Manning v. Ross et al

Filing 16

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - 1. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt (Doc. 9) is ADOPTED in its entirety.2. Plaintiffs claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities is DISMIS SED WITH PREJUDICE. 3. Defendants Ross, Mukherjee, Epstein and Summit Health Chambersburg Hospital are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE fromthis action. 4. Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment false arrest claim is DISMISSEDWITHOUT PREJUDICE. 5. Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 6. Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 7 Plaintiffs First Amendment malicious prosecution claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.8. This action shall be remanded to Magistrate Judge Blewitt for furtherpre-trial management. (eo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EUGENE DOUGLAS MANNING,
Plaintiff,
v.
PAMELA ROSS, et al.,
Defendants.

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1:13-cv-831

Hon. John E. Jones III
Hon. Thomas M. Blewitt

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
September 3, 2013
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation
(R&R) of Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Blewitt (Doc. 9), filed on July 17, 2013.
The R&R recommends that we dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff Eugene Douglas
Manning’s claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their official
capacities; dismiss with prejudice Defendants Ross, Mukherjee, Epstein and
Summit Health Chambersburg Hospital; dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim; dismiss with prejudice
Plaintiff’s First Amendment malicious prosecution claim; dismiss without
prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; and dismiss
without prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. (Doc. 9 at 23).
Plaintiff has filed various documents, all of which we construe to be objections to

the R&R, although not entitled as such. (Docs. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14).
Accordingly, this matter is ripe for our review. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s R&R essentially in its entirety.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When, as here, objections are filed to the report of a magistrate judge, the

district court makes a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objections are made. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-75 (1980). The
court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s
findings or recommendations. Id. Although the standard of review is de novo, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) permits whatever reliance the district court, in the exercise of
sound discretion, chooses to place on a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and
recommendations. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674-75; see also Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 275 (1976); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 (3d Cir. 1984).
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pro se plaintiff Eugene Douglas Manning, an inmate at the Franklin County

Jail in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, filed the instant complaint on April 2, 2013.1
1

Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court on August 26, 2013 advising that he would be
transferred to a different institution imminently. (Doc. 15). He further advised that he would
provide the Court with an updated address upon receipt of the same. We have yet to receive any
further communication from the Plaintiff on this matter.
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(Doc. 1). Plaintiff Manning brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983,
alleging civil rights violations against various individuals and entities.. (Id. ¶ 1).
Within his complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants: (1) Pamela
D. Ross, Physician’s Assistant at Summit Health; (2) Summit Dermatology
Chambersburg Hospital; (3) Orion Hippensteel, Chambersburg Police Officer; (4)
Douglas Strickland, Chambersburg Police Officer; (5) Robert Peterson,
Chambersburg Police Officer; (6) David Arnold, Chambersburg Police Chief; (7)
David Rush, Pennsylvania State Police Officer; (8) Robert Johnson, Chambersburg
State Police Commanding Officer; (9) Norman Epstein, CEO of Summit Health;
and (10) Dr. Satyajit Mukherjee, Psychiatrist of Summit Health. (Id. ¶¶ 4-14).
This action stems from Plaintiff Manning’s arrest on September 1, 2011 by
Defendant Officers Orion Hippensteel and Douglas Strickland, following a
complaint by Defendant Ross. (Id. ¶ 4). Plaintiff alleges that on or around June
9, 2011, he saw Defendant Ross to seek medical treatment for a cyst at Summit
Health. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35). Plaintiff claims that Defendant Ross made sexual overtures
during his first and subsequent visits, culminating in sexual relations on August 4,
2011. (Id. ¶¶ 36-38). Plaintiff admits that he became emotionally attached to
Defendant Ross and that he wrote her “some Letters from his Heart,” although he
asserts that she never objected to the letters. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39).
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Plaintiff claims that on August 23, 2011, the police arrived at his house with
letters he had written to Defendant Ross; he claims the officers stated that
Defendant Ross had not called them and made no statements concerning their
interactions, other than stating that she believed Plaintiff had “become infatuated
with her.” (Id. ¶ 40).2 On September 7, 2011, Plaintiff was arrested and charged
with stalking Defendant Ross. (Id. ¶ 41). Plaintiff states that he went to
Chambersburg Hospital where he was assessed by staff as delusional and was
committed against his will. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44). Plaintiff claims that he was ordered by
a “County Judge” to undergo counseling following his release from the hospital,
but he refused to attend counseling sessions and was subsequently thrown out of
the counseling program. (Id. ¶ 44). Plaintiff was subsequently arrested and
convicted on 28 counts of harassment and 2 counts of stalking. (Id. ¶ 1).
Within his pleading, Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested by
Defendants Hippensteel and Strickland, subject to unlawful search and seizure by
Officer David Rush, and maliciously, selectively and vindictively prosecuted by
Officers Hippensteel, Strickland, Rush, David Arnold, and Robert F. Johnson. (Id.,
¶ 1, 4). Plaintiff claims his arrest was in violation of his First Amendment, Fourth

2

Defendant Hippensteel’s Affidavit of Probable Cause states that he had spoken with
Defendant Ross, who wanted the letters to stop and said she was becoming afraid that Plaintiff
Manning might harm her. (Doc. 1 at 40).
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and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff additionally alleges state claims of
invasion of privacy, false light, intentional inflection of emotional distress, assault,
negligent medical malpractice and defamation against Defendant Pamela D. Ross
and Summit Health. (Id. ¶ 4). Finally, Plaintiff claims “Emotional Rape,” torture,
defamation, invasion of privacy, assault and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Defendants Ross, Summit Health, Dr. Satyajit Mukherjee, M.D.
and Norman Epstein.34 As relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory damages totaling
$895 million and punitive damages from all Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 25-32).
III.

DISCUSSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 obligates the Court to engage in a

screening process when a prisoner files a civil complaint, seeking redress from a
governmental entity, officer, or employee of a government entity. 28 U.S.C.
§1915(A)(a); See Vega v. Kyler, 90 Fed. Appx. 437 (3d Cir. 2004). Under
§1915A, a complaint should be dismissed if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1). The
statutory text of §1915A echoes Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6),

3

As far as the Court is aware, “emotional rape” is not a cause of action recognized
anywhere in the laws of this country.
4

Magistrate Judge Blewitt provides a thorough discussion of all claims made by Plaintiff
at pages 7 and 8 of his report. Thus, we have only highlighted the claims here.
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which states that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To bring a legally sufficient
complaint, a plaintiff must show, based on factual allegations accepted to be true,
that he is plausibly entitled to relief, through a “short and plain” statement of a
cause of action. See Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Factual
allegations must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above a speculative level.
Twombly, at 555.
In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must prove the
following: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under
color of state law; and (2) the conduct complained of deprived the plaintiff of
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the law or the Constitution of the
United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d
176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993).5 With these standards in mind, we now turn to a review
of the Magistrate Judge’s analysis.
As recommended by Magistrate Judge Blewitt, Plaintiff Manning’s
monetary claims against Defendants working in their official capacities shall be

5

Magistrate Judge Blewitt provides a thorough discussion of the Standard of Review
applied to 28 U.S.C. §1915A, Rule 12(b)(6) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at pages 1 to 5 of his report.
Thus we have only highlighted the Rule’s threshold requirements herein.
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dismissed with prejudice inasmuch as state actor Defendants can only be sued in
their individual or personal capacities. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Ross, Epstein,
Mukherjee and Summit Health Chambersburg Hospital shall also be dismissed
with prejudice, as they are private actors and a private medical company, and did
not act under color of state law. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137,
1141 (3d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hippensteel, Strickland, Peterson,
Arnold, Rush and Johnson for violation of his First, Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights shall also be dismissed as recommended by the Magistrate
Judge. While Plaintiff brings various allegations against the Defendant Officers, he
provides no factual information to support his claims. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 64-65). In order
to successfully assert a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, Plaintiff must show
that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to make the arrest. Kokinda
v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 592 (M.D. Pa. 2008); See also Barna v. City of
Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994). However, Plaintiff has failed to
provided facts to supporting a claim that he was arrested without probable cause.
Further, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts suggesting his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights were violated by these Defendants in any way. In
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view of the utter lack of factual description, we are constrained to dismiss these
claims without prejudice, giving the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleading
with respect to these claims, inasmuch as we cannot ascertain whether or not leave
to amend would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103,
111 (3d Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim against
Defendants Hippensteel, Strickland, Peterson and Rush also fails. Exhibits found
on pages 40 through 45 of Plaintiff’s complaint contain (1) the Affidavit of
Probable Cause prepared by Defendants Hippensteel, Strickland and Rush, (2) the
Search Warrant Application prepared by Defendant Rush, and (3) the
Receipt/Inventory of Items Seized. (Doc. 1, at 40-45). We agree with the
Magistrate Judge that these documents establish that a search of Plaintiff’s
residence was objectively reasonable. See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d
175, 182 (3d Cir. 2005); See Also United States. v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277 (3d.
Cir. 2009); Untied States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 526 (3d Cir. 2010). In
addition, all items seized were within the limits of the Search Warrant Application,
as signed by the issuing Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 1, at 43, 45). For the reasons
stated above, Plaintiff’s unreasonable search and seizure claim against Defendants
Hippensteel, Strickland, Peterson, Rush and Johnson will be dismissed with
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prejudice.
Finally, as explained by the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim, asserted as a violation of the First Amendment, is barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff claiming a violation of §1983, which would render the conviction or
sentence invalid, must prove the conviction or sentence was overturned. Heck, at
486-87. Plaintiff has not pled that his conviction and sentence have been
invalidated or overturned, thus his claims are barred by Heck’s “favorable
termination rule.” Id. However, in the interest of caution we shall dismiss
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim without prejudice, to him re-filing or
amending this claim in the event his conviction or sentence are invalidated or
overturned in the future.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we shall adopt the Magistrate Judge’s
R&R in its entirety, the sole exception being that we are dismissing the malicious
prosecution claim without prejudice rather than with prejudice as Magistrate Judge
Blewitt recommended. We have thoroughly reviewed the Plaintiff’s submissions
and do not find any arguments within them to persuade us to alter our decision to
adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
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1.

The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Thomas M.
Blewitt (Doc. 9) is ADOPTED in its entirety.

2.

Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages against Defendants in their
official capacities is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3.

Defendants Ross, Mukherjee, Epstein and Summit Health
Chambersburg Hospital are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from
this action.

4.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

5.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

6.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim
is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

7

Plaintiff’s First Amendment malicious prosecution claim is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

8.

This action shall be remanded to Magistrate Judge Blewitt for further
pre-trial management.6

6

We note that a copy of this Memorandum and Order will be sent by the Clerk to the
Plaintiff’s last known address, which is the Franklin County Jail. As noted above, the Plaintiff
advised the Court in late August that he was to be transferred to a different institution
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s/ John E. Jones III
John E. Jones III
United States District Judge

imminently. Thus, to the extent the Court receives notice of the Plaintiff’s change of address,
upon receipt of the same, another copy of this Memorandum and Order should be sent to that
new address.
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