Sepulveda et al v. United States Of America

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM & ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants Motion 59 for Protective Order is GRANTED and Discovery is STAYED pending resolution of theMotion to Dismiss filed in this action. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on 4/4/14. (rc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GEORGE SEPULVEDA,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.

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CIVIL NO. 1:13-CV-1262

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case

This is one of a number of related actions, in which federal inmates have sued
the United States of America, alleging injuries stemming from the consumption of
food contaminated with salmonella that was served at the United States Penitentiary,
Canaan. The Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss which argues that we lack
jurisdiction in this case at present due to the Plaintiff’s failure to timely exhaust his
administrative remedies before commencing this lawsuit. In conjunction with this
dispositive motion the Defendant has also filed a motion for protective order that
seeks to stay discovery until this threshold jurisdictional question is resolved.
For the reasons set forth below we will grant the Defendant’s request and
discovery will be stayed pending resolution of this motion to dismiss.

II.

Discussion

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
matter. At the outset, the scope of discovery is defined by Rule 26(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense –
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)( C ).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
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disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
We note that this broad discretion over discovery matters extends to decisions
under Rule 26(c) relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and regulating
the timing of discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: “ ‘[t]he grant and nature of [a
protective order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court and may be

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reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’ Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d
986, 997 (2d Cir.1973) (citation omitted).” Dove v. Atlantic Capital Corp., 963 F.2d
15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992).
This discretion is also guided, however, by certain basic principles. One of
these cardinal principles, governing the exercise of discretion in this field, is that the
district court may properly defer or delay discovery while it considers a potentially
dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court concludes that the pretrial
motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g., James v. York County
Police Dep’t, 160 F.App’x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ. Sch. of Ed., 205
F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring discovery in such a case, while
the court determines the threshold issue of whether a complaint has sufficient merit
to go forward, recognizes a simple, fundamental truth: Parties who file motions
which may present potentially meritorious and complete legal defenses to civil
actions should not be put to the time, expense and burden of factual discovery until
after these claimed legal defenses are addressed by the court. In such instances, it is
clearly established that:
“[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially
dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without
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foundation in law.’ ” In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litigation, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (quoting
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp., 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10
(S.D.N.Y.1991)) (citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 203
F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); AntiMonopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
March 7, 1996)).
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
This principle applies with particular force to motions to dismiss brought under
Rule 12(b)(1) which raise jurisdictional challenges to a lawsuit. “When a motion to
dismiss is based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), as
well as other Rule 12(b) defenses, the Court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)
challenge first because, if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction the accompanying defenses become moot and need not be addressed.”
(internal citations omitted.) Stefanowitz v. Suntrust Mortgage, Inc., Civ. No. 3:101321, 2011 WL 2970805 at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2011) report and recommendation
adopted, 2011 WL 2960870 (M.D. Pa. July 20, 2011) See also Walthour v. Herron,
2011 WL 1325981 at*1 (E.D. Pa. 2011); Tagayun v. Stolzenberg, 239 Fed. App’x
708, 710 (3d Cir. 2007) (“An actual determination must be made whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists before a court may turn to the merits of the case.”);
McCurdy v. Esmonde, 2003 WL 223412, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“Without jurisdiction
the court cannot proceed at all in any cause”).
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Guided by these legal tenets we conclude that discovery should be stayed at
this time. We note that the Defendant has filed a potentially dispositive motion in this
case. The merits of these claims are currently being addressed by the Court, ensuring
a very prompt resolution of these motions. In this setting, we conclude, consistent
with settled case law, that: “[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution
of a potentially dispositive motion where the motion ‘appear[s] to have substantial
grounds' or, stated another way, ‘do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law.’”
Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Therefore, we will defer further discovery pending resolution of the outstanding
motion to dismiss. An appropriate order follows:
III.

Order

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s Motion for Protective
Order (Doc. 59.) is GRANTED and Discovery is STAYED pending resolution of the
Motion to Dismiss filed in this action.
So ordered this 4th day of April, 2014.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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