Love v. Astrue

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION (Order to follow as separate docket entry) - Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioners decision is upheld, and the clerk is directed enter judgment for the defendant and close this case. An appropriate order will follow. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on September 30, 2014. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CYNTHIA LOVE,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY
Defendant.

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Civil No. 1:12-CV-1923

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case
A.

Introduction

When adjudicating social security appeals, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
typically must make three factual determinations, factual findings which in turn often
define the legal outcome in a case. First, the ALJ must assess the credibility of the
claimant. Second, the ALJ must determine the degree to which medical opinions
accurately encapsulate the claimant’s limitations. Third, the ALJ must develop a
residual functional capacity assessment for the claimant which accurately embraces
the impairments and limitations credibly experienced by the claimant.
1

The ALJ performs these fact-finding tasks guided by regulations, regulatory
guidance and case law, all of which describe the role of the ALJ in this process and
define for the courts a deferential standard of review when evaluating these factbound determinations. We are reminded of these legal tenets in this case where we
are asked to evaluate an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision denying social
security disability benefits to the plaintiff, Cynthia Love. In this case, the ALJ’s
decision was made against a factual backdrop marked by conflicting evidence relating
to the nature, severity and disabling effect of Ms. Love’s medical conditions. Much
of this evidence cast doubt upon the claimant’s credibility and seemed to undermine
this disability claim. Upon consideration of this evidence, for the reasons set forth
below, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
which is adequately explained on the record and, therefore, this decision will be
affirmed.
B.

Love’s Medical and Employment History

On July 29, 2009, Cynthia Love applied for Social Security Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II, of the Social Security Act, alleging that she
could no longer work any job in the national economy since January 25, 2009. (Tr.
123-29.) According to Love she had become disabled due to the cumulative effects
of myalgia, myositis, plantar fascial fibromatosis, degenerative discs disease and
2

carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 13, 151.)1 At the time of the alleged onset of this
disability, Love was 47 years old, which is defined as a younger individual, age-4549, had a 9th grade education, and had a prior work history as a packager and bar
attendant. (Tr. 16, 150-57.)
In presenting this claim of total disability, Love’s credibility encountered an
immediate obstacle:

At her disability hearing, Love acknowledged collecting

unemployment benefits, which are premised upon the claimant’s assertion that she is
able to work, at the same time that Love was insisting that she was totally disabled,
and unable to pursue gainful activity. (Tr. 25.)
Love also came before the ALJ as an individual with a documented,
longstanding opiate dependency. (Tr. 29-30.) Moreover, when questioned about this
opiate use during her August 6, 2010, disability hearing, and specifically questioned
concerning her past heroin use, Love provided inconsistent answers to the ALJ, first
stating that she had not experimented with this narcotic drug for more than 20 years,
and then acknowledging heroin use within the past three months. (Tr. 29-30.)2

Myalgia refers to muscle pain. Myositis is a medical term for muscle
inflammation. Plantar fibromatosis is a painful mass, or nodule, that affects the
tendons of the feet.
1

Love’s efforts to reconcile these inconsistencies was also particularly
troubling. When questioned about medical notes which indicated that she has
been regularly using heroin as her drug of choice in 2009, Love explained at the
2

3

Love’s medical records revealed that her use of opiates and other narcotics was
a recurring theme, and concern, for her care givers. Thus, as early as January 2009,
Love’s physician was advising that “she should be able to take less hydrocodone.”
(Tr. 228.) Later, in October 2009, Love saw her treating physician, Dr. Hartman, (Tr.
295-96.), and reported “that her back was feeling good, but she did not want it to get
bad.” (Tr. 296.) Medical staff administered a urine screen to Love during this visit,
(Tr. 296.), which tested positive for hyrdrocodone and mydromorphine, but negative
for oxycodone. (Tr. 299.) As a result of this positive drug test, Love’s physician
reviewed their drug abuse policy with the plaintiff and instructed her regarding the
treatment goals associated with long-acting opiates. (Tr. 298.) Two months later, in
December 2009, Love began Suboxone3 treatment at the Shepherdstown Family
Practice. (Tr. 311-22.) In the course of this treatment program, Love identified her
drugs of choice as heroin or oxycontin, (Tr. 316.), stating that she used four to five
packs of heroin a day, whenever she could obtain it, (Tr. 322.), and disclosing that
she had used heroin three weeks prior to her treatment at Shepherdstown. (Id.)

ALJ hearing that she had lied to her doctor about this heroin use in order to obtain
Suboxone, a prescription medication, from that doctor. (Tr. 37-8.) Thus, Love
described herself under oath to the ALJ as an opportunistic dissembler, who would
lie to doctors about her physical condition to obtain drugs.
Suboxone is a medication approved by the FDA for the treatment of opiate
dependence.
3

4

As for Love’s other underlying medical conditions, from 2009 through 2011,
she was seen and treated by Dr. Stuart Hartman on numerous occasions. Dr. Hartman
repeatedly documented unremarkable and benign findings during these physical
examinations of Love.

(Tr. 217, 222, 227, 331-32, 339-40, 343-44.)

Thus,

throughout 2009 and 2010, Dr. Hartman observed that Love’s condition was “stable
on [her] medications” (Tr. 218, 223, 228, 233, 238, 242, 245, 249, 295, 298, 301, 304,
306, 332, 336, 340.) Dr. Hartman also repeatedly opined in his treatment records that
Love was “able to return to [her] normal occupation with minimal limitation” from
January 2009 to May 2011. (Tr. 15, 217, 222, 227, 232, 237, 241, 245, 249, 294, 297,
300, 302, 305, 331, 339.)
Love’s own reported activities of daily living also supported a finding that she
had some capacity for gainful activity. While Love reported that she spent “90
percent” of the day sitting down, (Tr. 39.), Love also stated that she drove, vacuumed,
washed dishes, did the laundry, cooked, shopped for groceries alone, took care of the
family dog, and attended church weekly. (Tr. 35-6, 176-78.). In addition, Love
testified that two weeks prior to the administrative hearing she traveled to the beach,
which was approximately two and a half hours from her house, albeit with two
breaks. (Tr. 34.)

5

It was against this backdrop that, on June 28, 2010, Dr. Hartman prepared a
physical capacities evaluation for Love in connection with these disability
proceedings. (Tr. 308-310.) For the most part, this evaluation revealed that Love
retained the capacity for performing sedentary work.4 Thus, Dr. Hartman found that
Love could lift 10 pounds; could engage in grasping, reaching, pulling, pushing and
fine manipulation; and could occasionally bend, squat, stoop and carry. (Id.) Dr.
Hartman also found that Love had the ability to drive, shop, travel without assistance,
ambulate, climb stairs, and engage in a full array of activities of daily living. (Id.)
Indeed, the only aspect of Dr. Hartman’s evaluation which was at all problematic in
terms of her continued employment in sedentary work was his notation that she could
not operate foot controls, and his indication that she could only sit for a 4 hour period
during the workday. (Tr. 308.)
C.

The ALJ Hearing and Decision

Having received this equivocal and contradictory evidence regarding Love’s
physical condition, the ALJ conducted a hearing on August 6, 2010. (Tr. 21-54.) At
this hearing, Love testified, providing contradictory accounts of her heroin use,
admitting that she had lied to at least one physician in the past in order to obtain
Sedentary work is defined as work that “involves lifting no more than 10
pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files,
ledgers, and small tools.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a).
4

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drugs, and giving an equivocal account of the degree to which her medical conditions
were wholly disabling. (Tr. 26-45.) A vocational expert (VE) also testified. (Tr. 4653.) In this VE testimony, the expert addressed a series of hypothetical questions
posed by the ALJ, hypotheticals relating to a 48 year old, with a 9th grade education,
who could sit for 6 hours a day, and stand or walk for one hour each workday, who
was limited to lifting or carrying 10 pounds, had no limitations on hand and finger
manipulation, but could bend and squat occasionally, and whose leg movements were
restricted to occasional movements for the right leg but unlimited movement of the
left leg. (Tr. 46.) Presented with this hypothetical, the VE opined that a person with
this constellation of conditions could work at a number of sedentary occupations.
(Tr. 47-48.) The VE conceded, however, that if this hypothetical worker could not
sit, stand or walk for 8 hours a day, then she would be disabled. (Tr. 49-50.)
Following this hearing, on November 1, 2010, the ALJ issued his decision
denying Love’s application for benefits. (Tr. 8-20.) After reviewing the medical
evidence, and Love’s one contradictory accounts, the ALJ found that Love was not
wholly credible in her descriptions of the degree and severity of her pain. The ALJ
detailed the factual basis for this conclusion in the opinion, noting at length how
Love’s subjective complaints did not match objective medical testing, or the treatment
records provided by her care givers. (Tr. 14-15.)
7

The ALJ further found that Love suffered from the following conditions that,
while severe, did not meet any of the listing criteria which would qualify Love for
benefits at step 3 of the five step Social Security disability assessment process:
myalgia, myositis, plantar fascial fibromatosis, degenerative discs disease and carpal
tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 13.) The ALJ then concluded that Love retained the ability to
perform sedentary work, with the following limitations: Love could sit for 6 hours
a day, and stand or walk for one hour each workday; was limited to lifting or carrying
10 pounds; had no limitations on hand and finger manipulation; could bend and squat
occasionally; and Love’s leg movements were restricted to occasional movements for
the right leg but unlimited movement of the left leg. (Tr. 14.) For the most part this
residual functional capacity assessment incorporated the limitations recommended by
Dr. Hartman in his physical capacity assessment, (Tr. 308-310.), and was consistent
with the objective medical records provided to the ALJ, records which consistently
reported that Love was “able to return to [her] normal occupation with minimal
limitation” from January 2009 to May 2011. (Tr. 15, 217, 222, 227, 232, 237, 241,
245, 249, 294, 297, 300, 302, 305, 331, 339.)
Where the ALJ did not adopt particular medical limitations described by Dr.
Hartman, the ALJ articulated specific reasons for not doing so. For example, the ALJ
explained that he did not limit Love to 4 hours sitting per day at work, because Love
8

had testified that she currently was able to sit 90% of the day, testimony which
suggested a greater tolerance for extended periods seated than that acknowledged by
Dr. Hartman. (Tr. 16.) Similarly, the ALJ declined to adopt the full extent of the foot
manipulation restrictions suggested by Dr. Hartman because the ALJ found that the
doctor’s opinion did not distinguish between right and left foot movements, a
distinction that drew significant support from the record before the ALJ, which
revealed that Dr. Hartman only documented significant findings with regard to Love’s
right foot and leg during physical examinations. (Tr. 305, 331-32, 335, 339-40, 343,
347.)
Having made these findings the ALJ then concluded at step 5 of the analytical
process that Love could perform sedentary work. (Tr. 16.) Therefore, the ALJ found
that Love was not disabled and denied her application for disability benefits. (Id.)
This appeal followed. (Doc. 1.) The parties have now fully briefed this matter,
with the plaintiff arguing on appeal: (1) that the ALJ erred in finding that Love
lacked credibility; (2) that the ALJ erred in failing to give appropriate weight to all
of the physical limitations found by Love’s treating physician; and (3) that the
residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment of the ALJ was incomplete and
erroneous because it did not fully incorporate all of Love’s claimed medical

9

limitations. (Docs. 9 and 11.) The Commissioner has responded to these arguments,
(Doc. 10.), and this case is now ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below we find that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ findings in this case; that those findings are adequately explained on the record;
and that the findings reflect an appropriate assessment of all of the medical evidence.
Therefore, this appeal will be denied.
II.

Discussion
A.

Standards of Review–The Roles of the Administrative Law
Judge and This Court

Resolution of the instant social security appeal involves an informed
consideration of the respective roles of two adjudicators–the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) and this Court. At the outset, it is the responsibility of the ALJ in the
first instance to determine whether a claimant has met the statutory prerequisites for
entitlement to benefits. To receive disability benefits, a claimant must present
evidence which demonstrates that the claimant has an “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
432(d)(1)(A). Furthermore,

10

[a]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if [her]
physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
[she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot, considering
[her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which [she] lives, or
whether a specific job vacancy exists for [her], or whether [she] would be
hired if [she] applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence
(with respect to any individual), “work which exists in the national
economy” means work which exists in significant numbers either in the
region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
In making this determination the ALJ employs a five-step evaluation process to
determine if a person is eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. See
also Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999). If the ALJ finds that a
plaintiff is disabled or not disabled at any point in the sequence, review does not
proceed any further. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. As part of this analysis the ALJ must
sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s
impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant’s impairment
prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant’s
impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520.

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This disability determination also involves shifting burdens of proof. The initial
burden rests with the claimant in steps 1 through 4 to demonstrate that he is unable to
engage in past relevant work.

If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the

Commissioner must show that jobs exist in the national economy that a person with the
claimant's abilities, age, education, and work experience can perform. Mason v.
Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic procedural and
substantive requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement
that the ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability
determination. Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial
evidence standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by "a clear and satisfactory
explication of the basis on which it rests." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir.
1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which
evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting
certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his decision
which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.”
Schaudeck v. Com. of Soc. Sec., 181 F. 3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).
Once the ALJ has made a disability determination, it is then the responsibility
of this Court to independently review that finding. In undertaking this task, this Court
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applies a specific, well-settled and carefully articulated standard of review. In an
action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security denying plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits, Congress has specifically
provided that the “findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The “substantial evidence” standard of review prescribed by statute is a
deferential standard of review. Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).
When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, we must simply determine whether
the denial is supported by substantial evidence. Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213
(3d Cir. 1988); see also Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d
Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of
evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.
1999).” Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200. See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
It is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla of proof.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial evidence means "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)(quoting Ventura v.
Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995).
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A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores
countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason
v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). However, in an adequately developed
factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the
evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent [the decision] from being supported by substantial
evidence."

Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

Moreover, in conducting this review we are cautioned that “an ALJ's findings based on
the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight and deference,
particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness's demeanor
and credibility.’ Walters v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th
Cir.1997); see also Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 801
(10th Cir.1991) (‘We defer to the ALJ as trier of fact, the individual optimally
positioned to observe and assess witness credibility.’).” Frazier v. Apfel, No. 99-715,
2000 WL 288246, *9 (E.D. Pa. March 7, 2000). Furthermore, in determining if the
ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court may not parse the record
but rather must scrutinize the record as a whole. Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 970
(3d Cir. 1981).

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B.

The ALJ’s Decision Was Supported By Substantial Evidence

Judged against this deferential standard of review we find that the ALJ’s
disability decision in this case was supported by “substantial evidence” and, therefore,
may not now be disturbed. Indeed, given the evidence undermining Love’s credibility,
and the many conflicting and contradictory threads in the evidence presented to the
ALJ, this ruling reflects a thorough, careful, balanced analysis of the proof. It is,
therefore, the paradigm of a decision which draws carefully upon substantial evidence.
Having reached this conclusion, we discuss the separate claims of error advanced
by Love in this appeal.
1.

The ALJ’s Credibility Assessment is Supported by
Substantial Evidence

At the outset, contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, we find that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Love’s testimony regarding the degree
and persistence of her pain was not fully credible is supported by substantial evidence.
Any assessment of Love’s credibility must begin by acknowledging a fundamental
contradiction: Love sought disability benefits claiming she was unable to work at the
same time that she collected unemployment compensation premised upon the assertion
that she could work. While we agree that this contradiction does not automatically
disqualify Love from receiving disability benefits, (Doc. 11.), this contradiction is

15

profound and may properly profoundly affect Love’s credibility. Indeed, in assessing
a claimant’s credibility: “it was entirely proper for the ALJ to consider that [the
claimant’s] receipt of unemployment benefits was inconsistent with a claim of
disability during the same period. See, e.g., Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 180 (8th
Cir.1997) (application for unemployment compensation benefits can adversely affect
a claimant's credibility because of admission of ability to work required for
unemployment benefits).” Myers v. Barnhart, 57 F. App'x 990, 997 (3d Cir. 2003).
In any event: “[A]lthough ‘[t]estimony of subjective pain and inability to
perform even light work is entitled to great weight,’ Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d
403, 409 (3d Cir.1979), an ALJ may nonetheless reject a claim of disabling pain where
he ‘consider[s] the subjective pain and specif[ies] his reasons for rejecting these claims
and support[s] his conclusion with medical evidence in the record.’ Matullo v. Bowen,
926 F.2d 240, 245 (3d Cir.1990).” Harkins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 399 F. App'x 731,
735 (3d Cir. 2010). Where a disability determination turns on an assessment of the
level of a claimant’s pain, the Social Security Regulations provide a framework under
which a claimant’s subjective complaints are to be considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
Such cases require the ALJ to “evaluate the intensity and persistence of the pain or
symptom, and the extent to which it affects the individual’s ability to work.” Hartranft
v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). Cases involving an assessment of
16

subjective reports of pain “obviously require[ ]” the ALJ “to determine the extent to
which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he or
she is disabled by it.” Id. In making this assessment, the ALJ is guided both by statute
and by regulations. This guidance eschews wholly subjective assessments of a
claimant’s disability. Instead. at the outset, by statute the ALJ is admonished that an
“individual’s statement as to pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive
evidence of disability as defined in this section; there must be medical signs and
findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered
with all the evidence. . . , would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a
disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A).
Applying this statutory guidance, the Social Security Regulations provide a
framework under which a claimant’s subjective complaints are to be considered. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529. Under these regulations, first, symptoms, such as pain, shortness
of breath, and fatigue, will only be considered to affect a claimant’s ability to perform
work activities if such symptoms result from an underlying physical or mental
impairment that has been demonstrated to exist by medical signs or laboratory findings.
17

20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (a)-(c). Once a medically determinable impairment which results
in such symptoms is found to exist, the Commissioner must evaluate the intensity and
persistence of such symptoms to determine their impact on the claimant’s ability to
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (a)-(c). In so doing, the medical evidence of record is
considered along with the claimant’s statements. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (a)-(c). Social
Security Ruling 96-7p gives the following instructions in evaluating the credibility of
the claimant’s statements regarding his symptoms: “In general, the extent to which an
individual's statements about symptoms can be relied upon as probative evidence in
determining whether the individual is disabled depends on the credibility of the
statements. In basic terms, the credibility of an individual's statements about pain or
other symptoms and their functional effects is the degree to which the statements can
be believed and accepted as true. When evaluating the credibility of an individual's
statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case record and give specific
reasons for the weight given to the individual's statements.” SSR 96-7p. SSR 96-4p
provides that “Once the existence of a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged has been established on the basis of medical signs and laboratory findings,
allegations about the intensity and persistence of the symptoms must be considered

18

with the objective medical abnormalities, and all other evidence in the case record, in
evaluating the functionally limiting effects of the impairment(s).” SSR 96-4p.
Here the ALJ followed this statutory and regulatory guidance when assessing
Love’s claims of pain. As we have noted this decision involved an assessment of
conflicting and equivocal medical testimony by a claimant who sought disability
benefits at the same time that she collected unemployment compensation based upon
her claim that she was able to work. See Myers v. Barnhart, 57 F. App'x 990, 997 (3d
Cir. 2003). Moreover, Love contradicted herself during her testimony on a material
matter, past heroin use, and then attempted to reconcile these contradictions, in part,
by stating that she had in the past lied about heroin use to a doctor in order to try to
obtain other drugs from that physician.
Furthermore, the evidence showed that the plaintiff’s subjective complaints often
were not fully supported by independent diagnostic evidence and testing, or by the
observations of her treating physician who described Love’s condition was “stable on
[her] medications” (Tr. 218, 223, 228, 233, 238, 242, 245, 249, 295, 298, 301, 304,
306, 332, 336, 340.), and repeatedly opined that Love was “able to return to [her]
normal occupation with minimal limitation” from January 2009 to May 2011. (Tr. 15,
217, 222, 227, 232, 237, 241, 245, 249, 294, 297, 300, 302, 305, 331, 339.)

19

Since “there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically
acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a
medical impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged,” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), the results of these diagnostic tests,
which did not confirm the type of abnormalities which would sustain the plaintiff’s
reports of pain, constituted “substantial evidence” supporting the ALJ’s finding.
Similarly, the ALJ’s assessment of the competing medical evidence rested upon
sufficient “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion,” Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200, and, therefore, was supported by “substantial
evidence.” In this case, the ALJ correctly noted Love’s lack of credibility and properly
concluded that the plaintiff’s complaints were not consistently supported by medical
treatment records, or by her own description of her medical and mental condition.
Given these conflicts in the evidence, the ALJ as fact-finder was entitled to give greater
weight to this other objective medical evidence, objective evidence which did not
support these claims of total disability. Recognizing that the “substantial evidence”
standard of review prescribed by statute is a deferential standard of review, Jones v.
Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004), which is met by less than a preponderance
of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla of proof, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
20

389, 401 (1971), we find that the ALJ’s decisions assessing this competing proof
regarding the plaintiff’s’s ability to function despite her various claimed physical
impairments was supported by substantial evidence and may not now be disturbed on
appeal.
Finally, Love argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of law in finding her claims
of intractable pain were not fully credible, while relying upon Love’s statement that she
sat at home 90% of the time to determine that Love could sit at least six hour each
workday. Love characterizes the ALJ’s approach to this credibility assessment, which
chose to credit some of Love’s testimony while discounting other testimony, as
improper and inconsistent. In effect, Love invites us to substitute our judgment for the
judgment on the ALJ in making this credibility assessment, and urges us to adopt a
categorical rule requiring an ALJ to accept Love’s testimony in its totality.
We will decline this invitation to impose an all-or-nothing approach upon ALJs
when assessing questions of credibility. At the outset, we note that the ALJ is uniquely
well-poised to make these credibility assessments having actually met Love and
observed her testimony. Moreover, as a legal matter “[t]he ALJ, . . ., ‘has the right, as
the fact finder, to reject partially, or even entirely, [a claimant’s statements] if they are
not fully credible.’ Weber v. Massanari, 156 F.Supp.2d 475, 485 (E.D.Pa.2001) (citing
Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312 (3d Cir.1974)).” Schuster v. Astrue, 879 F.
21

Supp. 2d 461, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2012).

Here, the ALJ made such credibility

determinations, finding that Love was not credible when she stated that her pain was
so severe that it prevented her from working, but also concluding that Love testified
truthfully when she stated that she often sat for much of the day. This credibility
determination, which found that Love was inclined to overstate her symptoms,
permitted the ALJ to both reject Love’s claims of disabling pain, while crediting those
portions of Love’s testimony which supported a finding that she was able to sit for
extended periods and, therefore, was not disabled from performing sedentary work
which requires frequent sitting. Since”[t]he ALJ has discretion to ‘evaluate the
credibility of a claimant and ... arrive at an independent judgment, in light of medical
findings and other evidence, regarding the true extent of the pain alleged....’ Brown v.
Schweiker, 562 F.Supp. 284, 287 (E.D.Pa.1983) (internal quotations omitted),” Cerrato
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. App'x 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2010), this credibility
assessment, which made informed judgments regarding Love’s believability, taking
into account Love’s motive to both overstate her disabilities while understating her
abilities, was entirely appropriate and was supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, there was no error in this credibility assessment by the ALJ.

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2.

The ALJ Appropriately Considered the Opinion
Evidence

Love also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give appropriate weight all
aspects of the opinion of her treating physician. In particular, Love alleges that the
ALJ erred in not adopting those aspects of her treating physician’s opinion which
would have limited her foot movements and restricted her ability to sit for more than
4 hours per day while at work. In this regard, the legal standards governing our
assessment of an ALJ’s evaluation of this type of evidence are familiar ones. In
Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit set forth the standard for evaluating the opinion of a physician stating that:
A cardinal principle guiding disability eligibility determinations is that the
ALJ accord treating physicians' reports great weight, especially "when
their opinions reflect expert judgment based on a continuing observation
of the patient's condition over a prolonged period of time." Plummer [v.
Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir.1999)] (quoting Rocco v. Heckler, 826
F.2d 1348, 1350 (3d Cir.1987)); see also Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43,
47 (3d Cir.1994); Jones, 954 F.2d at 128; Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37,
40-41 (3d Cir.1989); Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3d
Cir.1988); Brewster, 786 F.2d at 585. Where, as here, the opinion of a
treating physician conflicts with that of a non-treating, non-examining
physician, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but "cannot reject
evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason." Plummer, 186 F.3d at
429 (citing Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir.1993)). The
ALJ must consider the medical findings that support a treating physician's
opinion that the claimant is disabled. See Adorno, 40 F.3d at 48. In
choosing to reject the treating physician's assessment, an ALJ may not
make "speculative inferences from medical reports" and may reject "a
treating physician's opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory
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medical evidence" and not due to his or her own credibility judgments,
speculation or lay opinion. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429; Frankenfield v.
Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir.1988); Kent, 710 F.2d at 115.
Id. at 317-318.
Similarly, the Social Security Regulations state that when the opinion of a
treating physician is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your
case record,” it is to be given controlling weight. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). When the
opinion of a physician is not given controlling weight, the length of the treatment
relationship and the frequency of examination must be considered. The Regulations
state:
Generally, the longer a treating source has treated you and the more times
you have been seen by a treating source, the more weight we will give to
the source's medical opinion. When the treating source has seen you a
number of times and long enough to have obtained a longitudinal picture
of your impairment, we will give the source's opinion more weight than
we would give it if it were from a non-treating source.
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c).
Additionally, the nature and extent of the doctor-patient relationship is
considered. The Regulations state:
Generally, the more knowledge a treating source has about your
impairment(s) the more weight we will give to the source's medical
opinion. We will look at the treatment the source has provided and at the
kinds and extent of examinations and testing the source has performed or
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ordered from specialists and independent laboratories. For example, if
your ophthalmologist notices that you have complained of neck pain
during your eye examinations, we will consider his or her opinion with
respect to your neck pain, but we will give it less weight than that of
another physician who has treated you for the neck pain. When the
treating source has reasonable knowledge of your impairment(s), we will
give the source’s opinion more weight than we would give it if it were
from a nontreating source.
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c).
Given this recognition of the great weight that should attach to the professional
judgment of treating physicians, an ALJ must provide an adequate explanation for any
decision which chooses to disregard a treating physician’s findings regarding illness,
impairment and disability. Thus, as one court has aptly observed:
“An ALJ may not reject a physician's findings unless he first weighs them
against other relevant evidence and explains why certain evidence has
been accepted and why other evidence has been rejected.” Mason v.
Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1067 (3d Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks,
citations and indication of alteration omitted). Where the findings are
those of a treating physician, the Third Circuit has “long accepted” the
proposition that those findings “must [be] give[n] greater weight ... than
... the findings of a physician who has examined the claimant only once
or not at all.” Id. (citations omitted) An ALJ may reject a treating
physician's opinion on the basis of contradictory medical evidence, see
Frankenfield v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir.1988), and may afford
a medical opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent to which
supporting explanations are provided, see Mason, 994 F.2d at 1065
(“[f]orm reports in which a physician's obligation is only to check a box
or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best”), and whether the reporting
doctor is a specialist, see Id. at 1067. An ALJ may not, however, reject
medical determinations by substituting his own medical judgments. See
Frankenfield, 861 F.2d at 408.
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Terwilliger v. Chater, 945 F.Supp. 836, 842-3 (E.D.Pa.1996).
In this case we find that the ALJ’s decision did afford due deference to Love’s
treating physician’s opinion. Indeed, that opinion, which generally found Love capable
of performing sedentary work, was given substantial weight by the ALJ, and many of
the limitations suggested by Dr. Hartman were expressly incorporated by the ALJ into
Love’s residual functional capacity assessment.
Furthermore, where the ALJ did not adopt particular medical limitations
described by Dr. Hartman, the ALJ articulated specific reasons for not doing so. For
example, the ALJ explained that he did not limit Love to 4 hours sitting per day at
work, because she had testified that she currently was able to sit 90% of the day. (Tr.
16.) Similarly, the ALJ declined to adopt the full extent of the foot manipulation
restrictions suggested by Dr. Hartman because the ALJ found that the doctor’s opinion
did not distinguish between right and left foot movements, a distinction that drew
significant support from the record before the ALJ, which revealed that Dr. Hartman
only documented significant findings with regard to Love’s right foot and leg during
physical examinations. (Tr. 305, 331-32, 335, 339-40, 343, 347.) Finally, the ALJ’s
conclusion that Love could perform sedentary work was entirely consistent with Dr.
Hartman’s contemporaneous treatment notes, which repeatedly stated that Love was

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“able to return to [her] normal occupation with minimal limitation” from January 2009
to May 2011. (Tr. 15, 217, 222, 227, 232, 237, 241, 245, 249, 294, 297, 300, 302, 305,
331, 339.)
Viewed in this light, we find that the ALJ did not err in giving substantial weight
to many aspects of the opinion of Love’s treating physician which found that Love
could perform sedentary work, while declining to follow that opinion in two narrow
respects where the opinion was inconsistent with other objective evidence, including
the doctor’s own frequent observation that Love could “return to [her] normal
occupation with minimal limitation.”
3.

The ALJ Did Not Err in Formulating a Residual
Functional Capacity for Love

Finally, Love argues that the ALJ erred in formulating a residual functional
capacity for Love which did not fully incorporate all of her subjective complaints, and
all of the recommendations suggested by her treating physician. This argument, which
largely recasts Love’s prior claims regarding the ALJ’s credibility determinations,
warrants only brief consideration on appeal.
“ ‘ “Residual functional capacity is defined as that which an individual is still
able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” ’ Burnett v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting Hartranft, 181

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F.3d at 359 n. 1); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d
34, 40 (3d Cir. 2001). In conducting this assessment “[t]he ALJ must consider all
relevant evidence when determining an individual's residual functional capacity.”
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d Cir. 2001). An ALJ must also “explain his
reasons for discounting all of the pertinent evidence before him in making his residual
functional capacity determination.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d
112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). Therefore:
Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, he must give
some indication of the evidence which he rejects and his reason(s) for
discounting such evidence. See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429; Cotter, 642
F.2d at 705. “In the absence of such an indication, the reviewing court
cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply
ignored.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705.
Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000).
In examining this issue, though,“[w]e do not require an ALJ to submit [in an
RFC] to the vocational expert every impairment alleged by a claimant.” Rutherford v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005)(emphasis in original). Rather, the ALJ
must simply “accurately convey [in an RFC] to the vocational expert all of a claimant's
credibly established limitations.” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir.
2005), citing Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 431 (3d Cir. 1999)(emphasis in
original). Therefore, in making this assessment and framing a proper hypothetical

28

question for a vocational expert, “[l]imitations that are medically supported but are also
contradicted by other evidence in the record may or may not be found credible—the
ALJ can choose to credit portions of the existing evidence but ‘cannot reject evidence
for no reason or for the wrong reason’ (a principle repeated in Mason v. Shalala, 994
F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir.1993); Reg. § 929(c)(4)).” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d
546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005).
In this case, we find that the residual functional assessment made by the ALJ
fully comported with these legal requirements. In this regard, we note that, in making
this residual functional capacity determination, the ALJ can, should, and must make
credibility assessments. Here, the ALJ made such determinations regarding the extent
to which Love’s claims were credible. For reasons that were good and sound, and fully
supported by the evidence, the ALJ found that Love’s complaints regarding the severity
of her pain were not fully credible. The ALJ also found that the observations made by
Love’s treating physician, who for the most part found that Love could perform
sedentary work, were credible. The ALJ then simply discounted two restrictions
suggested by the treating doctor, restrictions which were not fully supported by
objective evidence, in formulating this residual functional capacity assessment.
This action by the ALJ does not constitute an abuse of discretion, as Love
suggests. Rather, it reflects the informed exercise of judgment and discretion in the
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fact-finding process. In short, we find that the record in this matter shows that the
claimant’s complete medical history was adequately developed, but that medical history
justified the ALJ’s finding that Love was not disabled. Recognizing that substantial
evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999),” Johnson, 529 F.3d
at 200; and consists of less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere
scintilla of proof, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); we conclude that
there was substantial evidence which supported the ALJ findings in this case.
Therefore, those findings should not be disturbed on appeal.
III.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the
Commissioner’s decision is upheld, and the clerk is directed enter judgment for the
defendant and close this case. An appropriate order will follow.
So ordered this 30th day of September, 2014.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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