Corbeil v. Cahill et al

Filing 15

ORDER denying plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel 10 . (See order for complete details.) Signed by Honorable Christopher C. Conner on 7/9/13. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CLINTON MATTHEW CORBEIL,
Plaintiff
v.
VINCENT CAHILL, III, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1-13-CV-1323
(Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of July, 2013, upon consideration of plaintiff’s motion
for appointment of counsel (Doc. 10), and assuming that plaintiff’s claims have an
arguable basis in law and fact1, and it appearing, at this early juncture in the
proceedings, from the complaint (Doc. 1), amended complaint (Doc. 9) and this
motion (Doc. 10), which was accompanied by a memorandum of law (Doc. 11) and
supporting declaration (Doc. 12), that he is capable of properly and forcefully
prosecuting his claims, and that discovery neither implicates complex legal or
factual issues nor requires factual investigation or the testimony of expert

If the Court determines that a claim has “arguable merit in fact and law,”
Id. at 155, consideration of the litigant’s ability to proceed pro se in light of a
number of additional non-exhaustive factors, including: (1) the plaintiff’s ability to
present his or her case; (2) the complexity of the particular legal issues; (3) the
degree to which factual investigation is required and the ability of the plaintiff to
pursue such investigation; (4) the amount a case is likely to turn on credibility
determinations; (5) whether the case will require testimony from expert witnesses;
and (6) the plaintiff's ability to retain and afford counsel on his or her own behalf, is
then undertaken. Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002); Parham
v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 457–58 (3d Cir. 1997); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147at 155–57
(3d Cir. 1993).
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witnesses, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-57 (3d Cir. 1993) (listing factors
relevant to request for counsel), and it being well-established that there is no
constitutional or statutory right to counsel in a civil case, Montgomery v. Pinchak,
294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d Cir. 2002); Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456–57 (3d Cir.
1997); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153–43 (3d Cir.1993), and that district courts
have broad discretion to determine whether to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. §
1915, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion (Doc. 10) is DENIED. If further
proceedings demonstrate the need for counsel, the matter will be reconsidered
either sua sponte or upon motion of plaintiff.

S/ Christopher C. Conner
CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
United States District Judge