Gebhart v. Steffen et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER -AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2013, upon consideration of deft.'s mtn. for jgm. on the pleadings 25 , & plf.'s response thereto, & pur. to the accompanying Memorandum, it is ordered that: 1. Deft.'s mtn. is GRANTED. 2. Plf. may file an amd. complt., on her malicious prosecution claim, w/in twenty (20) days of the dt. of this order, if she chooses to do so. (See memo for complete details.) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 6/27/13. (am)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GLORIA GEBHART,
Plaintiff
vs.

DAVID STEFFEN
Defendant

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: CIVIL NO. 1:12-CV-1837
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MEMORANDUM

I.

Introduction
We are considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by

Defendant, David Steffen. This matter relates to the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff,
Gloria Gebhart. Plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging Defendants, David Steffen and
Timothy Barker, maliciously prosecuted her and abused the legal process. On January
15, 2013, we granted Defendant Barker’s motion to dismiss the complaint and gave
Plaintiff leave to amend. On February 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On
February 26, 2013, Defendant Barker filed a second motion to dismiss. On March 4,
2013, Defendant Steffen filed an answer to the complaint. On April 15, 2013, we granted
Defendant Timothy Barker’s motion to dismiss all claims against him.

II.

Standard of Review
We are considering Defendant Steffen’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Since the motion argues that the complaint fails to
state a claim, we review it under the standard used for motions to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Turbe v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991);
Bangura v. City of Philadelphia, 338 F. App’x 261, 264 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential).
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “accept all factual
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint
need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and
detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d. 929 (2007), a complaint must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels and
conclusions” are not enough, and a court “‘is not bound to accept as true a legal

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conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoted case
omitted).
In resolving a motion to dismiss, we thus “conduct a two-part analysis.”
Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual elements from the legal
elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, we “determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoted case omitted).
III.

Background
The following facts are set forth in Plaintiff’s amended complaint and are

taken as true. See Turbe, 938 F.2d at 428. Defendant David Steffen, a police officer,
brought baseless charges against Plaintiff, including corrupt organization, deceptive
business practices, theft by deception, and criminal conspiracy to commit theft by
deception. Defendant Barker, an Assistant District Attorney for York County, advised
Steffen about the charges to bring against Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that these charges
were brought in retaliation for her son bringing a civil rights action against York County
officials. As a result of being charged, Plaintiff was “handcuffed and incarcerated.” Her
bond was set at $100,000.00. She was ordered to attend all pretrial events and spent
tens of thousands of dollars on her legal defense. On November 17, 2010, a jury found
Plaintiff not guilty on all charges. Plaintiff filed the instant action, alleging Defendants
violated her rights to be free from malicious prosecution and abuse of process.

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IV.

Discussion
A. Malicious Prosecution
Defendant Steffen argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for malicious

prosecution. On April 15, 2013, we granted Defendant Barker’s motion to dismiss this
claim against him, because we found that Plaintiff failed to allege that she was seized.
Defendant Steffen contends that this reasoning applies to the claim against him.
To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding;
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor;
(3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;
(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing
the plaintiff to justice; and
(5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept
of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding
DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Malicious prosecution is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because “it undermines an
individual's right to be free from unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment.”
Davis v. Malitzki, 451 Fed. Appx 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential). “Pretrial
custody and some onerous types of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure.” Id. at 603. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not allege that she
was subject to pretrial custody. Thus, we must determine whether the non-custodial
restrictions she alleges constitute a seizure.
The Third Circuit has held that where a defendant was required "to post a
$10,000 bond, . . . to attend all court hearings[,] . . . to contact Pretrial Services on a

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weekly basis . . ., and . . . was prohibited from traveling outside New Jersey and
Pennsylvania . . .[a]lthough it is a close question, . . . these restrictions amounted to a
seizure.” Gallo v. City of Phila., 161 F.3d 217, 222-223 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Johnson
Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 85, n, 14 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[defendant’s] detention in the cell at the
police station for approximately two days until he could ‘make bail,’ constitutes a
deprivation of liberty”). The Court also found that where plaintiffs "were only issued a
summons; . . . were never arrested; . . . never posted bail; . . . were free to travel; and . . .
did not have to report to Pretrial Services,” they were not subject to a "seizure." Dibella,
407 F.3d at 603.
In the present case, Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Steffen are
identical to the allegations we found insufficient to state a claim against Defendant
Barker. Plaintiff alleges that she was arrested and her bail was set at $100,000. She
was also required to attend pretrial court proceedings. She does not allege that her
travel was restricted or that she was required to report to pretrial services.1 Considering
the Court in Gallo, a case with more non-custodial restrictions, was a “close question,”
we find that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Steffen are insufficient to constitute

In Plaintiff’s opposition brief, she asserts that she was required to pay $5,000
to be released on bail, and her travel was restricted to the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. However, these allegations do not appear in Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, and they will not be considered. See Commonwealth of Pa. Ex rel
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that a
plaintiff’s complaint “may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to
dismiss.”) (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.
1984)).
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a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Lear v. Zanic, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS
6902, *4, 2013 WL 1363872, *1 (“simply being forced to appear at a trial or pretrial
hearings is not sufficient to constitute a deprivation of liberty for a malicious prosecution
claim.”) (nonprecedential); Penberth v. Krajnak, 347 Fed. Appx. 827, 829 (3d Cir. 2009)
(explaining that being arrested and detained for 35 to 40 minutes without being required
to post bail, contact pre-trial services regularly, or limit travel was insufficient to constitute
a seizure) (nonprecedential). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege the final element of a
malicious prosecution claim, we must dismiss her claim.
B. Abuse of Process
Defendant Steffen argues that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for abuse of
process. Our January 15, 2013 and April 15, 2013 Orders dismissed this claim against
Defendant Barker. Defendant Steffen contends that the reasoning set forth in our
January 15, 2013 Order applies to the claim against him.
An abuse of process claim, when brought pursuant to section 1983, “lies
where prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for a purpose other than
intended by the law.” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 n. 17 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation and
internal quotation omitted). “[T]he gravamen of [a malicious abuse of process claim] is
not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil
proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any
purpose other than that which it was designed to accomplish.” Dunne v. Twp. of

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Springfield, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 20521, *6 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a (1965)).
Under Pennsylvania state law, abuse of process requires a plaintiff to show
that the defendant “(1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to
accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been
caused to the plaintiff.” Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1236 (Pa. Super. 1998).
“[T]he gist of an action for abuse of process is the improper use of process after it has
been issued, that is, a perversion of it.” McGee v. Feege, 517 Pa. 247, 252, 535 A.2d
1020 (Pa. 1987) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint focuses on injuries she suffered as a result of
Defendant Steffen bringing “exaggerated and trumped up charges, without probable
cause . . . “ (Doc. 17, ¶ 1). She does not allege that, after initiation of the criminal
proceedings, Defendant Steffen misused the legal process in any way. For this reason,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for abuse of process. See Napier v. City of New
Castle, 407 Fed. App’x 579, 582 (finding “the initial filing of criminal charges and
[plaintiff’s] arrest, if improper, would constitute malicious prosecution, not abuse of
process.”) (non-precedential); McGee, 517 Pa. at 258 (explaining that "the bringing of an
action; a malicious or unfounded suit, and the lack of probable cause . . . are factors
germane to an action for malicious [prosecution], not to an action for abuse of process.”).

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C. Qualified Immunity
Because we find that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant
Steffen, we need not address whether he is entitled to qualified immunity.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons above, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings

will be granted. Plaintiff will be permitted to amend his malicious prosecution claim, but
leave to amend will be denied as futile as to the abuse of process claim. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (allowing courts to deny leave to
amend if such an amendment would be futile).
We will issue an appropriate order.
/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GLORIA GEBHART,
Plaintiff
vs.

DAVID STEFFEN,
Defendant

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ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2013, upon consideration of Defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (doc. 25), and Plaintiff’s response thereto, and
pursuant to the accompanying Memorandum, it is ordered that:
1. Defendant’s motion (doc. 25) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint, on her malicious prosecution
claim, within twenty (20) days of the date of this order, if she chooses to do
so.

/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

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