Colbert v. Anderson et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM re Mtns to Dismiss 12 , for Subpoena 15 and to Amend evidence 18 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 08/25/14. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CUSTIS COLBERT,
Plaintiff
vs.
AGENT EBONY ANDERSON, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-13-1096
(Judge Caldwell)

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
Plaintiff, Custis Colbert, proceeding pro se, commenced this action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendants are the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole (the Board) and Agent Ebony Anderson. (Doc. 1, Compl.) Colbert filed this action
alleging that after his release from prison he was unconstitutionally placed in an in-patient
drug treatment program rather than in the mental-health facility required as a condition of
his parole. As relief, Colbert seeks “2.5 million dollars” in compensatory damages and
“proper mental health treatment.” (Id.)1
Presently before the court is the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff also has two motions
pending. The first motion (Doc. 15) seeks a subpoena so he may access his parole file,
and the second motion (Doc. 18) is a “motion to amend evidence” seeking to add a series

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Colbert was placed at the Gaudenzia treatment center but is not presently incarcerated or
otherwise in custody. He is currently living in Reading, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 20, Notice Change of
Address).

of exhibits to his complaint.2
For the reasons that follow, the court will grant the defendants’ motion to
dismiss and deny Plaintiff’s motions.

II.

Standard of Review
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A court considering a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d
118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014)(internal quotations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate where the
plaintiff has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949,
173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when
there is enough factual content “that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at
1949. In resolving a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally should
consider only the allegations in the complaint, “exhibits attached to the complaint, [and]
matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's

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Colbert also filed an amended complaint (Doc. 16). As the proposed amended complaint
was filed more than twenty-one days after service of defendants’ Rule 12(b) motion, Colbert cannot
amend his complaint without defendants’ consent or leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). For
the reasons discussed infra, even if Colbert had sought approval for the amended complaint, it
would have been denied as futile.

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claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir.
2010)(citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Additionally, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013). Pro se litigants are to be granted leave
to file a curative amended complaint even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend,
unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile See Connelly, 706 F.3d at 217
(quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008)). However,
dismissal without leave to amend is justified on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay,
prejudice or futility. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, a
complaint that sets forth facts which affirmatively demonstrate that the plaintiff has no right
to recover is properly dismissed without leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State
Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002).
With this standard in mind, we set forth the background to this litigation, as
Plaintiff alleges it.

III.

Background
On July 25, 2012, the Board granted Colbert parole to a community treatment

center that had a mental-health program. (Doc. 1, Compl.) On September 17, 2012,
Colbert was placed in a drug rehabilitation program rather than in a mental-health program.
Plaintiff alleges Agent Ebony Anderson “forced” him “into a new contract by using the threat
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of imprisonment” if he failed to sign. (Id.) From September 17, 2012, through October 13,
2012, Colbert’s medication was increased because of his increased feelings of stress due
to “being in a hostile environment.” (Id.)

IV.

Discussion
A.

The Board is not a “Person” for the Purpose
of a § 1983 Action

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential elements: (1) the
conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2)
the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its agencies are not “persons” for
the purpose of a § 1983 action. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71,
109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Pettaway v. SCI Albion, 487 F. App’x 766,
768 (3d Cir. 2012)(nonprecedential). Accordingly, Colbert’s claims against the Board will
be dismissed as it is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B.

Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against Agent
Anderson for which Relief May be Granted

As noted above, to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential
elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of
state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir.
2009). Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights. Rather, it is a means to redress
violations of federal law by state actors. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85, 122
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S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002).
In his opposition brief, Plaintiff contends his Eighth Amendment rights were
violated by being placed in an improper medical setting. This appears to be an Eighth
Amendment medical claim. On such a claim, a plaintiff must show "(I) a serious medical
need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to
that need." Natale v. Camden City. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003); see
also Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). A finding of deliberate
indifference must be based on what an official actually knew, rather than what a reasonable
person should have known. See Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir.
2001).
A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious
medical needs when he "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). “If a prisoner
is under the care of medical experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be
justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218,
236 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, absent a belief or actual knowledge that medical
personnel mistreated or failed to treat a prisoner, the non-medical defendants cannot be
charged with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference. Id.
Additionally, a section 1983 claim cannot be premised on a theory of
respondeat superior. In order to establish liability for deprivation of a constitutional right, a
party must show the personal involvement of each defendant. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129
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S.Ct. at 1948; Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). “It is
uncontested that a government official is liable only for his or her own conduct and
accordingly must have had some sort of personal involvement in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct.” Argueta v. U.S. I.C.E., 643 F.3d 60, 71-72 (3d Cir. 2011). This
personal involvement can be shown where a defendant personally directs the wrongs, or
has actual knowledge of the wrongs and acquiesces in them. See Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207(3d Cir. 1988); A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr.,
372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)(noting that “a supervisor may be personally liable under §
1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate
them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates'
violations”). A defendant “cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he
or she neither participated in nor approved.” C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201202 (3d Cir. 2000).
In the present case, Colbert seeks to hold Agent Anderson responsible for
placing him in what is primarily a drug treatment program, Gaudenzia Common Ground,
rather than in a mental-health facility as directed by the terms of the Board’s July 25, 2012,
Notice of Board Decision. He also attempts to hold her responsible for failing to remove
him from the alleged inappropriate placement once alerted to the fact. Colbert further
argues Agent Anderson forced him to accept the inappropriate placement or return to
prison. (Doc. 14, Pl.’s Opp’n Br.) As a result of this improper placement Colbert’s
“medication was increase[d] d[ue] to added stress from being in a hostile environment.”
(Doc. 1, ECF p. 2).
Broadly interpreting these allegations, the court construes Colbert’s
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Complaint as asserting an Eighth Amendment, denial of adequate mental health care,
claim against Agent Anderson.
As defendants correctly point out, Colbert has not alleged that Agent
Anderson had any control over selecting or directing his placement at the Gaudenzia
Common Grounds facility, or any role in providing or denying him mental-health care while
at that facility. Moreover, Colbert fails to allege that Agent Anderson had any reason to
believe that his mental health needs were not being adequately addressed by those
running the program. Colbert’s own statements that his medication was adjusted, albeit
increased, during his stay at the Gaudenzia program belies any notion that his mentalhealth needs were not being addressed by medical professionals at the facility. Based on
these allegations, Colbert fails to state an Eighth Amendment, or other constitutional tort
claim, against Agent Anderson.
Further, to the extent that Colbert argues that his placement in the Gaudenzia
Common Ground program itself violated his “contract” or the Board’s conditions of his
parole, he again fails to suggest Agent Anderson’s role in his placement.
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege that the terms of hi parole were violated as
a result of his placement in the Gaudenzia program rather than in another in-patient mental
health facility. (Doc. 14, Pl.’s Opp’n Br.) Colbert clearly states that one of his four
conditions of parole was that he be “reparoled to a community corrections residency with a
mental health component”. (Id., ECF p. 2)(emphasis added). Other conditions of his
release required him to be evaluated for drug/alcohol treatment services, and that if such
treatment was recommended, that he “must enroll and successfully complete” such
programming. (Id.) The court takes judicial notice of the mission statement of Gaudenzia,
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available at www.gaudenzia.org, “Gaudenzia helps people affected by chemical
dependency, mental illness and related conditions to achieve a better quality of life –
allowing them to live as productive and accountable individuals.” Thus it would appear that
the Gaudenzia program does comply with the Board’s July 25, 2012, conditions of parole,
i.e. that Colbert be placed in a community residency program with a mental health
component. The fact that it was not a in-patient intensive mental health program as he
perhaps desired, does not violate Colbert’s terms of parole or his constitutional rights.
Based on the above information, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be
granted. Additionally, Colbert’s amended complaint would have been futile as the
complaint sought to add Agent Anderson’s supervisor as a defendant and Plaintiff has
failed to assert an underlying constitutional right that was violated by any individual.
Plaintiff’s motion for a subpoena for his parole file for the time he was housed at the
Gaudenzia program will also be denied as moot.
An appropriate order follows.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

Date: August 25, 2014

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