Abney v. Younker et al

Filing 151

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - IT IS ORDERED that the parties motions for sanctions, (Docs. 105 and 136 ) are DENIED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on April 15, 2016. (kjn)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CLARENCE ABNEY,
Plaintiff
v.
CALEB YOUNKER, et al,
Defendants

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Civil No. 1:13-CV-1418
(Judge Kane)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I.

Statement of Facts and of the Case

This prisoner civil rights lawsuit comes before the court for resolution of two
competing sanctions motions. These sanctions motions, in turn, illustrate how on
occasion merits litigation can be hijacked by collateral disputes between the parties.
In this case upon consideration of the competing sanctions motions filed by the
parties, for the reasons set forth below, both motions are DENIED.
These competing motions arise in what has been contentious litigation. Turning
first to Abney’s sanctions motion, the background of this sanctions request is as
follows: On October 16, 2013, the Court (M.J. Schwab) set a schedule for limited
discovery and dispositive motions on a preliminary issue, the affirmative defense of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 25.) A motion for partial summary
judgment on that issue was then timely filed on February 28, 2014, by the defendants.

(Doc. 52.) Judge Schwab issued a Report and Recommendation regarding this motion
on August 4, 2014. That Report and Recommendation recommended that this motion
be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 95.) The partial denial of this defense
motion was based upon Judge Schwab’s conclusion that there were certain factual
disputes which precluded summary judgment.
With their understanding of the deficiencies in their summary judgment motion
informed by Judge Schwab’s Report and Recommendation, the defendants filed a
second summary judgment motion on August 27, 2014. (Doc. 98.) This motion, which
was filed while Judge Schwab’s Report and Recommendation was pending,
endeavored to address some of the evidentiary shortcomings cited by the judge in her
Report and Recommendation. Ultimately, these efforts by defense counsel were
unavailing. Judge Schwab issued a second Report and Recommendation which
recommended that the second summary judgment motion also be denied. (Doc. 112.)
The district court later adopted both of these Reports and Recommendations. (Docs.
111 and 145.)
In his sanctions motion, (Doc. 105), Abney argues that the filing of this second
summary judgment motion without the prior approval of the court constituted a
sanctionable act of misconduct on the defendants’ part. Thus, in our view this motion
seeks to sanctions zealous aggressive, albeit unsuccessful, advocacy by defense
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counsel.
The defendants have also filed a motion for sanctions, (Doc. 136), which seeks
to sanction zealous, and aggressive advocacy by the plaintiff’s counsel, advocacy
whose prudence has yet to be determined. On December 1, 2015, Abney filed a
motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. This motion sought leave to bring
new allegations of constitutional violations against additional defendants, including
the defense trial counsel in this case, arising out of what were efforts to transfer Abney
between state prisons for the purpose of deposing him in this underlying case, efforts
that were allegedly undertaken prior to obtaining court approval for the deposition.
(Doc. 130.)1 Abney has now also repeated these allegations in a newly filed lawsuit,
a separate and free-standing civil action. Abney v. Basiel, 1:16-CV-350.

T h e

defendants have regarded this very aggressive advocacy as sanctionable misconduct,
and have sought sanctions against Abney’s counsel as a result of this filing. The
defendants chart this course, however, prior to any legal assessment of the merits of
these newly filed legal claims. Thus, the defendants seek to sanction counsel for filing
a frivolous pleading, before the merits or frivolousness of that pleading have been
ascertained.

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We will by separate order address this motion for leave to file a
supplemental complaint, which also remains pending in this case.
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Having carefully considered the parties competing submissions, we find that
both motions should be denied.
II.

Discussion

The standards governing motions for sanctions are familiar ones. With respect
to such motions, our exercise of discretion in this instance is guided by settled case
law describing the responsibilities of the court when considering sanctions against
parties. At the outset, it is well-settled that a district court has the inherent power to
sanction parties appearing before it for refusing to comply with its orders and to
control litigation before it. See, e.g., Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d
212, 242 (3d Cir. 2007). Indeed, the inherent power of the Court to act in this area has
long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, which has held that:
It has long been understood that “[c]ertain implied powers must
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their
institution,” powers “which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because
they are necessary to the exercise of all others.” United States v. Hudson,
7 Cranch 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980)
(citing Hudson ). For this reason, “Courts of justice are universally
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose
silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their
lawful mandates.” Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242
(1821); see also Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 510, 22 L.Ed. 205
(1874). These powers are “governed not by rule or statute but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to
achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v.
Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-1389, 8
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L.Ed.2d 734 (1962).
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).
Sanctions decisions rest in the sound discretion of the court and, if a district
court awards sanctions pursuant to its inherent authority, such an award may only be
reviewed for abuse of discretion, which will be found only where “the court’s decision
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an
improper application of law to fact.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice
Litig. Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Orthopedic Bone
Screw Products Liability Litig., 193 F.3d 781, 795 (3d Cir. 1999)).
In addition to the court’s inherent authority, Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure also imposes an ethical duty upon counsel to ensure the timeliness and
accuracy of pleadings, and authorizes sanctions for improper conduct, stating in
pertinent part:
[A]n attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
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(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery....
The Third Circuit has noted that “[f]ormulating a rule broad enough to
curb abusive litigation tactics and misuse of the court's process but yet
not so sweeping as to hinder zealous advocacy was obviously a
formidable task.” Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir.
1987); see also Cvetko v. Derry Twp. Police Dep't, 2010 WL 3338256
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010). The Third Circuit found that Rule 11 imposes
an obligation on attorneys to “Stop, Think, Investigate and Research”
before filing litigation documents. Id. The court cautioned, however, that
“Rule 11 is not to be used routinely when the parties disagree about the
correct resolution of a matter in litigation. Rule 11 is intended for only
exceptional circumstances.” Id. at 483 (internal quotation omitted).
Spencer v. Borough of Moosic, No. CV 3:14-1704, 2016 WL 613782, at *1-2 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 16, 2016).
Yet while this court doubtless has the discretion to order imposition of
sanctions in appropriate cases, the exercise of this discretion is guided by certain basic
principles. Foremost among these principles is the tenet that sanctions should always
be narrowly tailored to meet the misconduct, and should entail no greater punishment
than is reasonably necessary to address the specific wrongdoing that confronts the
court. See Klein v. Stahl, GMBH & Co., Maschinefabrik, 185 F.3d 98 (3d. Cir.
1999).This basic, but pivotal, aspect of the exercise of discretion in this area, has been
voiced in many ways. Thus, it is well established that, “[b]ecause of their very

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potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion. A primary
aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct
which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 501 U.S. at 44-45
(citation omitted). Therefore, in exercising this authority we are cautioned that:
[A] district court must ensure that there is an adequate factual predicate
for flexing its substantial muscle under its inherent powers, and must
also ensure that the sanction is tailored to address the harm identified. In
exercising its discretion under its inherent powers, the court should be
guided by the same considerations that guide it in the imposition of
sanctions under the Federal Rules. First, the court must consider the
conduct at issue and explain why the conduct warrants sanction.
Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 43 F.3d at 74.
Moreover:
[H]aving evaluated the conduct at issue, the district court must
specifically consider the range of permissible sanctions and explain why
less severe alternatives to the sanction imposed are inadequate or
inappropriate. Although the court need not “exhaust all other sanctioning
mechanisms prior to resorting to its inherent power” (Landon v. Hunt,
938 F.2d at 450, 454 (3d Cir.1991)), the court must explain why it has
chosen any particular sanction from the range of alternatives it has
identified. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 16
and 37).
Id.
With these basic principles in mind we turn to consideration of the parties’
competing motions for sanctions.

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In this case, we find that both parties’ sanctions motions seek to sanction the
opposing party for aggressive, zealous acts of representation. While we would
encourage each party to temper their zeal with moments of cooler reflection in the
future, presently we find that no sanctions are warranted in this case against either
party for their representational conduct. We reach this conclusion mindful of the fact
that:
Rule 11 sanctions are generally appropriate only in the “exceptional
circumstance” that a claim, motion, or other paper “has absolutely no
chance of success,” although a finding of the signer's bad faith is not
required. Doering, 857 F.2d at 194 (citing Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 483; Lieb
v. Topstone Indus., Inc. ., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir.1986); Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir.1986)). A finding of
frivolousness is a prerequisite to any imposition of sanctions. Id. at 195.
Cvetko v. Derry Twp. Police Dep't, No. 1:09-CV-01260, 2010 WL 3338256, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2010).
Viewed in this light we find that the defendants’ submission of a second
summary judgment motion was simply an aggressive and zealous effort to promote
a legal defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and address a
shortcoming initially identified by the court in that legal defense. While this effort was
unavailing, the failure of the summary judgment motion does not in our mind equate
to exceptional circumstances, or conduct of such a frivolous nature that sanctions are
warranted. Therefore, this motion for sanctions will be denied.
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Likewise, the plaintiff’s effort to address matters occurring in the course of this
litigation through the filing of a motion to submit a supplemental complaint which
named opposing counsel as a putative defendant will soon be addressed on its merits,
either in this case, or in Abney’s newly filed lawsuit which echoes these claims.
Abney v. Basiel, 1:16-CV-350. Given the procedural posture of this matter, we
believe that the defendants’ sanctions motion is premature. Instead, we believe that
the sanctions question should be deferred until after the court has the opportunity to
address the underlying merits of the claims made by Abney, claims which are now
set forth by Abney in a separate free-standing complaint. Abney v. Basiel, 1:16-CV350. To these extent that the court may at the conclusion of this process determine any
claims to be frivolous, we believe that the proper course would be to: first, test the
legal merits of the claims through a motion to dismiss; and; second, file a motion for
sanctions, if appropriate, once the merits of the claims have been adjudicated. We
should not, however, at this juncture place the sanctions cart before the merits horse
in the fashion suggested by the defense.
An appropriate order follows:

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ORDER
AND NOW this 15th day of April, 2016, in accordance with the accompanying
memorandum, IT IS ORDERED that the parties’ motions for sanctions, (Docs. 105
and 136) are DENIED.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

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