Pearson v. Varano et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM re dfts' MOTION to Dismiss 27 (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 03/02/15. (ma)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONIO PEARSON,
Plaintiff
vs.
DAVID VARANO, et al.,
Defendants
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL NO. 1:CV-13-1733
(Judge Caldwell)
MEMORANDUM
I.
Introduction
The pro se plaintiff, Antonio Pearson, a state inmate, filed this civil-rights
lawsuit alleging that during his employment in the dietary department at the state
correctional institution in Coal Township, Pennsylvania, defendants paid him differently than
similarly situated inmates with respect to his compensation for hours worked. (Doc. 1,
Compl.). Plaintiff asserts federal and state-law claims. Presently before the court is the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 27, Mot. to Dismiss). The “DOC defendants” are
defendants Varano, Wetzel, Moore-Smeal, Klopotoski, Varner, Baker, Ellet,1 McMillian,
Shedleski and Snyder.
The motion to dismiss argues as follows: (1) the DOC defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity; (2) Plaintiff fails to state an equal protection claim; (3) Plaintiff fails to
allege the personal involvement of several of the administrative level defendants; and (4)
1
Spelled “Ellett” by Plaintiff.
the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
(Doc. 28, Defs.’ Br. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss).
For the reasons discussed below, we will deny the DOC defendants’ motion
to dismiss.
II.
Standard of Review
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint “for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the district
court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)).
While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim, “ Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at
1974. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for
more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “[L]abels and conclusions” are not enough, and a court is “not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.
-2-
With this standard in mind, the following is the background to this litigation, as
Plaintiff alleges it.
III.
Background
Pearson worked in SCI-Coal Township’s dietary department from December
25, 2010, until at least June 2013. (Doc 1, ECF p. 5).2 He alleges that although he worked
eight hours and forty-five minutes a day, 10 a.m. until 6:45 p.m., he was only paid for eight
hours. (Id.).
All other shifts get paid 8 hours but work less than 8 hours or
exactly 8 hours. The 4:00 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. shift works 7 hours
but get[s] paid for 8 hours and the 5:00 a.m. shift to 1:00 p.m. shift
works 8 hours and gets paid for 8 hours. All shifts get the same
amount of breaks and when the other shifts work past their 8 hour
shifts they get overtime pay for them.
(Id.). According to DOC policy, inmates are not permitted to work in excess of eight hours,
but Plaintiff alleges he routinely works eight hours and forty-five minutes daily. (Id., ¶ 24,
ECF p. 11). Pearson claims that he cannot leave the work site without approval of his
supervisor or unless he is placed on a “call-out” sheet for an approved pass. Nondefendant prison security staff have threatened him with a misconduct when he has
returned to his housing unit early on occasion. (Id., ECF p. 6). Once at his work station,
he, like other workers on the 10:00 a.m. to 6:45 p.m. shift, is required to do “anything that
he is told to do or be subject to a misconduct.” (Id.)
2
At the time Pearson filed his Complaint, he was housed at SCI-Coal Township, where the
alleged events took place. Pearson is currently housed at SCI-Greene, in Waynesburg,
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 34).
-3-
When Pearson spoke with Food Service Managers Shedleski and Snyder
about “how [he] is being treated differently th[a]n other kitchen workers, that work other
shifts, and how they get paid for 8 hours of work even though they work less then 8 hours
or only work 8 hours but get paid for 8 hours and the plaintiff only gets 8 hours for 8 hours
and 45 minutes of work . . . Defendant Shedleski told [him] not to worry about other shifts
and to worry about [his] shift and [him]self, because what other shifts get doesn’t matter.”
(Id., ECF p. 13).
When Pearson spoke with Deputy Superintendent Miller about this issue,
Deputy Miller told him “if [he] was not happy working in the kitchen that [he] could always
be removed.” (Id.) When he approached defendant McMillian, he was told “that this is how
the kitchen is ran and they are not going to change it just for [him].” (Id.) When Pearson
spoke with Deputy Superintendent Ellet, she told him to write to her and she would “see
what the reasons for this” were, but Pearson never heard from her after he wrote her. (Id.)
While at the 2012 Triumph Banquet, Pearson spoke to Executive Deputy
Shirley Moore-Smeal and Eastern Regional Deputy Secretary Michael Klopotosky, who told
him to write to them and they would look into the situation. However, after writing to both,
he never received a response from either defendant. (Id., ECF p. 14). When Pearson
wrote to Secretary Wetzel regarding this matter, Eastern Regional Assistant Baker
responded to the inquiry but failed to stop the continuing constitutional violations from
occurring. (Id., ECF p. 15). Defendant Varner “has a duty to stop Constitutional violations
that the defendants were perpetrating against” him but failed to do so when she upheld his
grievance concerning this issue at Final Review. (Id.)
-4-
Pearson alleges Due Process, Equal Protection and discrimination claims.
(Id., ECF p. 7 and p. 16). He claims defendants’ discrimination is “motivated by racial or
otherwise class based invidious discrimination.” (Id.) He also makes a state-law claim,
alleging defendants violated Section 5301 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code which relates
to official oppression and other state statutes. (Id.) Pearson seeks compensatory and
punitive damages from all defendants. (Id., ECF p. 16).
IV.
Discussion
A.
Due Process Claim
The Complaint sets forth a due process claim. (Doc. 1, ¶ 27, ECF p. 8). The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. “To state a claim under §
1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was
deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to him did not
provide ‘due process of law.’” Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238
(3d Cir. 2013)(quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006)). If
there is no protected liberty or property interest, it is unnecessary to determine if the
procedures available to Plaintiff, if any, provided due process. For Pearson to make out a
successful due process claim, he must base it on an enforceable liberty or property
interest. Thus, the question is whether a prisoner has a liberty or property right to
compensation for his post-conviction prison labor.
-5-
In moving to dismiss the due-process claim, Defendants point out that
prisoners have no Fourteenth Amendment liberty or property interest in payment for their
work. See Dmytryszyn v. Hickenlooper, 527 F. App’x 757, 760 (10th Cir.
2013)(nonprecedential)(inmate’s Thirteenth Amendment and due process rights not
violated when he was required to work for payment below minimum wage); Serra v. Lappin,
600 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010)(“A prisoner has no basis for asserting a violation of
due process simply because he is made or allowed to work for low pay as punishment for a
crime of which he was lawfully convicted,”); Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th
Cir. 1985)(holding that the state does not deprive a prisoner of a constitutionally protected
liberty interest by forcing him to work without pay); Murray v. Mississippi Dep’t Corr., 911
F.2d 1167, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1990)(same); Johnson v. Townsend, 314 F. App’x 436, 440
(3d Cir. 2008)(nonprecedential)(inmates do not “have a constitutional right to
compensation”).
In his opposition brief, Pearson maintains he is not asserting a due process
claim. See Doc. 37, ECF p. 7. He is mistaken, as our cite to his Complaint shows. His
due process claim will therefore be dismissed. Further, we will not allow amendment of this
claim as any amendment would be futile.
B.
Pearson’s Equal Protection Claim
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment directs that “[n]o
state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause requires “that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
-6-
473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). “‘The purpose of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the
state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’”
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 1074-75, 145 L.Ed.2d
1060 (2000)(quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441, 43 S.Ct. 190, 67
L.Ed. 340 (1923)).
Pearson does not allege an equal protection claim based on his membership
in a “suspect class.” See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72
L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Instead, he makes a “class of one” equal protection claim, that he was
intentionally treated differently by the defendants from others similarly situated without a
rational basis for such treatment. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564, 120 S.Ct. at 1074. As the Third
Circuit has put it, to state a claim under the class-of-one theory, a plaintiff must show that
“‘(1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant
did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’”
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008)(quoting Hill v. Borough of
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006)).
In moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s “class of one” claim, the DOC Defendants
make two arguments. First, Plaintiff has not alleged that he is similarly situated to inmates
being given higher pay because he alleges that those other inmates are on a different shift.
We reject this argument. As the defendants note, “[p]ersons are similarly situated under
the Equal Protection Clause when they are alike “in all relevant aspects.’” Spiker v.
Whittaker, 553 F. App’x 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2014)(nonprecedential)(quoting Startzell v. City of
-7-
Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008)). Merely because other inmates are on a
different shift or shifts does not mean that they are not similarly situated to Pearson as he
suggests the different shifts are not relevant to his claim. Defendants’ citation to Matsey v.
Westmoreland Cnty., 185 F. App’x 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2006)(nonprecedential), does not
assist them. It was shown there on summary judgment, among other things, that the
plaintiff’s duties as a prison night shift commander were different from those of the day shift
commanders. At the motion-to-dismiss stage here, there is no such differentiating
evidence before the court.
Second, the DOC Defendants argue that the equal protection claim fails
because Plaintiff does not allege that they intended to discriminate. We disagree. On a
“class of one” claim, a plaintiff need only prove that the conduct was intentional, not that
there was an intent to discriminate. A plaintiff need only prove that he “has been
‘intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational
basis for the difference in treatment.’” Matsey, supra, 185 F. App’x at 130 (quoting Olech).
See also Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2004)(“The Supreme
Court has held that a class of one can attack intentionally different treatment if it is irrational
and wholly arbitrary.”)(quoting Olech)(internal quotation marks omitted).
C.
State Law Claims
Pearson asserts defendants have also violated the following state laws: 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5301 (official oppression); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 1481
(concerning industries and labor in penal institutions); and 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3104
-8-
(addressing inmate labor in county correctional institutions). Pearson relies upon
supplemental jurisdiction to support this court’s jurisdiction over these state law claims.
(Doc. 1, ECF p. 16).
With respect to Pearson’s request to have the defendants’ criminally
prosecuted for official oppression, or any other criminal statute, neither he nor this court
has the authority to initiate such proceedings. The decision to prosecute and the criminal
charges to bring are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's, not the court's,
discretion. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204, 60
L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 596 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1992). Claim
based on these statutory sections will therefore be dismissed. The remaining state-law
claims will be permitted to proceed.
D.
Qualified Immunity
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct.
2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987);
see also Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 616 (3d Cir. 1994). In determining whether
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the court should engage in a three-part
inquiry: (1) whether plaintiff alleged a violation of his constitutional rights; (2) whether the
-9-
right alleged to have been violated was clearly established in the existing law at the time of
violation; and (3) whether a reasonable official knew or should have known that the alleged
action violated the plaintiff’s rights. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, Pearson’s complaint sufficiently alleges an equal protection claim. His
complaint specifically alleges that the defendants knew they were treating him differently
than other kitchen workers. At this point in the case, at which we must accept all factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Pearson’s favor, the Complaint
suffices to allege an equal protection violation. A determination as to defendants’ qualified
immunity defense is more appropriate for summary judgement. Therefore, it will be denied
without prejudice at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
Date: March 2, 2015
-10-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?