Rinaldi v. United States of America et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM re Dfts' MOTION to Dismiss 18 and/or for Summary Judgment (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 05/07/15. (ma) (Main Document 42 replaced on 5/7/2015 due to clerical error) (ma).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL RINALDI,

:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., :
:
Defendants
:

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-13-00450
(Judge Rambo)

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Michael Rinaldi initiated this civil rights action pursuant to Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
by filing a complaint on February 19, 2013 against numerous officers and staff at
the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg (USP-Lewisburg), the facility where he
was formerly confined. (Doc. 1.) In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges several civil
rights violations involving his confinement with a hostile cell-mate, Defendants’
refusal to allow him to practice his religion, and USP-Lewisburg’s policy
regarding psychiatric treatment. (Id. at 5.) Presently before the court is
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. (Doc. 18.) For the
reasons stated below, the motion will be granted.

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I.

Background1
In January, 2012, approximately two months after arriving at USP-

Lewisburg, Plaintiff was told by Defendant Baysore that if he did not stop filing
administrative remedy requests, she would have him moved into a cell with an
inmate who was known for assaulting his cell-mates. (Doc. 1 at 3.) When Plaintiff
reported this to Defendant Kissell (a case manager at USP-Lewisburg), Kissell told
him that he was not going to get involved because it was “over his head” and the
other officials were tired of Plaintiff filing administrative remedy requests. (Id.)
On February 2, 2012, Defendant Officer Gee informed Plaintiff that he was being
moved because he had continued filing administrative remedy requests. (Id.)
When Plaintiff refused to cooperate, Gee threatened to call a team of officers and
have Plaintiff gassed and placed in restraints. (Id.) Plaintiff was then moved into a
cell with an inmate who had told prison officials that he would kill Plaintiff. (Id.)
Over the next few weeks, Plaintiff had several physical altercations with his
cell-mate that left him with cuts and bruises. (Id.) The cell in which he was placed
was also dirty and had a toilet stained from urine and feces. (Id.) When Plaintiff

Because Defendants move for dismissal primarily under Rule 12(b)(6), this court will recite the
factual background of the case as set forth by Plaintiff. See, e.g., Brown v. Card Service Center,
464 F.3d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “accept all wellpled allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”)
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complained of this, the staff refused to do anything and provided him with no
cleaning supplies aside from a small amount of disinfectant. (Id. at 3–4.) Prison
officials also turned off the prison’s heating system just before the temperature
dropped below freezing. (Id. at 4.) When Plaintiff complained of this, he was told
that the building was “too old” to turn the heat back on and was refused any
blankets to keep warm. (Id.) Plaintiff contracted a cold as a result of the
temperature drop. (Id.)
While at USP-Lewisburg, Defendants Packard, Tanner, and Bingaman
(prison officers) ridiculed Plaintiff and called him a “rat” or “snitch” because he
had filed administrative remedy requests. (Id.) They denied Plaintiff his recreation
period on multiple occasions due to issues such as having milk cartons out in his
cell or having a clothesline hanging up. (Id.) Plaintiff was denied the opportunity
to attend Friday prayers in congregation, which is required by his religion. (Id.)
Defendant Officer Shivery also stole Plaintiff’s personal property during a search
of his cell; when Plaintiff requested a confiscation sheet showing the items that
were taken, his request was denied. (Id.)
Plaintiff suffered emotional distress from these events and requested a
psychological review with the prison’s psychologist, Defendant Dr. Mink. (Id.)
Plaintiff was then informed that the review would have to be conducted through
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the cell door within hearing range of other nearby inmates. (Id.) Because of this,
Plaintiff was unable to confidentially express his emotional distress and other
psychological issues to Dr. Mink. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed an administrative remedy request regarding these issues, but it
was not “appropriately investigated or responded to.” (Id.) Plaintiff also appealed
this request to the General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, but this was
“not adequately investigated” and was not responded to. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
numerous staff, including the warden and associate wardens, of USP-Lewisburg
“make light of the administrative remedy situation and refer to it as a joke.” (Id.)
He further alleges that staff members “acknowledge that all they have to do is stick
together and lie for each other and they can get away with whatever they want.”
(Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on February 19, 2013. (Doc. 1.)
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on May 28,
2013. Plaintiff later filed a brief in opposition to this motion (Doc. 30), and
Defendants filed a reply brief (Doc. 36). The motion is thus now ripe for
disposition.

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II.

Legal Standard
A.

Motion to Dismiss—Lack of Jurisdiction

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing “only that power
authorized by Constution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A party may challenge whether a district court
has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a given claim through a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1). A court may treat a Rule 12(b)(1) motion as either a facial or
factual challenge to jurisdiction. Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 549
F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In reviewing a facial attack, the court must accept all
of the allegations in the complaint as true, whereas when reviewing a factual attack
the court has no obligation to accept the truth of these allegations and may base its
decision on information not contained in the complaint. Id.; see also Gould Elecs.
v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176–77 (3d Cir. 2000). As subject matter
jurisdiction is a fundamental prerequisite for any judicial action, the court cannot
consider the merits of a claim without first determining that it has jurisdiction. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
B.

Motion to Dismiss—Failure to State a Claim

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint set forth “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). “Fair notice” in the context of Rule 8 “depends on the type of case—some
complaints will require at least some factual allegations to make out a ‘showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must provide more than
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” to show entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (recognizing that Rule 8 pleading standard “does
not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”); see also Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that the court is not “compelled to accept
unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences or a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.”) (quotations omitted).
A defendant may attack a complaint by a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is required to accept as true all of
the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences permitted by
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the factual allegations, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Watson v. Abington Twp., 478 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2007); Kanter v. Barella, 489
F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007). If the facts alleged are sufficient to “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level” such that the plaintiff’s claim is “plausible on its
face,” a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570) (explaining a claim has “facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); see also
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234; Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir.
2007); Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 2007). When a complaint
contains well-pleaded factual allegations, “a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at
664. However, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id.
When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the
complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as
from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003);
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Youse v. Carlucci, 867 F. Supp. 317, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Such a complaint “must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976)).
Finally, in the Third Circuit, a court must grant leave to amend before
dismissing a civil rights complaint that is merely deficient. See, e.g., FletcherHarlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007);
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). “Dismissal without leave to
amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or
futility.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
C.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment may be granted if, drawing all inferences in favor of the
non-moving party, “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); see also Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 387 (3d
Cir. 2010).
A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the
outcome of the suit under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir.
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2011). Disputes must be both (1) material, meaning concerning facts that will
affect the outcome of the issue under substantive law, and (2) genuine, meaning
there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute “to require a jury
or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” In re
Lemington Home for Aged, 659 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2011); see also S.H. ex rel.
Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2013).
A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of supporting
its assertion that the material facts are not genuinely disputed by citing to particular
parts of materials in the record—i.e., depositions, documents, affidavits,
stipulations, or other materials— or by showing that: (1) the materials cited by the
non-moving party do not establish the presence of a genuine dispute, or (2) that the
non-moving party cannot produce admissible evidence to support its factual
allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The moving party may discharge its burden
by “pointing out to the district court” the “absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case” when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of
proof for the claim in question. Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co, 364
F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr.,
266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001)).

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Conversely, in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must support its assertion that at least some facts are genuinely
disputed by citing to particular parts of materials in the record, or by showing that:
(1) the materials cited by the moving party do not establish the absence of a
genuine dispute, or (2) the moving party cannot produce admissible evidence to
support its fact(s). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). When determining whether there are
any genuine issues of material fact, the court “should view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that
party’s favor.” Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d at 256.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court does not make
credibility determinations, and summary judgment is “inappropriate when a case
will turn on credibility determinations.” El v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 479
F.3d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Horowitz v. Federal Kemper Life Assur. Co.,
57 F.3d 300, 302 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995)).

III.

Discussion
In his complaint, Plaintiff sets forth the following claims: 1) the conditions

of his confinement at USP-Lewisburg, including being forced to reside with an

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inmate who stated that he wanted to kill Plaintiff, constituted cruel and unusual
punishment;
2) Defendants unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff for filing grievances by
forcing him to reside with an inmate who stated that he wanted to kill Plaintiff; 3)
Defendants violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by denying him access
to adequate recreation; 4) the denial of Plaintiff’s ability to worship in
congregation violated his right to religious freedom; and 5) the requirement to have
psychological review conducted through the cell door resulted in Plaintiff being
denied proper medical care and violated his right to confidentiality with his doctor.
(Doc. 1 at 3, 5.) Defendants raise the following grounds for dismissal and/or
summary judgment: 1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for
the claims regarding the conditions of his confinement, retaliation, and the denial
of his ability to worship in congregation; 2) The doctrine of sovereign immunity
renders this court without jurisdiction to hear claims against the United States and
the individual defendants in their official capacities; 3) Plaintiff failed to
adequately establish his claim of retaliation; 4) Plaintiff’s claims should be
dismissed as to Defendants Kissell, Baysore, and Gee because the threats they
allegedly made do not amount to a constitutional violation; 5) The denial of
Plaintiff’s recreation time does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
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violation; 6) Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Shivery stole his personal property is
factually unsupported; 7) Plaintiff’s claim regarding his psychological treatment by
Defendant Mink does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation; 8)
The claims against Defendants Norwood, Thomas, Gondolosky, Young, Bahre,
and Taggert should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege any direct
involvement by them in his claims; 9) Plaintiff has failed to show that he was
denied the free practice of his religion; 10) Summary judgment should be granted
to the United States because Plaintiff’s injuries are not compensable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act; and 11) The prison official defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity. (Doc. 24 at 5–6.) The court will first address the question of
jurisdiction before turning to the other grounds for dismissal.
A.

Lack of Jurisdiction—Sovereign Immunity

Defendants argue that, insofar as Plaintiff asserts his claims against the
United States and individual Defendants in their official capacity, this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear those claims because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It
is well established that “the United States, as sovereign, ‘is immune from suit save
as it consents to be sued.’” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)
(quoting United States v. Sherwood, 31 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). Sovereign

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immunity applies in the same manner to prevent suits against individual defendants
in their official capacity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985).
Plaintiff does not explicitly respond to this argument to indicate what
authority he relies on to show that the United States has waived immunity for this
suit. (See Doc. 31.) However, this court notes that Plaintiff cited the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”) as one of the jurisdictional authorities for his complaint.
(Doc. No. 1 at 2.) The FTCA, in relevant part, states:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts . . .
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In order for a court to exercise jurisdiction under the
FTCA, the plaintiff must first have “presented the claim to the appropriate Federal
agency” and the agency must have issued a final denial of the claim within six
months before the filing of the FTCA action. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). On May 26,
2012, Plaintiff filed an administrative tort claim complaining about being forced to
live with an inmate who threatened to kill him and subsequently being assaulted.
(Doc. 26-1 at 4.) This claim was denied on November 28, 2012. (Id. at 6.) There

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is no record of any other administrative tort claims filed by Plaintiff related to his
incarceration at USP-Lewisburg. (See Doc. 25 at 6.)
Aside from this exhaustion requirement, the claim asserted must also be such
that a private person could be held liable for it. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also
United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (2005). In the instant complaint, Plaintiff
asserts that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to
reside in a cell with an inmate who threatened to kill him. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Setting
aside Plaintiff’s invocation of the Eighth Amendment, the substance of his claim
appears to be that he suffered injuries because Defendants forced him to reside
with an inmate that they knew, or should have known, had expressed an intention
to kill Plaintiff. (Id. at 3-4.) This is essentially a negligence action against
Defendants, which is allowed under the FTCA. See United States v. Muniz, 374
U.S. 150 (1963).
However, the FTCA provides an exception to this waiver of immunity for
any claim “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The applicability of this “discretionary function exception” is
determined by a two-part inquiry:
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First, a court must determine whether the act involves an element of
judgment or choice. The requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if
a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of
action for an employee to follow. Second, even if the challenged conduct
involves an element of judgment, the court must determine whether that
judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was
designed to shield. The focus of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective
intent in exercising the discretion conferred by the statute, but on the nature
of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.
Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d 361, 363–64 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations
and punctuation omitted). The challenged conduct in this case, assigning Plaintiff
to a cell and determining how best to protect him, is unquestionably covered by
this exception. While prison officials have a statutory duty to provide for the
safekeeping of inmates, 18 U.S.C. § 4042, the statute leaves the implementation of
that duty up to the discretion of prison officials. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United
States, 284 F. App’x 75, 77 (4th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, “how best to protect one
inmate from the threat of attack by another” is the kind of conduct “that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Id. (quoting Mitchell,
225 F.3d at 363); see also, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 460 F. App’x 80 (3d Cir.
2012).
Because the conduct challenged in this case falls within the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, this court lacks
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against the United States and all other
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Defendants in their official capacity. Thus, this court will dismiss all claims
against the United States and all other Defendants in their official capacity.
B.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), prisoners who
wish to bring a civil action alleging that prison conditions violate federal law must
first exhaust all available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. This
requirement is mandatory and not left to the discretion of the district court.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
734 (2001)). Prisoners must exhaust all available remedies with respect to each
claim even when those remedies cannot grant the relief the prisoner seeks. Id.
Exhaustion in this context means “proper” exhaustion, which requires the
completion of all steps in the administrative relief process and compliance with all
procedural requirements. Id. at 91. This exhaustion requirement is not
jurisdictional, but operates instead as an affirmative defense that must be proved by
the defendants. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal
citation omitted). A party can only obtain summary judgment on the ground of an
affirmative defense by supporting their motion with evidence “that would entitle
[it] to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229,
237 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986)
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(Brennan, J., dissenting)). Once the moving party makes this showing, “it is
entitled to summary judgment unless the non-moving party comes forward with
probative evidence that would demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact.”
Id.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) maintains a four-step procedure for
the resolution of inmate complaints. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10–542.19. This
procedure requires that an inmate must generally first attempt an “informal
resolution” with the prison staff according to procedures established by the warden
of the prison. Id. at § 542.13. If that is unsuccessful, the inmate must then file a
formal administrative remedy request with the local staff member designated to
receive such requests within 20 days of the occurrence that is the basis of the
complaint. Id. at § 542.14. The request will then be reviewed and, if filed
according to the procedural requirements, will be formally responded to by the
Warden. Id. If the response is unfavorable, the inmate must appeal the decision to
the BOP Regional Director within 20 days of the date the Warden signed the
response. Id. at § 542.15. If the response to the appeal is unfavorable, the inmate
must then file an appeal to the BOP General Counsel within 30 days of the date the
Regional Director signed the response. Id. After this last stage, an inmate has

17

exhausted his available administrative remedies. Id. at § 542.15(a) (“Appeal to the
General Counsel is the final administrative appeal.”)
Defendants concede that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies with
respect to his claims of being denied recreation, not receiving adequate
psychological reviews, and having his property stolen during a cell search by
Defendant Shivery. (Doc. 24 at 11.) Defendants contend, however, that Plaintiff’s
other claims regarding his conditions of confinement, retaliation, and the restriction
of his religious exercise remain unexhausted. Plaintiff disputes this, stating that he
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to each claim in the complaint.
(Doc. 31 at 2.) The record of Plaintiff’s administrative remedy requests for each
claim will be examined in turn.
i. Claims Related to Forced Residence with Hostile Inmate
Plaintiff contends that he exhausted his claims of being assaulted by his cellmate by appealing administrative remedy request number 675165 to the BOP
General Counsel. (Id.) That request is dated February 1, 2012, the day before
Plaintiff was unexpectedly moved in with the cell-mate who had threatened to kill
him. (Doc. 36-1 at 11.) In that request, Plaintiff complains of being assaulted by a
different cell-mate, and requests that USP-Lewisburg cease forcing inmates to cell
together regardless of their compatibility. (Id.) Plaintiff filed an appeal after this
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request was denied, in which he raised the issue that he was now being forced to
reside with a cell-mate who had threatened to kill him. (Id. at 14.) However, the
BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program regulations specifically prohibit an inmate
from raising issues for the first time on appeal. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(b)(2). By
raising this issue for the first time on appeal, Plaintiff did not comply with the
procedural requirements of the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program and thus
did not exhaust his administrative remedies for this claim.
Plaintiff also asserts that he exhausted this claim by filing request number
684006 directly with the Regional Director, pursuant to the regulations allowing
inmates to file their initial request with the Regional Director when it pertains to a
“sensitive issue.” (Doc. 31 at 2; 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1).) However, the record
indicates that the Regional Director rejected this claim.2 (Doc. 36-1 at 21.) When
a sensitive claim is rejected, the inmate is directed to file the request locally for
review by the Warden. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(1). Instead of refiling this request
locally, Plaintiff claims he appealed the rejection to the General Counsel, though
there is no record of this appeal being received. (Doc. 31 at 2; Doc. 36-1 at 34.)
Plaintiff claims that the General Counsel’s failure to respond constituted a denial of
The relevant BOP regulations distinguish between the terms “rejected,” which indicates a
refusal to accept the filing due to a procedural defect, and “denied,” which indicates an
acceptance of the filing for review but a denial of the relief requested. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14.
2

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the substance of his request, thus exhausting his administrative remedies on this
claim. (Doc. 31 at 2.) This method of denial by default, however, only applies
after a request has been accepted for filing, and Plaintiff’s request was never
accepted. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. Even assuming that Plaintiff filed an appeal to the
General Counsel, the General Counsel would still have had to affirmatively accept
the filing in order to trigger the provision that deems a failure to respond a denial.
See 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.17(c), 542.18. Because this request was not properly filed
and appealed through each level of the process, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his
claims regarding being forced to reside with a cell-mate who threatened to kill him.

Thus, both Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and his conditions of confinement
claim regarding this forced residence with a hostile inmate must be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ii. Conditions of Confinement—Overcrowding and Understaffing
Plaintiff next contends that he exhausted his claim regarding overcrowded
conditions in USP-Lewisburg by filing and appealing request number 699223.
(Doc. 31 at 2.) In this request, Plaintiff complained that the overcrowded
conditions in the prison contributed to physical altercations between inmates and
requested to be moved to the Residential Reentry Center or put into house arrest.
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(Doc. 36-1 at 38.) Plaintiff’s request was denied, and the record shows he
exhausted the available appeals for this request. (Id. at 41.) Defendants reply that
the appeal of this request did not exhaust Plaintiff’s remedies for any of his claims
because it did not raise any of the specific overcrowding issues that Plaintiff raises
in the instant complaint and because none of the individual Defendants were
identified in the request. (Doc. 36 at 7.)
Defendants do not cite any authority to support their assertion that Plaintiff
needed to name Defendants in his request forms in order to exhaust his
administrative remedies, and there appears to be no such authority in this circuit.
The Third Circuit has held that prisoners must name defendants in their
administrative remedy requests where the identity of the defendant is a “fact
relevant to the claim”—but this holding was based on a procedural requirement of
Pennsylvania’s prison grievance system. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d
Cir. 2004). The BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program does not place such
requirements on the substance of an inmate’s request, and instead only require that
the inmate “place a single complaint or a reasonable number of closely related
issues on the form.” See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(c)(2). Even if there were such a
requirement, it is unclear how the identity of any individual Defendant would be
relevant to a claim regarding overcrowded conditions.
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Furthermore, the issue raised in this request is substantially similar to one of
the issues raised as part of Plaintiff’s instant Eighth Amendment claim. In the
request, Plaintiff complained that “[p]rison overcrowding and understaffing
increases the incidence of assaults” at USP-Lewisburg. (Doc. 36-1 at 38.) In the
instant complaint, Plaintiff claims, in part, that “[o]vercrowding, understaffing and
the totality of the circumstances violated” his Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 1
at 5.) Defendants argue that this administrative remedy request actually concerned
whether Plaintiff should be placed in the Residential Reentry Center (Doc. 36 at 7),
but that was clearly Plaintiff’s requested relief, not the central problem for which
he was trying to obtain relief. There is no requirement that plaintiffs must seek the
same remedy through administrative channels as they do in a civil rights lawsuit,
only that they present the same claim. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6 (holding that
the PLRA requires an inmate to exhaust remedies “irrespective of the forms of
relief sought and offered through administrative avenues”).
Thus, the record shows that Plaintiff has exhausted his conditions of
confinement claim regarding the overcrowded and understaffed conditions at USPLewisburg.
iii. Conditions of Confinement—Cell Temperature

22

Plaintiff next contends that he exhausted his administrative remedies for his
claim that the cells at USP-Lewisburg had inadequate temperature controls through
administrative remedy request number 688567. (Doc. 31 at 3.) The BOP’s
database states that this request concerned the fact that Plaintiff’s housing unit was
cold and that he only had a t-shirt to keep warm, and that this request was appealed
through each level of the process. (Doc. 36-2 at 2–6.) Defendants argue that this
request was inadequate for exhaustion purposes because it “did not identify any of
the individual Defendants and [the] Complaint fails to demonstrate how any named
Defendant had any personal involvement in the acts complained of in the remedy
request.”
As already mentioned above, there is no general requirement that inmates
must name individual defendants in an administrative remedy request in order to
exhaust their administrative remedies for a claim. (See supra Part III.B.ii.) The
relevant claim in the instant complaint is that the inadequate temperature controls,
combined with inadequate clothing, constituted inhumane conditions of
confinement at USP-Lewisburg. (Doc. 1 at 4–5.) Defendants offer no reason to
conclude that the identity of particular defendants is so integral to this claim as to
be a requisite component of the administrative remedy request.

23

Thus, the record indicates that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative
remedies for the issue of inadequate temperature controls for his conditions of
confinement claim.
iv. Conditions of Confinement—Denial of Cleaning Products
Plaintiff next contends that he exhausted his claim regarding the denial of
adequate supplies to clean and/or sanitize his cell through request number 693008.
(Doc. 31 at 3.) This request, which was appealed through each step of the process,
complained of the fact that inmates were only given disinfectant once a week to
clean their cells, and were not given any brushes or other supplies with which to
clean. (Doc. 36-2 at 20–29.) Defendants argue again that this request did not
exhaust the claim because it did not identify any individual Defendants and
because neither the request nor the Complaint explain how Defendants are
involved with this issue. (Doc. 36 at 11–12.) Defendants again offer no
explanation for why the identity of individual defendants is so integral to this issue
as to be a necessary component of the remedy request. (See supra Part III.B.ii.)
Thus, the record reflects that Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative
remedies for the issue of the denial of cleaning supplies for his conditions of
confinement claim.
v. Free Exercise of Religion
24

Plaintiff next contends that he exhausted his administrative remedies for his
free exercise of religion claim through administrative remedy request number
693008. (Doc. No. 31 at 3.) The record shows that this request concerned
Plaintiff’s desire to offer “Friday (Jumuah)3 prayers in congregation” with other
Muslims and that this request was appealed through each level of the process.
(Doc. 36-2 at 8–19.) Defendants concede that, to the extent that this claim “only
pertains to the ability for him to participate in a congregational Friday Jumah
prayer with other Muslim inmates, this claim is exhausted,” but argue that this
request did not exhaust any claim of “a general denial of his ability . . . to practice
his Muslim faith.” (Doc. 36 at 10.)
In the instant complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was “denied the opportunity
to freely practice his religion when he was not afforded the opportunity to offer
Friday prayer in Congregation.” (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff clearly states that he
believes his religion requires him to “attend Friday prayers in Congregation.” (Id.
at 4.) Defendants’ attempt to distinguish between a denial of Plaintiff’s ability to
exercise his faith and a denial of his ability to participate in a congregational
Jumuah prayer are unavailing, as Plaintiff is clearly claiming that attending Jumuah

This word is alternatively spelled “Jumuah” and “Jumah” in the briefs submitted by Plaintiff
and Defendants. (See, e.g., Doc. 31 at 4; Doc. 36 at 9.) This court will use the spelling
“Jumuah” except where directly quoting other material.
3

25

prayer in congregation is an essential component of his religion. See Garraway v.
Lappin, 490 F. App’x 440 (3d Cir. 2012) (analyzing a similar claim regarding
attending the Jumuah prayer in congregation as a free exercise claim). It is
irrelevant that Plaintiff did not claim in his administrative remedy request that his
ability to practice his religion was being hampered in other ways, as he is not
attempting to raise such claims in his complaint.
Thus, Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies for his claim that
Defendants denied him the ability to exercise his religion.
vi. Inadequate Investigation of Administrative Remedy Requests
Plaintiff finally contends that he exhausted his claim that prison officials
“failed to adequately investigate his complaints” and that “the administrative
remedy procedure is inadequate” through request number 699129. (Doc. 31 at 3.)
Prison inmates have no right to an administrative procedure for handling
grievances and thus the mishandling of administrative remedy requests is not
cognizable as a freestanding claim. See, e.g., Heleva v. Kramer, 214 F. App’x 244,
247 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Because this is not a legally cognizable claim, this court finds it unnecessary to
examine the issue of whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies for
this issue and will dismiss the claim.
26

C.

Failure to State a Claim—Denial of Recreation

Plaintiff alleges that on “numerous occasions,” Defendants Packard, Tanner,
and Bingaman denied him recreation time “for having milk cartons in his room or a
clothing line hanging up.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff claims that these deprivations
denied him due process. (Id. at 5.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim under the Fifth or Eighth4 Amendment based on the denial of his
recreation time. (Doc. 24 at 17–19.)
The disciplining of inmates by prison officials does not generally impinge
upon the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause unless the action “imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). This rule is intended
to allow a great deal of discretion for prison officials in the day-to-day
management of prisons by setting a high bar for the sorts of disciplinary actions
that must be accompanied by due process. See id. at 482 (explaining that an older
approach “led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management
of prisons” and ran “counter to the view . . . that federal courts ought to afford

While Plaintiff never mentions the Eighth Amendment with respect to the denial of his
recreation time, he does state that the “totality of the circumstances” during his stay at USPLewisburg violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Thus, this court will
construe the complaint liberally to include a claim that the denial of Plaintiff’s recreation time
constituted an inhumane condition of confinement under the Eighth Amendment.
4

27

appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile
environment.”). The disciplinary actions that Plaintiff complains of, even if true,
do not meet this high standard. See, e.g., Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654
(3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he sanction [Plaintiff] challenges (seven months disciplinary
confinement) does not, on its own, violate a protected liberty interest as defined in
Sandin.”); Young v. Beard, 227 F. App'x 138 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that an
inmate who had been placed in disciplinary confinement for 930 days was not
entitled to procedural guarantees of the Due Process clause). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding the denial of his recreation time fail to state a claim under the
Fifth Amendment.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Eighth
Amendment with regard to these allegations. (Doc. 24 at 17–19.) In order to state
a claim of inhumane prison conditions under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff
must allege that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the health or
safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citations
omitted). This requires that a plaintiff satisfy “both an objective (‘Was the
deprivation sufficiently serious’) and a subjective (‘Did the officials act with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind?’) test.” Allah v. Bartkowski, 574 F. App’x 135,
138 (3d Cir. 2014). To satisfy the objective component of the test, a plaintiff must
28

show that the conditions of the prison deprived him or her of the “minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
304 (1991) (“Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment
violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they
have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single,
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.”). To satisfy the
subjective component of the test, the plaintiff must show that the prison official
both knew of and disregarded those conditions. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Plaintiff’s claim that he was unfairly denied recreation time cannot meet
either component of this test. First, Plaintiff does not offer an estimation of how
many times he was denied recreation, whether these denials were for a lengthy,
continuous period of time, nor even whether he suffered any harm as a result of
these denials. “While the denial of exercise and recreation may result in a
constitutional violation, a temporary denial is insufficiently serious to implicate the
Eighth Amendment.” Millhouse v. Arbasak, 373 F. App’x 135, 138 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citing Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
denial of recreation for thirteen days did not violate the Eighth Amendment)). As
for the subjective component of the test, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied
29

his recreation time because he had left milk cartons in his cell and/or items of
clothing hanging to dry. (Doc. 1 at 4.) In the absence of any reason to believe that
this temporary denial of recreation threatened to cause Plaintiff serious harm, this
falls short of alleging the requisite mental state—one of deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm—for an Eighth Amendment Claim. See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837.
Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations with regard to being denied recreation time fail
to state a claim under either the Fifth or Eighth Amendments and will be dismissed.
D.

Failure to State a Claim—Search of Cell and Seizure of
Property

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shivery conducted a search of his cell and
“stole his personal property and commissary items.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) Defendants
contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on this matter or, in the alternative,
that they should be awarded summary judgment as to this claim because the record
does not support that the alleged search took place. (Doc. 24 at 19–20.) Even
accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff’s right to Due Process was not
violated by the intentional theft or destruction of his property so long as a
“meaningful postdeprivation remedy” was available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 533 (1984). The Third Circuit has deemed the BOP’s Administrative Remedy
Program to be a meaningful post-deprivation remedy in these circumstances, and
30

whether the program yielded favorable results for Plaintiff is irrelevant to the
question of whether it was a meaningful remedy. See, e.g., Toney v. Sassaman,
588 F. App’x 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that plaintiff had “adequate postdeprivation remedies” where Plaintiff’s efforts at obtaining compensation through
the BOP’s Administrative Remedies Program were unsuccessful).
Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations that his property was stolen by Defendant
Shivery fail to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment and will be dismissed.
E.

Failure to State a Claim—Inadequate Psychological Treatment

Plaintiff claims that when he requested a psychological review from prison
officials he was told that “the review had to be done through the cell door in front
of his cellmate and within earshot of the other inmates.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) Because of
this, Plaintiff states he was “unable to confidentially express his emotional distress
and other psychological issues.” (Id.) Similarly, when Plaintiff requested a “one
on one” psychological session with Defendant Dr. Mink he was told that, due to
the overcrowded and understaffed conditions at the prison, he would have to
“receive treatment through the cell door or no treatment at all.” (Id.) Plaintiff
claims that these events denied him “proper psychological care” and that his
“doctor/patient confidentiality rights” were also violated. (Id. at 5.) Defendants
contend that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim with regard to these allegations, or,
31

in the alternative, that the treatment provided to Plaintiff was constitutionally
adequate. (Doc. 24 at 21–23.)
The Eighth Amendment requires that prisons provide adequate medical care
to inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). This requirement extends
to the treatment of psychiatric as well as physical ailments. Inmates of Allegheny
County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979). In order to state a claim
that prison officials rendered inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that the officials in
question acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. In this
context, deliberate indifference is more than an “inadvertent failure to provide
adequate medical care,” and requires “obduracy and wantonness . . . which has
been likened to conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a
serious risk.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal
quotations omitted). Prisoners also unquestionably maintain a right to privacy in
their medical information, albeit not to the same extent as free citizens. Doe v.
Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 317 (3d Cir. 2001). An inmate’s right to privacy regarding
their medical information may be “curtailed by a policy or regulation that is shown
to be ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Id. (quoting Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Furthermore, not every disclosure of medical
32

information is so serious as to rise to the level of a violation of an inmate’s
constitutional right to privacy. See Allah v. Hayman, 442 F. App’x 632, 636 (3d
Cir. 2011) (expressing doubt that conducting a tuberculosis skin test in front of
other inmates would violate an inmate’s privacy rights).
To the extent Plaintiff attempts to state a free-standing claim of a violation
of his right to privacy in his medical records, this attempt fails. Plaintiff alleges no
facts to indicate that his confidential medical information was in fact disclosed to
others against his will. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that he was unable to
express his psychological issues to Defendant Mink and that he did not participate
in any psychological review that was offered to him through his cell door. (See
Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 31 at 3.) As Plaintiff has not alleged that any Defendant actually
disclosed his medical information without his authorization, he fails to state a
claim of violation of his right to privacy. See Allah, 442 F. App’x at 636 (holding
that plaintiff failed to state privacy claim where plaintiff refused to participate in
tuberculosis tests conducted in front of other inmates).
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical treatment also
fails because he does not allege that any physical injury resulted from the failure to
provide adequate psychiatric treatment. A prisoner may not bring a civil action
under federal law “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
33

without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). The alleged
physical injury must be more than a de minimis injury but need not rise to the level
of a significant injury. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 535–36 (3d Cir. 2003). In
the instant complaint, Plaintiff only alleges that he was unable to express his
“emotional distress and other psychological issues,” but does not claim that any
physical injury followed from this. (See Doc. 1 at 4.)
Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the lack of adequate psychiatric
treatment at USP-Lewisburg fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted
and will be dismissed.
F.

Summary Judgment—Free Exercise of Religion

Plaintiff claims that he was denied his right to exercise his religion when
prison officials denied him the opportunity to attend the Friday Jumuah prayer
service in congregation with his fellow Muslim inmates. (Doc. 1 at 4, 5.) Plaintiff
claims that this violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. (Doc. 31 at 4.)
i. First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion
In order to determine whether a prison regulation that impinges on an
inmate’s ability to practice his or her religion violates the First Amendment, a
court must examine the following four factors: (1) whether there is a valid, rational
34

connection between the prison regulation and the government’s legitimate
penological interests; (2) whether the inmate is afforded an alternative means of
practicing their religion; (3) the impact that accommodating the inmate’s religious
needs would have on the prison, its staff, and other inmates; and (4) the availability
of alternative forms of regulation that could accommodate the prisoner’s rights at
de minimis cost to the government’s interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90; see also
DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183
F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999)).
It is clear that the Turner factors weigh against Plaintiff in this case and that
summary judgment should be awarded to Defendants on this claim. As for the first
element, Plaintiff is housed in USP-Lewisburg’s Special Management Unit (SMU),
a program which is designed to house inmates who “present unique security and
management concerns” and whom the prison officials believe merit “greater
management of their interaction . . . to ensure the safety, security, or orderly
operation” of the prison. (Doc. 26-1 at 31.) The conditions in an SMU are similar
to those in Special Housing Units (SHU), and the BOP’s program statement on
religious practices explicitly recognizes that inmates confined in an SHU may not
ordinarily congregate for religious services. (Doc. 26-2 at 26.) Given that the
SMU is designed as a program for closely managing the interactions of inmates
35

who have a history of involvement in group or gang-related criminal activity, there
is clearly a rational connection between USP-Lewisburg’s denial of Plaintiff’s
ability to observe the Jumuah prayer in congregation and its legitimate interest in
maintaining security and order in the prison. See Garraway v. Lappin, Civ. No.
4:CV-10-1697, 2012 WL 959422, *9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2012) (holding that
policies restricting the congregation of general population inmates had a rational
connection to the legitimate security concerns of USP-Lewisburg), aff’d 490 F.
App’x 440 (3d Cir. 2012).
As for the second element, Plaintiff does not dispute that he was afforded the
opportunity to practice his religion aside from the single issue of observing the
Jumuah prayer in congregation with fellow Muslims. (See Doc. 1 at 4–5, Doc. 31
at 3–4.) Inmates in the SMU at USP-Lewisburg are permitted to request diets that
conform to their religious needs, perform daily prayers in their cells, and request
religious texts through the prison library. (Doc. 25 at 11–12.) USP-Lewisburg
also alters the meal schedule for Muslim inmates during Ramadan to facilitate their
fasting schedule. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff does not dispute any of these facts, but
contends that participating in the Jumuah prayer in congregation is a required
aspect of his faith. However, despite the fact that Plaintiff had no alternative
method to observe Jumuah in congregation, the fact that he was capable of
36

observing the other central practices of his religion within the SMU program
causes this element to weigh in favor of Defendants. See O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351–52 (1987) (“While we in no way minimize the central
importance of Jumu'ah to respondents . . . . [the] ability on the part of respondents
to participate in other religious observances of their faith supports the conclusion
that the restrictions at issue here were reasonable.”).
As for the third element, accommodating the right of inmates in the SMU to
worship in congregation would have a significant impact on prison resources. As
explained above, the purpose of the SMU is to closely restrict and monitor the
activities and interactions of inmates who have a history of group or gang-related
criminal activity. (Doc. 26-1 at 31–32.) Inmates in the SMU are generally
confined to their cells for twenty-three hours per day and offered outside recreation
for a total of five hours per week. (Doc. 25 at 10; Doc. 26-1 at 35–36.) In the first
two levels of the SMU program, inmates are only allowed minimal interaction with
each other, and prison officials must determine which inmates may interact with
each other during their limited periods outside of their cells. (Doc. 26-1 at 38–39.)
After advancing to the third level, inmates may move about and interact with each
other more openly, albeit still under close supervision. (Id. at 39.) It is only after
attaining the fourth and final level of the SMU program that inmates are allowed to
37

interact openly and participate in the Jumuah prayer in congregation. (Id. at 40;
Doc. 25 at 13.) This regimented approach to inmate interaction is designed to
protect the safety and orderly operation of the prison as well as condition inmates
to properly “function in a general population setting with inmates of various group
affiliations.” (Doc. 26-1 at 31–32, 40.) Thus, allowing inmates in the SMU—who
may have different or even opposing group affiliations—to congregate in prayer
weekly would necessarily have a significant impact on prison resources, as staff
would have to be drawn from other duties to closely monitor the services.
As for the fourth element, there are no apparent alternative policies that
would provide Plaintiff with the freedom to congregate in the manner he seeks at a
de minimis cost to the prison. As explained above, the regulations in question are
closely tied to the SMU program’s purpose of managing the interactions of inmates
that may potentially pose threats to the security and orderly operation of the prison
if left in a general population environment. The freedom that Plaintiff seeks would
significantly alter the structure of this program and therefore any alternative would
necessarily impose a substantial cost on the prison.
Thus, because a consideration of each of the Turner factors weighs in favor
of Defendants, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants on this
claim.
38

ii. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Claim
Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb
et seq., the federal government may not “substantially burden a person’s exercise
of religion” unless it can establish that the burden “is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. Plaintiff claims
that Defendants’ denial of his ability to observe Jumuah in congregation was an
impermissible burden of his exercise of religion under the RFRA. (Doc. 1 at 4–5;
Doc. 31 at 3–4). Defendants contend that this claim should be dismissed because
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the regulation imposes a “substantial
burden” under the RFRA. (Doc. 24 at 29.)
For purposes of the RFRA, a “substantial burden” on religious exercise
exists where:
1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his
religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other
inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to
receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an
adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.

39

Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).5 Whether the plaintiff is
afforded other means of observing his religion, or whether the religious practice in
question is an absolute commandment, is irrelevant to this inquiry. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”)
(incorporated into the RFRA by 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (4)); see also Holt v. Hobbs,
___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 853, 862 (2015). Plaintiff claims that observing
Jumuah in congregation with fellow Muslims is “required by his religion” and that
Defendants denied him the opportunity to do so. (Doc. 1 at 4.) This clearly
implies that Defendants have placed “substantial pressure” on Plaintiff to modify
his behavior in a way that violates his beliefs. Keeping in mind that Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se and that his complaint must be read generously, this court finds
that he sufficiently states a substantial burden for the purpose of his RFRA claim.
Furthermore, this court notes that Defendants do not dispute the fact that Plaintiff’s
religious beliefs are sincerely held nor that he was unable to attend the Jumuah
prayer in congregation while he resided in the SMU at USP-Lewisburg. (See Doc.
25 at 10–12.)
Although Washington concerned a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), the same test to determine the existence of a “substantial burden” is also
applied to RFRA claims. See, e.g., Geneva College v. Secretary U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 442 (3d Cir. 2015).
5

40

Although the restrictions on SMU inmates imposed a substantial burden on
Plaintiff’s exercise of his religion, that burden may still be justified under RFRA if
Defendants can show that these restrictions are the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling government interest. As explained above, the SMU
program is designed to closely manage the interactions of inmates with a history of
group-related criminal activity in order to maintain the security and orderly
operation of the prison. (See Doc. 25 at 10; Doc. 26-1 at 31–42.) The security and
orderly operations of prisons is unquestionably a compelling government interest.
See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005); Washington, 497
F.3d at 283. In the particular context of this case, it is also clear that the
government has a compelling interest in maintaining security over inmates with a
history of group or gang-related criminal activity and that the restrictions on
congregation for inmates in the SMU furthers this compelling interest. Yet
Defendants offer no evidence to show that this is the least restrictive means
available to further that interest, nor that they have considered and rejected any
other alternative means. This court does not suggest that Defendants must “refute
every conceivable option” in an attempt to show that the policy in question is the
least restrictive. See Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 868 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, the
41

burden lies with Defendants to show that the policy enforced here was the least
restrictive means available, and they have offered no evidence whatsoever to
satisfy this burden. See Holt, 135 S.Ct. at 863. Washington, 497 F.3d at 284
(“[T]he phrase ‘least restrictive means’ . . . . necessarily implies a comparison with
other means. Because this burden is placed on the Government, it must be the party
to make this comparison.”)
Thus, this court finds that Defendants have failed to show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact regarding this claim. However, as explained below,
this claim will nonetheless be dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff has
failed to allege that any individual Defendants were personally involved in denying
him access to congregational prayer.

42

G.

Degree of Involvement of Remaining Defendants

Defendants next claim that Plaintiff has failed to allege any personal
involvement on the part of Defendants Bahre,6 Bledsoe, Gondolosky, Norwood,
Taggert, Thomas, and Young, and thus any remaining claims must be dismissed as
to those defendants. (Doc. 24 at 23–25.) Plaintiffs may not rely on theories of
vicarious liability to hold defendants responsible in a civil rights suit, but instead
“must plead that Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
“Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or
of actual knowledge and acquiescence,” but these allegations “must be made with
appropriate particularity.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988). This court will now examine the remaining claims in the complaint to
determine whether Plaintiff adequately alleged the personal involvement of any
remaining Defendants.7
Three of Plaintiff’s remaining claims involve alleged violation of his rights
under the Eighth Amendment due to: 1) the overcrowded and understaffed
6

Defendant Bahre is referred to in the complaint as “Mrs. Rear.” (Doc. 1 at 2.)

This court also notes that Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants “have individually and jointly
conspired together to violate the constitutional rights of Rinaldi and to cover these violations”
(Doc. 1 at 5), is conclusory and cannot form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims against each
Defendant. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687–88.
7

43

conditions at USP-Lewisburg; 2) the low cell temperatures at USP-Lewisburg
combined with a refusal to provide Plaintiff with warmer clothing than a t-shirt;
and 3) the lack of adequate cleaning supplies. (Doc. 1 at 4–5.) Regarding the first
claim, Plaintiff only states that the “overcrowding, understaffing, and the totality of
the circumstances” violated his Eighth Amendment rights. (Id. at 5.) Nowhere in
the complaint does Plaintiff mention which, if any, of the Defendants was
personally responsible for the overcrowded or understaffed conditions, nor does he
describe how Defendants were otherwise personally involved in the creation of
these conditions. (See id. at 2–3 (describing each individual defendant and their
roles at USP-Lewisburg)). Plaintiff does state each of the wardens was
“responsible for the operation of [USP-Lewisburg] and for the welfare of all the
inmates housed there” (Id. at 2), but this is merely an allegation of managerial
responsibility, and respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability in a Bivens
claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege the
personal involvement of any Defendant in this matter, this claim must be
dismissed.
As for Plaintiff’s second conditions of confinement claim, he alleges that
USP-Lewisburg “is inadequately heated and cooled,” and when he “complained

44

about this he was told that the building was constructed in 1932 and is too old to
adequately heat and cool.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff also states that
[f]or approximately a one month period after the heat was turned off,
the temperatures dropped below freezing, [Plaintiff] requested the heat
be turned back on or he be provided with adequate clothing and these
requests were denied. [Plaintiff] was told that the building was too
old to turn the heat back on and the t-shirt and pants he was provided
with were adequate. As a result of these extremely cold temperatures
[Plaintiff] suffered from cold, runny nose and severe discomfort.
(Id. at 4.) Plaintiff does not name any Defendant in these allegations and at no
point in the complaint does he state that any Defendant was responsible for the
heating system at USP-Lewisburg, aside from very general allegations of
supervisory responsibilities. (See id. at 2–3.) Because Plaintiff has failed to allege
the personal involvement of any Defendants in this matter, this claim must also be
dismissed.
As for Plaintiff’s third remaining conditions of confinement claim, he states
that during his stay at USP-Lewisburg, “he was not once provided with a broom,
mop, toilet brush, scrub brush or cleaning rags. The only thing ever provided was
a small amount of disinfectant.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff does not allege that any
Defendant was personally responsible for the cleaning supplies that he was given,
aside from very general allegations of supervisory responsibilities. (See id. at 2–3.)

45

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege the personal involvement of any Defendants
in this matter, this claim must also be dismissed.
The last remaining claim in the complaint is Plaintiff’s RFRA claim. As for
that claim, Plaintiff only alleges that he “was denied the opportunity to attend
Friday prayers in Congregation as required by his religion,” and that he “was
denied the opportunity to freely practice his religion when he was not afforded the
opportunity to offer Friday prayer in Congregation.” (Id. at 4–5.) At no point in
the complaint does Plaintiff allege that any Defendant was personally responsible
for the denial of his ability to congregate for Friday prayer, aside from very general
allegations of supervisory responsibilities. (See id. at 2–3.) Because Plaintiff has
failed to allege the personal involvement of any Defendants in this matter, this
claim must also be dismissed.

IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons given above, all of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed.8 All

claims against the United States and Defendants in their official capacity will be
dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, as any attempt to cure this

Because all of Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed on other grounds, this court finds it
unnecessary to reach Defendants’ arguments concerning whether Plaintiff suffered an injury
under the FTCA or whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 24 at 29–35.)
8

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jurisdictional defect through an amended pleading would be futile. Plaintiff’s
claim regarding the theft of his personal property will also be dismissed with
prejudice, as any attempt at amendment would be futile due to the availability of a
meaningful administrative remedy. Summary judgment will be granted in favor of
Defendants on Plaintiff’s Bivens claims regarding being forced to cell with a
hostile inmate, as Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Summary
judgment will also be granted in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim of denial of his right to freely exercise his religion.
For the reasons given above, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims regarding
overcrowding, lack of cleaning supplies, low cell temperatures, and inadequate
psychiatric treatment will all be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Fifth and
Eighth Amendment claims regarding the denial of recreation time will also be
dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s RFRA claim regarding the denial of his
right to engage in the Jumuah prayer in congregation will also be dismissed
without prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted thirty (30) days to file an amended
complaint in order to attempt to cure the defects in pleading these claims. Plaintiff
is advised that any proposed “amended complaint must be complete in all respects.
It must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without

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reference to the complaint already filed.” Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185,
1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: May 7, 2015.

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