoms result from an underlying physical or mental
impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by medical signs or laboratory
findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (a)-(c). Once a medically determinable impairment
which results in such symptoms is found to exist, the Commissioner must evaluate
the intensity and persistence of such symptoms to determine their impact on the
claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (a)-(c). In so doing, the medical
evidence of record is considered along with the claimant’s statements. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529 (a)-(c). Social Security Ruling 96-7p gives the following instructions in
evaluating the credibility of the claimant’s statements regarding his symptoms: “In
general, the extent to which an individual's statements about symptoms can be relied
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upon as probative evidence in determining whether the individual is disabled depends
on the credibility of the statements. In basic terms, the credibility of an individual's
statements about pain or other symptoms and their functional effects is the degree to
which the statements can be believed and accepted as true. When evaluating the
credibility of an individual's statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case
record and give specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's statements.”
SSR 96-7p. SSR 96-4p provides that “Once the existence of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce the
pain or other symptoms alleged has been established on the basis of medical signs and
laboratory findings, allegations about the intensity and persistence of the symptoms
must be considered with the objective medical abnormalities, and all other evidence
in the case record, in evaluating the functionally limiting effects of the
impairment(s).” SSR 96-4p.
There is a necessary corollary to this rule governing ALJ treatment of medical
evidence concerning a claimant’s pain. It is also well-settled that:
Because they are not treating medical professionals, ALJs cannot make
medical conclusions in lieu of a physician: ALJs, as lay people, are not
permitted to substitute their own opinions for opinions of physicians.
This rule applies to observations about the claimant's mental as well as
physical health. As the Seventh Circuit stated, “[J]udges, including
administrative law judges of the Social Security Administration, must
be careful not to succumb to the temptation to play doctor.”
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Accordingly, “[a]n ALJ cannot disregard medical evidence simply
because it is at odds with the ALJ's own unqualified opinion.” Nor is
the ALJ allowed to “play doctor” by using her own lay opinions to fill
evidentiary gaps in the record. Carolyn A. Kubitschek & Jon C. Dubin,
Social Security Disability Law and Procedure in Federal Courts, § 6:24
(2013) (citations omitted).
Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 779 (W.D. Pa. 2013).

B.

The ALJ’s Decision Is Not Supported By Substantial
Evidence and Will be Remanded

Judged against these legal guideposts, we find that the ALJ erred in her
assessment of Ridgway’s complaints of intractable pain in a way which compels a
remand of this case for further consideration. Specifically, we find that the ALJ erred
when discounting Ridgway’s own complaints of persistent pain in a manner which
seemed to express a lay medical opinion, by stating:
In this case, the claimant’s case in establishing disability concerning his
physical impairments is also directly dependent on the element of pain
which is of an intractable nature. Pain is subjective and difficult to
evaluate, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Nevertheless, most
organic diseases produce manifestations other than pain and it is
possible to evaluate the underlying processes and degree of resultant
impairment by considering all of the symptoms. Generally, when an
individual has suffered pain over an extended period, there will be
observable signs such as a significant loss of weight, an altered gait or
limitation of motion, local morbid changes, or poor coloring or station.
In the present case, the claimant has complained of pain over an
extended period of time. None of the above signs of chronic pain are
evident. While not conclusory by itself, this factor contributes to the
determination that the claimant is not disabled as a result of pain.
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(Tr. 23.)(emphasis added.)
In our view, this conclusion is erroneous on two scores, each of which compels
a remand of this matter. First, the ALJ’s decision to discount these claims of pain is
internally inconsistent with the residual functional capacity assessment made by the
ALJ. When discounting Ridgway’s claims of pain, the ALJ opined that this pain
should be confirmed by “an altered gait or limitation of motion,” and stated that: “In
the present case, the claimant has complained of pain over an extended period of
time. None of the above signs of chronic pain are evident.” (Tr. 23.)(emphasis
added.) Yet, in framing an RFC for Ridgway, the ALJ contradicted this conclusion
that Ridgway displayed no altered gait due to pain since the ALJ expressly found that
Ridgway “also requires the use of a cane for ambulation.”

(Tr. 14.)

This

inconsistency, standing alone, compels a remand here to reconcile the ALJ’s legal
conclusions with her factual findings.
Moreover, we are also constrained to note that the precise language found in
this opinion and relied upon by the ALJ to reject Ridgway’s claims of pain has been
used in the past by ALJs to discount complaints of pain, and has been roundly
condemned by the courts. Thus, in the past we have criticized this type of sweeping
generalization on two different grounds, finding that it is either an unsupported
factual conclusion or an improper lay medical opinion. Wolfe v. Colvin, CIV.A.
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3:12-1868, 2014 WL 1689967 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2014); Reader v. Colvin, 1:12-CV1623, 2014 WL 1653090 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2014); Goss v. Astrue, 1:12-CV-1349,
2014 WL 888497 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2014); Witkowski v. Colvin, 1:CV-13-0161,
2014 WL 580204 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2014), comparing Kostelnick v. Astrue, No.
12–CV–901, 2013 WL 6448859, at *7 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 9, 2013); Kinney v. Astrue, No.
11–CV–1848, 2013 WL 877164, at *2–3 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 8, 2013); Ennis v. Astrue,
No. 11–CV–1788, 2013 WL 74375, at *8 (M.D.Pa. Jan. 4, 2013); Hughes v. Astrue,
No. 10–CV–2574, 2012 WL 833039, at *12–13 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 12, 2012); Daniels v.
Astrue, No. 08–CV–1676, 2009 WL 1011587, at *17 (M.D.Pa. April 15,
2009)(finding language to be unsupported factual finding); with Ferari v. Astrue, No.
07–CV–1287, 2008 WL 2682507, at *7 (M.D.Pa. July 1, 2008); Morseman v. Astrue,
571 F.Supp.2d 390, 396–97 (W.D.N.Y.2008) (finding this language to be an improper
lay medical opinion).
The ALJ’s reliance upon this erroneous boilerplate language is particularly
troublesome in this case which involved a diagnosis of fibromyalgia since
fibromyalgia is notable its lack of objective diagnostic signs. In fact, in Foley v.
Barnhart, 432 F.Supp.2d 465 (M.D.Pa. 2005), this Court recognized that with respect
to determinations involving fibromyalgia, it is reversible error to require objective
findings, since the disease itself eludes such measurement. Id. at 475. While we
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appreciate the difficulties and challenges which assessment of the disabling impact
of fibromyalgia entails, in our view labels cannot substitute for analysis in this field.
Therefore, an ALJ cannot dismiss the claimant’s medically supported description of
intractable pain, by simply substituting her own medically invalid lay opinion,
particularly when the ALJ finds that the claimant suffers from fibromyalgia, a
diagnosis that is recognized as a disabling condition. Foley v. Barnhart, 432
F.Supp.2d 465 (M.D.Pa. 2005).
Accordingly, the ALJ’s reliance upon this inappropriate lay opinion, coupled
with the failure to reconcile the inconsistencies between this lay opinion and the facts
found by the ALJ, compels us to recommend that this case be remanded for further
proceedings. Yet, while case law calls for a remand and further proceedings by the
ALJ in this case assessing Ridgway’s claim under the five-step sequential analysis
applicable to such claims in accordance with this opinion, nothing in this opinion
should be construed as suggesting what the ultimate outcome of that final and full
analysis should be. Instead, we simply direct that this analysis on remand reconcile
these inconsistencies and refrain from a lay medical judgment of the type which has
been disapproved by this Court in the past.
An appropriate order will follow.

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S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: September 30, 2014

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