Hagan v. Harris et al
Filing
110
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 74 MOTION to Compel filed by Damont Hagan. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on June 1, 2015. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAMONT HAGAN,
Plaintiff
v.
QUENTIN DOLPHIN, et al.,
Defendants
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Civil No. 1:13-CV-2731
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I.
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff in this action, Damont Hagan, is an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), currently housed at the State
Correctional Institution at Frackville, who has sued individuals for matters relating
to his prior incarceration at SCI Smithfield. He is also a frequent litigant in federal
court. In this case, Hagan is suing four individuals, all of whom are contracted with
or employed by the DOC, alleging that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to
modify his health diagnosis and discontinue his prescription medications in order to
keep him hidden from certain Department of Justice officials who were intending to
tour the facility and interview inmates as part of an investigation.1 Hagan also alleges
The remaining defendants in this action include Quentin Dolphin, David
Swisher, Robert Marsh, and John Wetzel, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections.
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that the defendants took these actions to retaliate against him for filing grievances and
other litigation against prison staff. Additionally, Hagan alleges that the defendants
prolonged his detention in segregated housing, and exhibited deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The case now comes before the court for resolution of a discovery dispute.
Specifically, Hagan has filed a motion to compel defendants Marsh and Swisher to
further reply to interrogatories. (Doc. 74.) These interrogatories sought information,
inter alia, regarding whether these defendants were aware that Hagan had filed
grievances against them, and whether the defendants concurred in a decision to deny
Hagan psycho-tropic medications.
The defendants have responded to the motion, arguing that it should be denied
because the responses they have furnished Hagan comply fully with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure; because the information that Hagan seeks should be, in some
instances, already in his possession; and because Hagan’s medical file has been made
available to him.
The motion is fully briefed and, therefore, is ripe for resolution. For the
reasons that briefly follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
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II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standards of Review
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.
(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected
persons, a party may move for an order compelling
disclosure or discovery. The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without
court action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which now
provides that:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court
order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party's claim or defense--including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons who know of any
discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter
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involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
26(b)(2)(c).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district.” DiGregorio v. First Rediscount
Corp., 506 F2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the scope of
discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the Court.
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a court’s
decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel disclosure of
certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching
discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters.
In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly
broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See
Farmers & Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group
Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J. 1997). When a
magistrate judge’s decision involves discretionary
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[discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly
becomes an abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D. Pa. 2004)
(citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 501,
502 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge’s discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and
is reversible only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v.
Panasonic Commc’ns and Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64
(D.N.J. 1996); see also Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous.
Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding
that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of
discretion standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v.
Mr. Gold, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding that a magistrate’s resolution of discovery
disputes deserves substantial deference and should be
reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance still cabin and restrict the court’s
discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information,” a concept which is defined
in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”
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A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of providing the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 261 F.R.D. 570, 573 (D.
Kan. 2009).
With these legal considerations in mind, we turn to consideration of Hagan’s
discovery requests.
B.
Hagan’s Motion to Compel Will be Granted, in Part, and Denied, in
Part
At the outset, Hagan filed a series of interrogatories asking defendants Marsh
and Swisher to state when, and if, they were aware that Hagan had filed grievances
against them. (Swisher interrogatory 10; Marsh interrogatory 7.) Hagan argues that
this information is relevant to his retaliation claims against the defendants, since
Hagan’s theory of prosecution is that the defendants retaliated against him because
he had previously lodged grievances against them.
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Given, Hagan’s proffer of relevance, we believe that the plaintiff is entitled to
a further response to these interrogatories. It is well-settled that retaliation claims can
be based upon alleged retaliation against an inmate due to his filing of grievances
against prison officials. However, in this context it is essential that the plaintiff show
that the defendants knew of the grievance at the time they took the allegedly
retaliatory actions, and the “failure to allege [or show] that [defendants] had any
knowledge of those grievances is fatal to [these] claims.” Ray v. Rogers, No.
2:12CV985, 2014 WL 1235905, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2014). Since knowledge
of the inmate’s grievance by prison official defendants is an essential element of a
retaliation claim in this factual context, Hagan is entitled to discovery aimed at
learning when, and if, the defendants knew of his prior grievances against them. The
motion to compel further responses to these interrogatories will be granted.
In addition, Hagan’s complaint alleges that the medical defendants, Dr.
Dolphin along with defendants Marsh and Swisher, wrongfully denied Hagan his
psycho- tropic medications and improperly altered his mental health diagnosis.
Hagan has now posed a series of interrogatories to defendants Marsh and Swisher
which, in essence, ask these defendants if they concurred in the decision to remove
Hagan from these medications and alter his diagnosis. (Swisher interrogatory 8 and
9; Marsh interrogatory 4.) Given the issues framed by Hagan in this lawsuit, these
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interrogatories also, in our judgment, are relevant to the claims and issues in this
litigation. While we appreciate that this information could have been sought through
a request for admission, recognizing that Hagan is proceeding pro se we do not find
the form of this inquiry as an interrogatory to be a sufficient ground for denying these
requests for discovery, and we will order the defendants to provide a more fulsome
responses to these interrogatories.2
Further, Hagan has asked defendant Swisher to identify what treatment he
provided to the plaintiff between July and October 2013. (Swisher interrogatory 8.)
The defendant has objected to this interrogatory, noting that Hagan has already been
provided copies of his treatment records. While we regard this response as generally
sufficient, out of an abundance of caution we will direct the defendant to supplement
this response by verifying that the records described all treatment provided to Hagan,
or by providing a further description of any additional treatment provided to the
plaintiff.
In addition, Hagan seeks to compel further responses by both defendants
Swisher and Marsh regarding a statement which Hagan attributes to defendant Marsh
Such a response may, of course, consist of a statement acknowledging
concurrence in Dr. Dolphin’s actions; a statement noting that the defendant
opposed these actions; an explanation that the defendant’s concurrence was
neither sought nor necessary; or any other factually complete response to these
queries.
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in August 2013, a statement in which Marsh allegedly described Hagan as a
“Behavioral Management Unit type.” (Swisher interrogatory 9; Marsh interrogatories
5 and 6.) The defendants have objected to these interrogatories, because they
apparently reject, and object to the factual premise that defendant Marsh ever made
this statement. We regard this objection as generally well founded, and will deny the
motion to compel, with one narrow exception. Liberally construed, we believe that
Hagan’s discovery demands propounded upon defendant Marsh call upon defendant
Marsh to confirm whether he recalls making any such statement to Hagan. We
believe that Hagan is entitled to a response to this narrow inquiry.
Finally, Hagan asks defendant Swisher a series of interrogatories which, in
essence, ask him to further explain a written response to a grievance which he
previously provided to the plaintiff. (Swisher interrogatories, 11, 12 and 13.)
Because we agree with defendant Swisher that this document speaks for itself, we
will deny Hagan’s discovery requests which seek to require the defendant to
recharacterize these prior grievance responses.
An appropriate order follows:
III.
ORDER
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, upon consideration of the
plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 74.), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the
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motion is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
1.
With respect to Swisher interrogatory 10 and Marsh interrogatory 7 the
defendants shall supplement their responses by stating when, and if, they
were aware that Hagan had filed grievances against them.
2.
The defendants shall also further respond to Swisher interrogatory 8 and
9, and Marsh interrogatory 4 which, in essence, ask these defendants if
they concurred in the decision to remove Hagan from these medications
or alter the plaintiff’s mental health diagnosis.
3.
Defendant Swisher shall supplement his response to Swisher
interrogatory 8 which asks him to identify what treatment he provided
to the plaintiff between July and October by verifying that the medical
records provided to Hagan described all treatment provided to Hagan,
or by providing a further description of any additional treatment
provided to the plaintiff.
4.
With respect to Marsh interrogatories 5 and 6, which seeks to compel
further responses regarding a statement which Hagan attributes to
defendant Marsh in August 2013, a statement in which Marsh allegedly
described Hagan as a “Behavioral Management Unit type”defendant
Marsh shall confirm whether he recalls making any such statement to
Hagan.
In all other respects, the motion to compel is DENIED.
So ordered this 1st day of June, 2015.
/S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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