Simpson v. Warden

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM re Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Peter Simpson 1 (Order to follow as separate docket entry) Signed by Honorable William W. Caldwell on 05/08/14. (ma)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PETER SIMPSON,
Petitioner
vs.
WARDEN, FCI ALLENWOOD,
MEDIUM,
Respondent

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CIVIL NO. 1:CV-14-0711
(Judge Caldwell)

MEMORANDUM
I.

Introduction
The pro se petitioner, Peter Simpson, a prisoner confined at the Allenwood

Medium Federal Correctional Institution, in White Deer, Pennsylvania, brings this petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Simpson challenges his eleven-count indictment in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of West Virginia on eleven narcotics violations. (Doc. 1,
Pet.) He claims the indictment is unconstitutionally vague as it charges him with various
crimes involving cocaine, which is later referred to as crack. He notes that since “cocaine
is not crack . . . the indictment does not track the language of the intended charge by the
government.” (Id.)
Upon review of his filings, we conclude Simpson has failed to show that a
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention. His § 2241 petition will therefore be summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (West Supp.).1

II.

Background
On March 9, 1995, Simpson was indicted in the Northern District of West

Virginia for various narcotic violations. See Doc. 1, Pet., ECF pp. 4-14.2 Simpson was
charged with conspiracy to possess with the intent to deliver “cocaine, also known as
‘crack’” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); aiding and abetting in the
maintenance of “place for the purpose of distributing and using a controlled substance,
namely cocaine, also known as ‘crack,’” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(b)(Count Two);
interstate transportation in aid of a business enterprise “involving cocaine, also known as
‘crack,’” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(Count Three); aiding and abetting interstate
transportation in aid of a business enterprise involving “involving cocaine, also known as
‘crack,’” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) and 2 (Counts Six, Eight, Ten and Eleven);
and the distribution “of cocaine, also known as ‘crack,’” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1)(Counts Four, Five, Seven and Nine). (Id.)
On March 6, 1996, following a jury trial, Simpson was found guilty on all
eleven counts. On September 4, 1996, Simpson was sentenced to fifty years’
imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. See United States v. Simpson,120

1

Under Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254 (West Supp.), the rules governing petitions under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 can be applied to section 2241 petitions. Rule 4 of the section 2254
rules permits summary dismissals.
2

On this background, the court takes judicial notice of the docket sheet in United
States v. Simpson, No. 1:95-CR-0005 (N.D. W.Va.), available through the federal court’s
online Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) at http://www.pacer.gov/.

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F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 1997)(table).
On November 30, 1998, Simpson filed his first motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. The motion was denied on January
28, 1999. On July 27, 1999, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a certificate of
appealability and dismissed the appeal. Simpson filed his second motion pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2255 on September 11, 2000, asserting counsel was ineffective for failing to
object and to move the court to require the Government to prove the type and quantity of
drugs. He also raised a claim pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490,
120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 425 (2000).3 On March 31, 2003, the district court
denied the motion as a successive petition that was filed without first obtaining the
permission of the Fourth Circuit. On February 15, 2005, the Fourth Circuit denied
Simpson authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.
On July 21, 2008, Simpson filed a motion for retroactive application of the
sentencing guidelines for crack cocaine offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. On October 19,
2009, Simpson’s original sentence was reduced from 600 months’ incarceration to 365
months’ incarceration. In February 2012, Simpson filed a second motion requesting a
reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) which was denied by the district
court. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. See United States v.
Simpson, 474 F. App’x 245 (4th Cir. 2012)(nonprecedential).
In the pending § 2241 petition, Simpson alleges that his indictment was

3

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct.
at 2362-63.

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unconstitutionally vague as it referred to cocaine as crack in each count, but “cocaine is
not crack” and therefore he “cannot be held legally responsible for crack cocaine, and thus
factually and legally innocent of such offenses.” (Doc. 1, ECF p. 2).

III.

Discussion
“A motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the means to

collaterally challenge a federal conviction or sentence,” Massey v. United States, 581 F.3d
172, 174 (3d Cir. 2009), and the motion must be presented to the sentencing court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (providing that a defendant “may move the court which imposed the
sentence”).
A defendant may invoke section 2241, but only when he shows under
section 2255's “safety valve” provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), that the remedy under section
2255 would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e). “A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner
demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a § 2255
proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his wrongful detention
claim.” Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002). “Section
2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not grant
relief, the one-year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the

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stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended § 2255.” Id. at 539.4 Rather, the
“safety valve” under section 2255 is extremely narrow and has been held to apply only in
unusual situations, such as those in which a prisoner has had no prior opportunity to
challenge his conviction for conduct later deemed to be non-criminal by an intervening
change in law. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing In re
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997)). If a defendant improperly challenges his
federal conviction or sentence under section 2241, the petition must be dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971); Hill v.
Williamson, 223 F. App'x 179, 180 (3d Cir. 2007)(nonprecedential).
Applying the foregoing principles here, the court finds that Simpson is clearly
challenging the conviction and sentence he received in the Northern District of West
Virginia. As such, the challenge should be brought pursuant to § 2255 rather than § 2241.
Simpson asserts that he has met the stringent standards of the “savings clause” because
of his “inability to bring [his present] claim in a successive § 2255" petition. (Doc. 1, ECF
p. 2). However, the issue presented in his § 2241 petition could have been raised in his
earlier § 2255 motion. To the extent he was unsuccessful in raising this claim via a
successive § 2255 petition, without first seeking leave of the Fourth Circuit, does not
4

Section 2255's “gatekeeping” provision, section 2255(h), prohibits a second or
successive 2255 motion unless the following requirements are met:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would
have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.

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demonstrate that a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his
claim. Likewise, the fact that the Fourth Circuit denied Simpson permission to file a
second or successive § 2255 motion does not demonstrate § 2255 is inadequate or
ineffective. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120-21. Merely because Simpson was
unsuccessful, or failed to raise all claims available to him at the time he filed his first §
2255 motion, does not render the remedy ineffective or inadequate so that he can pursue
his claims in a § 2241 petition. The remedy afforded under § 2241 is not an additional,
alternative, or supplemental remedy to § 2255. Consequently, the court will dismiss
Simpson’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction.
An appropriate order follows.

/s/ William W. Caldwell
William W. Caldwell
United States District Judge

Date: May 8, 2014

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