Parks v. Jordan
Filing
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MEMORANDUM re MOTION to Reopen Case 16 filed by Darrell Parks (Order to follow as separate docket entry)Signed by Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo on 6/20/16. (ma)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DARRELL PARKS,
Petitioner
v.
A. JORDAN,
Respondent
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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-13-2912
(Judge Rambo)
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is a motion to reopen these habeas proceedings under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), filed by Petitioner Darrell Parks. (Doc.
16.) In the motion, Petitioner requests that the court reopen his habeas action
because of newly discovered evidence and “for any other reason that justifies
relief.” (Id. at 1.) For the reasons that follow, the motion to reopen will be denied.
I.
Background
Petitioner is a federal inmate formerly incarcerated at the United States
Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP-Lewisburg”). In his habeas
petition, filed on December 3, 2013, Petitioner alleged that his constitutional rights
were violated in the context of a disciplinary proceeding. (Doc. 1.) In addition,
Petitioner claimed that he faced a potential denial of parole as a “collateral
consequence” of prison officials’ failure to follow the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”)
policies and procedures with respect to his disciplinary hearing. (Id.) He also
claimed that he was denied his right to privacy when his misconduct was
discussed in the presence of staff and other inmates. (Id.) As relief, he requested
that his incident report be expunged and injunctive relief. (Id.)
On February 7, 2014, the court denied Petitioner’s habeas petition on the
merits based on the fact that he had received all due process during his
disciplinary proceedings and, as such, his “collateral consequences” claim failed.
(Doc. 8.) Petitioner appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. (See Doc. 10.) On September 10, 2014, the Third Circuit
entered a Judgment affirming this court’s denial of the habeas petition, but for
different reasoning. See Parks v. Jordan, No. 14-1403 (3d Cir. 2014) (Doc. 15-1).
Specifically, the Third Circuit held that, rather than the petition be denied on the
merits, this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims and,
thus, the merits of those claims should not have been considered. Id. at 4-5 (Doc.
15-1 at 4-5).
On May 16, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant motion to reopen this case
under Rule 60(b). (Doc. 16.) Petitioner requests that the court reopen these
habeas proceedings based on newly discovered evidence and “for any other reason
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that justifies relief.” (Id.) Respondent has filed a brief in opposition, (Doc. 18),
and the motion is now ripe for disposition.
II.
Discussion
“Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request
reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud,
mistake, and newly discovered evidence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528
(2005). The Rule provides, in pertinent part:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been
reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3), no more than a year after the
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entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). A “movant seeking relief under Rule
60(b)(6) [must] show ‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a
final judgment.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. “It is available where the party
seeking relief demonstrates that ‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’ hardship will result
absent such relief.” Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2011)
(citing United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). The movant bears
a heavy burden of proof that extraordinary circumstances are present. Bohus v.
Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991). Further, the decision to grant or deny
relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) lies in the sound discretion of the trial court guided
by accepted legal principles applied in light of all relevant circumstances. Ross v.
Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 648 (3d Cir. 1981).
In the instant motion, Petitioner argues that his case should be reopened to
prevent a “manifest injustice” where the court previously misconstrued his
constitutional claims as a challenge only to his disciplinary proceedings without
also including his retaliation and freedom of speech claims. (See Doc. 17 at 3.) In
addition, Petitioner seemingly alleges that “newly discovered evidence” exists in
the form of a November 9, 2015 United States Parole Commission Notice of
Action that denied him parole based, in part, on three disciplinary infractions he
received while incarcerated. (Id.; Doc. 16-1, Notice of Action.) One of those
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disciplinary infractions was the subject of the instant habeas petition. (See Doc.
16-2, Pet.’s Aff.)
In the brief in opposition to the instant motion to reopen, Respondent argues
that Petitioner’s motion is untimely. (Doc. 18 at 4.) In addition, Respondent
contends that reopening this case would be futile since the court lacks jurisdiction
over Petitioner’s claims, (id. at 5), and that Petitioner has not demonstrated any
other basis for relief, (id. at 5-7). Because the court agrees that the motion to
reopen is not only untimely, but also that the court would lack jurisdiction over
Petitioner’s habeas claims should the motion be granted, the motion to reopen will
be denied.
A.
Timeliness of Rule 60(b) Motion
As stated above, a “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time - and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the
entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c). “What constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ depends on the circumstances of each
case” and “which Rule 60(b) clause a claimant is trying to avail.” In re Diet
Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 383 F. App’x 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2010). “A court
considers many factors, including finality, the reason for delay, the practical
ability for the litigant to learn of the grounds relied upon earlier, and potential
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prejudice to other parties.” Id. “A motion under Rule 60(b)(6) filed more than a
year after final judgment is generally untimely unless ‘extraordinary
circumstances’ excuse the party’s failure to proceed sooner.” Gordon v. Monoson,
239 F. App’x 710, 713 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, Petitioner states that his motion to reopen is brought, in part, based on
newly discovered evidence in the form of the Parole Commission’s 2015 Notice of
Action. (Doc. 17 at 3.) In order to properly move to reopen pursuant to Rule
60(b)(2), the “newly discovered evidence” would have to be “evidence of facts in
existence at the time of [Petitioner’s] original filing of which he was excusably
ignorant.” Lusick v. Lawrence, 439 F. App’x 97, 99 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing United
States v. 27.93 Acres of Land, 924 F.2d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 1991)). Obviously,
Petitioner could not have been aware of the 2015 Notice of Action at the time of
his original action.1 Nevertheless, it is clear that Petitioner failed to seek relief
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Even if the court were to consider the Parole Commission’s 2015 Notice of Action as
“newly discovered evidence,” that evidence does not serve as any basis for relief in this case.
Specifically, the Parole Commission denied parole for Petitioner because “there is a reasonable
probability that you would not obey the law if released and your release would endanger the
public safety.” (Doc. 16-1 at 2.) The Commission based this decision on the fact that Petitioner
had received three disciplinary infractions since the date of his last parole review. (Id.) Only one
of those infractions is at issue here. Thus, as the Third Circuit pointed out in its decision
affirming the court’s judgment in this case, “even if [Petitioner] is successful at expunging the
disciplinary infraction at issue, parole is not a certainty; there are other factors which could affect
his chances for parole, including other disciplinary infractions.” See Parks, No. 14-1403, at 5
(Doc. 15-1 at 5). The 2015 Notice of Action ultimately does not support Petitioner’s contention
that he has been denied parole as a consequence of the sole disciplinary infraction at issue here.
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within one year of this court’s February 7, 2014 judgment. Again, a Rule 60(b)
motion based on newly discovered evidence must be brought within one (1) year
of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). “An appeal does not toll
this time period.” Lusick, 439 F. App’x at 99 (quoting Moolenaar v. Gov’t of V.I.,
822 F.2d 1342, 1346 n.5 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Further, to the extent that Petitioner brings his motion under Rule 60(b)(6),
which has a less stringent time limit, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), nothing in the
motion can be construed as an allegation of “extraordinary circumstances” that
would otherwise justify reopening this case. Specifically, Petitioner’s argument
that the court should have construed his habeas petition attacking the disciplinary
hearing as a civil rights complaint does not constitute “extraordinary
circumstances.” Not only is this argument not based on any legal authority, but
the original petition itself belies his contention here, as it specifically states a
challenge to the due process received at his disciplinary proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 69.) Further, as the Third Circuit stated in its decision on appeal, dismissal of the
habeas petition should be without prejudice to Petitioner’s ability to pursue his
claims in a civil rights action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Parks, 14-1403, at 5 (Doc. 15-1 at 5). As it appears that
Petitioner may be now barred from bringing civil rights claims by the applicable
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statute of limitations, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524 (applicable statute of
limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for personal injury is two years); see also
Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1087 n.3 (3d
Cir. 1988) (noting that the same statute of limitations applies to both Bivens and §
1983 claims), the instant motion to reopen these habeas proceedings cannot now
be the means by which Petitioner raises those claims.
Petitioner’s motion to reopen brought two years after this court denied his
habeas petition, under either grounds, is untimely.
B.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As set forth above, on September 10, 2014, the Third Circuit affirmed this
court’s denial of the instant habeas petition, but did so using different reasoning.
See Parks, No. 14-1403 (Doc. 15-1). Specifically, the Third Circuit held that,
rather than the petition be denied on the merits, this court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims because: (1) he did not lose any good time
credits during the disciplinary proceedings at issue, and (2) his due process claims
relating to his chances at parole were insufficient because they did not directly
affect the duration of his confinement. Id. at 4-5 (Doc. 15-1 at 4-5). In light of the
Third Circuit’s decision, even if the court would grant Petitioner’s motion to
reopen this case, it would not have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims presented
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in his habeas petition. Thus, it would be futile to grant the instant motion to
reopen.
III.
Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, the motion to reopen will be denied. An
appropriate order will issue.
s/Sylvia H. Rambo
United States District Judge
Dated: June 20, 2016.
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