Hill v. Chair, Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM re dfts' MOTION TO DISMISS 17 (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 08/14/14. (ma)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONNA HILL,

:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
CHAIR, PENNSYLVANIA BOARD
:
OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, et al., :
:
Defendants
:

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-13-02581
(Judge Rambo)

MEMORANDUM
On March 3, 2014, Plaintiff Donna Hill, the spouse of an inmate currently
incarcerated by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, filed a pro se amended
complaint in this civil rights action commenced pursuant to the provisions of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 12.) In the amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief
based on the allegation that the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole does not
consider parole for inmates serving a life sentence. Plaintiff also filed a pendant state
law claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress for alienation of
affection.
Presently before the court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. (Doc. 17.) For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be
granted.

I.

Background
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff provides the following factual background

with respect to her claim. For purposes of disposition of the instant motion to dismiss,
the factual allegations asserted in the amended complaint will be accepted as true and
viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.
A.

Facts

Plaintiff is a United States citizen and a resident of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. (Doc. 12.) Her husband, Dwayne Hill, is currently a Pennsylvania
inmate serving a life sentence. (Id.) In the amended complaint, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief based on the allegation that the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole (“PA Board”) does not consider the propriety of parole for inmates serving
sentences of life imprisonment. (See id.) Specifically, Plaintiff requests that the court
direct Defendants to provide Plaintiff’s husband with a parole hearing. (Id.) In
addition, Plaintiff seeks monetary relief on a pendant state law claim, alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress for alienation of affection. (Id.)
B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff initially filed a complaint on October 16, 2013. (Doc. 1.) By order
dated November 22, 2013, the court directed service of the complaint on all

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Defendants named therein. (Doc. 6.) On January 31, 2014, Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss (Doc. 10) and filed a brief in support on February 14, 2014 (Doc. 11). On
March 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Doc. 12), which was accepted
by the court on April 24, 2014, causing the court to deem the motion to dismiss as
moot (Doc. 15). On June 4, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint and supporting brief. (Docs. 17 & 18.) After being granted an extension of
time (see Doc. 20), Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on July 2, 2014 (Doc. 21).
Thus, the motion to dismiss the amended complaint is now ripe for disposition.
II.

Standard of Review
Among other requirements, a sound complaint must set forth “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). This statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “Fair notice” in the
context of Rule 8(a)(2) “depends on the type of case – some complaints will require at
least some factual allegations to make out a showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation
omitted). “[A] situation may arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a
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complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of
claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Id. A plaintiff must provide more than
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” to show entitlement to relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (recognizing that Rule 8 pleading standard “does
not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”); accord, e.g., Baraka v. McGreevey,
481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that the court is not “compelled to accept
unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences or a legal conclusion couched as
a factual allegation.” (quotations and citations omitted)).
A defendant may challenge a complaint by a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is required to accept as true all of the factual
allegations in the complaint, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007), and all
reasonable inferences permitted by the factual allegations, Watson v. Abington Twp.,
478 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2007), and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007). If the facts alleged are
sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” such that the plaintiff’s
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claim is “plausible on its face,” a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 663 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570) (explaining a claim has “facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”); see also
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234; Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 2007);
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 66 (3d Cir. 2007). Further, when a complaint
contains well-pleaded factual allegations, “a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 664.
However, a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements
do not suffice.” Id.
“To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations
contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public
record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,
268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that
a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are
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based on the [attached] document[s].” Pension Benefit, 998 F.2d at 1196.
Additionally, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose
authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading,
may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v Higgins, 281 F.3d
383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Although a district court may not consider matters
extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the
complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment.”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in
making its decision. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250,
1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the
complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from
what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003); Youse v.
Carlucci, 867 F. Supp. 317, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Such a complaint “must be held to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson,551 U.S.
at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

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Finally, in the Third Circuit, a court must grant leave to amend before
dismissing a civil rights complaint that is merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Weston v.
Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 428 (3d Cir. 2001); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116
(3d Cir. 2000). “Dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on the grounds of
bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d
Cir. 2004).
III.

Discussion
In order to state a viable Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead two essential

elements: 1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under
color of state law, and 2) that said conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege,
or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant’s conduct must have a close causal
connection to the plaintiff’s injury in order for Section 1983 liability to attach.
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980).1 A prerequisite for a viable civil
rights claim is that a defendant directed, or knew of and acquiesced in, the deprivation

The Court in Martinez explained: “Although a § 1983 claim has been described as ‘a
species of tort liability,’ it is perfectly clear that not every injury in which a state official has played
some part is actionable under that statute.” Martinez, 444 U.S. at 285 (internal citation omitted).
1

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of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08
(3d Cir. 1988). On its face, § 1983 creates no exceptions to the liability it imposes,
nor does it speak of immunity for any individual who might deprive another of civil
rights. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993). Nevertheless, it is
well-settled that certain government officials possess immunity from § 1983 liability.
Id.
In the instant motion to dismiss, Defendants seek dismissal of the amended
complaint on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of
her husband; (2) an inmate sentenced to a term of incarceration for life by a
Pennsylvania court does not have a right to be reviewed for parole; and (3) the state
law claim is barred by sovereign immunity. Because the court concludes that Plaintiff
lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of her husband, it will not address
Defendants’ second ground for dismissal and will not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claim.
A.

Standing

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants contend that Plaintiff, who is not an
attorney but is acting pro se on her own behalf, does not have standing to pursue
claims on behalf of her husband. In support, Defendants rely on Hill v. Pennsylvania
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Department of Corrections, 521 F. App’x 39 (3d Cir. 2013), a decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that found this same Plaintiff lacked
standing to bring a federal lawsuit based on violations of her husband’s constitutional
right to adequate medical care. In affirming the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint based on lack of standing, the Third Circuit relied on well-settled
principles of standing, as follows:
The constitutional and prudential components of standing must be
satisfied before a litigant may seek redress in a federal court. Three
components comprise the “irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing”: an “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized and
actual or imminent; a causal connection between the injury and the
complained-of conduct; and a likely, not speculative, redressability of the
injury through a favorable decision. Prudential standing requires, inter
alia, that a litigant assert his or her own legal rights and not rely on the
rights or interests of third parties.
Hill, 521 F. App’x at 40 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is based on her allegation that
Pennsylvania inmates serving life sentences have a right to be considered for parole
by the PA Board. Although the facts of this case are different than those of Plaintiff’s
previous case considered by the Third Circuit, the same principles of standing
nevertheless apply to this case. Again, it is well-settled that “a person does not have
standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a third party.” James v. York Cnty.
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Police Dep’t, 160 F. App’x 126, 131 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 255 (1953)). Thus, Plaintiff’s amended complaint will be dismissed based
on Plaintiff’s lack of standing to assert claims on behalf of her husband or any other
inmate serving a life sentence.2 Furthermore, because Plaintiff lacks standing, it
would be futile to allow her to amend the complaint yet again. See Alston, 363 F.3d at
236.
B.

Supplemental Jurisdiction

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if, inter alia, “the district court has dismissed
all claims over which is has original jurisdiction . . . .” This decision concerning the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is left to the sound discretion of the district
court. See Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966)). In addition, when the
claim is dismissed by the district court prior to trial pursuant to a provision such as
Section 1367(c)(3), “the district court must decline to decide the pendant state claims
unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties
To the extent that Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of her husband, she has not
alleged or demonstrated that she has been appointed as his legal representative. Even if so, Plaintiff
still could not appear in federal court to allege the instant federal claims because she is not a lawyer.
Plaintiff’s husband would have to appear before the court either pro se or through counsel.
2

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provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Id. (citing Lovell Mfg. v. ExportImport Bank of the U.S., 843 F.2d 725, 732 (3d Cir. 1988); Growth Horizons, Inc. v.
Delaware Cnty., 983 F.2d 1277, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993)). The Third Circuit has also
noted that a district court should decline jurisdiction over such claims “where the
federal claims are no longer viable, absent extraordinary circumstances.” Shaffer v.
Board of Sch. Dirs. of Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir.
1984) (citing Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1982) (internal
quotations omitted)).
In the instant case, the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s pendant state law claim because her federal claim is not viable based
on her lack of standing. Without an associated federal claim, “[a] claim for alienation
of affections is a common law tort that by itself cannot be the basis for a federal
claim.” Hill, 521 F. App’x at 41 n.3. As a result, Plaintiff’s pendant state law claim
will be dismissed without prejudice to any right Plaintiff may have to pursue it in state
court. In so holding, the court expresses no opinion as to the merits of any such
claim.3

The court notes that the Third Circuit recognized that Pennsylvania has abolished
actions for alienation of affections. Hill, 521 F. App’x at 41 n.3 (citing 23 Pa. C.S. § 1901).
3

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IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion to dismiss (Doc. 17) will be granted

because Plaintiff lacks standing and the court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim. In addition, Plaintiff will not be permitted
to file a second amended complaint because doing so would be futile. An appropriate
order will issue.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: August 14, 2014.

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