Pearson v. Williams
Filing
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MEMORANDUM re Amended Complaint 49 filed by Antonio Pearson (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 9/26/17. (ma)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTONIO PEARSON,
Plaintiff
v.
THOMAS WILLIAMS, et al.,
Defendants
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No. 1:13-CV-1988
(Judge Caldwell)
MEMORANDUM
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff Antonio Pearson, a state inmate, filed this action concerning
the loss of his single-cell status in retaliation for his filing of institutional grievances
against prison staff. He proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. On our own motion,
the case is before us due to Pearson’s failure to cooperate with discovery,
noncompliance with a court order, and his failure to advise the court of his present
location.
For the reasons that follow, Pearson’s action will be dismissed with
prejudice.
II.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that an action may be
involuntarily dismissed “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these
rules or a court order.” “The power to dismiss for failure to prosecute . . . rests in
the discretion of the trial court and is part of its inherent authority to prevent undue
delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in its docket.”
Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Link v. Wabash Railroad
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 – 30, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1389, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)). However,
“dismissal for failure to prosecute ‘must be a sanction of last, not first resort.’”
Roberts v. Ferman, 826 F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Knoll v. City of
Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, “where a plaintiff’s
actions amount to the willful refusal to prosecute or blatant failure to comply with a
district court order, dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate.” Roberts, 826
F.3d at 123 (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit has mandated that courts apply the following factors
to evaluate whether dismissal for failure to prosecute is warranted:
(1) to the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2)
the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to
meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a
history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the
party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the
effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which
entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). Not every
factor needs to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted, Mindek v.
Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992), and “no single Poulis factor is
dispositive.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). Instead,
the decision must be made in the context of the district court’s extended contact with
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the litigant. A careful assessment of the Poulis factors in this case weighs heavily in
favor of dismissing this action with prejudice.
III.
Background
The pro se plaintiff, Antonio Pearson, is a state inmate formerly
confined at the state correctional institution in Coal Township, Pennsylvania.1 On
July 17, 2013, Pearson filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
claiming that in 2011 Unit Manager Thomas Williams revoked his single-cell status,
Z Code, in retaliation for his filing of grievances against prison staff. (ECF NO. 1,
Compl.) Defendant Williams filed a motion to dismiss on January 29, 2014. (ECF
No. 18). Following the Court’s resolution of the motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 41 and
42), we granted Pearson leave to file an amended complaint.
Pearson filed an amended complaint on September 23, 2015. (ECF
No. 49). On November 12, 2015, we set the close of discovery for May 10, 2016,
and called for the filing of pretrial motions by June 10, 2016. (ECF No. 57). On April
4, 2016, Defendant Williams filed a motion to compel Pearson’s answers to
interrogatories and request for production of documents. (ECF No. 60). Defendant
Williams noted that Plaintiff was properly served with these discovery requests on
February 10, 2016, and that Plaintiff has failed to respond. (Id.) Defendant
contends he cannot properly prepare a dispositive motion or prepare for trial in this
matter without Plaintiff’s cooperation in discovery. (Id.) Defendant attached to his
1 Pearson is presently housed at SCI-Pine Grove, in Indiana, Pennsylvania.
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motion a copy of the disputed discovery requests and the corresponding certificates
of service. (ECF No. 60-2). Pearson did not file a brief in opposition to Defendant’s
motion to compel.
On May 2, 2016, we issued an order directing Pearson to respond to
the outstanding discovery. (ECF No. 62). Plaintiff was cautioned that should he fail
to comply with our order he must show cause why his case should not be dismissed
as a sanction for his noncompliance with our order. (ECF No. 63). On May 13,
2016, Pearson filed a motion to stay our May 2, 2016, order, asserting that he never
received Defendant’s discovery requests or his motion to compel. (ECF No. 64).
On May 16, 2016, we directed the Clerk of Court to serve Pearson with a copy of
Defendant’s motion to compel and supporting brief. He was further directed to file a
copy of his certificate of service of his discovery responses with the court. He was
advised that his failure to comply with our order may result in the dismissal of his
action for noncompliance with a court order. (ECF No. 65).
To date, we have neither received a copy of Pearson’s certificate of
service nor received any further communication from Plaintiff. Further, Pearson has
not advised the Court of his change of address. The last known address on the
docket reflects Pearson’s incarceration at SCI-Greene. According to the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ Inmate Locator, Pearson is now housed at
SCI-Pine Grove.
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IV.
Discussion
1.
The Party’s Personal Responsibility
Under Poulis, we initially assess “the extent of the party’s
personal responsibility.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. Here, Pearson, an
experienced pro se litigator, has failed to comply with two court orders. First,
he has not provided us with a copy of the certificate of service demonstrating
his fulfilment of his discovery obligations. He also has failed to keep the court
advised of his current address. 2 It is not our obligation to locate parties, even
pro se parties. Finally, he has failed to communicate at all with the court as to
why he has not followed through on our mandates. As Pearson is proceeding
pro se the delays in this case are entirely attributable to him. For these
reasons, the first Poulis factor, the party’s personal responsibility, weighs in
favor of dismissal.
2.
Prejudice to the Defendant
Next, we consider “the prejudice to the adversary caused by the
failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery.” Poulis, 747 F.2d
at 868 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff has failed to respond to discovery
concerning events that occurred in 2011. Defendant is prejudiced by
2 The court’s standard practice order, mailed to Pearson on July 23, 2013, advised
Pearson of his affirmative obligation to keep the court informed of his current address. (ECF
No. 3, p. 4). It also advised Pearson that if the court is unable to communicate with him
because he failed to notify the court of his address, the plaintiff “will be deemed to have
abandoned the lawsuit.” (Id.) The court has not received any correspondence from
Pearson since May 2016.
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Pearson’s failure in responding to discovery as the lapse in time can cause
witnesses’ memories to fade and impedes his ability to prepare a summary
judgment motion, and ultimately, for trial.
Prejudice does not require a showing of “irremediable harm” to
the Defendant, but rather a burden that impedes a party’s ability to prepare
effectively for trial. Ware, 322 F.3d at 222. As stated above, Pearson has
failed to advise the Court whether he has properly responded to Defendant’s
discovery request and has not communicated with the court since May 16,
2016. His actions have created an unnecessary stalemate in the
advancement of this action and prevent Defendant from being able to conduct
discovery or prepare for trial. Accordingly, we find that the second Poulis
factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
3.
History of Dilatoriness
“Extensive repeated delays or delinquency constitutes a history
of dilatoriness such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or
consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams v. Trs. of N.J.
Brewery Emps.’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994); see
also McCollum v. Eagle Sec. Agency, No. 97-6712, 1999 WL 727433, at *4
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1999) (maintaining that a plaintiff's lack of communication
with a court is indicative of dilatory behavior). Courts have held that a “history
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of dilatoriness weighs toward, but does not mandate, dismissal.” Adams, 29
F.3d at 875.
Pearson was cautioned twice about his failure to comply with
our orders concerning his responses to Defendant’s discovery. He has an
obligation to prosecute his case, respond to our orders, and provide the Clerk
of Court with his current address. His failure to fulfill any of these obligations,
or otherwise communicate with the court for the past sixteen months,
demonstrates Pearson’s apparent abandonment of his claim. Such conduct
weighs in favor of dismissal.
4.
Willfulness or Bad Faith Conduct
The fourth factor to be considered is the willfulness, or bad faith, of the
conduct at issue. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. Under this factor, we must
consider whether the conduct was “the type of willful or contumacious
behavior which was characterized as flagrant bad faith.” Adams, 29 F.3d at
875 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, “[w]illfulness
involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Id. If the conduct is merely
negligent or inadvertent, we will not call the conduct “contumacious.” Briscoe
v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 262 (3d Cir. 2008).
Here, the facts are insufficient to support a conclusion that Pearson’s
failure to file the required certificate of service has been willful or in bad faith.
However, as Plaintiff is not a first-time pro se litigator, he is well aware of his
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continuing obligation to provide the court with a current address to facilitate
communication with the court, including issues concerning the advancement
of his case. For these reasons, we find that this factor weighs in favor of
dismissal.
5.
Alternative Sanctions
The fifth Poulis factor is “the effectiveness of sanctions other
than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions.” Poulis,
747 F.2d at 868; Adams, 29 F.3d at 876 (“Before dismissing a case with
prejudice, a district court should consider alternative sanctions.”). Generally,
sanctions less than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant, such as
[Plaintiff], is proceeding pro se.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App’s 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2011).
Here, Pearson’s status as a pro se litigant prevents us from
sanctioning him or using alternative sanctions to advance this litigation. This
factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
6.
Merits of Pearson’s Claim
“A claim … will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of
the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff….”
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 87. Pearson alleges that the Defendant retaliated against
him for filing prison grievances by revoking his single- cell status, or Z Code.
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While on its face, Pearson’s Amended Complaint appears to state a
claim, because no discovery has taken place (at least none that the court is
aware of), we are not in a position to determine the merits of Pearson’s claim.
we find the merits of the claim neutral with regard to dismissal.
V.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, the court concludes that the Poulis
factors weigh in favor of dismissal.
We will issue an appropriate order.
/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge
Date: September 26, 2017
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