Hagan v. Harris et al
Filing
82
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 66 MOTION to Compel filed by Damont Hagan. The plaintiffs motion to compel, is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part, as follows: On or before April 17, 2015, we direct the defendants to provide to the court fo r its in camera inspection all disputed documents, including records contained among Hagans medical records which allegedly describes Hagan as a security risk due to his focus on litigation. Armed with this information the court can determine: (1) wh ether this information is relevant to the issues raised in this case; (2) whether it is subject to any valid claim of privilege recognized by the Federal Rules; and (3) to what extent, in what format, and under what conditions it may be released to theplaintiff. Signed by Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson on April 1, 2015. (kjn)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAMONT HAGAN,
Plaintiff
v.
QUENTIN DOLPHIN, et al.,
Defendants
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Civil No. 1:13-CV-2731
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.
Statement of Facts and of the Case
The plaintiff in this action, Damont Hagan, is an inmate in the custody of the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, (DOC) currently housed at the State
Correctional Institution at Huntingdon. He is also a frequent litigant in federal court.
In this case, Hagan has sued five individuals, all of whom are contracted with or
employed by the DOC, alleging that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to
modify his health diagnosis and discontinue his prescription medications in order to
keep him hidden from certain Department of Justice officials who were intending to
tour the facility and interview inmates as part of an investigation. Hagan also alleges
that the defendants took these actions to retaliate against him for filing grievances and
other litigation against prison staff. Additionally, Hagan alleges that the defendants
prolonged his detention in segregated housing, and exhibited deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
This case now comes before the court for resolution of a discovery dispute.
Specifically, Hagan has filed a motion to compel which seeks access to what he
describes as documents contained among his medical records which allegedly identify
Hagan as a security risk due to his focus on litigation. (Doc. 66.) The defendants
have responded by arguing that the disclosure of these documents would entail
release of information pertaining to sensitive security matters, and that Hagan has not
shown that the documents sought are relevant. (Doc. 71.) This motion is now fully
briefed by the parties. (Docs. 67, 71, and 78.) Upon consideration of the motion to
compel, the motion will be denied, in part, and granted, in part, as follows: The
defendant will be directed to produce for in camera inspection any previously nondisclosed medical and related reports described by Hagan, so the court may assess
their relevance and any claims of privilege relating to these documents.
II.
Discussion
Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant discovery
dispute. At the outset, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs
motions to compel discovery, and provides that:
(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery
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(1) In General. On notice to other parties and all affected persons, a
party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery. . . .
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
The scope of what type of discovery may be compelled under Rule 37 is
defined, in turn, by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which now
provides that:
(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope
of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense-including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 26(b)(1).
Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which
discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court’s discretion and
judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are
“committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” DiGregorio v. First
Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the
scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the
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Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus,
a court’s decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel
disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse
of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983).
This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on
discovery matters. In this regard:
District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad
discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l
Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585
(D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a
discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , “courts in this district have
determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an
abuse of discretion standard.” Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224
F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States,
943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate
judge's discovery ruling “is entitled to great deference and is reversible
only for abuse of discretion.” Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and
Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); see also Hasbrouck v.
BankAmerica Hous. Servs., 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999)
(holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion
standard rather than de novo standard); EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc., 223
F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's
resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and
should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).
Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).
This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. Thus, at the
outset, it is clear that Rule 26's broad definition of that which can be obtained through
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discovery reaches only “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense.” Therefore, valid claims of relevance and privilege still cabin and restrict
the court’s discretion in ruling on discovery issues. Furthermore, the scope of
discovery permitted by Rule 26 embraces all “relevant information” a concept which
is defined in the following terms: “Relevant information need not be admissible at
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.”
A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving the
relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 203
F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D.Pa. 2001). Once that initial burden is met, “the party resisting
the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that
the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as
defined under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the
potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in
favor of broad disclosure.” In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation, 261 F.R.D. 570, 573
(D.Kan. 2009).
Furthermore, in a prison setting, inmate requests for information relating to
security procedures can raise security concerns, and implicate a legitimate
governmental privilege, a governmental privilege which acknowledges a
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governmental needs to confidentiality of certain data but recognizes that courts must
balance the confidentiality of governmental files against the rights of a civil rights
litigant by considering:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by
discouraging citizens from giving the government information; (2) the
impact upon persons who have given information of having their
identities disclosed; (3) the degree to which governmental selfevaluation and consequent program improvement will be chilled by
disclosure; (4) whether the information sought is factual data or
evaluative summary; (5) whether the party seeking the discovery is an
actual or potential defendant in any criminal proceeding either pending
or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question; (6) whether
the police investigation has been completed; (7) whether any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the
investigation; (8) whether the plaintiff’s suit is non-frivolous and
brought in good faith; (9) whether the information sought is available
through other discovery or from other sources; and (10) the importance
of the information sought to the plaintiffs case.
Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
With these legal guideposts in mind, we turn to consideration of Hagan’s
discovery requests.
In this case, it appears that the contested records relate to assessments of the
security risks presented by Hagan as a result of his focus on litigation activities.
Without knowing the content of these documents it is difficult to assess their
relevance to the claims in this lawsuit. We note, however, that similar claims for an
inmate’s psychological records have been made, and accommodated, by the courts
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and correctional officials in the past. For example, in Mincy v. Chmielewski, No. 05292, 2006 WL 3042968 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 25, 2006), this court faced a similar request,
which the court resolved in terms that are equally applicable here. As the court
observed in that case:
Plaintiff also seeks the release of psychological records. Defendants
oppose general disclosure of these documents for a number of reasons
. . .point[ing] out that the value of mental health records lies in the
candid nature of the information.. Disclosure compromises honest
opinions and frank evaluations and could potentially subject staff and
treating professionals to retribution, thereby inhibiting candid
observations from these individuals. Also of concern is that disclosure
could reveal the “methods and manner used to monitor inmate behavior”
which may lead to inaccurate assessments, improper institutional
placement, and premature release.
Despite these valid objections, defendants have agreed to release certain
medical and mental health information pertinent to plaintiff's admission
to the psychiatric observation cell during his hunger strike in late
November and early December 2004, provided plaintiff agrees to
execute a confidentiality agreement. (Doc. 93, p. 9). Given that this is
the only time period relevant to the complaint, the court finds that
defendants' proposal is reasonable. Defendants will be required to
release the pertinent mental health records, provided the precondition of
execution of a confidentiality agreement is met.
Mincy 2006 WL 3042968, 2 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 25, 2006)(internal citations omitted).
Thus, the release of a prisoner’s psychological records to that inmate, subject to
temporal limits and the execution of appropriate releases and confidentiality
agreements, has been a practice that has been endorsed by the courts in the past.
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The defendants raise some more heightened security concerns, however,
alleging that this information may be sensitive from an institutional security
perspective. These concerns may not be addressed in an informed fashion in the
abstract. Therefore, we will decline to authorize wholesale disclosure of these
documents on the grounds that such disclosure may gravely impair institutional
security, see e.g., Banks v. Beard, 3:CV-10-1480, 2013 WL 3773837 (M.D. Pa. July
17, 2013); Mearin v. Folino, CIV.A. 11-571, 2012 WL 4378184 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24,
2012), but, consistent with prior case law and acting out of an abundance of caution,
we will direct a narrowly tailored in camera review of these records. See, Victor v.
Lawler, 3:08-CV-1374, 2011 WL 1884616 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2011) reconsideration
denied, 3:08-CV-1374, 2011 WL 3664741 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2011) and on
reconsideration, 3:08-CV-1374, 2011 WL 4753527 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2011).
Specifically, the defendants shall provide to the court, for its in camera inspection,
the investigative documents in their possession regarding this incident that have not
been released to the plaintiff so the court may determine whether these records, on
their face, contain evidence relevant to Hagan’s claims in this litigation.
AND NOW, this 1st day of April, 2015, the plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc.
66.), is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part, as follows:
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On or before April 17, 2015, we direct the defendants to provide to the court
for its in camera inspection all disputed documents, including records contained
among Hagan’s medical records which allegedly describes Hagan as a security risk
due to his focus on litigation. Armed with this information the court can determine:
(1) whether this information is relevant to the issues raised in this case; (2) whether
it is subject to any valid claim of privilege recognized by the Federal Rules; and (3)
to what extent, in what format, and under what conditions it may be released to the
plaintiff.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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