Hagan v. Harris et al
Filing
42
MEMORANDUM ORRDER - IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The plaintiffs request for leave to file a second amended complaint is GRANTED. 2. The defendants motions to dismiss the first amended complaint (Docs. 20, 22) are DENIED as moot, without prejudice t o their right to file renewed motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. 3. The defendants motion to strike the second amended complaint (Doc. 30) is DENIED. 4. The plaintiffs motion to moot Defendant Dolphins pending motion to dismiss the seco nd amended complaint (Doc. 33) is DENIED. 5. The plaintiff shall file a brief in response to Defendant Dolphins motion to dismiss the second amended complaint within 14 days of receiving a copy of this order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on August 21, 2014. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAMONT HAGAN,
:
:
Plaintiff
:
:
v.
:
:
JOHN WETZEL, U/K MARSH,
:
JAMES HARRINGTON, DAVID :
SWISHER, QUENTIN DOLPHIN, :
:
Defendants
:
Civil No. 1:13-CV-02731
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff in this action is Damont Hagan, an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections currently housed at the State Correctional
Institution at Huntingdon. Hagan initiated this action on November 7, 2013. Upon
direction from the court, Hagan filed an amended complaint on December 26, 2013,
naming the above-captioned five defendants, all of whom are employed by the
Department of Corrections. (Doc. 9.) In response, the defendants moved to dismiss
the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 20, 22.) After the parties filed briefs in
support of and opposition to these motions, Hagan filed a second amended complaint
(Doc. 28), which was accompanied by a document labeled “Notice” (id., attach.),
which we have liberally construed as a motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint. In response, Defendant Dolphin has moved to dismiss the second amended
complaint, (Doc. 29), and the remaining defendants have moved to have the latest
complaint stricken as improperly filed, (Doc. 30).
In essence, Hagan’s claims articulated in each of the three complaints filed to
date can be simply stated: he has alleged that the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections s and four psychiatrists or psychologists employed by the Department of
Corrections retaliated against him for his repeated exercise of protected First
Amendment activity by withholding mental health treatment and needed medications
that had been prescribed to Hagan to treat an array of mental illnesses from which he
suffered, including a psychotic disorder. Hagan claims that the decision to withhold
treatment and medication was intended as retaliation, and also to prevent Hagan from
speaking with or being interviewed by officials with the United States Department of
Justice, who were investigating allegations regarding mistreatment of Pennsylvania
inmates suffering from mental illness, and the effects of long-term segregation in
solitary confinement.1
Hagan also contends that the decision to withhold his
1
Hagan avers that he has been held in solitary confinement for seven and
one-half years, and that he has been outspoken in his criticism of the conditions of
his confinement and the treatment of inmates with mental illness, including by
filing grievances, lawsuits, and communicating with outside advocacy groups.
2
medication and treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he claims that he suffered
from a variety of mental-health related ailments as a result, and that he attempted
suicide and engaged in other forms of self-harm during this time.
This action was reassigned to the undersigned on August 12, 2014, after the
parties consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge preside over the matter.
(Doc. 41.) Upon consideration of the motions that have been filed in this case to date,
and the state of the pleadings, we liberally construe Hagan’s “Notice” as seeking leave
of court to file a second amended complaint, and that motion will be granted.
Accordingly, the defendants’ motions to dismiss previous iterations of the complaint
and to strike the second amended complaint will be denied as moot.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Rule 15(a) - The Legal Standard
In response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss which had been filed in
response to Hagan’s first amended complaint, Hagan took the protective step of filing
a second amended complaint, accompanied by a “Notice”. In this notice, Hagan
represents that he has “attached a second amended complaint in the event that this
court finds any of [the] claims insufficient, and request that this Honorable Court files
the second amended complaint if it if finds any of plaintiff’s claims so . . . .” (Doc.
3
28, Second Am. Compl., Attach.) We construe the “Notice” liberally to be a motion
for leave to file a second amended complaint.
Rule 15(a) provides that a party may only amend a pleading once as a matter
of course within 21 days after serving it, or if the pleading is one to which a
responsive pleading is required, within 21 days after service of a responsive pleading,
or service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15(a). In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent, or with leave of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The rules
provide that courts should freely grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Id.
Accordingly, Hagan requires leave of court to file the second amended complaint, as
he has previously amended the original complaint once as a matter of right.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a liberal approach to granting
leave to amend pleadings, observing that leave should be granted freely in order to
ensure that a particular claim is decided on “the merits rather than on technicalities.”
Dole v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1990). Nevertheless, a district
court retains discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a party’s request to
amend its pleading, Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000, and may deny
a motion for leave to amend if the plaintiff’s delay in seeking amendment is undue,
motivated by bad faith, prejudicial to the opposing party, or where amendment would
4
be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The Third Circuit has instructed that “undue prejudice is ‘the touchstone for the
denial of leave to amend.’” Heyl & Patterson Intern., Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing of
Virgin Islands, Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Cornell and Company,
Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d
Cir. 1978)) (further citations omitted); see also Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196,
204 (3d Cir. 2006). In order to show undue prejudice, the party opposing a motion to
amend bears the burden of showing that it will be “unfairly disadvantaged or deprived
of the opportunity to present facts of evidence” unless leave to amend is denied.
Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1989). The issue of prejudice
requires a court to examine the hardship to the objecting defendant if amendment were
permitted. See Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). In such cases,
the Third Circuit has considered whether allowing an amendment would result in
additional discovery, cost, and preparation in order to defend against new facts or new
legal theories. Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir.
2001). Compare Adams, 739 F.2d at 869 (no prejudice because no new facts or
additional discovery required) with Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155
F.3d 644, 655 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding that duration of case and substantial effort and
expense in resolving underlying motion to dismiss could constitute delay or prejudice)
5
and Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 573 F.2d
820, 823-24 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding significant prejudice because proposed
amendment would have changed the legal and factual basis of the claim, and would
have prevented the defendant from presenting a defense).
In the absence of undue prejudice, “denial must be grounded in bad faith or
dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained delay, repeated failure to cure deficiency
by amendments previously allowed or futility of amendment.” Heyl & Patterson
Intern., Inc. v. F.D. Rich Housing of Virgin Islands, Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir.
1981) ((citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). Delay alone is not sufficient to justify denial
of leave to amend. See Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d at 204. However, “at some
point, the delay will become ‘undue,’ placing an unwarranted burden on the court, or
will become ‘prejudicial,’ placing an unfair burden on the opposing party.” Cureton
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)). In this regard, “[d]elay may
be come undue when a movant has had previous opportunities to amend a complaint.”
Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273 (citing Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir.
1993) (three year lapse between filing of complaint and proposed amendment was
unreasonable delay where the plaintiff had numerous earlier opportunities to amend);
see also Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654-55 (3d Cir.
6
1998) (denying proposed second amended complaint where the plaintiffs were
repleading facts that could have been pled earlier).
With these factors in mind, Hagan’s request for leave to file a second amended
complaint will be granted, as we find that doing so will help to ensure that the claims
brought in this case are addressed on their merits, because we do not find that the
defendants will suffer any undue prejudice by permitting the amended pleading, and
because we do not find that Hagan has been dilatory or otherwise acted in bad faith
in filing the amended complaint.
B.
The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint
and to Strike the Second Amended Complaint are Moot
Ordinarily, an amended complaint will displace the current pleading, effectively
invalidating the extant complaint. See Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co.
(In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.), 226 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A]n
amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect”);
see also 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (“A pleading that has been amended . . . supersedes
the pleading it modifies. . . . Once an amended pleading is interposed, the original
pleading no longer performs any function in the case. . . .”). Since the complaint in
this case will be amended, the first amended complaint is now a nullity, and the
defendants’ pending motion to dismiss challenging the legal sufficiency of that
7
pleading is now moot. Accordingly, we will deny the pending motions to dismiss as
moot, but without prejudice to the defendants renewing their motions to dismiss as to
the second amended complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Local Rules of this Court governing the briefing of motions. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); LR 7.5-7.8.
Likewise, the pending motion to strike the second amended complaint for
failing to comply with the requirements prescribed by Rule 15(a) (Doc. 30) will also
be denied, in light of our ruling allowing that pleading to be filed. Similarly, Hagan’s
“Motion to Moot Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as the Motion is Premature,” (Doc.
33), which appears to challenge Defendant Dolphin’s motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint (Doc. 29) will be denied, since that motion now stands as a legal
challenge to the sufficiency of the second amended complaint, and the operative
pleading, in this case. The plaintiff shall be required to respond to Defendant
Dolphin’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint within 14 days from the
date he receives a copy of this order.
8
III.
ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.
The plaintiff’s request for leave to file a second amended complaint is
GRANTED.
2.
The defendants’ motions to dismiss the first amended complaint (Docs.
20, 22) are DENIED as moot, without prejudice to their right to file
renewed motions to dismiss the second amended complaint.
3.
The defendants’ motion to strike the second amended complaint (Doc.
30) is DENIED.
4.
The plaintiff’s “motion to moot” Defendant Dolphin’s pending motion
to dismiss the second amended complaint (Doc. 33) is DENIED.
5.
The plaintiff shall file a brief in response to Defendant Dolphin’s motion
to dismiss the second amended complaint within 14 days of receiving a
copy of this order.
/s/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: August 21, 2014
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?