Perez v. Gamez et al

Filing 51

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re 33 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Officer Andrew Richard Crone. Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 11/25/13. (pw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EVER PEREZ,

:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
CORPORAL RICHARD GAMEZ;
:
OFFICER ANDREW CRONE;
:
BRIAN HUNTER; OFFICERS JOHN :
DOE 1-6; PRESIDENT JUDGE
:
TODD HOOVER; CAROLYN
:
THOMPSON; JUDGE BERNARD
:
COATES, JR.; JUDGE DEBORAH
:
CURCILLO; JASON LAMBRINO;
:
STEVEN MIMM; JOSEPH
:
GAVAZZI; DAUPHIN COUNTY
:
JANE DOES 1-6,
:
:
Defendants
:

Civil No. 1:13-CV-1552

Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM
In this Section 1983 civil rights action, Plaintiff has sued several
individuals asserting violations of his rights protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as pendent state law claims. Plaintiff alleges that several
police officers, a county sheriff, three judges, a district court administrator, three
public defenders, and twelve unidentified individuals were the cause of his being
incarcerated as the unfortunate result of his brother intentionally misrepresenting
himself as Plaintiff during a traffic stop. Presently before the court is a motion to
dismiss filed by Defendant Crone (Doc. 33), wherein he contends that Plaintiff has
failed to state valid Section 1983 or Pennsylvania tort claims. For the following
reasons, Defendant Crone’s motion will be granted.
I.

Background
“As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may

not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory

Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, for the purposes of the motion
sub judice, and in light of the record presently in existence, the court only considers
the allegations contained in the amended complaint (Doc. 7) and exhibits submitted
in support thereof (Doc. 3).
A.

Facts1

At the time relevant to the instant action, Plaintiff, Ever Uribe Perez
Velazquez, was 27 years old, and approximately five feet and a half-inch tall. (Doc.
7, ¶¶ 17-20; see also Doc. 3-1.) Plaintiff’s brother, Jose Luis Perez Velazquez
(“Jose”),2 was 21 years old,3 and approximately five feet and seven inches tall. (Doc.
7, ¶¶ 31, 32.) Both Plaintiff and Jose are Hispanic and citizens of Mexico (Id. at ¶¶
17, 21, 31), and while Plaintiff “understands some English” but speaks only Spanish
(Id. at ¶ 22), Jose speaks some English (Id. at ¶ 33). Officer Andrew Crone
(“Defendant Crone”) was employed as a police officer with Middletown Borough
Police Department. (Id. at ¶ 6.)
The facts giving rise to the claims against Officer Crone arise from
Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Richard Gamez’s stop of Plaintiff’s vehicle, a
burgundy 1998 Ford Windstar minivan, on November 19, 2010, at approximately
1

As required when deciding a motion to dismiss, the court will accept as true all wellpleaded factual allegations contained in Plaintiff’s amended complaint. See Trump Hotels & Casino
Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975)).
2

For ease of reference, Plaintiff’s brother is referred to as “Jose.” Such use of a more
familiar name is intended solely to avoid confusion between Plaintiff and his brother. No disrespect is
intended to Plaintiff’s brother by the use of this name convention.
3

Jose was 21 years old at the time of the events providing the basis for Plaintiff’s claims,
i.e., Plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent detention beginning on June 11, 2011. The court notes that at the
time of the underlying event, i.e., when Jose was stopped by Corporal Gamez on November 19, 2010,
and had a blood alcohol level of .081%, Jose was only 20 years old.
2

9:30 p.m. within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (See Doc. 7, ¶¶ 35, 36; Doc. 33.) According to Corporal Gamez’s affidavit of probable cause, he initiated the
traffic stop due to his observing the vehicle traveling fifteen miles per hour over the
speed limit, swerving, crossing the white fog line on three occasions, and nearly
striking the westside guardrail. (Doc. 3-3, p. 6 of 6.) Jose identified himself as
Plaintiff by giving Plaintiff’s Mexican passport, which was in the glovebox, to
Corporal Gamez. (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 38, 39.) During the encounter, Corporal Gamez
observed several indicia of intoxication and, after Jose failed a portable breath test,
Corporal Gamez arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol, and drove
him to the Harrisburg Hospital for a blood test, the results of which confirmed that
Jose’s blood alcohol content was in excess of the legal limit. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 41; Doc.
3-3, p. 6 of 6.) Corporal Gamez released Jose from custody after photographing him
and informing him that he would receive a summons to appear in court. (Doc. 7, ¶¶
42, 43.) Because Jose produced Plaintiff’s passport as his only form of
identification, Corporal Gamez released Jose believing him to be Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶
39; see Doc. 3-3, p. 6 of 6.)
On November 30, 2010, Corporal Gamez filed a police criminal
complaint charging Plaintiff with six counts related to the November 19, 2010
incident. (See Doc. 7, ¶ 44; see also Doc. 3-3.) In the affidavit of probable cause,
Corporal Gamez recounted the events giving rise to the stop, and stated that “[t]he
defendant was identified by his International ID as Ever URIVE [sic] PEREZ, DOB:
[redacted as submitted].” (Doc. 3-3, p. 6 of 6.)
On December 1, 2010, Magisterial District Judge Gregory D. Johnson
issued a summons for Plaintiff to appear for a preliminary hearing scheduled for
3

February 7, 2011. (Doc. 7, ¶¶ 49, 53.) The court sent two copies of the summons to
Plaintiff’s address, the first by certified mail, which was accepted by an individual
whom Plaintiff fails to identify in his complaint (Id. at ¶ 51), and the second by
regular mail, which was not returned as undeliverable (Id. at ¶ 52). Nevertheless,
Plaintiff contends he did not receive either copy of the summons, and consequently,
failed to appear for the preliminary hearing. (Id. at ¶¶ 50, 54.)
Due to Plaintiff’s failure to appear, Magisterial District Judge Johnson
transferred the case to the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas and requested a
bench warrant be issued on February 9, 2011. (Id. at ¶ 55.) On February 11, 2011,
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas Judge Andrew Dowling issued a bench
warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest, which ordered that “the Sheriff of Dauphin County, or
any other police officer . . . convey and deliver [Plaintiff] . . . into the custody of the
[Dauphin County] Court [of Common Pleas],” but instructed that, if the court was
unavailable, the individual may be held at the county jail pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 150(A)(5)(b). (Doc. 3-4, p. 1 of 5.) The bench warrant
listed the reason for its issuance as “Failure to Appear,” identified Plaintiff as the
individual to be seized, and was signed by Judge Dowling. (Id.)
On June 11, 2011, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Defendant Crone
stopped Plaintiff, who was operating his burgundy minivan in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, for speeding. (Doc. 7, ¶ 60.) Plaintiff provided Defendant Crone with
several documents, including his passport. (Id. at ¶ 62.) Upon inspecting the
documents, Defendant Crone reentered his vehicle for approximately thirty minutes,
and presumably discovered the outstanding bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. (See
id. at ¶ 63.) Thereafter, three additional police vehicles arrived, and Defendant
4

Crone effectuated Plaintiff’s arrest with the assistance of several other law
enforcement officers, who Plaintiff identifies in his complaint as “John Does 1-6.”
(Id. at ¶ 64.) Plaintiff understood only portions of what the officers said because
they spoke only English. (Id. at ¶ 65.) Plaintiff was transported to Dauphin County
Prison, at which time he was strip-searched, fingerprinted, given a tuberculosis test,
outfitted with prison clothes, and interviewed in English, during which he was able
to provide answers to biographical questions. (Id. at ¶¶ 71, 75-77.) Plaintiff alleges
he “had no idea why he was being jailed.” (Id. at ¶ 80.) Dauphin County Deputy
Sheriff Brian Hunter signed the warrant and returned it as executed to the Dauphin
County Court of Common Pleas on June 15, 2011. (Id. at ¶ 90.)
Following a series of continuances, which form the basis of a motion to
dismiss filed by a separate group of defendants, Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before
Judge Curcillo on October 18, 2011, at which time Corporal Gamez compared a
photograph of the individual taken at Harrisburg Hospital on the night of the incident
to Plaintiff and realized that Plaintiff was not the individual whom he pulled over on
November 19, 2010. (Id. at ¶ 107; Doc. 3-7, p. 2 of 4.) The county prosecutor
agreed to amend the criminal information to reflect the name of the individual who
was actually driving, Jose, and release Plaintiff. (Id. at p. 2 of 4.) Plaintiff was
released from custody on October 18, 2011. (Doc. 7, ¶ 108.)
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action on June 10, 2013, and filed his first
amended complaint on June 28, 2013. (Doc. 7.) In his complaint, Plaintiff asserted
several constitutional claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and named ten
defendants, including two police officers, a county sheriff, three state judges, a
5

district court administrator, and three public defenders, in addition to twelve
unidentified “Jane” or “John” Doe individuals. (Id.) Relevant to the instant motion,
Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Crone’s arresting Plaintiff constituted an unlawful
seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Id. at ¶¶ 135-143),
and constituted false arrest and false imprisonment under Pennsylvania state law (Id.
at ¶¶ 149-152).
On September 30, 2013, Defendant Crone filed a motion to dismiss the
claims asserted against him. (Doc. 33.) As the basis for his motion, Defendant
Crone contends that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
(Id.), arguing in support that, because Defendant Crone arrested Plaintiff pursuant to
a facially valid warrant, he cannot be held liable for committing an unlawful seizure
as a matter of law. (Id. at ¶ 28.) Alternatively, Defendant Crone argues that he
properly relied on a dispatch report that a valid warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest existed
and did not himself see the warrant, and thus cannot be held liable for committing a
seizure on an invalid warrant as a matter of law. (Id. at ¶ 36.) Lastly, Defendant
Crone argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at ¶ 38.)
On October 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a response, in which he argued that
the warrant pursuant to which Defendant Crone effectuated Plaintiff’s arrest “was
issued on less than probable cause and facially invalid.” (Doc. 43, p. 2 of 7.)
Therefore, Plaintiff reasoned that, because Corporal Gamez identified Plaintiff as the
driver he stopped on November 19, 2010, with a “reckless disregard for the truth,”
any officer participating in an arrest arising therefrom was not entitled to rely on the
warrant. (See id.) Defendant Crone filed an untimely reply brief on November 15,
2013. Thus, the matter is ripe for consideration.
6

II.

Legal Standard
Defendant Crone’s motion challenges Plaintiff’s amended complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests
the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a),
which requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief “in order to give the defendant fair notice
of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S 41, 47
(1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it must
contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Thus, when adjudicating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the court must view all the allegations and facts in the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and must grant the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that can be derived therefrom. Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). However,
the court need not accept inferences or conclusory allegations that are unsupported
by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Reuben v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 500 F.
App’x 103, 104 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678); Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that district courts “must
accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal
conclusions”).
Ultimately, the court must determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.”
7

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). The “plausibility standard” requires “more
than a sheer possibility” that a defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.
Reuben, 500 F. App’x at 104 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The complaint must do
more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief; it must “show such an
entitlement with its facts.” Steedley v. McBride, 446 F. App’x 424, 425 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint
has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (alterations in original).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To evaluate whether allegations in a complaint survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the district court must initially “take note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir.
2010). Next, the court should identify allegations that “are no more than
conclusions” and thus, “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Lastly, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id.
“A complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely
that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.”
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 588 n.8). Rather, Rule 8 “does not impose a probability requirement at
the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
8

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].” Id. at
234.
III.

Discussion
As Plaintiff brings his claims pursuant to Section 1983, the court will

briefly address the law as it pertains to that statute. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code offers private citizens a means to redress violations of federal
law committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to
vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To establish a claim under this section, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons
acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Harvey v. Plains
Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Crone violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable seizures, which includes the right to be free from
9

false arrest and false imprisonment. A person is seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes only if he is detained by means intentionally applied to terminate his
freedom of movement. Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (2000). A
seizure occurs even when an unintended person is the object of detention, so long as
the means of detention are intentionally applied to that person. Id. (citing Brower v.
Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).
An arresting officer violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights when
the officer arrests a person without probable cause. See Hanks v. Cnty. of Delaware,
518 F. Supp. 2d 642, 648 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d
136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967)
(acknowledging that a plaintiff may recover civil damages for false arrest under
Section 1983 if the plaintiff is able to establish the arresting officers lacked good
faith and probable cause). When an officer does make an arrest without probable
cause, the arrestee may also assert a Section 1983 false imprisonment claim based on
any subsequent detention resulting from that arrest. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,
47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995).4 Probable cause exists when the facts and
circumstances within an arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a
reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the
person to be arrested. Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995).

4

A Section 1983 false imprisonment claim arising from an arrest without probable cause is
grounded in the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures. Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). The law of the state where the arrest occurs controls
whether the arrest is valid. United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963)). A claim for false arrest under Pennsylvania law is coextensive with
one made under Section 1983. Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 592-93 (M.D. Pa. 2008). To
state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish that he was detained, and that the
detention was unlawful. James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 682-83 (3d Cir. 2012).
10

Probable cause for arrest generally exists when a defendant is named in a facially
valid bench warrant, and any Fourth Amendment argument arising out of the arrest is
without merit even if the bench warrant later turns out to be invalid. United States v.
Smith, 468 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Spencer, 684 F.2d 220, 223 (2d
Cir. 1982) (maintaining that a bench warrant is equivalent to a judicial determination
of probable cause); Carter v. Balt. Cnty., 95 F. App’x 471, 479 (4th Cir. 2004)
(finding that once an arresting officer ascertained that the plaintiff was the individual
listed on the bench warrant, the officer had “probable cause (and indeed the duty) to
serve the warrant and take [the plaintiff] into custody”). This is true so long as a
reasonably well-trained officer would not have known that the arrest was illegal
despite there being a bench warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922
n.3 (1984) (holding that physical evidence seized pursuant to a facially valid warrant
is admissible, even though a reviewing court has subsequently determined that the
warrant was defective).5
Furthermore, officers are generally entitled to rely upon a National
Criminal Information Center bulletin and to assume the reported outstanding warrant
is valid. See Whitely v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971);
Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1989). This does not mean, of
course, that an officer may arrest an individual whom he knows is not the subject of
the warrant or indefinitely detain an arrestee without attempting to resolve an
apparent issue of identity. Garcia v. Cnty. of Bucks, Pa., 155 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266
(E.D Pa. 2001) (citing Kennell v. Gates, 215 F.3d 825, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2000)
5

Although Leon arose in the context of a search warrant, the principles enunciated apply
with equal force to arrest warrants, because both implicate significant Fourth Amendment concerns. See
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.6 (1986).
11

(distinguishing officer with apparent knowledge that the plaintiff was detained
mistakenly from those who merely failed to investigate a claim of mistaken
identity)). Nevertheless, an officer making an arrest pursuant to a warrant generally
is not required to investigate the arrestee’s claim of innocence or mistaken identity.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1979); Kennell, 215 F.3d at 828 (holding
that an unreasonable refusal to investigate a claim of mistaken identity by a person
arrested and detained pursuant to a facially valid warrant does not amount to a
constitutional violation).
There is no doubt that Defendant Crone acted under color of state law
when he arrested Plaintiff. Nor is there doubt that Plaintiff’s arrest pursuant to the
bench warrant constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Nevertheless,
the complaint does not establish a prima facie claim against Defendant Crone.
Even in his response to Defendant Crone’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff
argues that:
[Corporal] Gamez made false statements, namely that
Plaintiff was the drunk driver he arrested on November
19[, which were] made with reckless disregard for the truth
because any reasonably prudent officer would have
recognized that the drunk driver he had just stopped was
not [the] same person depicted in the identification that the
driver presented during the traffic stop.
(Doc. 43, p. 2 of 7.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Crone appears to be
based on the actions of Corporal Gamez in preparing the affidavit of probable cause
supporting the issuance of the summons. Plaintiff does not aver that Defendant
Crone played a role in obtaining the bench warrant from Judge Dowling. Indeed,
Defendant Crone first appears in the story after the bench warrant is issued.
Therefore, Defendant Crone would have no idea (and he was not required to inquire)
12

whether there was an adequate factual foundation for the warrant. Baker, 443 U.S. at
145-46; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 231(1985) (quoting United
States v. Robinson, 536 F.2d 1298, 1300 (1976)) (“[E]ffective law enforcement
cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on the directions and information
transmitted by one officer to another and that officers, who must often act swiftly,
cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for
the transmitted information.”). Moreover, Defendant Crone was entitled to rely upon
information relayed to him that a valid warrant existed. See Capone, 868 F.2d at 105
(“Given that the NCIC bulletin expressly stated that a warrant existed for the arrest
of [the plaintiff] . . . [the defendant-officer]’s reliance upon the bulletin cannot be
said to have been unreasonable.”). Lastly, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege either
that Plaintiff put Defendant Crone on notice that he was not the individual arrested
on November 19, 2010, or that Defendant Crone possessed or had access to
information that would make his arresting Plaintiff unreasonable. Cf. Baker, 443
U.S. at 145 (stating that “[W]e may even assume, arguendo, that, depending on what
procedures the state affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere
detention pursuant to a a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of
innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of
‘liberty without due process of law’” (emphasis supplied)); Berg v. Cnty of
Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (remanding for district court to
determine the reasonableness of the arrest pursuant to a warrant naming the plaintiff
due to a clerical error).
Without deciding the issue, it may be possible for Plaintiff to establish
that the warrant was invalid; however, the warrant’s validity is not the issue before
13

this court as it pertains to Defendant Crone’s motion. To state a valid claim under
the Fourth Amendment against Defendant Crone, Plaintiff would need to allege that
Defendant Crone did not rely in good faith on the facially valid warrant. He has not
done so. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish, for federal pleading purposes,
that Defendant Crone’s actions in effectuating Plaintiff’s seizure were unreasonable.6

IV.

Conclusion
Plaintiff has failed to properly show, for federal pleading standards, that

the bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest was facially invalid. Moreover, even
assuming the summons was issued upon a recklessly false affidavit, Plaintiff has not
pleaded a basis for finding Defendant Crone’s reliance thereon was unreasonable.
For these reasons, the court will grant Defendant Crone’s motion to dismiss in its
entirety, and dismiss Counts I and III as against him.
An appropriate order will issue.

s/Sylvia H. Rambo
SYLVIA H. RAMBO
United States District Judge

Dated: November 25, 2013.

6

Moreover, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields “government officials performing
discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Bergdoll v. City of York, 515 F. App’x 165, 169 n.2 (3d
Cir. 2013). Given that the NCIC bulletin expressly stated that a warrant existed for Plaintiff’s arrest,
Defendant Crone’s reliance upon the bulletin cannot be said to have been unreasonable. Therefore, the
protection of qualified immunity from both Section 1983 and state law tort claims extends to Defendant
Crone. See Capone, 868 F.2d at 105
14