Perez v. Gamez et al
Filing
49
MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 7 Amended Complaint filed by Ever Perez. Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 11/23/13. (pw) Modified on 11/22/2013 (pw).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EVER PEREZ,
:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
CORPORAL RICHARD GAMEZ,
:
OFFICER ANDREW CRONE,
:
BRIAN HUNTER, OFFICERS JOHN :
DOE 1-6, PRESIDENT JUDGE
:
TODD A. HOOVER, CAROLYN C. :
THOMPSON, JUDGE BERNARD L. :
COATES, JR., JUDGE DEBORAH E. :
CURCILLO, JASON ANTHONY
:
LAMBRINO, STEVE ALLEN
:
MIMM, JOSEPH MARTIN
:
GAVAZZI AND DAUPHIN JANE
:
DOES 1-16
:
Defendants
:
CIVIL NO. 1:13-CV-01552
JUDGE SYLVIA H. RAMBO
MEMORANDUM
In this Section 1983 civil rights action, Plaintiff has sued multiple
individuals alleging, inter alia, violations of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive
and procedural due process rights as a result of Plaintiff’s detention at Dauphin
County Prison from June 11 to October 18, 2011. Presently before the court is a
motion to dismiss filed by Defendants President Judge Hoover, Judge Coates, Judge
Curcillo, and District Court Administrator Thompson (collectively “Judicial
Defendants”). (Doc. 28.) The issue presented by this motion is whether Plaintiff’s
claims against the Judicial Defendants are barred by judicial, legislative, or qualified
immunity, or in the alternative, whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
Judicial Defendants. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted because
judicial immunity bars the claims against Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant
Judge Curcillo, legislative immunity bars the claims against Defendant Judge
Hoover, and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
against Defendant Thompson.
I.
Background
Following a traffic stop on June 11, 2011, Plaintiff Ever Perez
(“Plaintiff”) was arrested and subsequently detained for approximately 130 days.
Because Plaintiff was allegedly never told the reason for his arrest and was not given
the opportunity to speak on his own behalf, and proceeded through the judicial
process without access to an interpreter (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 56, 109), Plaintiff commenced
this action against Judicial Defendants for violations of his procedural and
substantive due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Rights (Docs.
1 & 7).1 The facts underlying Plaintiff’s claims against Judicial Defendants are as
follows.
A.
Facts2
Plaintiff is a Mexican citizen who speaks only Spanish, although he
understands some English. (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 17, 22.) Plaintiff resided in Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania from 2004 until February 2013. (Id. at ¶ 23.) During November and
December of 2010, Plaintiff’s brother, Jose Luis Perez Velazquez (“Jose”),
occasionally resided at Plaintiff’s home. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Jose is approximately five
years younger and six-and-a-half inches taller than Plaintiff. (See id. at ¶¶ 17, 20, 31,
1
Plaintiff also brings Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of unlawful seizure and
malicious prosecution and state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution against defendants other than Judicial Defendants.
2
As required when deciding a motion to dismiss, the court will consider all well-pleaded
factual allegations contained in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. (Doc. 7.)
2
32). While Jose lived with Plaintiff, Plaintiff owned a Ford Windstar minivan that
Jose occasionally borrowed. (Id. at ¶¶ 25, 35.)
On November 19, 2010, while Jose was driving Plaintiff’s minivan,
Defendant Corporal Richard Gamez (“Defendant Gamez”) initiated a traffic stop due
to his observing the vehicle speed, swerve, and cross the fog line. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-37.)
Jose gave Plaintiff’s Mexican identification, which was in the glove box, to
Defendant Gamez rather than producing his own. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 38.) As a result of
failing a portable breath test, Jose was arrested and was taken to the Harrisburg
Hospital for a blood test, the results of which indicated that Jose was operating the
vehicle while his blood alcohol content was in excess of the legal limit. (Id. at ¶ 40.)
While at the hospital, Defendant Gamez took Jose’s photograph, informed him that
he would receive a summons to appear before court, and released him. (Id. at ¶¶ 42,
43.) Defendant Gamez released Jose from the hospital believing him to be Plaintiff.
As a result of Jose’s November 19, 2011 arrest and misidentification of
himself, Defendant Gamez filed a criminal complaint naming Plaintiff as the
defendant with Magisterial District Judge Gregory D. Johnson (“MDJ Johnson”),
which charged Plaintiff with six offenses.3 (Id. at ¶ 44.) In the criminal complaint,
Defendant Gamez stated that he identified Plaintiff based solely upon the Mexican
identification provided by Jose at the time of the arrest. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Defendant
3
The criminal complaint charged Plaintiff with two counts of Driving Under the Influence
of Alcohol or Controlled Substance, one count of Drivers Required to be Licensed, one count of Driving
on Roadways Laned for Traffic, one count of Maximum Speed Limits, and one count of Careless
Driving. (Id. at ¶ 48.)
3
Gamez also stated that fingerprints were not taken (Id. at ¶ 45), and described the
offender as being five feet and five inches tall (Id. at ¶ 46).4
On December 1, 2012, MDJ Johnson sent Plaintiff two summonses to
his residence in Harrisburg, one by certified mail and the other by regular mail. (Id.
at ¶ 49.) Plaintiff maintains that he never received either summons, despite court
records reflecting that someone signed for the summons delivered by certified mail
and that the summons sent by regular mail was not returned as undeliverable. (Id. at
¶¶ 50-52.) Plaintiff failed to appear for his preliminary hearing. (Id. at ¶ 53.)
Consequently, MDJ Johnson transferred the case to Dauphin County Court of
Common Pleas Judge Andrew H. Dowling, who issued a bench warrant for
Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 55, 56.)
While driving his minivan on June 11, 2011, Plaintiff was stopped by
Middletown Police Officer Andrew Richard Crone (“Defendant Crone”). (Id. at ¶
60.) Defendant Crone examined Plaintiff’s documents, including Plaintiff’s Mexican
identification, and returned to his vehicle, at which time he presumably discovered
the bench warrant issued for Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 63.) Thereafter, three additional
police vehicles arrived, and a total of eight law enforcement officers participated in
arresting Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 64.)
After being held at the Middletown Police Station for two hours,
Plaintiff was taken to Dauphin County Prison where he was strip-searched,
fingerprinted, innoculated, dressed in prison clothes, and interviewed. (Id. at ¶¶ 71,
75.) The interview was conducted in English despite Plaintiff requesting a Spanish
interpreter. (Id. at ¶¶ 76, 78.) Plaintiff was able to answer basic biographical
4
Plaintiff is five foot and one half inch tall. (Id. at ¶ 20.)
4
questions in English, but could not understand the majority of the interview,
including any statement that may have been made regarding the reason underlying
his arrest. (Id. at ¶¶ 76, 77, 80.)
A series of four hearings were then held for Plaintiff at the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas. (See id. at ¶¶ 81-101.) During the time period
relevant to these proceedings, Judge Todd A. Hoover (“Defendant Judge Hoover”)
was the President Judge of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas and Carolyn
C. Thompson (“Defendant Thompson”) was the District Court Administrator for the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10.)
During the hearings, Plaintiff was not provided a Spanish interpreter
and he was represented by three different public defenders, at least two of whom did
not speak Spanish. (See id. at ¶¶ 81-100.) Plaintiff’s first hearing took place on June
13, 2013. (Id. at ¶ 81.) At that hearing, the assistant district attorney stated that
Plaintiff failed to appear for his preliminary DUI hearing, and then requested the
hearing be continued so an interpreter could be provided. (Id. at ¶¶ 85, 86.) Judge
Bernard L. Coates, Jr. (“Defendant Judge Coates”) granted the request and continued
the proceedings until June 16, 2011. (Id. at ¶ 87.) Plaintiff avers that he did not
understand what was being said at the June 11, 2011 hearing, and was not given the
opportunity to speak. (Id. at ¶ 88.)
The second hearing was held on June 16, 2011, at which time Judge
Deborah E. Curcillo (“Defendant Judge Curcillo”) set bail for Plaintiff at
$10,000.00,5 without hearing from Plaintiff, and continued the hearing so that an
5
It should be noted that the transcript submitted with the complaint demonstrates that
Plaintiff was otherwise subject to an ICE detainer. (Doc. 3-6, p. 3.)
5
interpreter could be provided. (Id. at ¶¶ 91-93.) At the third hearing, which was held
on June 29, 2011, Defendant Judge Curcillo again presided. Despite the second
hearing being continued for purposes of obtaining an interpreter, an interpreter was
again absent from the third hearing. (Id. at ¶¶ 96, 97.) Plaintiff was not present in
the courtroom for the third hearing, at which time Plaintiff’s public defender waived
Plaintiff’s right to speedy trial and again requested a continuance for lack of an
interpreter. Defendant Judge Curcillo granted the continuance and rescheduled the
hearing for August 10, 2011. (Id. at ¶¶ 98-100.) At the rescheduled hearing on
August 10, 2011, the assistant public defender again requested and received a
continuance. (Id. at ¶ 101.)
After the August 10, 2011 hearing, Plaintiff retained a private attorney,
and on August 30, 2011, the private attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charges on
the basis that Plaintiff was not the individual who was driving the vehicle on
November 19, 2011. (Id. at ¶¶ 103, 104.) A hearing was held on October 18, 2011,
at which time an interpreter was provided. (Id. at ¶¶ 105, 106.) The prosecutor
agreed to amend the charges to reflect Jose’s name after Defendant Gamez stated that
Plaintiff was not the individual that he had pulled over on November 16, 2010. (Id.
at ¶ 107; Doc. 3-7, p. 3 of 4.) Plaintiff was released from custody that day. (Doc. 7,
¶ 108.)
Plaintiff claims that he suffered substantial damages, including physical
pain and suffering, emotional distress and harm, embarrassment, lost wages and
employment, other financial losses, and loss of liberty as a result of his being in
custody. (Id. at ¶ 126.)
6
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on June 10, 2013 (Doc. 1) and an
amended complaint on June 28, 2013 (Doc. 7). Plaintiff’s amended complaint sets
forth, inter alia, two Fourteenth Amendment claims against Judicial Defendants, the
first asserting violations of his substantive due process rights and the second
asserting violations of his procedural due process rights.6 (See Doc. 7.) On
September 16, 2013, Judicial Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 28), which
was perfected on September 30, 2013 (Doc. 32). After the court granted an
extension of time to respond (Doc. 41), Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to Judicial
Defendant’s motion to dismiss on October 24, 2013 (Doc. 42). Judicial Defendants
replied on November 7, 2013. (Doc. 44.) Thus, the issues have been fully briefed
and the motion is now ripe for disposition.
II.
Legal Standard
When presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
court “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may
disregard any legal conclusions,” and ultimately must determine “whether the facts
alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim
for relief.’” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210, 211 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief; it must ““show” such an entitlement
with its facts.” Id. at 211. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it
6
Although Plaintiff originally sued Defendant Judge Hoover and Defendant Thompson in
both their individual and official capacities (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 9, 10), Plaintiff now pursues claims against all
Judicial Defendants only in their individual capacities (Doc. 42, p. 1).
7
has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
(alterations in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). In other words, a claim has
“facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id.
“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the
allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters
of public record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268
(3d Cir. 2007). The court may consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a
defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are
based on the [attached] document[s].” Pension Benefit, 998 F.2d at 1196.
Additionally, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose
authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the
pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d
548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v.
Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Although a district court may not
consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly
relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to
dismiss into one for summary judgment.” (internal quotation omitted)). However,
the court may not rely on other parts of the record in making its decision. Jordan v.
Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
8
III.
Discussion
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides private
citizens a means to redress violations of federal law by state officials. The statute
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, this statute does not abrogate common law immunities
that may be available to the state official, including judicial, legislative, and
qualified immunity. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991); see also McArdle
v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1084 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Despite these broad terms . . ., the
Supreme Court has held consistently that [] Section 1983 did not abolish longstanding common law immunities . . . and defenses to civil suits.”). The official
seeking a common-law immunity bears the burden of showing that application of the
immunity is justified. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486.
A.
Judicial Immunity
Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, a judge is granted absolute
immunity from Section 1983 suits if: 1) the judge had jurisdiction over the dispute;
and 2) the alleged violation occurred while the judge was performing a judicial act.
Clark v. Conahan, 737 F. Supp. 2d 239, 256 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Wallace v.
Powell, No. 3:09-cv-286, 2009 LEXIS 109163, *7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2009)). If the
court finds that the action complained of is both within the judge’s jurisdiction and
constituted a judicial act, then the judge is entitled to judicial immunity regardless of
whether the act was committed “in error, with malice, in excess of his authority, or
9
in conspiracy with others.” Johnson v. Jacques Ferber, Inc., No. 02-8508, 2003 WL
22594230, *2 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 15, 2003) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 499 U.S. 24
(1980)).
1. Jurisdiction
In determining whether a judge had jurisdiction over a dispute for
purposes of judicial immunity, the “scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be
construed broadly.” Clark, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356 (1978)). Judicial immunity will only be defeated for lack of
jurisdiction when the judge has performed “in the clear absence of jurisdiction.”
Johnson, 2003 WL 22594230 at *3 (citing Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d
760, 769 (3d Cir. 2000)); Keener v. Feudale, No. 89-2694, 1989 WL 60454, *1
(E.D. Pa., Jun. 6, 1989) (citing Sparks, 449 U.S. at 27). Even where the judge is
mistaken about the status of jurisdiction or commits a procedural error that allows
him or her to act without jurisdiction, he or she will still be granted judicial
immunity. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 771.
In the instant case, the court has little trouble determining that
Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo acted within their jurisdiction
when they allegedly failed to appoint an interpreter and granted the continuances.
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas judges have “unlimited original jurisdiction in
all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law.” PA. Const. art. V, § 5, cl. b;
Johnson, 2003 WL 22594230 at *3. Both Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant
Judge Curcillo had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s criminal case as presiding judge.
Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 4412(a), which Plaintiff himself cites to, makes it clear
that the Defendant Judges Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo did not act outside
their authority when they failed to appoint an interpreter to Plaintiff’s case or when
they granted the requested continuances. Indeed, Section 4412(a) of Title 42
10
requires a certified interpreter be appointed “if the presiding judicial officer
determines that a principal party in interest or witness has a limited ability to speak
or understand English.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 4412(a). This statute gave Defendant Judge
Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo express authority to decide whether to appoint
an interpreter in a case pending before them, and was therefore unquestionably
within their jurisdiction.
2. Judicial Act
Defining “judicial act” for purposes of judicial immunity requires a
deeper analysis because the Supreme Court has not articulated a class of acts which
are unquestionably considered “judicial. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227
(1988). This lack of guidance has led to inconsistent results among the circuits.
However, in Stump, the Supreme Court articulated a two-factor framework to guide
an analysis of whether a judge’s action qualifies as a judicial act. The first factor
assesses whether the challenged action is a function normally performed by the
judge. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. The second factor assesses whether the parties
would expect to deal with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Id. Thus, the test
requires a court to analyze whether the function of the act performed is judicial in
nature, rather than merely determining whether it was properly performed by a
judge, because only acts that are judicial in nature are protected by judicial
immunity. Wallace, 2009 LEXIS 109163 at *7-8. A judicial act must be
distinguished from those acts that a judge was assigned to perform, but are
administrative, legislative, or executive in nature. Id. at *7 (citing Forrester, 484
U.S. at 227). For example, in Forrester, the Supreme Court held that the judge
firing an employee was administrative and not judicial in nature because it was not
adjudicative and therefore outside the doctrine of judicial immunity. 484 U.S. at
229. Similarly, in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880), the Supreme Court held
11
that the preparation of an annual list for individuals eligible for grand jury was
administrative in nature, and therefore outside the doctrine of judicial immunity.
To further aid in analyzing whether an act is judicial in nature under the
Stump test, both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have considered the following factors:
“(1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether
the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge’s
chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the
court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official
capacity.” Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 222-23 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also Duvall v. Cnty. of
Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside,
183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999)). These factors must be interpreted broadly in
favor of judicial immunity. Davis, 565 F.3d at 223 (citing Malina v. Gonzales, 994
F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993)).
For example, in Davis, the Fifth Circuit applied these factors and
determined that the judge’s selection of applicants to be included on a list eligible
for court appointments was judicial in nature. Davis, 565 F.3d at 226. The court
reasoned that selecting the applicants for the list was inextricably linked to
appointing counsel to a case, which the court believed to be easily categorized as a
judicial act. Id. This reasoning is consistent with the D.C. Circuit, which held in
Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2006), that judges performed judicial acts
when they devised and implemented a system for appointing attorneys to handle
juvenile delinquency matters. The reasoning of the D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit
diverge from that of the Second Circuit in Mitchell, 377 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2004),
wherein the court held that forming a list of potential counsel to represent indigent
defendants was an administrative act. The court emphasized that the appointments
12
in that case were not related to a particular criminal case before the judge, therefore
supporting the conclusion that the act served an administrative function. Id. at 174.
Although this circuit has never decided whether the appointment of an
interpreter qualifies as a judicial act, in Lopez v. Young, Civ. A. No. 86-7114, 1987
WL 13745, *1 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1987), the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that judicial immunity applied to a common pleas judge who
failed to provide an interpreter for a defendant in a criminal trial. The Lopez court
reasoned that “it [was] within the court’s discretion to decide whether an interpreter
[was] necessary.” Id.
In the instant case, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Judge Coates’ and
Defendant Judge Curcillo’s failure to appoint an interpreter is not a judicial act
because appointing an interpreter is mandated by 42 Pa.C.S. § 4412(a), which states
in relevant part that “[u]pon request or sua sponte, if the presiding judicial official
determines that a principal party in interest or witness has a limited ability to speak
or understand English, then a certified interpreter shall be appointed.” (Doc. 7, ¶
114.) Although it may be mandatory to appoint an interpreter once the judge
determines one is necessary, it is in the court’s discretion to determine whether there
is such a necessity. See Lopez, 1987 WL 13745 at *1. Therefore, even assuming
arguendo that Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo erroneously
decided that an interpreter was not necessary, their actions would still be shielded by
judicial immunity provided such an act is judicial in nature under the Stump test.
However, the facts of this case appear to show that Defendant Judge
Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo did not refuse to appoint an interpreter. The
transcripts attached to the complaint clarify that it was Plaintiff’s public defenders
13
who stated they would provide an interpreter.7 (See Doc. 7; see also Doc. 3-5, p. 2;
Doc. 3-6, p. 2.) Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo were clearly
of the impression that an interpreter would be provided by Plaintiff’s public defender
and they correctly used their discretion in determining that appointing an interpreter
was unnecessary. The statute cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to require a judge
to appoint an interpreter even when counsel has indicated that he or should would
provide an interpreter. Furthermore, Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge
Curcillo granted continuances because defense counsel represented that an
interpreter would be provided at the next proceeding. This is not a case where a
judge failed to appoint an interpreter and then continued proceedings despite the lack
of an interpreter.
7
The following occurred at the hearing on June 13, 2011, before Defendant Judge Coates:
[Defense counsel]:
We have an interpreter problem on this case.
The Court:
You mean you don’t have one?
[Defense counsel]:
Yes.
*
*
*
[The Prosecutor]:
Do you just want to schedule it for Thursday and have an
interpreter out there?
[Defense counsel]:
Yeah, that would be best.
(Doc. 3-5, p. 2.)
A similar exchange occurred at the hearing continued on June 16, 2011 before Judge Curcillo:
[The Prosecutor]:
[Defense counsel] indicated that he needed an interpreter
and that he would contact – or whoever would be
contacted to get one.
*
*
*
The court:
[Defense counsel], if I set him for tomorrow morning,
will you have somebody to interpret?
[Defense counsel]:
I can certainly ask at the office. It’s all about the
availability, with the limited interpreters that we have.
(Doc. 3-6, p. 2.)
14
Applying the Stump test and the Fifth and Ninth Circuit factors, the
court finds that the challenged actions of Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant
Judge Curcillo were judicial in nature. First, appointing an interpreter is a normal
judicial function. Indeed, the authority to do so is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 4412(a),
and is reserved to the “presiding judge.” See 42 Pa.C.S. § 4412(a). Second, the
challenged actions occurred in the courtroom during the time and place set for
hearing. Third, the challenged actions directly related to Plaintiff’s criminal charges
that were pending before the court. Indeed, the reason Plaintiff needed an interpreter
was to answer the charges brought against him. Fourth, the challenged actions
occurred while Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo were acting in
their official capacities as presiding judges. Certainly, Plaintiff would expect to deal
with Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo in their judicial
capacities during a hearing in his criminal case over which they were presiding.
Furthermore, relevant case law favors applying judicial immunity. The
instant case is easily distinguished from Forrester, Ex Parte Virginia, and Mitchell.
In each of these cases, the respective court held that the act complained of was
administrative in nature because the actions challenged therein did not relate to a
case pending before the defendant judge. Here, however, the challenged actions
directly related to Plaintiff’s criminal case actually pending before Defendant Judge
Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo. For this reason, the instant case presents a
stronger basis for the application of judicial immunity than the facts in Davis and
Roth, both of which held that appointments of attorneys to a list were judicial in
nature.8
8
For example, in Davis, the court reasoned that appointing attorneys to a list was judicial in
nature, despite that forming the list did not directly relate to a specific case. The court reasoned that the
formation of the list could not be separated from the clear judicial act of selecting an attorney from the
(continued...)
15
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the challenged actions
of Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo constituted judicial acts.
Because the actions of Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo were
judicial acts made while they had jurisdiction over the dispute, they are entitled to
judicial immunity. Because judicial immunity insulates judges from liability for
Section 1983 claims, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Coates and
Defendant Judge Curcillo will be dismissed.
B.
Legislative Immunity
Under the doctrine of legislative immunity, an individual, including a
judge, may be shielded from liability in a Section 1983 claim if the act alleged to
violate the plaintiff’s rights was both substantively and procedurally legislative.
Gallas, 211 F.3d at 774; see also Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (holding that legislative immunity insulated judges while
acting in their legislative capacity). An act is substantively legislative when it
involves policy making decisions. Gallas, 211 F.3d at 774. In order to involve
policy making decisions, the act must affect more than a small group of individuals.
Id. An act is procedurally legislative if it is passed pursuant to an “established
legislative procedure.” Id. “This principle requires that constitutionally accepted
procedures of enacting the legislation must be followed in order to assure that the act
is a legislative, reasoned decision representing the will of the people.” Id.
8
(...continued)
list to be appointed to a specific case. Applying Davis’ reasoning to the instant case, there is stronger
support for the application of judicial immunity because Defendant Judge Coates’ and Defendant Judge
Curcillo’s granting continuances so that an interpreter could be provided was inextricably linked to their
decision not to appoint an interpreter at the respective hearings. Granting continuances were clearly
judicial acts. See Johnson, 2003 WL 22594230 at *3 (“Other courts have defined the grant or denial of
a litigant’s request for a continuance as a “judicial” act, and have exempted such actions from § 1983
claims on grounds of judicial immunity.”). Thus, for this additional reason, the challenged actions were
judicial in nature.
16
The next issue is whether the doctrine of legislative immunity applies to
Defendant Judge Hoover’s9 alleged failure to adopt policies or procedures to ensure
interpreters are available to criminal defendants. Other jurisdictions have
categorized the failure to act in this regard as tantamount to an affirmative act. See
Martin v. Augusta-Richmond County, CV 112-058, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169099,
12-13 (D. Ga. 2012) (“Defendants’ failure to enact a redistricting plan was
quintessentially legislative, and [therefore defendants] are entitled to legislative
immunity for this action.”); Fletcher v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 550 F. Supp. 2d 30,
39-40 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]he law is equally clear in this Circuit that federal officials
are protected by absolute immunity for the promulgation of regulations and any
accompanying failure to modify regulations.”); Tolman v. Finneran, 171 F. Supp. 2d
31, 36 (D. Mass. 2001) (“[I]f the sole basis for a § 1983 action is the failure to pass
legislation, legislative immunity would foreclosure suit.”).
The court holds that the decision to implement policies relating to the
appointment of interpreters is entitled to legislative immunity. Such an act is
substantially legislative because implementing a policy for appointing an interpreter
is a decision that affects a large number of individuals. Furthermore, the act is
procedurally legislative in Pennsylvania because the president judge of each Court of
Common Pleas is statutorily authorized to “promulgate all administrative rules and
regulations.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 325(e). Moreover, every court has the ability to make
rules and orders of court as required by “the interests of justice or the business of the
court.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 323. These statutes were promulgated by the Pennsylvania
9
Although Judicial Defendants’ brief in support of their motion to dismiss (Doc. 32) states
that Defendant Thompson should also be shielded by legislative immunity, Defendant Thompson, as
district court administrator, does not possess the statutory authority to make policy decisions of this
nature, and therefore, fails to meet the procedurally legislative requirement. For this reason, claims
against Defendant Thompson will be addressed separately.
17
legislature, and provide to President Judge Hoover the authority to act pursuant to
constitutionally accepted procedures. Thus, Defendant Judge Hoover’s actions taken
pursuant to this authority is entitled to legislative immunity. Based on the foregoing,
the claims against Defendant Judge Hoover based on his alleged failure to adopt
policies and procedures to ensure interpreters for criminal defendants qualifies as a
legislative act and is therefore entitled to legislative immunity. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Judge Hoover will be dismissed.
C.
Defendant Thompson
Plaintiff brings two Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claims
against Defendant Thompson, the first for allegedly violating his substantive due
process rights, and the second for allegedly violating his procedural due process
rights. In order to prevail on a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) he suffered a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or law of the
United States; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting
under the color of state law. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000);
Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993). However, even if the plaintiff is
successful in meeting these elements, the plaintiff must also show that the defendant
was personally involved in the deprivation of the right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527, 537 (1981); Brown v. Rinehart, 325 Fed. App’x 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2009); Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff may prove personal
involvement by showing that the defendant either personally participated in the
deprivation of the right or, under certain circumstances, that the defendant is liable
under respondeat superior. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. A defendant “cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor
18
approved.” Loscombe v. City of Scranton, 902 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540 (M.D. Pa.
2012) (quoting C. H. ex rel. Z. H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2000)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead Defendant
Thompson’s personal involvement in the deprivation of his rights. Plaintiff cites to
42 Pa.C.S. § 4411, which states, in relevant part, that the Court Administrator “may
establish a program to appoint and use certified interpreters in judicial proceedings,”
42 Pa.C.S. § 4411(a), and “shall compile, maintain, and disseminate a current list of
interpreters,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 4411(b). However, this act applies to the Court
Administrator of Pennsylvania, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 4402, and therefore neither grants
authority to nor imposes duty upon a District Court Administrator, the position that
Defendant Thompson actually held. The complaint does not make any other
allegations that support the finding that Defendant Thompson had an affirmative
duty to create a policy concerning interpreters. Furthermore, following the
reasoning in Loscombe,10 even assuming Defendant Thompson was obligated to
implement policies and procedures for appointing an interpreter, Plaintiff
nevertheless fails to plead how that obligation amounted to Defendant Thompson’s
specific involvement. In short, no reasonable inference establishes that Defendant
Thompson was personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights.
Instead of providing facts to support Defendant Thompson’s personal
involvement, Plaintiff merely alleges the following legal conclusions: “Defendants
Hoover and Thompson jointly caused this violation by failing to adopt policies and
procedures that ensure interpreters for criminal defendants with limited English
proficiency,” (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 155, 162), and “Defendants Hoover and Thompson acted
10
In Loscombe, the plaintiff sued the town Mayor alleging that he failed to enforce city
ordinances. 902 F. Supp. 2d at 534. The court held that although the city code required the Mayor to
enforce all city ordinances, the plaintiff failed to show his personal involvement in their action. Id.
19
with deliberate indifference to the likelihood that violations of Plaintiff’s
fundamental rights would result from their failure to act” (Id. at ¶¶ 156, 163).11
Plaintiff fails to show, for purposes of federal pleading standards, how Defendant
Thompson acted with deliberate indifference by failing to implement a policy that
Defendant Thompson had neither the authority nor duty to make.
Plaintiff does sufficiently plead that the District Court Administrator
has a duty to appoint an interpreter by citing to 204 Pa. Code § 201(c), which states
in relevant part that “[o]nce the . . . District Court Administrator . . . is made aware
of the need for an interpreter, he or she shall procure a certified interpreter.” (Doc.
7, at ¶ 115.) However, the complaint fails to allege that Defendant Thompson was
“made aware” of Plaintiff’s need for an interpreter, and further fails to allege
Defendant Thompson did not provide an interpreter. Without these missing factual
allegations, the court cannot conclude that Plaintiff has met his burden of pleading
sufficient facts to support a plausible claim for relief against Defendant Thompson.
Therefore, the court will dismiss all claims against Defendant Thompson for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
11
Moreover, these paragraphs continue with the allegation that “[t]he lack of court
interpreters was an ongoing problem acknowledged by the Pennsylvania legislature, which mandated
[Defendant Judge Hoover and Defendant Thompson’s] action to resolve it.” (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 156, 163.)
However, the only Pennsylvania statute that Plaintiff cites to regarding the Court Administrator’s duties
to develop policies to appoint interpreters states that the Court Administrator “may establish a program
to appoint and use certified interpreters in judicial proceedings,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 4411(a) (emphasis
supplied), which refers to the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania, a position that Defendant Thompson
did not occupy. Furthermore, the statute imposes a permissive, not mandatory, responsibility.
20
IV.
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing discussion, the court finds that the
claims against Defendant Judge Coates and Defendant Judge Curcillo are barred by
judicial immunity, that the claims against Defendant Judge Hoover are barred by
legislative immunity, and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted against Defendant Thompson. As a result, Judicial Defendant’s
motion will be granted in its entirety. An appropriate order will issue.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge
Dated: November 22, 2013.
21
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