Vernon v. Custer et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 37 MOTION to Amend/Correct 1 Complaint filed by Tyrik Vernon. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on 4/15/14. (pw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TYRIK VERNON,
Plaintiff
v.
CHARLES CUSTER, et al.,
Defendant

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Civil No. 1:13-CV-1497
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
Tyrik Vernon is an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections, currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Greene, in
Western Pennsylvania. In this action, Vernon has endeavored to bring claims against
a number of supervisory officials within the Department of Corrections, as well as a
number of employees at SCI-Coal Township, where Vernon was housed before his
transfer to SCI-Greene in the spring of 2013.
Vernon has filed three separate amended complaints which attempted to bring
claims against the defendants at SCI Coal Township for alleged violations of his right
to procedural due process in connection with certain disciplinary proceedings that
were brought against him in 2012. In addition, Vernon has claimed that the

defendants retaliated against him for engaging in activities protected by the First
Amendment. Finally, Vernon has alleged that some of the defendants at Coal
Township committed intentional torts against him in violation of federal law, in
connection with his disciplinary proceedings.
To date, Vernon’s efforts to articulate claims upon which relief may be granted
against the SCI Coal Township defendants have been consistently unavailing. Thus,
we have dismissed Vernon’s prior complaints against these defendants, but have
permitted Vernon one final opportunity to state a claim against these defendants.
Undeterred by his failure to state a claim in this case against any of the defendants are
alleged to have taken actions against Vernon while at SCI Coal Township, Vernon
has now moved to supplement his complaint to add allegations against defendants at
SCI Greene, a correctional facility located in the jurisdiction of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 37.) The defendants
have opposed this motion arguing that this Court should not allow Vernon to add
claims against state officials in Western Pennsylvania which could not otherwise be
properly brought in this Court to his complaint. (Doc. 41.) This motion is fully
briefed by the parties, (Docs. 41 and 45.), and is ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.

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II.

Discussion
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendments and

supplementation of pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Rule 15(a) authorizes a party to
amend his pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after serving it, or if the
pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of
the responsive pleading, or 21 days after service of a dispositive motion under Rule
12, whichever is earlier. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A) and (B). “In all other cases, a
party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent, or the
court’s leave,” which courts are to freely give “when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Consistent with this policy, leave to amend rests in the discretion
of the court and may, which justice so requires, be denied if the court finds “undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.”
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see also Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275,
291 (3d Cir. 2000).
Rule 15(d), in turn, governs the submission of supplemental pleadings. That
rule provides that upon the motion of a party, “the court may, on just terms, permit
a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or
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event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(d). A supplemental complaint thus “refers to events that occurred after the
original pleading was filed” whereas an amendment to a complaint “covers matters
that occurred before the filing of the original pleading but were overlooked at the
time.” Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1188-89 (3d Cir.
1979); see also Moore’s Federal Practice 3d § 15.30 (“Rule 15(d) applies only to
events that have occurred since the date of the filing of the pleading.”). Thus, the
purpose of the rule “is to promote as complete an adjudication of the dispute between
the parties as possible by allowing the addition of claims which arise after the initial
pleadings are filed.” Carl Zeiss Meditec v. Xoft, Inc., C.A. No. 10-308-LPS/MPT,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36785, * 4 (D. Del. April 5, 2011) (citation omitted).
“The standard under Rule 15(d) is ‘essentially the same’ as that under Rule
15(a), and leave to supplement should be granted unless it causes undue delay or
undue prejudice.” Micron Tech. v. Rambus, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 552, 558 (D. Del.
2006) (citing Medeva Pharma Ltd. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 201 F.R.D. 103, 104
n.3 (D. Del. 2001)). Application of Rule 15(d) in a given case is committed to the
Court’s broad discretion. Intel Corp. v. Amberwave Sys. Corp., 233 F.R.D. 416, 418
(D. Del. 2005). “The decision of whether to permit a supplemental pleading is within
this Court's discretion. See Owens–Illinois, Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d
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1185, 1188–89 (3d Cir.1979); see also Burns v. Exxon Corp., 158 F.3d 336, 344 (5th
Cir.1998) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to
file supplemental complaint.)” Hassoun v. Cimmino 126 F.Supp.2d 353, 360 -361
(D.N.J.2000). Therefore, decisions regarding motions to amend or supplement
pleadings rest in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed
absent a abuse of that discretion. See e.g., Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d
263 (3d Cir. 2008); Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 252 F.3d 267 (3d
Cir. 2001).
That discretion, however, is governed by certain basic principles, principles
that are embodied in Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In this regard,
while Rule 15 provides that leave to amend should be freely given when justice so
requires, the district court still retains broad discretion to deny a motion to amend,
Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2008); Cureton v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 252 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001), and may deny a request:
if the plaintiff's delay in seeking to amend is undue, motivated by bad
faith, or prejudicial to the opposing party. Adams, 739 F.2d at 864.
Delay becomes “undue,” and thereby creates grounds for the district
court to refuse leave, when it places an unwarranted burden on the court
or when the plaintiff has had previous opportunities to amend. Cureton,
252 F.3d at 273 (citing Adams, 739 F.2d at 868; Lorenz v. CSX Corp.,
1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir.1993)). Thus, our review of the question of
undue delay . . . will “focus on the movant's reasons for not amending
sooner,” Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273, and we will balance these reasons
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against the burden of delay on the District Court. Coventry v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 520 (3d Cir.1988).
Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, supra, 550 F.3d at 266.
Furthermore, “‘[a]mong the grounds that could justify a denial of leave to
amend are undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice, and futility.’ In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir.1997)
(‘Burlington’); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413-14 (3d Cir.1993). ‘Futility’
means that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1434.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113,
115 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, a party seeking to supplement pleadings must act in
a diligent fashion. Thus, for example, “[a] District Court has discretion to deny a
plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as to the deficiencies
in his complaint, but chose not to resolve them. Rolo v. City Investing Co.
Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654 (3d Cir.1998).”

Krantz v. Prudential

Investments Fund Management LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
Finally, in every instance, the exercise of this discretion must be guided by the
animating principle behind Rule 15(d), which is “to make pleadings a means to
achieve an orderly and fair administration of justice.” Griffin v. County School Bd.
of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964). Therefore, in considering a

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motion to amend we must always “appl[y] Rule 15(d) in a manner aimed at securing
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action-‘[t]he standard
applicable to motions to amend under [Rule 15(d) ] is essentially the same standard
that applies to [Rule 15(a) ].’ ” Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., 2010
WL 1609899, at *1 (D.Del. Apr.20, 2010) (quoting Medeva Pharma Ltd. v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 201 F.R.D. 103, 104 n. 3 (D.Del.2001)).” CMR D.N. Corp. v.
City Of Philadelphia, No. 07-1045, 2011 WL 857294, *4 (E.D.Pa. March
11,2011)(Stengel, J.).
In this case, it is submitted that the proper exercise of the court’s discretion,
Hassoun v. Cimmino, 126 F.Supp.2d 353, 360-61 (D.N.J.2000), calls for denial of
this motion to file a supplemental complaint adding claims that arise in Western
Pennsylvania, claims over which we have no jurisdiction or venue. Indeed, a
dispassionate assessment of this motion reveals that it runs afoul of many of the
factors which guide the exercise of judicial discretion in this field.
At the outset, it is plain that these proposed amendments would yield undue
delay in the resolution of the merits of these claims. As we have noted, “Delay
becomes ‘undue,’ and thereby creates grounds for the district court to refuse leave,
when it places an unwarranted burden on the court.” Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort,
LP, supra, 550 F.3d at 266. Judged against this standard, Vernon’s efforts to add new
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and disparate claims to his lawsuit relating activities at other prisons in other districts
simply does not satisfy the principle which animates Rule 15, which “is to promote
as complete an adjudication of the dispute between the parties as possible by allowing
the addition of claims which arise after the initial pleadings are filed.” Carl Zeiss
Meditec v. Xoft, Inc., C.A. No. 10-308-LPS/MPT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36785, *
4 (D. Del. April 5, 2011) (citation omitted). Instead, it would merely allow Vernon
to layer new, speculative and unrelated claims against additional defendants onto this
lawsuit, based solely upon Vernon’s subjective sense that everything that happens to
him must in some way be connected. Thus, we find that Vernon’s motion fails to
satisfy even the liberal standards imposed by Rule 15(d).
Furthermore, Vernon’s allegations of misconduct are all claimed to have
occurred at SCI-Greene, a facility which is located in the Western District of
Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. 118(c). In civil right actions where alleged violations
of the United States Constitution at SCI-Greene are alleged form the basis for the
Court’s jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) defines the proper venue as to these specific
allegations, and provides that any action challenging alleged misconduct at SCIFayette should:
be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if
all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
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occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action
is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be
found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be
brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
In this case, with respect to the events described in Vernon’s latest proposed
supplemental complaint, it is apparent that more than “a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred” at SCI-Greene, in the Western District
of Pennsylvania; rather, all of the alleged events are claimed to have occurred in that
district. Moreover, with respect to these claims arising out of events at SCI-Greene
it appears that each of the individuals named in the proposed supplemental complaint
either reside in, or may be found in the venue of the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. § 118(c). Indeed, plaintiff
himself is located in the Western District of Pennsylvania as an inmate housed at SCIGreene.
Therefore, it is evident from the face of plaintiff's proposed supplemental
complaint that these matters at SCI-Greene should not properly be joined with the
single remaining allegation in this action, based simply upon Vernon’s subjective
assertion that these acts are part of a seamless, global, yet wholly clandestine
conspiracy. Since venue over these alleged matters lies in the United States District

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Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to the extent the plaintiff believes he
has a valid civil rights action against the new defendants he identifies in his proposed
supplemental complaint, he should pursue relief through a complaint brought in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
Finally, we note that granting leave to file supplemental pleadings on these
facts would be antithetical to the guiding principle which animates and informs the
exercise of our discretion, which is “to make pleadings a means to achieve an orderly
and fair administration of justice.” Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. 218, 227 (1964). In fact, we find that granting this motion would
be unfair to all parties. It would be unfair to the defendants who would now face
new, belated, disparate, speculative, and in some instances futile claims, many of
which fall outside the venue of this Court. These amendments would also needlessly
compound costs and burdens of this particular litigation for all parties, since it would
inappropriately broaden claims, weave together seemingly unrelated events,
necessitate additional motions practice and litigation in pursuit of what appear to be
either fruitless claims or allegations of conduct which fall outside the venue of this
court, and connect this disparate allegations to events in this district solely on the
basis of speculative claims of clandestine conspiracies. Since we must always
“appl[y] Rule 15(d) in a manner aimed at securing the just, speedy and inexpensive
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determination of every action,” CMR D.N. Corp. v. City Of Philadelphia, No. 071045, 2011 WL 857294, *4 (E.D.Pa. March 11,2011)(Stengel, J.),our conclusion that
granting this motion would be unjust, cause undue delay, and needlessly increase the
costs of litigation, also calls call for the denial of this motion.
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file

a supplemental complaint adding new defendants and claims (Doc. 37.) will be
DENIED. The merits of the plaintiff’s amended complaint with respect to the
previously named defendants in this lawsuit will be separately addressed by the Court
in its consideration of the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants.
An appropriate order will follow.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge

DATED:

April 15, 2014

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