Kearney et al v. Sheffield et al

Filing 42

MEMORANDUM re dfts' MOTION to Dismiss 29 and 39 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 04/17/14. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD MULIEK KEARNEY

:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
ROGER SHEFFIELD; WILLIAM D. :
BAKER; JOSEPH HORTON; and
:
CHARLES E. GLIECHMAN,
:
:
Defendants
:

Civil No. 1:13-CV-1851

Judge Sylvia H. Rambo

MEMORANDUM
In this Section 1983 civil rights action, Plaintiff has sued four law
enforcement officers asserting violations of his rights protected by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Presently before the court is Defendants’ motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). (Docs. 29 &
39.) Because the court finds that the favorable termination requirement of Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), bars Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it
will grant the motion to dismiss.
I.

Background
“As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may

not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory
Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, for the purposes of the motion
sub judice, the court only considers the allegations contained in the complaint, as
amended, and exhibits submitted in support thereof (Docs. 1 & 38) and will accept as
true all well-pleaded factual allegations contained therein. See Trump Hotels &
Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). It is
important to note that Plaintiff’s amended complaint was filed with a complete
disregard for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Middle District of Pennsylvania

Local Rules of Court, and orders of this court, inasmuch as the amended complaint
contains two paragraphs, only one of which is substantive in nature, referring to the
original complaint and clarifying that each defendant is sued in both an individual
and official capacity. (See Doc. 38; see also, e.g., Doc. 31, p. 2 of 2 (incorporating
dictates of Local Rule 15.1 and indicating that an amended complaint must be
complete in and of itself); Doc. 28.) Due to Plaintiff’s pro se status, the court will
turn to the properly pleaded portions of Plaintiff’s original complaint, as amended,
despite the fact that the amended complaint fails to conform to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Local Rules of Court, and unambiguous instructions set forth in
prior orders.
A.

Facts

Plaintiff, a state inmate acting pro se, asserted constitutional claims
related to the legal processes which led to his sentence of 24 to 48 months of
incarceration following his convictions on October 11, 2011, in the Fulton County
Court of Common Pleas for burglary, simple assault, and criminal mischief, arising
from his actions on February 2, 2011, involving the unlawful entry into a dwelling.
(See Doc. 1, ¶ 13; Doc. 32-1.) Plaintiff presumably alleges that his identification,
arrest, prosecution, conviction, and resulting detention were illegal, not based upon
probable cause, and in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Roger Sheffield, a state police officer stationed at the
McConnellsburg Pennsylvania State Police Barracks (“McConnellsburg Barracks”),
established probable cause for his application for an arrest warrant by “harassing the
alleged victim[,] Travis Smith[,] into cooperating by searching [the victim’s]
residence looking for firearms and narcotics.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 20.) According to Plaintiff,
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this was done after Smith refused to cooperate. (Id.) On or about February 11, 2011,
a search of Smith’s residence was conducted, during which Defendant Joseph
Horton, another state police officer stationed at the McConnellsburg Barracks,
assisted. (See id. at ¶ 23.) At this time, Smith identified the perpetrator only by the
name “Benny.” (See generally id.) Plaintiff further alleges that, on March 1, 2011,
“before an identification procedure had taken place,” Defendant William D. Baker, a
supervising corporal stationed at the McConnellsburg Barracks, sent an email that
identified Benny as Plaintiff and that no officer inquired into how Defendant Baker
had established the identity of Benny, despite the identification being conducted
“without no [sic] physical evidence nor forensic evidence.” (See id. at ¶¶ 15-17.)
Plaintiff further alleges that the photographic lineup presented by Defendant
Sheffield to Smith was unduly suggestive. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Plaintiff included Defendant
Charles E. Gleichman, another supervising corporal also stationed at the
McConnellsburg Barracks, as a defendant in the action on the basis of his
supervisory positions and due to his “encourag[ing] and condon[ing]” his
subordinate’s actions. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 22.) As relief for these alleged constitutional
violations, Plaintiff seeks declaratory1 and injunctive relief and both compensatory
and punitive damages. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-28.)
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on July 8, 2013.
(Doc. 1.) Plaintiff asserted his claims against Defendants in both their official and
Here, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that Defendants violated his constitutional rights to
secure his conviction. Because requests for a declaratory judgment that a conviction is unconstitutional
attack the validity of the fact or length of confinement, these claims are not cognizable until the
conviction or sentence has been overturned. Although he does not specifically request release, the
finding of such declaratory relief in Plaintiff’s favor would show that release is required.
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individual capacities. (Id. at ¶ 9; Doc. 38, ¶ 1.) The court granted Plaintiff’s motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and directed that a summons be prepared and
issued on October 23, 2013. (See Docs. 16 & 17.) Defendants timely waived
service. (Doc. 26.) On November 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of
default (Doc. 24), which the court denied as premature on December 2, 2013 (Doc.
25).
On December 13, 2013, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint,
which was noncompliant with Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rule 15.1,
inasmuch as it contained only two vague paragraphs and failed to contain a proposed
amended complaint. (See Doc. 27.) Despite Plaintiff’s noncompliance and because
such a motion was unnecessary due to operation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a)(1)(B), the court deemed Plaintiff’s motion moot and advised Plaintiff that he
may file his amended complaint as a matter of course no later than 21 days after
service of Defendants’ responsive pleading or motion filed under Rule 12(b), (e), or
(f), whichever was earlier. (Doc. 28.) On January 6, 2014, Defendants filed a joint
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
(Doc. 29), followed by a brief in support thereof on January 10, 2014 (Doc. 32). In
response to a request from Plaintiff filed on January 8, 2014 (see Doc. 30), the court
clarified its previous order regarding Plaintiff’s options, instructing that he could
either file an amended complaint that was complete in all respects or file a response
to the pending motion to dismiss (see Doc. 31).
On January 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay the proceedings.
(Doc. 34.) The court denied the stay but granted Plaintiff an extension of time until
February 14, 2014, in which he was to comply with the previous orders. (Doc. 35.)
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Significantly, and in light of similar conduct in several other cases that Plaintiff had
initiated, see Kearney v. Hibner, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-1892 (M.D. Pa.); Kearney v.
Wadsworth, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-1850 (M.D. Pa.); Kearney v. Davis, Civ. No. 1:13-cv1852 (M.D. Pa.), the court also set forth the consequences of not filing an opposing
brief to a pending motion to dismiss. (Id.) On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed
another motion for an extension of time (Doc. 36), which the court granted,
extending the deadline to February 28, 2014 (Doc. 37). Significantly, and again in
light of similar conduct in several other cases that Plaintiff had initiated, see Kearney
v. Hibner, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-1892 (M.D. Pa.); Kearney v. Wadsworth, Civ. No. 1:13cv-1850 (M.D. Pa.); Kearney v. Davis, Civ. No. 1:13-cv-1852 (M.D. Pa.), the court
advised Plaintiff that no further extensions of time would be granted. (Id.)
On March 5, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which was
noncompliant with the Local Rules and court orders, inasmuch as it was not
complete in and of itself, but rather only referenced the original complaint. (Doc.
38.) Also on March 5, 2014, Defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss,
indicating that they elected to rely upon the grounds set forth in their January 10,
2014 brief in support. (Doc. 39.) On March 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed yet another
motion seeking an extension of time (Doc. 40), which the court denied by order
dated March 24, 2014 (Doc. 41). Based on the record, this matter has been
adequately briefed and is appropriate for disposition.
II.

Legal Standards
A.

Pro Se Pleadings

Pro se pleadings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,
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404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial
stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in
favor of the complainant, especially when the complainant is a pro se litigant. Giles
v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d Cir. 2009). Even liberally construing the factual
averments contained therein, however, Plaintiff’s complaint cannot withstand
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
B.

Failure To State a Claim

Defendants’ motion challenges Plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the
sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), which
requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief “in order to give the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). While a complaint need
not contain detailed factual allegations, it must contain “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, when adjudicating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the court must view all the allegations and facts in the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and must grant the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that can be derived therefrom. Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)). However,
the court need not accept inferences or conclusory allegations that are unsupported
by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
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203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (directing that district courts “must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions”).
Ultimately, the court must determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “The plausibility standard requires ‘more than a sheer
possibility’ that a defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Reuben v. U.S.
Airways, Inc., 500 F. App’x 103, 104 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
The complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief; it must
“show such an entitlement with its facts.” Steedley v. McBride, 446 F. App’x 424,
425 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alterations in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555).
To evaluate whether allegations in a complaint survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the district court must initially “take note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir.
2010). Next, the court should identify allegations that “are no more than
conclusions” and thus are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Lastly,
“where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for
relief.” Id.
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“A complaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely
that the plaintiff can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits.”
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 588 n.8). Rather, Rule 8 “does not impose a probability requirement at
the pleading stage, but instead simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].” Id. at
234.
Plaintiff attached pages of exhibits to his pleadings. The use of these
exhibits by the court, however, does not convert Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim into a motion for summary judgment. Pryor v. National Coll.
Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[C]ertain matters outside the body
of the complaint itself, such as exhibits attached to the complaints and facts of which
the court will take judicial notice, will not trigger the conversion of [a Rule] 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss to [a Rule] 56 motion for summary judgment.”).
III.

Discussion
The court interprets Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting a Section 1983

claim for malicious prosecution/false arrest/false imprisonment. Section 1983 of
Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a means to redress
violations of federal law committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
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an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method to
vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” Pappas v. City of
Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To establish a claim under this section, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons
acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by either the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Harvey
v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
The essence of Plaintiff’s claims is that Defendants violated his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, which includes the right to
be free from malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment. An
arresting officer violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights when the officer
arrests a person without probable cause. See Hanks v. County of Del., 518 F. Supp.
2d 642, 648 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citing Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d
Cir. 1988)); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967) (acknowledging
that a plaintiff may recover civil damages for false arrest under Section 1983 if the
plaintiff is able to establish the arresting officers lacked good faith and probable
cause). When an officer does make an arrest without probable cause, the arrestee
may also assert a Section 1983 false imprisonment claim based on any subsequent
detention resulting from that arrest. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d
628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
within an arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person
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to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be
arrested. Id. at 634.
A.

Favorable Termination Requirement

Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed in accordance
with Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The court agrees. Plaintiff seeks to
bring a civil rights action premised on his imprisonment, which is based upon valid
state criminal convictions that have not been set aside or overturned. This he cannot
do. To the contrary, it is well-settled that an essential element of a civil rights false
arrest or imprisonment claim is that the underlying criminal case must have been
terminated in favor of the civil rights claimant. Therefore, where, as here, the civil
rights plaintiff brings a malicious prosecution or false arrest claim based upon a state
case that resulted in a conviction, the plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. In
Heck, the Supreme Court held that “the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments
applies to [Section] 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to
prove the unlawfulness of his conviction of confinement.” Id. at 486. The Third
Circuit has aptly observed in this regard:
The Supreme Court has “repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. §
1983 creates a species of tort liability.” Given this close
relation between § 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme
Court has said that the common law of torts, “defining the
elements of damages and the prerequisites for their
recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting point for
inquiry under § 1983 as well.” The Supreme Court applied
this rule in Heck to an inmate’s § 1983 suit, which alleged
that county prosecutors and a state police officer destroyed
evidence, used an unlawful voice identification procedure,
and engaged in other misconduct. In deciding whether the
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inmate could state a claim for those alleged violations, the
Supreme Court asked what common-law cause of action
was the closest to the inmate’s claim and concluded that
“malicious prosecution provides the closest analogy . . .
because unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or
imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed
pursuant to the legal process.” Looking to the elements of
malicious prosecution, the Court held that the inmate’s
claim could not proceed because one requirement of
malicious prosecution is that the prior criminal proceedings
must have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, and the
inmate in Heck had not successfully challenged his
criminal conviction.
Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 155-56 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
Thus, it is a legal prerequisite to a civil rights claim in this setting based
upon allegations of false arrest or malicious prosecution that the plaintiff show that
the criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor. Indeed, it is well-settled that:
To prove malicious prosecution under [S]ection 1983, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a
criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in
plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without
probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for
a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and
(5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent
with the concept of seizure as a consequence of the legal
proceeding.
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis supplied).
As the Third Circuit has observed:
The purpose of the favorable termination requirement is to
avoid “the possibility of the claimant . . . succeeding in the
tort action after having been convicted in the underlying
criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial
policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions
arising out of the same or identical transaction.”
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Consistent with this purpose, we have held that a prior
criminal case must have been disposed of in a way that
indicates the innocence of the accused in order to satisfy
the favorable termination element. Accordingly, a
malicious prosecution claim cannot be predicated on an
underlying criminal proceeding which terminated in a
manner not indicative of the innocence of the accused.
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations and footnote
omitted).
In this case, it is evident that Plaintiff’s prior state criminal prosecution
did not terminate favorably for him, in a way which “indicate[d] the plaintiff’s
innocence of the alleged misconduct underlying the offenses charged,” Kossler, 564
F.3d at 188, because Plaintiff was convicted in the state case of burglary, inter alia,
and sentenced to 24 to 48 months of imprisonment. (See Doc. 26-2.) The essence of
Plaintiff’s federal claims is that Defendants Sheffield and Horton harassed an
uncooperative victim into cooperating and then utilized “an [sic] very unnecessarily
suggestive line-up to identify Plaintiff.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Baker provided the photograph which was used in the “unnecessarily
suggestive” lineup, allegedly without a proper basis to believe that Plaintiff was the
perpetrator. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff apparently takes exception with the manner of his
identification rather than the result thereof, as he does not allege that he did not
commit the crimes charged.
It is well established that the use of unreliable identification evidence
obtained by police through unnecessarily suggestive procedures violates a
defendant’s right to due process. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
However, because judgment in favor of Plaintiff on a claim arising from an
unconstitutional identification procedure would imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s
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convictions, any claim related to the improper identification procedure is barred by
Heck. Accordingly, the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims insofar as the complaint
challenges the actions of Defendants Sheffield, Horton, and Baker regarding their
use of allegedly unconstitutional identification procedures in the course of their
investigation.
To the extent Plaintiff contends that he was not the individual who
committed the acts for which he was charged, the trier of fact clearly did not agree.
Plaintiff admits, and the public records confirm, that he was convicted of the
offenses for which he was charged in relation to his actions on February 2, 2011.
The favorable termination rule applies because Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit necessarily
calls into question the validity of his convictions, as his civil suit is premised on his
unconstitutional convictions or sentences that have not been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Since “one requirement of
malicious prosecution is that the prior criminal proceedings must have terminated in
the plaintiff’s favor,” Hector, 235 F.3d at 156, the immutable fact of Plaintiff’s
conviction on these grave charges defeats any federal civil rights claim based upon
false arrest or malicious prosecution in this state case and compels dismissal of these
claims. In short, Plaintiff’s complaint is based upon the fundamentally flawed legal
premise that Plaintiff can sue state officials for false arrest and imprisonment even
though he stands convicted of the crimes charged against him. Because, as applied
to the facts here, this premise is simply incorrect, Plaintiff’s complaint fails as a
matter of law. Accordingly, the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims insofar as the
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complaint challenges the conduct of Defendants Sheffield, Horton, and Baker during
the investigation and prosecution of the crimes for which Plaintiff was convicted.
B.

Supervisor Liability

Additionally, Plaintiff names Supervising Corporals Gleichman and
Baker as defendants in this action on the basis of their supervisory authority.
Defendants contend that the facts alleged do not establish liability as to these
individuals. For the following reasons, the court agrees with Defendants, and any
claim predicated on Defendant Gleichman’s or Defendant Baker’s supervisory status
will be dismissed from the action.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action based upon personal liability and
predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant
caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 12829; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 693 (“[E]ach Government official . . . is only liable for his or
her own misconduct.”). Accordingly, liability under Section 1983 may only be
based upon a defendant’s personal involvement amounting to a constitutional
violation. Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir.
1976). “Liability may not be imposed under Section 1983 on the principle of
respondeat superior.” Hetzel v. Swartz, 909 F. Supp. 261, 264 (M.D. Pa. 1995)
(citing Hampton, 546 F.2d at 1082). Therefore, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
the complaint must contain averments establishing each defendant’s involvement in
the conduct that caused a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Applicable to the matter sub
judice, “a supervisor may be personally liable . . . if he or she . . . , as the person in
charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” Santiago,
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629 F.3d at 129 (citing A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372
F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Plaintiff has not alleged facts in his complaint from which it can be
reasonably inferred that the personal conduct of Defendants Gleichman or Baker
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See supra Part III.A (finding that Defendant
Baker’s email implicating Plaintiff and Defendant Baker’s providing Plaintiff’s
photograph to Defendant Sheffield was insufficient to establish Section 1983
liability). Because the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to show that
Plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief” for a Section 1983 claim against Defendant
Gleichman on the basis of his personal involvement, any claim purportedly asserted
against Defendant Gleichman on that basis will be dismissed. Additionally,
Plaintiff’s claims must fail to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to assert claims
against Defendants Gleichman or Baker for supervisor liability, i.e., that they had
knowledge of and acquiesced in their subordinates’ alleged violations of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. As discussed supra, Part III.A, Plaintiff cannot maintain an
action where the success of that action would implicitly require the invalidation of
his criminal conviction. Thus, any claim that Defendants Gleichman or Baker knew
of and acquiesced in Defendants Sheffield and Horton’s actions necessarily includes,
as an element, an actual violation at the hands of the supervisor’s subordinate.
Because such a violation cannot be shown, Plaintiff cannot maintain an action on the
basis of supervisory liability. Accordingly, Defendants Gleichman and Baker will be
dismissed from this action.
IV.

Conclusion

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Based on the foregoing, the court finds that a ruling in favor of Plaintiff
in this Section 1983 civil rights litigation would necessarily imply the invalidation of
Plaintiff’s convictions, which remain valid at this time. Thus, these claims are not
cognizable due to the favorable termination requirement set forth in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Accordingly, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and will dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety.
An appropriate order will issue.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: April 17, 2014.

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