Johnson v. Predator Trucking, LLC et al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM re First MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint 26 filed by Robert Johnson (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 02/14/14. (ma)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ROBERT JOHNSON,
:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
PREDATOR TRUCKING, LLC; and :
MICHAEL PAREJA,
:
:
Defendants
:
Civil No.: 1:13-CV-1683
Judge Sylvia H. Rambo
MEMORANDUM
In this civil action invoking this court’s diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff
has sued Defendants for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of an incident
involving a tractor and trailer allegedly operated by Defendant Pareja and owned by
Defendant Pareja’s employer, Defendant Predator Trucking. Presently before the
court is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 26.) For the
reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion will be granted.
I.
Background
In this memorandum, the court sets forth only the factual and procedural
background necessary to explain its ruling.
A.
Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendants’ Answer
On June 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Pareja
sounding in negligence (Count I), and against Defendant Predator Trucking sounding
in negligence based on vicarious liability (Count II) and negligent
hiring/retention/supervision (Count III). (Doc. 1.) On August 30, 2013, Defendants
answered the complaint and asserted eleven “affirmative defenses” to liability. (Doc.
10.) The parties are currently engaged in fact discovery, which is set to conclude on
June 16, 2014. (See Doc. 15.)
As asserted in the complaint, this case concerns an accident that
occurred on January 3, 2012, at Beck Aluminum Alloy LTD’s recycling center,
located within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Defendant Pareja, employed by
Defendant Predator Trucking, was operating a vehicle, owned by Defendant Predator
Trucking. The vehicle had been backed into the Beck Aluminum facility as the
freight was being unloaded. Defendant Pareja allegedly caused the vehicle to move
forward, which resulted in the rear tires of the trailer striking Plaintiff, who was
operating a forklift near Defendant Pareja’s vehicle. Plaintiff allegedly suffered
serious injuries as a result of the incident. Defendants admit that Defendant Predator
Trucking both employed Defendant Pareja and owned the vehicle Defendant Pareja
was operating. (Doc. 10, ¶¶ 5, 6.)
B.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint. (Doc. 26.) In his motion, Plaintiff avers that, based on the answers he
had received from Defendants, he believes that: (1) more than one employer was
responsible for hiring, training, and supervising Defendant Pareja; (2) Defendant
Pareja was using his mobile phone while operating the tractor; (3) Defendant Pareja
was operating the vehicle in violation of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations; and (4) more than one entity was responsible for entrusting its shipment
to Defendant Predator Trucking. (See Doc. 26.) Relevant to the matter sub judice,
Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint, submitted pursuant to Local Rule 15.1,
2
contained the following allegations related to his request to add Ricksant LLC
(“Ricksant”) as a defendant to the action:
5.
Defendant, Ricksant, LLC, is a limited liability
company, doing business as Klein Recycling
(hereinafter referred to as Ricksant, LLC), organized
under the laws of New Jersey with offices at 2156
Camplain Road, Hillsborough, New Jersey 08844.
*
7.
*
*
It is believed that after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery, there will be
evidentiary support to show that at all times relevant
hereto, Defendant Ricksant, LLC was the cosupervisor, co-principal, or co-employer of
Defendant, Michael Pareja.
*
*
*
9.
It is believed that after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery, there will be
evidentiary support to show that at all times relevant
hereto Defendant, Michael Pareja was acting as the
co-agent, ostensible co-agent, co-servant and/or coemployee of Defendant Ricksant, LLC, and was
acting within the course and scope of said co-agency,
ostensible co-agency or co-employment with said
Defendant Ricksant, LLC.
10.
It is believed that after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery, there will be
evidentiary support to show that at all times relevant
hereto, Defendant Predator Trucking, LLC, and its
employees were acting as the agents, ostensible
agents, servants and/or employees of Defendant,
Ricksant, LLC and were acting in the course and
scope of their agency, ostensible agency, or
employment.
3
(Doc. 31, ¶¶ 5, 7, 9-10.) Based on these averments, Plaintiff’s proposed amended
complaint contains two additional counts, asserting claims against Ricksant sounding
in negligence based on vicarious liability (Count III) and negligent
hiring/retention/supervision (Count V), and contains additional substantive
allegations regarding Defendants’ alleged conduct.
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion to amend. (See generally Doc.
33.) Specifically, Defendants argue that the court should disallow Plaintiff to file an
amended complaint adding Ricksant as a defendant because the claims against
Ricksant, as asserted in the proposed amended complaint, would be futile as unable
to withstand a motion to dismiss. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s requests
to add the allegations set forth in subparagraphs 37(u),(v), and (x) and
47(j),(k),(n),(p), and (q) of the proposed amended complaint would be futile as
unable to withstand a motion to dismiss. The issue has been fully briefed and is ripe
for consideration.
II.
Legal Standard for a Motion To Amend
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the rules
governing amended pleadings and provides that, if more than 21 days has elapsed
after a defendant has served a responsive pleading, a party may amend its pleading
only with leave of court or with the opposing party’s written consent. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15.1 In the instant matter, Plaintiff must obtain leave of court because Defendants
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 contains the rules for amending and supplementing
pleadings and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
1
(a)
Amendment Before Trial
(continued...)
4
have not given such consent, and more than 21 days have elapsed since Defendants
filed their responsive pleading.
Rule 15(a) embodies the liberal pleading philosophy of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 2006).
However, “the policy favoring liberal amendments [of pleadings] is not unbounded.”
Kearney v. JPC Equestrian, Inc., Civ. No. 11-cv-1419, 2012 WL 5247322, *4 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 23, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dole v. Arco Chem. Co.,
921 F.2d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 1990)). Although the decision whether to grant or deny a
motion for leave to amend rests within the sound discretion of the district court,
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), a district court should deny leave to
amend a complaint where “it is apparent from the record that (1) the moving party
has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment
would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party.” Diaz v.
Palakovich, 448 F. App’x 211, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Lake v. Arnold, 232
(...continued)
(1)
Amendment as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its
pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A)
(B)
(2)
21 days after serving it, or
if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is
required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or
21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or
(f), whichever is earlier.
Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the
court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.
5
F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)).2 Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion only on the
basis of futility.
In this context, for a proposed amendment to be futile, “the complaint –
as amended – must fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Id. at
216. Futility of amendment may only serve as a basis for denial of leave to amend
where “the proposed amendment ‘is frivolous or advances a claim . . . that is legally
insufficient on its face.’” Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Imps., Inc., 133 F.R.D.
463, 468 (D.N.J. 1990) (citing 6 Wright, et al. Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487
(2d ed. 1990)). Amendment of the complaint is futile if the amended complaint
“cannot withstand a renewed motion to dismiss.” Jablonski v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Massarsky v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 125 (3d Cir. 1983)) (holding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying motion to amend based on futility of amendment because
proposed claim was barred by the statute of limitations). Thus, in determining
whether a claim would be futile, “the district court applies [to the proposed
amendments] the same standard of legal sufficiency as applie[d] under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594
F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also Miller v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp., 844 F.
Supp. 990, 1001 (D.N.J. 1993) (“Futility of an amendment is shown when the claim .
. . is not accompanied by a showing of plausibility sufficient to present a triable
issue.”).
Leave to amend may also be denied for “repeated failures to correct deficiencies with
previous amendments.” Riley v. Taylor, 62 F.3d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1995). Because Plaintiff has not
amended his complaint previously, this ground for denying leave to amend is inapplicable to this case.
2
6
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in turn, provides
that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering whether a complaint fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court “must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true,” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009), and construe all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild,
O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court need
not credit a complaint’s bald assertions and may “disregard any legal conclusions”
when deciding a motion to dismiss. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Through this lens, the court must determine “whether the facts alleged
in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for
relief.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility
of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader
is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). In
other words, a claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007)).
III.
Discussion
Each of Defendants’ arguments are based on futility. “Futility” means
that the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
7
granted, and in assessing “futility,” the court must take all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Kingsway Am. Agency, Inc., Civ. No. 11-cv-1195, 2013 WL
214634, *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2013). Claims in a complaint will be dismissed only
if “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.” Pegasus Int’l, Inc. v. Crescent Mfg. Co.,
Civ. No. 06-cv-2943, 2007 WL 1030457, *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2007) (citing Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).
A.
Request To Add Ricksant as a Defendant
Defendants first oppose amending the complaint to include Ricksant on
the basis of futility, arguing that “the proposed Amended Complaint it [sic] utterly
devoid of any facts to support any claims against Ricksant.” (Doc. 33, p. 6 of 16.)
Defendants cite to the portions of the proposed amended complaint containing the
language: “[i]t is believed that after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
or discovery, there will be evidentiary support to show that at all times relevant
hereto.” In essence, Defendants’ argument challenges Plaintiff’s pleading of an
employment relationship between Ricksant and Defendant Pareja, arguing that the
proposed amended complaint is insufficient due to its failure to show that Ricksant is
vicariously liable for Defendant Pareja’s actions or negligent in hiring, supervising,
training, or entrusting Defendant Pareja. The court disagrees.
Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint asserts a cause of action against
Ricksant sounding in negligence on both the bases of vicarious and direct liability.
In Pennsylvania, an employer is held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of an
employee that cause injuries to third parties, provided that such acts were committed
8
during the course and within the scope of employment. Adams v. U.S. Airways Grp.,
Civ. No. 12-cv-5603, 2013 WL 5676356, *10 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2013) (quoting
Costa v. Roxborough Mem’l Hosp., 708 A.2d 490, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)).
Typically, the determination of whether an employee acted within the scope of his
employment is a question for the jury; however, a court need not reach the course
and scope of employment inquiry where a plaintiff has not first demonstrated an
underlying tort committed by an employee. Regarding negligent hiring, training, or
supervision, an employer is directly liable under Pennsylvania law of its own
negligent failure to protect a plaintiff from an employee that it knows, or has reason
to know, is likely to cause injury. See Adams, 2013 WL 5676356 at *9 (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (1965)). Under either theory, Plaintiff must
establish the existence of an employment relationship.
Here, Plaintiff avers that, based on discovery already conducted, he has
reason to believe an employment relationship between Ricksant and Defendant
Pareja existed, and, therefore, the former may be liable for the actions of the latter
based on both direct and vicarious liability. Although Defendants take exception
with what Plaintiff believes additional discovery will reveal, i.e., that it will produce
evidence confirming his allegations, Plaintiff’s honest uncertainty3 is insufficient to
warrant foreclosing the possibility for Plaintiff to establish liability through the factfinding mechanism contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Indeed, a
The court hypothesizes that, had Plaintiff simply alleged that “[A]t all times relevant
hereto, Defendant Ricksant, LLC was the co-supervisor, co-principal, or co-employer of Defendant,
Michael Pareja” rather than qualifying his belief with the language: “It is believed that after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery, there will be evidentiary support to show that,”
whether Ricksant had an employment relationship with Defendant Pareja would likely have been first
tested during summary judgment.
3
9
claim against Ricksant is not futile simply because Plaintiff may not yet have in his
possession conclusive evidentiary support to show that an employment relationship
existed. Plaintiff presumably has a legitimate basis for believing that Ricksant is
liable for Defendant Pareja’s actions because, otherwise, both Plaintiff and his
counsel are venturing down a dangerous path.4 Whether evidentiary support exists
for Ricksant’s alleged liability is the proper subject of discovery, and if discovery
undisputedly reveals that no such relationship existed, Ricksant’s lack of liability
would become the proper subject of a motion for summary judgment, which the
court is confident would come across its bench uncontested.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Ricksant had an employer-employee
relationship with Defendant Pareja, that Defendant Pareja was negligent during the
course of his employment, that Defendant Pareja’s negligence was the cause of harm
suffered by Plaintiff, and that Ricksant was negligent in its failure to exercise
reasonable care in hiring, training, or supervising Defendant Pareja. Viewing these
allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s
proposed amended complaint states claims upon which relief may be granted against
Ricksant. Thus, the amendment to add Ricksant as a defendant is not futile for lack
of substantive allegations.
B.
Request To Add Allegations Against Defendants Pareja and
Predator Trucking
Defendants also argue that the inclusion of certain allegations against
Defendant Pareja set forth in subparagraphs 37(u), (v), and (x) and against Defendant
Predator Trucking set forth in subparagraphs 47(j), (k), (n), (p), and (q) of the
Defendants do not argue, nor does the court have reason to believe, that Plaintiff has an
improper or malicious motive for seeking to add Ricksant as a defendant.
4
10
proposed amendment complaint would be futile. In support of their opposition,
Defendants characterize the contents of these paragraphs as “non-specific legal
conclusions” that cannot survive a motion to dismiss. The court is not convinced
that these proposed amendments are futile.
The basis of Defendants’ challenge remains less than clear. After a
review of the contested paragraphs, the court cannot conclude that the proposed
amendments are futile. Indeed, these paragraphs put Defendants on adequate notice
of Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Pareja violated policies, rules, guidelines,
procedures, and regulations of Defendant Predator Trucking or Ricksant and failed to
adhere to certain Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. (Doc. 31, ¶¶ 37 (u), (v),
(x).) Furthermore, the paragraphs put Defendants on adequate notice of Plaintiff’s
allegations that Defendant Predator Trucking negligently hired, trained, and
supervised Defendant Pareja. Each averment is related to the controversy at the heart
of this action. The court cannot conclude that amendment of the complaint to
include these paragraphs would be futile.
IV.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons and upon consideration of the liberal
pleading philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court finds that the
proposed amendments would not be futile. The court further finds no basis to either
conclude that the delay in filing for leave to amend was undue or motivated by bad
faith or that granting leave to amend would prejudice Defendants. To the extent
Defendants challenge the employment relationship of Defendant Pareja to Ricksant,
the court concludes that the more efficient route is to allow Plaintiff to amend his
11
complaint at the present time, and should it become clear that such an employment
relationship does not exist, that issue may be presented by motion for summary
judgment after completion of relevant discovery. Thus, the court concludes that
granting leave to amend is in the interest of justice under Rule 15(a).
An appropriate order will issue.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: February 14, 2014.
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?