Hagan v. Harris et al
Filing
104
MEMORANDUM ORDER re: 94 MOTION to Compel Discovery filed by Damont Hagan - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion is granted in part and denied in part as follows: 1. If the defendants have copies of the grievances and staff requests that the p laintiff is seeking in the plaintiffs fourth request for the production of documents (Doc. 95, Ex. Z-7), they shall provide copies to the plaintiff within 14 days from the date of this Order. 2. If the defendants are in possession of progress notes o r documents shared between Defendants Swisher and Marsh regarding the alleged decision to remove a medical diagnosis that had previously been assigned to Hagan (Doc. 95, Ex. Z-5), they shall provide copies to the plaintiff within 14 days from the dat e of this Order.3. To the extent Hagan seeks to review his medical file, the defendants haverepresented that they make it available to him, and that Hagan will be able to make copies of documents in that file at his own expense. To the extent Hagan wishes to conduct such a review, he shall notify defendants counsel who shall work with officials at SCI-Huntingdon to facilitate this review. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on May 18, 2015. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAMONT HAGAN,
Plaintiff
v.
QUENTIN DOLPHIN, et al.,
Defendants
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Civil No. 1:13-CV-2731
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff in this action, Damont Hagan, is an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), currently housed at the State
Correctional Institution at Huntingdon. He is also a frequent litigant in federal court.
In this case, Hagan has sued five individuals, all of whom are contracted with or
employed by the DOC, alleging that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to modify
his health diagnosis and discontinue his prescription medications in order to keep him
hidden from certain Department of Justice officials who were intending to tour the
facility and interview inmates as part of an investigation.1 Hagan also alleges that the
defendants took these actions to retaliate against him for filing grievances and other
1
The remaining defendants in this action include Quentin Dolphin, David
Swisher, James Harrington, Robert Marsh, and John Wetzel, the Secretary of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
litigation against prison staff. Additionally, Hagan alleges that the defendants
prolonged his detention in segregated housing, and exhibited deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The case now comes before the court, once again, for resolution of a discovery
dispute. Specifically, Hagan has filed a new motion to compel the defendants to
produce documents in response to his fourth, sixth and seventh request for the
production of documents, and to provide more fulsome answers to a second set of
interrogatories that Hagan propounded upon Secretary Wetzel.2
The document requests include those directed to Secretary Wetzel seeking
information related to an investigation allegedly conducted by the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) into the mental health challenges faced by inmates in
solitary confinement within Pennsylvania prisons; grievance documents and requests
Hagan made to staff; and information from Hagan’s medical file, including what he
describes as information relating to a decision to alter or remove a particular mental
health diagnosis that he had previously been assigned. With respect to the second set
of interrogatories directed to Secretary Wetzel, Hagan seeks records and information
relating to the establishment of the DOC’s Behavioral Management Unit and the
2
Hagan previously filed a motion to compel in this case (Doc. 66), which
the Court granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. 82.) He has another motion to
compel pending (Doc. 74), which will be addressed in a separate order.
2
development of policies relating to that unit. (Doc. 95, Exhibits.)
The defendants have responded to the motion, arguing that it should be denied
because the responses they have furnished Hagan comply fully with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure; because the information that Hagan seeks should be, in some
instances, already in his possession; because Hagan’s medical file has been made
available to him, and he has been informed that he is permitted to make copies of
documents contained within it provided that he pays for them; because some of the
information sought either does not exist and, if it did, it would be subject to privilege;
and because the information Hagan seeks is not relevant. The motion is fully briefed
and, for the reasons that briefly follow, will be granted in part and denied in part.
II.
DISCUSSION
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected
persons, a party may move for an order compelling
disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without
court action.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which now
provides that:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court
order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party's claim or defense--including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any
discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
26(b)(2)(C).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district.” DiGregorio v. First Rediscount
Corp., 506 F2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the scope of
discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the Court.
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a court’s
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decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel disclosure of
certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching
discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters.
In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly
broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See
Farmers & Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group
Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997). When a
magistrate judge’s decision involves discretionary
[discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly
becomes an abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 501,
502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge’s discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and
is reversible only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v.
Panasonic Commc’ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64
(D.N.J. 1996); see also Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous.
Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that
discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold,
Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that a
magistrate’s resolution of discovery disputes deserves
substantial deference and should be reversed only if there
is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
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discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance still cabin and restrict the court’s
discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information,” a concept which is defined
in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of providing the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D.
Kan. 2009).
Furthermore, in the prison setting, inmate requests for information that may
touch upon security procedures can raise security concerns, and implicate a legitimate
governmental privilege, a governmental privilege which acknowledges a
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governmental need to maintain confidentiality of certain data, but recognizes that
courts must balance the confidentiality of governmental files against the rights of a
civil rights litigant by considering:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental
processes by discouraging citizens from giving the
government information; (2) the impact upon persons who
have given information of having their identities disclosed;
(3) the degree to which governmental self-evaluation and
consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual
data or evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking
the discovery is an actual or potential defendant in any
criminal proceeding either pending or reasonably likely to
follow from the incident in question; (6) whether the police
investigation has been completed; (7) whether any
intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or
may arise from the investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff's
suit is non-frivolous and brought in good faith; (9) whether
the information sought is available through other discovery
or from other sources; and (10) the importance of the
information sought to the plaintiff's case.
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
With these legal considerations in mind, we turn to consideration of Hagan’s
discovery requests.
1.
Plaintiff’s Sixth Request for Production of Documents.
In Hagan’s sixth document request, which he directed to Secretary Wetzel, he
sought to be provide with documentation regarding the “specific diagnosis the
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Department of Justice was interested in regarding their expanded investigation into
serious mentally ill inmates in solitary confinement.” (Doc. 95, Ex. Z-2.) Wetzel
objected to this request, noting that the information was more properly sought from
the Department of Justice. Furthermore, Wetzel objected to producing any documents
because all correspondence between the DOJ and the DOC would have taken place
through counsel, and therefore Wetzel argued that all of the information sought would
be cloaked in attorney-client privilege.
We have some difficulty accepting a blanket assertion that correspondence
between counsel of the DOJ and DOC would be subject to a legitimate assertion of the
attorney-client privilege for the simple reason that the defendants have represented
that any communication was not, in fact, between an attorney and a client, but rather
between counsel for two government agencies. But it is unimportant to examine this
issue, because we find that Secretary Wetzel has articulated a reasonable and
compelling reason for declining to produce the information sought: due to its sensitive
nature, the DOC does not disclose to inmates detailed information regarding
investigations that may be conducted into its prisons’ conditions, including
information relevant to security and housing of inmates.
Hagan does not appear to appreciate the DOC’s plainly relevant security
concerns about sharing sensitive information such as state and federal investigative
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information with inmates, but even more than that he has not persuaded the Court that
the sensitive information he seeks is particularly relevant or especially important to
his case, considerations that Frankenhauser teaches should be taken into consideration.
Furthermore, we believe that the third and fourth factors identified in Frankenhauser
– the degree to which governmental self-evaluation and consequent program
improvement will be chilled by disclosure, and whether the information sought is
factual data or evaluative summary – militate against compelling wholesale disclosure
of this information.
2.
Plaintiff’s Fourth Request for Production of Documents.
In a document request directed to Defendant Swisher, Hagan seeks grievance
documents, requests to staff members, progress notes from his medical files, treatment
plans from his medical files, “recommendations or miscellaneous documents” from
his medical files, and other documentation within his medical record. (Doc. 95, Ex.
Z-7.)
The defendants have objected to producing any of the grievances or request
forms on the grounds that Hagan should have copies of them, since the forms are in
carbon-copy, with one copy to be kept by the inmate. Defendants argue that it would
be a “waste of resources” to compel them to produce documents that Hagan could
have maintained, but apparently did not. (Doc. 97, at 4.) While we appreciate that
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Hagan has doubtless been provided copies of these records previously, we do not
agree that this is a sufficient basis to withhold responsive documents, and find that any
incidental burden to the defendants is sufficiently minimal to justify requiring the
defendants to provide Hagan with copies of grievances and other requests that may
be within their possession that are responsive to his requests. This aspect of Hagan’s
motion will be granted, and the defendants will be required to provide Hagan with a
further response along with any responsive grievances or staff requests that are in their
possession.
With respect to the plaintiff’s request for medical documentation, the
defendants have represented that they have consistently told Hagan that he is able to
view his medical and mental health records at a time convenient to the records
department at SCI-Huntingdon, and at that time to make any copies of documents
maintained in those files at his own expense consistent with DOC policy. The
plaintiff has responded by arguing that documents have been removed from his files,
or by suggesting that his medical files are somehow incomplete. The plaintiff’s
argument in this regard is not an adequate response to what the defendants have
offered. To the extent the plaintiff has evidence to show that the defendants
improperly disposed of his personal medical information, or that they have withheld
evidence, he may file a motion seeking appropriate relief. However, at this time we
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find no basis to compel the defendants to do anything other than what they have
offered to do, namely, make the plaintiff’s medical files available to him for
inspection and copying, if he desires. This aspect of the motion will therefore be
denied.
3.
Plaintiff’s Seventh Request for Production of Documents.
The plaintiff’s seventh request for production of documents was directed to
Defendants Swisher and Marsh, and sought progress notes between these defendants
regarding the decision to remove a medical diagnosis that had previously been
assigned to Hagan. (Doc. 95, Ex. Z-5.)
The defendants have objected to this request on the grounds that the plaintiff
has not provided insufficient detail to identify this particular document being sought,
despite the fact that the plaintiff has provided a month and year during which he
believes the document was created and filed. More fundamentally, the defendants
have again represented that the plaintiff may inspect his medical records and make
copies of any documents that he deems necessary for this litigation. The defendants
also suggest that the plaintiff simply misapprehends the way in which inmates are
diagnosed, which the defendants represent is a matter committed exclusively to a
psychiatrist.
To the extent that defendants have within their possession one or more
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documents that are responsive to the plaintiff’s request, and to the extent there is no
legitimate basis for withholding this information, the defendants should produce the
documents, and the Court expects that the defendants will do so.
Moreover, the
plaintiff has been provided the opportunity to examine his medical records, and he
should feel free to take advantage of that opportunity and to make copies of
documents he believes may be relevant to this litigation. However, we understand the
defendants to be representing to Hagan and to the Court that they do not have the
documents that Hagan claims exist; if this is the case, we have no basis or ability to
compel a further response since one other immutable rule defines the court’s
discretion when ruling on motions to compel discovery. It is clear that the court cannot
compel the production of things that do not exist. Nor can the court compel the
creation of evidence by parties who attest that they do not possess the materials sought
by an adversary in litigation. See, e.g., AFSCME District Council 47 Health and
Welfare Fund v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 08-5904, 2010 WL
5186088 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2010); Knauss v. Shannon, No. 08-1698, 2009 WL 975251
(M.D.Pa. April 9, 2009).
4.
Plaintiff’s Second Set of Interrogatories.
The plaintiff directed his second set of interrogatories to Secretary Wetzel, and
in the pending motion seeks to compel further response to the questions posed, which
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seem to concern the DOC’s development of a Behavioral Management Unit or
“BMU”. (Doc. 95, Ex. Z-2.) Hagan seemed to be inquiring into his own eligibility
for placement into the BMU, the reasons for any potential placement there, and
information regarding the BMU program itself. (Id.)
Upon review of the interrogatories, the Court is unable to discern how the
questions Hagan asks of Wetzel are relevant to the claims in this case, which
concerned Hagan’s housing elsewhere within the DOC, and not within the BMU.
Thus, we do not find any basis to compel further answers to interrogatories about a
housing unit that is simply not relevant to Hagan’s claims in this lawsuit.
In reviewing the defendants’ objections to the interrogatories, we are also
constrained to find that the objections are well-placed. As the defendants rightly
observe, Hagan refers Wetzel to correspondence he allegedly sent, but Hagan does not
attach copies of that correspondence for Wetzel’s (or the Court’s) review, making
Hagan’s requests seem presumptuous and inadequately supported. In other areas,
Hagan presumes that Wetzel had conversations with others, and then asks about these
conversations, but there is no evidence that such conversations actually occurred.
Furthermore, the defendants once again noted that the plaintiff has access to his
medical and mental health records, which does appear to be an appropriate locus of
inquiry for the plaintiff’s questions regarding his mental health. Finally, to the extent
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the plaintiff is seeking additional answers to questions posed about a housing unit that
is not relevant to the claims in this case, we find no basis for such discovery and the
motion will be denied.
III.
ORDER
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, upon consideration of the
plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 94), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion
is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
1.
If the defendants have copies of the grievances and staff requests that the
plaintiff is seeking in the plaintiff’s fourth request for the production of
documents (Doc. 95, Ex. Z-7), they shall provide copies to the plaintiff
within 14 days from the date of this Order.
2.
If the defendants are in possession of progress notes or documents shared
between Defendants Swisher and Marsh regarding the alleged decision
to remove a medical diagnosis that had previously been assigned to
Hagan (Doc. 95, Ex. Z-5), they shall provide copies to the plaintiff
within 14 days from the date of this Order.
3.
To the extent Hagan seeks to review his medical file, the defendants have
represented that they make it available to him, and that Hagan will be
able to make copies of documents in that file at his own expense. To the
extent Hagan wishes to conduct such a review, he shall notify
defendants’ counsel who shall work with officials at SCI-Huntingdon to
facilitate this review.
In all other respects, the motion to compel is DENIED.
So ordered this 18th day of May, 2015.
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/S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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