Pearson v. Varano et al

Filing 67

MEMORANDUM re pltf's MOTION to Compel 57 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 11/18/15. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONIO PEARSON,
Plaintiff
vs.
DAVID VARANO, et al.,
Defendants

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-13-1733
(Judge Caldwell)

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
The pro se plaintiff, Antonio Pearson, has filed a motion to compel defendants

to produce his entire inmate jacket (DC-15), all counselor notes (DC-14), and all
information contained in his Inmate Cumulative Adjustment Record (ICAR). (Doc. 57).
Defendants have responded that the discovery sought is of questionable relevance, is
overly broad, confidential and privileged for security reasons in a prison setting.
For the reasons that follow the motion will be denied.

II.

Standard of Review
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), a party “may obtain discovery regarding

any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). While generally liberal, permissible discovery is not without limitations; it “should
not serve as a fishing expedition.” Provine v. Ambulatory Health Services, Inc., No. 13-CV334, 2014 WL 47771, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2014). Relevant information sought in

discovery need not be admissible at trial, as long as it “appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevance is
generally “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably
could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”
Oppenheimer Funds, Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 2389, 57 L.Ed.2d 253
(1978). Discovery of matters not ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence” is not within the scope of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). (Id.)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 requires that a request “describe with reasonable
particularity each item or category of items to be inspected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A).
The responding party “must either state that inspection and related activities will be
permitted as requested or state an objection to the request, including the reasons.” Id.; see
also Momah v. Albert Einstein Medical Cntr., 164 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1996). “[T]he
mere statement by a party that the interrogatory [or document request] was ‘overly broad,
burdensome, oppressive and irrelevant’ is not adequate to voice a successful objection to”
a discovery request. Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982). A party
attempting to withhold the release of relevant material on the grounds of privilege must also
“describe the nature of the documents, communications, or other tangible things not
produced or disclosed in a manner that will enable other parties to assess the claim.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, a party may move to compel discovery when
existing disclosures have been insufficient. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3). The party moving to
compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the relevance of the requested
information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
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The objecting party must then demonstrate in specific terms why a particular discovery
request does not fall within the broad scope of discovery or is otherwise privileged or
improper. Goodman v. Wagner, 553 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1982). A party “seeking
the protection of sensitive-but relevant-information” may argue the information sought is
protected by an evidentiary privilege pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or petition the
court for a protective order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to protect its disclosure.
Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 65 (3d Cir. 2000). “The burden of showing that a particular
document is privileged or protected rests with the party asserting the privilege.” Caver v.
City of Trenton, 192 F.R.D. 154, 159 (D.N.J. 2000).
It is well established that the scope and conduct of discovery are within the
sound discretion of the trial court. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 661-62
(3d Cir. 2003). “Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the Court’s discretion and
judgment.” McConnell v. Canadian Pacific Realty Co., 280 F.R.D. 188, 192 (M.D. Pa.
2011). A court’s decision regarding the conduct of discovery will be disturbed only upon a
showing of an abuse of discretion. Ohntrup v. Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 760
F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2014).

III.

Relevant Statement of Facts
Plaintiff Antonio Pearson, a state inmate formerly housed at the Coal

Township State Correctional Institution in Frackville, Pennsylvania,1 filed this civil-rights
action asserting a “class of one” equal protection claim based on his belief that he was

1

Plaintiff is presently housed at SCI-Greene in Waynesburg, Pennsylvania.

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intentionally treated differently by prison officials from other similarly situated dietary
workers without a rational basis for such treatment. (Doc. 1, Compl.) Pearson alleges he
was not paid in the same manner as other dietary workers. Specifically, others were given
overtime wages or paid more for working the same hours, or less, than he did. (Id.)

IV.

Discussion
Pearson does not identify a particular request for production of documents to

which he seeks a response. (Doc. 64, Br. in Supp. Mot. to Compel). Instead he generally
asserts that he has requested, and been denied, access to his “DC-14 CAR,” “DC-15 IRS,”
and “ICAR”. (Id., ECF pp. 1-2). Accordingly, the court will only examine Pearson’s first
request for production of documents as it discusses the release of his DC-14, DC-15 and
ICAR notes. His first request seeks the opportunity to:
review his institutional file(s), including but not limited to (DC-14
CAR and DC-15 IRS) for any and all documents that the plaintiff
needs and be allowed to copy any documents that the plaintiff
wants.
Doc. 62-1, ECF p. 1. Defendants objected to this request as overly broad and claim the
release of Pearson’s entire DC-14, DC-15 and ICAR notes would threaten the orderly
operation of the prison as well as the security of the inmates, staff members and the public.
(Id.) In responding to Pearson’s request, the defendants asked him to specifically identify
the “information that he needs that is relevant to his claim in this case, and the Defendants
will consider his request.” (Id.) Pearson does not say he narrowed his discovery request
as suggested by Defendants. In his motion to compel, Pearson argues that the

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Department of Corrections’ (DOC) policy statement DC-ADM 003, Release of Information,2
and procedures manual 11.5.1, Records Office Operations,3 permit inmates to obtain
copies of portions of the requested files. (Id.)
The court has reviewed DC-ADM 003 policy and the portions of the
procedures manual provided by Pearson. We do not find any suggestion that either
document permits the wholesale release of his DC-14, DC-15 or ICAR notes. We also find
his request to be overly broad. With respect to the DC-15, it is clear that Pearson has
detailed knowledge of what type of information may be contained in that file based on the
portions of the procedures manual as it lists the multitude of categories of documents to be
maintained in the DC-15. While Pearson could readily narrow his request based on this
information, as suggested by defendants, he has not done so. Additionally, while he
suggests in his motion that he should be allowed access to “parts of this file that are not
confidential and are allowed pursuant to DOC policy 003 and 11.5.1 procedures manual”
(Id., ECF p. 1), he makes no effort to identify what portions of his DC-15, DC-14, or ICAR
notes fall within this category. As noted before, the court’s review of the policy and
procedures manual does not suggest that they specifically address the disclosure of the
DC-15, DC-14, or ICAR to inmates. Finally, it is noted that his request for these files is not
limited to any specific time frame but seek the files in their entirety since his initial
incarceration until present day.

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Pearson has provided the court with a copy of DC-ADM 003. See Doc. 64-1, ECF pp. 6 -

13.
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Pearson has provided the court with a copy of portions of the 11.5.1 procedures manual.
See Doc. 64-1, ECF pp. 15 - 26.

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Under these circumstances, Pearson’s motion to compel the release of his
entire DC-14, DC-15 and ICAR file will be denied. Pearson fails to show the relevancy of
his entire DC-14, DC-15 or ICAR file to his equal protection claim. Such a broad discovery
request is a “fishing expedition” which the court will not permit.4 Therefore, without deciding
the merits of the defendants’ other objections, the court will deny Pearson’s motion to
compel the production of these files.
An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

Date: November 18, 2015

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To the extent Pearson seeks “responses to request slips and other documents,” that may
be in one of these files, he does not suggest that defendants’ responses to his other document
requests, which were worded more specifically and sought exactly that type of information, were
improper. See Doc. 62-1, Request (x), (xi) and (xiii).

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