Chandler v. Gordan

Filing 10

ORDER denying plaintiff's motion for recusal 8 . (See order for complete details.) Signed by Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner on 11/5/13. (ki)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHNNY RAY CHANDLER,
Plaintiff
v.
MR. A. GORDON,
Defendant

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:13-CV-1488
(Chief Judge Conner)

ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of November, 2013, upon consideration of plaintiff’s
motion for recusal (Doc. 8) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(a), in which a judge
is required to recuse himself if he has a personal bias either against a party or in
favor of any adverse party, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and under § 455(a),2 a judge is required

“In evaluating a motion brought under [Section] 144, the ‘test is whether,
assuming the truth of the facts alleged, a reasonable person would conclude that a
personal as distinguished from a judicial bias exists.’ ” United States v. Enigwe, 155
F. Supp.2d 365, 369 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (quoting Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415, 417 (3d
Cir. 1976)). “As a rule, only allegations of personal bias and prejudice will suffice
and the bias or prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source.” Id. (citations
omitted). “Extrajudicial bias is ‘bias not derived from the evidence or conduct of
the parties that the judge observes in the course of the proceedings.’ ” Schreiber v.
Kellogg, 838 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (E.D.Pa. 1993) (quoting Johnson v. Trueblood, 629
F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted)). When examining the allegations,
“[n]either the truth of the allegations nor the good faith of the pleader may be
questioned, regardless of the judge’s personal knowledge to the contrary.” Enigwe,
155 F.Supp.2d at 370 (quoting Mims, 541 F.2d at 417) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
1

The test for recusal under § 455(a) is whether a “reasonable person, with
knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 (3d Cir.
2004).
2

to recuse himself “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,”
and that the bias necessary to require recusal generally “must stem from a source
outside of the official proceedings,” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554
(1994); Selkridae v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004)
(beliefs or opinions which merit recusal must involve an extrajudicial factor) and
that judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion,” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, and that plaintiff seeks recusal of the
undersigned based on judicial rulings that have been made in this action, and other
civil actions that he has filed, concerning the imminent danger exception applicable
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal
(Doc. 8) is DENIED.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER
Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Middle District of Pennsylvania