Williams v. Gavins et al

Filing 76

MEMORANDUM ORDER - Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the parties competing motions for sanctions (Docs. 62 and 63 .) are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Williams wishes to depose these witnesses he must conduct deposition by written questions pursuant to Rule 31, and must propound and serve those written questions on or before September 22, 2014. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on August 21, 2014. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RONALD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
WAYNE GAVINS, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 1:13-CV-387
(Judge Rambo)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case

This is a civil rights action brought by a state inmate, Ronald Williams, who
claims that the defendants, state correctional officials, used cell searches to retaliate
against him and wrongfully interfere with his right of access to the courts. (Doc. 1.)
Currently, pending in this case are competing motions for sanctions filed by the
parties. (Docs. 62 and 63.)
These sanctions motions relate to an abortive effort by Williams to schedule
depositions of the defendants in this case. Williams moved for leave to depose the
defendants, prison staff, (Doc. 34.), and over the defendants’ objections, we
provisionally granted this motion. (Doc. 39.) Notwithstanding their objections, the
defendants then diligently attempted to work with Williams to schedule these
depositions. Thus, defense counsel arranged for the defendants to be present on a date

which counsel understood was convenient for Williams, and also coordinated the
logistics of the court reporter that Williams had contracted to take these deposition.
However, on the date scheduled for the depositions, June 24, 2014, Williams refused
to participate in the depositions he had requested, and instead sought to sanction the
defendants.
The reasons for Williams’ refusal are somewhat unclear to the Court. At times,
Williams suggests that he refused to participate because he believed, erroneously, that
some further order of the Court was necessary to take the depositions. At other times
Williams’ refusal seems to be grounded on his displeasure with the timing of the
depositions, which were briefly delayed on June 24; his dissatisfaction with the
arrangement of the deposition room; and his apparent pique at what he regarded as
discourteous treatment when he was brought to the room within the prison where the
depositions were to be taken. (Docs. 62 and 71.) The exchange between Williams and
defense counsel on June 24, 2014, also shows a complete lack of appreciation on
Williams’ part for the time, trouble, and inconvenience which his decision to refuse
to proceed with these depositions caused, factors which lead the Court to question
whether Rule 30 depositions are a practical discovery tool in this particular case.
(Doc. 63-2.)

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Upon consideration of these competing motions for sanctions, for the reasons
set forth below in the exercise of our discretion we will deny both motions. However,
our experience with this effort convinces us that the oral deposition scheduling sought
by Williams is not feasible, since Williams’ refused to participate in the type of
deposition which he sought once it was arranged. Therefore, we will direct Williams,
that if he wishes to depose these defendants he must do so through depositions by
written questions propounded within the next 30 days.
II.

Discussion

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions for sanctions, and provides that:
(c) Failure to Disclose, to Supplement an Earlier Response, or to
Admit.
(1) Failure to Disclose or Supplement. If a party fails to provide
information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the
party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence
on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially
justified or is harmless. In addition to or instead of this sanction, the
court, on motion and after giving an opportunity to be heard:
(A) may order payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, caused by the failure;
(B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and
(C) may impose other appropriate sanctions . . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c).

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The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37, and give
rise to sanctions, is defined, in turn, by Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This
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far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.
Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
Applying these principles, and exercising our discretion, we find that there is
nothing in the conduct of defendants which warrants any form of sanctions. Despite
opposing Williams’ request to depose these defendants, defense counsel appears to
have engaged in a sincere, diligent and good faith effort to assist Williams in arranging
these deposition, efforts which collapsed when Williams refused to participate in these
depositions. Therefore, Williams’ motion for sanctions will be denied.

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The defendants’ motion for sanctions against Williams presents a closer
question, since Williams undeniably refused to participate in the depositions which he
requested. As we have noted, some of Williams’ pleadings suggest that his refusal
was motivated by personal pique and dissatisfaction with relatively minor matters
relating to the precise timing and logistics of the depositions. There is, however,
another thread in some of Williams’ pleadings, an inexplicable confusion on Williams’
part that some further intervention by the Court was necessary before the depositions
could take place.
While we find some of Williams’ actions to have been unreasonable under the
circumstances, particularly in light of the substantial efforts made by defense counsel
to arrange these depositions on his behalf, we conclude that the defendants are not
entitled to the sanctions they seek in this motion, $4,287.44 in costs. However, in
light of Mr. Williams’ conduct in declining to participate in these oral deposition, we
also believe that further scheduling of oral depositions pursuant to Rule 30 is not
advisable or appropriate in this case.
In this regard, we note that, under Rule 30, rulings on inmate requests to
conduct oral depositions rest in the sound discretion of the Court. That discretion,
though, is guided by a basic recognition of the security and logistical difficulties that
such depositions present. McKeithan v. Jones, 212 F.App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2007).
However, in light of these logistical and security concerns, it is often preferable for
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inmates to seek discovery through timely written depositions pursuant to Rule 31 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This recent unfortunate experience scheduling oral depositions for inmate
Williams aptly illustrates why depositions on written questions are often preferable in
a custodial setting. Given these alternative means of obtaining discovery, and the
obvious security and logistical concerns presented by inmate oral depositions, it has
been held that the proper exercise of discretion in this field often entails denial of
inmate requests for orders compelling oral depositions, in favor of Rule 31 depositions
on written questions. McKeithan v. Jones, 212 F. App’x 129 (3d Cir. 2007).
This is the course we will follow here. Since our experience over the past
months trying to schedule oral depositions reveals that such scheduling is not feasible
for these parties, we will direct Williams, that if he wishes to depose these defendants,
he must conduct depositions by written questions pursuant to Rule 31, and must
propound and serve those written questions on or before September 22, 2014.
III.

Order

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the parties’ competing motions for
sanctions (Docs. 62 and 63.) are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if
Williams wishes to depose these witnesses he must conduct deposition by written

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questions pursuant to Rule 31, and must propound and serve those written questions
on or before September 22, 2014.
So ordered this 21st day of August, 2014.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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