Getzes v. Mackereth

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM (Order to follow as separate docket entry) re. MOTION to Combine Preliminary Injunction Hearing with a Trial on the Merits 12 and MOTION for Preliminary Injunction 6 Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 10/30/13. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM GETZES, by his mother and
next friend, Alice Getzes,
Plaintiff
v.

BEVERLY MACKERETH, in her official
capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania,
Defendant

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CIVIL NO. 1:13-CV-2067

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
This matter is before the court on the motion for preliminary injunction (Doc.

6) filed by Plaintiff William Getzes. Defendant Beverly Mackereth, in her official capacity
as the Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (“DPW”), opposes the motion. DPW also filed its own motion (Doc. 12)
alternatively requesting that the court consolidate any preliminary injunction hearing with
the trial on the merits of this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2).
For the reasons that follow, the court will grant DPW’s motion, advance the
trial on the merits, and consolidate it with the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction. Accordingly, the court will defer ruling on Plaintiff’s motion until after this joint
proceeding is conducted.
II.

Background
Plaintiff–a disabled individual participating in the DPW-administered

Medical Assistance program that provides medical care to needy individuals–initiated this
action following DPW’s refusal to authorize his claim for reimbursement of expenses
associated with the installation of fixed dental bridges, a type of permanent dental
restoration used to replace missing teeth. In his complaint (Doc. 1) filed on August 2,
2013, Plaintiff contends that DPW’s refusal to authorize payment: (1) violates his right to
medically necessary dental care pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (“Medicaid Act”); and (2) constitutes a failure to reasonably
accommodate his disabling cerebral palsy and seizure disorder, in violation of Title II of
the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794.
As relief for these alleged harms, Plaintiff requests that the Court “[e]nter
an injunction requiring [DPW] to provide for Plaintiff’s fixed dental bridges through the
Medical Assistance program.” (Doc. 1 at 9-10). Plaintiff also seeks costs, fees, and a
declaration from the court stating that DPW’s conduct violates the ADA, RA, and
Medicaid Act. (Id.).
On September 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for preliminary
injunction (Doc. 6) requesting that the court: (1) enjoin DPW from denying payment for
Plaintiff’s fixed dental bridges; and (2) provide the declaratory relief sought in Plaintiff’s
complaint. In essence, Plaintiff requests that the court enter an injunction at this
preliminary stage that would provide the same relief (except costs and fees) Plaintiff
believes he is entitled to following a trial on the merits.

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October 7, 2013, DPW responded by filing a motion to dismiss (Doc. 14)
challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, a motion (Doc.
12) requesting that the court consolidate any preliminary injunction hearing with the trial
on the merits pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). The court denied
DPW’s motion to dismiss by memorandum (Doc. 20) filed on October 28, 2013. In its
remaining motion, DPW argues that advancing the trial on the merits is appropriate since
DPW would have no recourse should it ultimately prevail at trial after the court awarded
the “preliminary” relief Plaintiff now seeks.
III.

Discussion
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that is not granted as a

matter of right. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). “The
purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues
on their merits.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Because the
scope and procedural posture of a hearing for a preliminary injunction differs from a trial
on the merits, “it is generally inappropriate for a federal court at the preliminary-injunction
stage to give a final judgment on the merits.” Id. at 157 (quoting University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1991)).
In appropriate circumstances, however, Rule 65(a)(2) provides a district
court with the option of advancing the trial on the merits and consolidating it with a
preliminary injunction hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) (stating in pertinent part that
“[b]efore or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary
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injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and
consolidated with the hearing”). Prior to consolidating, however, a district court should
give the parties “clear and unambiguous notice” of its intent to do so. Anderson, 125 F.3d
at 157.
In the case sub judice, the court concludes that advancing the trial on the
merits and consolidating it with the preliminary injunction hearing is the appropriate
course of conduct. Here, the “preliminary” relief Plaintiff seeks is the same which he
hopes to ultimately obtain following a trial on the merits–an injunction ordering DPW to
authorize payment for the fixed dental bridges, as well a declaration that DPW’s conduct
violated Plaintiff’s federally protected rights. Moreover, given the permanent nature of
fixed dental work and Plaintiff’s acknowledged indigence and inability to provide any
meaningful security (Doc. 18 at 13-14), DPW would be left without a remedy if it
prevailed on the merits at trial after the court had already granted the preliminary relief
Plaintiff now seeks. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) (“The court may issue a preliminary
injunction . . . only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers
proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been
wrongfully enjoined . . . .”).
Accordingly, the court will advance the trial on the merits in this matter and
consolidate it with the preliminary injunction hearing pursuant to Rule 65(b)(2).

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V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant DPW’s motion (Doc. 12) requesting

that the trial on the merits be advanced and consolidated with the preliminary injunction
hearing. We will defer ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 6) until
such consolidated hearing can be conducted. We will issue an appropriate order.

/s/William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

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